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On 02/02/2010 11:34, basile wrote: |
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> schism@×××××××××.org wrote: |
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> |
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>> On Mon, Feb 01, 2010 at 01:35:10PM +0100, Hinnerk van Bruinehsen wrote: |
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>> |
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>> |
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>>> But there is one thing which disturbs me: Since Gentoo (and hardened |
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>>> Gentoo) is sourcebased, i'll need a complete toolchain to keep the |
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>>> system up to date. |
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>>> |
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>>> I don't like the idea of giving this tools to someone who might |
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>>> compromise the server. |
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>>> |
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>>> |
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>> Removing the toolchain is an old, common misconception whose originator |
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>> I would love to meet and slap some sense into. |
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>> |
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>> |
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> In fact, this itself is the answer to what to do if you want to remove |
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> the toolchain. If you have several similar machines, you could use one |
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> to compile and build the .tbz2 packages for updates to deploy to those |
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> machines that do not have a toolchain. |
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> |
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> Having said that, I agree that removing the toolchain is weak defense |
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> and you should use rbac. |
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> |
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> |
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|
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I personally like the hardened project, but I think it's easy to |
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overlook that usually the biggest weaknesses (and most probed areas of |
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exploit right now) are something like: |
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|
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- Bad passwords for ssh/mysql (and other apps...) |
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- Various bad practices in web applications which allow remote |
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exploit/access/sql injection/xss, etc |
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- Trojans/viruses which target client workstations and can capture |
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information without breaking into the server |
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- Internal attacks... Admin's who leave. Disgruntled employees.. |
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|
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I think it's easy to overlook that the above is often your biggest |
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source of risk and continue polishing something which is normally pretty |
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resistant to external attack. As a rough rule of thumb I can only think |
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of perhaps a tiny handful of exploits in the last few years which would |
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have allowed remote breakin to a non hardened box running your usual |
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remote access services, say Apache or email or similar (I will discount |
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Bind and Sendmail from this analysis...). However, lots of unix boxes |
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have been rooted through simple holes in web applications and a bunch of |
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distros that leave remotely accessible accounts with known guessable |
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passwords... |
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|
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Virtualisation is also a big step forward for helping contain the |
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effects of a compromised machine - I'm very impressed with what we have |
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been able to do since we started using it on all our servers..! |
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|
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Good luck |
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|
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Ed W |