Gentoo Archives: gentoo-hardened

From: Robert Connolly <robert@××××××××××××××××.org>
To: gentoo-hardened@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] ssp random bytes solution
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 22:06:36
Message-Id: 200404201810.52116.robert@linuxfromscratch.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-hardened] ssp random bytes solution by Ned Ludd
1 On April 20, 2004 12:13 pm, Ned Ludd wrote:
2 > Robert,
3 >
4 > I must apologize the previous example code was printing the address
5 > of __guard and not value of the __guard itself.
6 >
7 > Can we try something like?
8 > -------------------------
9 > extern unsigned long __guard[];
10 >
11 > int main () {
12 > printf("__guard\t=\t0x%08x;\n", __guard[0]);
13 > return 0;
14 > }
15 > -----------------------
16
17 This output changes for each runtime using sysctl erandom.
18
19 > I've also been giving some more thought into using the gettimeofday() as
20 > we had discussed one day.. It could work across the board and would and
21 > no kernel patching would be required which is probably more ideal for
22 > Gentoo users as we have a butt ton of kernels. Disadvantage of course
23 > would be potential timing attacks by local users.
24
25 Using gettimeofday as a seed is less secure than we have now. I went to the
26 trouble of getting sysctl-erandom working because it is equaly secure as
27 urandom. I also have plans to patch mkstemp to use sysctl-erandom, and
28 anywhere else that isn't crypto. Sysctl-erandom will not be only for SSP.
29 Gettimeofday could be added to the canary fallback however. Infact I have an
30 arcfour lib to hash gettimeofday that could be added to the ssp.c file, but
31 it is a lot of bloat for a fallback feature, and again erandom does a better
32 job.
33
34
35
36 --
37 gentoo-hardened@g.o mailing list

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Re: [gentoo-hardened] ssp random bytes solution Robert Connolly <robert@××××××××××××××××.org>