Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Dirkjan Ochtman <djc@g.o>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Git braindump: 1 of N: merging & git signing
Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 15:03:26
Message-Id: CAKmKYaB7xj4TCZZ1PDLYq1hONzo8rQTNq8mVR2anLiHA8KpHmA@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] Git braindump: 1 of N: merging & git signing by Rich Freeman
On Mon, Jun 4, 2012 at 4:48 PM, Rich Freeman <rich0@g.o> wrote:
> When I do a cvs commit, I don't check the logs to make sure the last > 25 commits all look valid.  So, why would I expect others to do any > differently in git.  I make my changes, I run a git pull (bringing in > the hacked commit on gentoo-x86 master), and then merge/rebase in my > changes, signing my commit (which indicates that what _I_ just > commited is good, not that everything before is good).  I am not the > one commiting in hacked files - they were there before I got there.
If the tree was bad before you pushed, then it's not your fault the tree is bad. You're only responsible for the commits you bring into the tree, so if you're merging contributor's unsigned changesets, you merge them with a signature of your own.
>> Of course, we'd have to make sure the tip of whatever is pushed is >> always signed, but the hook for that should be trivial. > > Yup, but the hacker wouldn't run the hook.
If the hacker has unfettered access to the server where the repository lives, we probably have bigger problems, as they can get whatever rsynced to all our users. I guess we could have rsync process check that the cset it's about to push out to mirrors is signed? Cheers, Dirkjan

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] Git braindump: 1 of N: merging & git signing Rich Freeman <rich0@g.o>