Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Rich Freeman <rich0@g.o>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] UEFI secure boot and Gentoo
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 12:46:52
Message-Id: CAGfcS_=rybBHkeuAxF00GJkTVc8YkY1egg2OOBEG4S=MKLegrg@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] UEFI secure boot and Gentoo by Luca Barbato
1 On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 8:22 AM, Luca Barbato <lu_zero@g.o> wrote:
2 > If we want to try to get serious on 5, we could try to gather the
3 > hardened/security people across distributions and setup the whole chain
4 > to be parallel and cut deals with OEM to store this trust-chain keys
5 > along with MS.
6
7 Perhaps. Since we're only talking about the kernel really and that
8 doesn't vary as much across distros, we might even be able to get
9 momentum for it.
10
11 You could create a standard "secure kernel" - probably as a patch set
12 initially but perhaps merged into mainline with a config option that
13 turns on key verification for loading modules. Anybody could use that
14 to secure their own systems by using their own key in the
15 configuration. The central body could prepare and sign binaries for
16 individual distros. A distro would supply a kernel config file and
17 patch set and identifier for the upstream kernel to build against.
18 The central body would audit the patches and config for security,
19 build the kernel, and sign it, assessing a fee perhaps (likely cheap
20 for config-only, and expensive for extensive patches). The costs need
21 not be all that high - if you assume that vanilla linux with the
22 config option turned on is good enough then you only have to check
23 that the option is set, blacklist "bad" settings, and verify patches.
24 They could revoke certs when security issues are found, by keeping a
25 history of what configs/versions got signed.
26
27 Users could load the signing key of this body into their custom
28 settings, or OEMs could be persuaded to include it. The latter would
29 never be 100% effective unless a court ordered it.
30
31 Rich