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On Thursday 25 March 2004 21:03, Chris Bainbridge wrote: |
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> On Thursday 25 March 2004 19:44, Patrick Lauer wrote: |
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> > It is good that you, as well as many other Gentooists, are very aware of |
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> > security risks, but I think that this discussion is slowly slipping into |
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> > a paranoid worst-case analysis that says that we can't trust nobody. |
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> |
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> Yes we are losing sight of the point. |
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> |
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> A single rogue or compromised developer could destroy tens of thousands of |
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> systems. There is no security mechanism of gradual failure, and there are |
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> no plans to develop one. That is the point. |
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|
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I am very willing to consider and discuss multiple signing systems after we |
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have implemented single signing. However single signing wil require enough |
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effort to effectualize so I prefer to focus on it first and only later |
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implement security measures that offer better protection against rogue |
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developers. Especially since protecting against rogue developers (while a |
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worthwhile goal) will prove to be cumbersome. Really I would be very happy if |
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we had something in place next year which would protect against rogue |
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developers. |
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|
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Paul |
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|
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-- |
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Paul de Vrieze |
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Gentoo Developer |
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Mail: pauldv@g.o |
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Homepage: http://www.devrieze.net |
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