Gentoo Archives: gentoo-hardened

From: Kevin Chadwick <ma1l1ists@××××××××.uk>
To: gentoo-hardened@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 16:43:00
Message-Id: 20111214164243.de335f3c.ma1l1ists@yahoo.co.uk
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... by "Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón"
1 On Wed, 14 Dec 2011 16:27:45 +0100
2 Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón wrote:
3
4 When I have more time I promise to hunt the references out and send
5 them to you.
6
7 > I have never said to eliminate DAC. I just told that ONLY DAC as
8 > openbsd do is a bad option and insecure.
9 > You can substitute DAC with RBAC (and RSBAC gives an option to do it).
10 >
11 > Now DAC and RBAC are layered, RBAC can be secure without DAC, DAC
12 > WOULD NEVER be secure without RBAC.
13
14 Let's play your game as you keep mixing up contexts and you're the one
15 making blanket statements not me and telling me you know what I know
16 better than myself. I merely said that methods of breaking RBAC have
17 been discussed and a kernel exploit is one of them.
18
19 So show me how you can break out of the default apache on OpenBSD then?
20
21 >> There is no way that a rootkit could access to kernel memory,
22 >> /dev/mem, ioports an alike devices are fully controlled and module
23 >> interfaz too and kernel sources too. Tell me how the hell can anyone
24 >> launch a ring 0 rootkit, and give proofs as I did a not simple search
25 >> in grsec or openbsd sites.
26
27 >> RBAC IS the kernel,
28 >>
29
30 RBAC is part of the kernel yes and so stored in memory. It is also a
31 part of the kernel that is meant to be switchable. An exploit in the
32 kernel can not only bypass RBAC or switch it off it can even situate a
33 rootkit above the kernel leaving RBAC in place and having ALL rights
34 aka the root of the system. Yes a perfect policy may prevent an exploit
35 but it's equally possible that a perfect policy has to allow the
36 exploit for desired functionality.
37
38 The question is what is more important, keeping attackers out or making
39 sure your policies are good enough to stop them. I prefer OpenBSD for
40 many reasons aside from just this anyway.
41
42 You turned this into a bashing of OpenBSD and I'm not sure anyone here
43 appreciates the hijacking of this thread, I should have known better
44 than to mention OpenBSD here and almost removed it before sending, lets
45 stop and agree to disagree. It's not the first time the importance of
46 RBACs bug exploitation prevention versus bug removal and prevention at
47 source has been discussed. Hopefully one day the Linux kernel will be
48 as bug free and capable to be safely as static as OpenBSDs, I also hope
49 OpenBSD gets a MAC one day too. Unfortunately I can't see either
50 happening.

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... "Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón" <tazok.id0@×××××.com>