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Luca Barbato wrote: |
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> Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto wrote: |
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>> I have a few ideas about this that I'll have to put in writing and share |
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>> later, but let me start by proposing that for such a change we require |
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>> the support of at least 2/3 of the devs that vote *and* a minimum of 1/3 |
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>> of all devs. |
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> |
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> I'd use absolute majority even if it is more strict. |
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> |
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The only concern I have with these kinds of approaches is that right now |
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we tend to be pretty liberal with allowing people to be devs even if |
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they aren't heavily involved in gentoo. As long as their commits are of |
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sufficient quality that isn't a big deal. However, it does allow the |
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voting rolls to get pretty big with people that don't have a huge stake |
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in the outcome of an election. |
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|
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Organizations that tend to have supermajority policies tend to have |
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other kinds of requirements on dues or activity, and they also tend to |
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routinely clean out their rolls. A supermajority policy might work fine |
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if we also had a policy that a dev who fails to vote in two consecutive |
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elections gets the boot. I'm not sure that we really want that kind of |
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a policy, however. |
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|
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My feeling is that if you don't care enough to vote, you should have to |
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live with the consequences. Now, all elections of any kind should be |
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announced well in advance, and should span a period of a few weeks (as |
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they currently do). If an issue is particularly critical and nobody can |
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get around to voting for it in a 2 weeks span while there are hundreds |
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of arguments raging in IRC and the lists, then I'm not sure we can take |
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their silence as a vote of disapproval. |