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SSP is stack smashing protection. Unless an application your using for |
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some strange reason likes to over run the stack and execute code just |
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like a buffer overrun attack you won't have a problem. As far as Quake3 |
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goes you won't have a problem with the hardened tool chain. |
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|
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John Schember |
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|
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On Sat, 2007-01-27 at 18:20 -0800, gentoo-hardened-ml-01@××××××.org |
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wrote: |
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> I've had a "partially-hardened" workstation for awhile now. I use |
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> hardened-sources and enable many of the PaX/grsecurity options including |
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> stack smashing protection. This works great as I can disable SEGMEXEC, |
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> PAGEEXEC and mprotect for Quake3 (ioquake3) and get it to run. My question |
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> is if I take my workstation to a full hardened system with SSP+PIE toolchain, |
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> etc. will I still be able to run Quake3 and other programs like it? If I |
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> went to a full Hardened Gentoo system, even if I disabled PaX's SEGMEXEC, |
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> PAGEXEC and mprotect, which is sufficient to run Quake3 now, the toolchains' |
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> own SSP would then kick in and stop me, right? |
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> |
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> I'm normally a test and do-it-myself kind of person, but I really don't want |
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> to have to recompile the system to find out and then recompile again if gcc's |
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> SSP/ProPolice does stop me. |
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> |
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> Side note: I masked gcc-4* and >=glibc-2.4 when they were stabled in x86. I |
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> still run gcc-3.4.6-r2 and glibc-2.3.6-r5 so switching to the hardened |
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> profile will not present any of those types of problems for me. |
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> |
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> Thank you for your help. |
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-- |
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