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On Thursday 25 March 2004 18:33, Chris Gianelloni wrote: |
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> |
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> > Why? There are more gentoo developers than rsync servers. Their machines |
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> > do more than rsync servers. What reason is there to believe that a |
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> > compromise of an rsync server is more likely than compromise of a |
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> > developer machine? |
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> |
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> Well, all the rsync servers have at least ONE externally addressable and |
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> reachable service which could be exploited. Many developer machines are |
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> behind firewalls or have no listening services. It is *much* harder to |
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> compromise a machine which isn't facing the Internet than one that |
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> definitely is accessible. |
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Do you believe that this is the case for all developers? Even if it were, |
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there are many programs other than daemons that connect to the internet that |
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may contain exploitable code. Web browsers, email, irc, ftp, cvs, ssh, |
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usenet, p2p; developers use these programs often, and many exploits have been |
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found in client implementations in the past. Know that a developer checks out |
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cvs from some other project? Hack the server, and when his ip address |
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connects, send trojan code. Then there are physical attacks; is a developer |
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at your uni? Pick his door lock and install a hardware key logger. |
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All of these things might individually be less likely than a direct attack, |
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but together the possibility that one small security breach, for a single |
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developer, might occur is more than comparable to the possibility that the |
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rsync code, which has been extensively audited, might contain an external |
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exploit. |
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-- |
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