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On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 7:09 PM, Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: |
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> Your thoughts? |
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This seems pretty hasty. |
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First of all, SHA-256 should be safe for all intents and purposes, and |
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for the foreseeable future. This is nothing like Git's usage of SHA-1, |
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which was known to be on the way to brokenville for a long time. I |
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don't think there is a solid reason for deprecating it now. |
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Second, the amount of diversity proposed does not make sense. If |
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asked, I would propose we keep SHA-256 as one of the options and |
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additionally add a SHA3 variant and a BLAKE2 variant as other options. |
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This would provide more than enough diversity. Also totally agreed |
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with Vadim on the obscurity of the GOST algorithms. |
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But, this is the kind of thing where we really should get input from |
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the Security project, so we should get people like Hanno and Kristian |
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involved. |
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Third, I don't much trust the security record of the python libraries |
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mentioned. cryptography is the best Python library for crypto by far, |
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and I think we should use it exclusively for anything Python doesn't |
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provide in the stdlib. The PyCrypto security record is not exactly |
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stellar IIRC, and since pycryptodome is a fork of it, I don't trust it |
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that much, either. |
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But mainly, please, I think we should leave the security-sensitive |
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decisions to people with more security expertise. |
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Cheers, |
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Dirkjan |
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