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GENTOO LINUX SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT 200303-28 |
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|
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PACKAGE : krb5 & mit-krb5 |
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SUMMARY : multiple vulnerabilities fixed |
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DATE : 2003-03-31 10:01 UTC |
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EXPLOIT : remote |
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VERSIONS AFFECTED : krb5: <1.2.7-r2 mit-krb5: <1.2.7 |
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FIXED VERSION : krb5: >=1.2.7-r2 mit-krb5: >=1.2.7 |
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CVE : CAN-2003-0139 CAN-2003-0138 CAN-2003-0082 |
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CAN-2003-0072 CAN-2003-0028 |
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|
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|
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- From advisory: |
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"An attacker who has successfully authenticated to the Kerberos |
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administration daemon (kadmind) may be able to crash kadmind or induce |
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it to leak sensitive information, such as secret keys. For the attack |
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to succeed, it is believed that the configuration of the kadmind |
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installation must allow it to successfully allocate more than INT_MAX |
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bytes of memory." |
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|
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Read the full advisory at |
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http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2003-003-xdr.txt |
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|
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- From advisory: |
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"A cryptographic weakness in version 4 of the Kerberos protocol allows |
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an attacker to use a chosen-plaintext attack to impersonate any |
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principal in a realm. Additional cryptographic weaknesses in the krb4 |
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implementation included in the MIT krb5 distribution permit the use of |
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cut-and-paste attacks to fabricate krb4 tickets for unauthorized |
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client principals if triple-DES keys are used to key krb4 services. |
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These attacks can subvert a site's entire Kerberos authentication |
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infrastructure." |
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|
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Read the full advisory at |
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http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2003-004-krb4.txt |
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|
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- From advisory: |
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"Buffer overrun and underrun problems exist in Kerberos principal name |
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handling in unusual cases, such as names with zero components, names |
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with one empty component, or host-based service principal names with |
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no host name component." |
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|
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Read the full advisory at |
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http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2003-005-buf.txt |
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|
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SOLUTION |
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|
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It is recommended that all Gentoo Linux users who are running |
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app-crypt/krb5 and/or app-crypt/mit-krb5 upgrade to krb5-1.2.7-r2 and/or |
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mit-krb5-1.2.7 as follows: |
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|
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emerge sync |
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emerge krb5 |
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and/or |
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emerge mit-krb5 |
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emerge clean |
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|
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aliz@g.o - GnuPG key is available at http://cvs.gentoo.org/~aliz |
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