Title: Manifest2 hash policies and security implications
Version: $Revision: 1.6 $
Last-Modified: $Date: 2010/01/31 09:55:43 $
Author: Robin Hugh Johnson <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Type: Standards Track
Created: October 2006
Updated: November 2007, June 2008, July 2008, October 2008, January 2010
Post-History: December 2009, January 2010
While Manifest2 format allows multiple hashes, the question of which
checksums should be present, why, and the security implications of such
have never been resolved. This GLEP covers all of these issues, and
makes recommendations as to how to handle checksums both now, and in
This GLEP is being written as part of the work on signing the Portage
tree, but is only tangentially related to the actual signing of
Manifests. Checksums present one possible weak point in the overall
security of the tree - and a comprehensive security plan is needed.
This GLEP is not mandatory for the tree-signing specification, but
instead aims to improve the security of the hashes used in Manifest2.
As such, it is also able to stand on it's own.
The bad news
First of all, I'd like to cover the bad news in checksum security.
A much discussed point, as been the simple question: What is the
security of multiple independent checksums on the same data?
The most common position (and indeed the one previously held by myself),
is that multiple checksums would be an increase in security, but we
could not provably quantify the amount of security this added.
The really bad news, is that this position is completely and utterly
wrong. Many of you will be aghast at this. There is extremely little
added security in multiple checksums as noted by Joux [J04]. For any set
of checksums, the actual strength lies in that of the strongest
Wang et al [W04] extended Joux's [J04] work on SHA-0 to cover MD4, MD5,
HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD families of hashes.
How fast can MD5 be broken?
For a general collision, not a pre-image attack, since the announcement
by Wang et al [W04], the time required to break MD5 has been massively
reduced. Originally at 1 hour on a near-supercomputer (IBM P690) and
estimated at 64 hours with a Pentium-3 1.7Ghz. This has gone down to
less than in two years, to 17 seconds [K06a].
08/2004 - 1 hour, IBM pSeries 690 (32x 1.7Ghz POWER4+) = 54.4 GHz-Hours
03/2005 - 8 hours, Pentium-M 1.6Ghz = 12.8 Ghz-Hours
11/2005 - 5 hours, Pentium-4 1.7Ghz = 8.5 Ghz-Hours
03/2006 - 1 minute, Pentium-4 3.2Ghz = .05 Ghz-Hours
04/2006 - 17 seconds, Pentium-4 3.2Ghz = .01 Ghz-Hours
If we accept a factor of 800x as a sample of how much faster a checksum
may be broken over the course of 2 years (MD5 using the above data is
>2000x), then existing checksums do not stand a significant chance of
survival in the future. We should thus accept that whatever checksums we
are using today, will be broken in the near future, and plan as best as
possible. (A brief review [H04] of the SHA1 attacks indicates an
improvement of ~600x in the same timespan).
And for those that claim implementation of these procedures is not yet
feasible, see [K06b] for an application that can produce two
self-extracting EXE files, with identical MD5s, and whatever payload you
The good news
Of the checksums presently used by Manifest2 (SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160),
one stands close to being completely broken: SHA1; and another is
significantly weakened: RIPEMD160. The SHA2 series has suffered some
attacks, but still remains reasonably solid [G07],[K08].
To reduce the potential for future problems and any single checksum
break leading to a rapid decrease in security, we should incorporate the
strongest hash available from each family of checksums, and be prepared
to retire old checksums actively, unless there is a overriding reason to
keep a specific checksum, such as part of a migration plan.
What should be done
Portage should always try to verify all supported hashes that are
available in a Manifest2, starting with the strongest ones as maintained
by a preference list. Over time, the weaker checksums should be removed
from Manifest2 files, once all old Portage installations have had
sufficient time to upgrade. We should be prepared to add stronger
checksums wherever possible, and to remove those that have been
As soon as feasible, we should add the SHA512 and WHIRLPOOL algorithms.
In future, as stream-based checksums are developed (in response to the
development by NIST [AHS]), they should be considered and used.
The SHA512 algorithm is available in Python 2.5, which has been a
dependency of Portage since approximately Python 220.127.116.11.
The WHIRLPOOL checksum is not available within the PyCrypto library or
hashlib that is part of Python 2.5, but there are multiple alternative
Python implementations available, ranging from pure Python to C-based
The existence unsupported hash is not considered to be a failure unless
no supported hashes are available for a given Manifest entry.
Checksum depreciation timing
For the current Portage, both SHA1 and RIPEMD160 should be immediately
removed, as they present no advantages over the already present SHA256.
SHA256 cannot be replaced immediately with SHA512, as existing Portage
versions need at least one supported algorithm present (SHA256 support
was added in June 2006), so it must be retained for some while.
- Add WHIRLPOOL and SHA512.
- Remove SHA1 and RIPEMD160.
After the majority of Portage installations include SHA512 support:
- Remove SHA256.
Old versions of Portage may support and expect only specific checksums.
This is accounted for in the checksum depreciation discussion.
[AHS] NIST (2007). "NIST's Plan for New Cryptographic Hash Functions",
(Advanced Hash Standard). http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/
[BOBO06] Boneh, D. and Boyen, X. (2006). "On the Impossibility of
Efficiently Combining Collision Resistant Hash Functions"; Proceedings
of CRYPTO 2006, Dwork, C. (Ed.); Lecture Notes in Computer Science
4117, pp. 570-583. Available online from:
[H04] Hawkes, P. and Paddon, M. and Rose, G. (2004). "On Corrective
Patterns for the SHA-2 Family". CRYPTO 2004 Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2004/204. Available online from:
[J04] Joux, Antoie. (2004). "Multicollisions in Iterated Hash
Functions - Application to Cascaded Constructions;" Proceedings of
CRYPTO 2004, Franklin, M. (Ed); Lecture Notes in Computer Science
3152, pp. 306-316. Available online from:
[K06a] Klima, V. (2006). "Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions
Within a Minute". Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/105.
Available online from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf
[K06b] Klima, V. (2006). "Note and links to high-speed MD5 collision
proof of concept tools". Available online from:
[K08] Klima, V. (2008). "On Collisions of Hash Functions Turbo SHA-2".
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/003. Available online from:
[G07] Gligoroski, D. and Knapskog, S.J. (2007). "Turbo SHA-2".
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2007/403. Available online from:
[W04] Wang, X. et al: "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5,
HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD", rump session, CRYPTO 2004, Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2004/199, first version (August 16, 2004), second
version (August 17, 2004). Available online from:
I'd like to thank the following folks, in no specific order:
- Ciaran McCreesh (ciaranm) - for pointing out the Joux (2004) paper,
and also being stubborn enough in not accepting a partial solution.
- Marius Mauch (genone), Zac Medico (zmedico) and Brian Harring
(ferringb): for being knowledgeable about the Portage Manifest2
Copyright (c) 2006-2010 by Robin Hugh Johnson. This material may be
distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
Open Publication License, v1.0.
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