Gentoo Archives: gentoo-hardened

From: Peter Volkov <pva@g.o>
To: gentoo-hardened@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 03:19:03
Message-Id: 1323832687.18030.11.camel@tablet
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... by Alex Efros
1 В Вск, 11/12/2011 в 16:53 +0200, Alex Efros пишет:
2 > On Sun, Dec 11, 2011 at 02:25:19PM +0000, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
3 > > > 1) How can
4 > > > 4.2.4.1. Root Logon Through SSH Is Not Allowed
5 > > > increase security, if we're already using
6 > > > 4.2.4.2. Public Key Authentication Only
7 > > > Disabling root may have sense with password auth, but with keys it is
8 > > > just useless inconvenience.
9 > >
10 > > I read somewhere that security is about making things more inconvenient for
11 > > malicious people than for authorized ones.
12 > >
13 > > For me, immediately logging in as root is not done. I want to limit root
14 > > access through the regular accounts on the system (with su(do)). I never had
15 > > the need to log on as root immediately myself.
16 >
17 > Understood. But I still don't see how this can increase security.
18
19 To authorize you need pair: login/password or login/priv_key. By
20 requiring login be guessable too you make probability to guess both
21 harder. Remember how debian made possible to brute-force private
22 key[1]? Additional layers really may help in some situations...
23
24
25 1. http://digitaloffense.net/tools/debian-openssl/
26
27 --
28 Peter.