List Archive: gentoo-dev
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On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 8:18 AM, Luca Barbato <email@example.com> wrote:
> On 06/15/2012 06:57 AM, Chí-Thanh Christopher Nguyễn wrote:
>> If you have influence on UEFI secure boot spec, you could suggest that
>> they mandate a UI which lists all boot images known to the EFI boot
>> manager, and the user can easily whitelist both individual loaders and
>> the keys used to sign them.
> That would be a good compromise.
Agreed, though MS is likely to be sensitive about how this is done.
One of their requirements:
System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot / 14:
Mandatory. No in-line mechanism is provided whereby a user can bypass
Secure Boot failures and boot anyway Signature verification override
during boot when Secure Boot is enabled is not allowed. A physically
present user override is not permitted for UEFI images that fail
signature verification during boot. If a user wants to boot an image
that does not pass signature verification, they must explicitly
disable Secure Boot on the target system.
Sounds like they want to make getting around signature issues a fairly
technical exercise. This of course raises the barrier to loading
another OS, though to be fair the "Stuxnet wants to access your boot
sector - hit OK to allow or Cancel to not display the cute video your
friend sent you" options that are typical these days hasn't really
been very effective in keeping out malware.