On Thursday 25 March 2004 18:33, Chris Gianelloni wrote:
> > Why? There are more gentoo developers than rsync servers. Their machines
> > do more than rsync servers. What reason is there to believe that a
> > compromise of an rsync server is more likely than compromise of a
> > developer machine?
> Well, all the rsync servers have at least ONE externally addressable and
> reachable service which could be exploited. Many developer machines are
> behind firewalls or have no listening services. It is *much* harder to
> compromise a machine which isn't facing the Internet than one that
> definitely is accessible.
Do you believe that this is the case for all developers? Even if it were,
there are many programs other than daemons that connect to the internet that
may contain exploitable code. Web browsers, email, irc, ftp, cvs, ssh,
usenet, p2p; developers use these programs often, and many exploits have been
found in client implementations in the past. Know that a developer checks out
cvs from some other project? Hack the server, and when his ip address
connects, send trojan code. Then there are physical attacks; is a developer
at your uni? Pick his door lock and install a hardware key logger.
All of these things might individually be less likely than a direct attack,
but together the possibility that one small security breach, for a single
developer, might occur is more than comparable to the possibility that the
rsync code, which has been extensively audited, might contain an external
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