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List Archive: gentoo-dev
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To: gentoo-dev@g.o
From: enno+gentoo@...
Subject: Re: Manifest signing
Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:03:21 +0100

Am 29.09.2011 17:02, schrieb Anthony G. Basile:
> Hi everyone,
> The issue of Manifest signing came up in #gentoo-hardened channel ...
> again.  Its clearly a security issue and yet many manifests in the tree
> are still not signed.  Is there any chance that we can agree to reject
> unsigned manifests?  Possibly a question for the Council to adjudicate?

I followed the threads about manifest signing with interest and even had
a look at the manifest signing guide [4]. Sounds nice at first view.
But, please correct me, if I'm wrong. I didn't find a place where these
signatures are verified.
Is manifest signing for the infrastructure team, enabling them to verify
the author of a commit (see GLEP57 [1])? Wouldn't this be obsoleted by
commit signing if the move to git is done ([2])?
If it is (also) for the users, why is there no code for it in portage
anymore [3]?
Okay "why" is clear. Obviously nobody was maintaining it...
I thought about signing the manifests of my overlay. But this is
senseless, if there is no automatic check. I can't think of any user
verifying manifest signatures by hand.
To me it looks like there are repeating complaints about missing
signatures, but I don't see any verification methods for existing
manifest signatures.
At the moment there are 10608 of 15085 manifests signed in my portage
tree. But I can't check them, because I don't have the public keys and
if I fetch them from a public keyserver, I still don't know, if they
really belong to the corresponding Gentoo developers.
Is there some kind of Gentoo Keyring I don't know of?

How does infrastructure team check, if a GPG key belongs to a developer?
The Manifest signing guide [4] simply says "Upload the key to a
keyserver". Everbody can upload a key to the public keyservers. An
attacker, able to modify a signed Manifest, could simply create a new
key on the developers name and use it to sign the modified manifest.
Therefore it must be clear which key really belongs to a dev.

Furthermore the Tree-Signing-GLEPs [5] seem to be incomplete.
This looks like the right place to continue work on Tree Signing.



signature.asc (OpenPGP digital signature)
Re: Manifest signing
-- Robin H. Johnson
Manifest signing
-- Anthony G. Basile
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