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On Friday 26 March 2004 23:47, Robin H. Johnson wrote: |
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> On Fri, Mar 26, 2004 at 10:58:43PM +0200, Sami N??t?nen wrote: |
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> > The master keys could be kept totally outside of the net too so |
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> > only way to compromise those is to get physical access. Simple |
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> > script that automatically generates a bunch of new keys when an USB |
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> > mem card is inserted is pretty easy to make. And because the |
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> > computer that would do this is in no danger to be exploited through |
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> > network it really doesn't need to be updated. And if one gets |
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> > physical access to the machine he/she can also get physical access |
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> > to the user so it doesn't matter. |
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> |
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> Nope, all I'd have to do is crack the machine that it gets inserted |
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> into, and leave a trojan behind that sits waiting for the mem card to |
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> be inserted. |
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To do what? |
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The master key will not be present there. |
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And if you don't provide those keys that are in the card the keys you |
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make with the trojaned machine can't be validated with the master |
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public key. |
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-- |
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