Gentoo Archives: gentoo-hardened

From: "Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón" <tazok.id0@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-hardened@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 21:06:02
Message-Id: CAD98N_EAMkNwyL82VDU1HJdcJdq17GDUz0u7qZT8bcGrPDMtxQ@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... by Kevin Chadwick
1 > You know you can. No perl binary, or chmod 750 or rbac as I had said.
2 > All exploits are bugs and it should be harder to escalate priviledges
3 > through perl than by introducing your own C.
4
5 Clear, making use intensive under openbsd as you said. With 750 even
6 with 700 root can stills using it, as in extension any software run by
7 him. It's harder programming in python than in C? in python you can
8 write exploits too, no it isn't harder. Any programmer can do it.
9
10 > You are simplifying everything, security is a process. Noexec is a
11 > useful tool. How much of what I said did you read. I understand your
12 > points and most security has nothing to do with root. I understand root
13 > can execute files chmodded 000 and I agree that RBAC is useful, the
14 > point is so is noexec and systrace.
15
16 Noexec is not usefull at all I give you the reason it does not
17 controls scripts interpretation is a false sense of security. Is
18 something like get a not executable stack without pax mprotect, it
19 does nothing alone
20
21 My system has no root, root has all capabilities in 0, so the same
22 privileges as a normal user has, can't do ptrace to others process,
23 can't read files not our, can't load modules etc etc etc. Every
24 capability is removed. Check rsbac.org. With rbac even root can't
25 access a program he has started. Read about rbac and when you get
26 understood which it offers then told me what it can or what does not
27 offers.
28
29 Systrace is dead, the project is dead. It does not exists from long ago.
30 >
31 > No it doesn't it restricts root. An exploit may bypass RBAC it may
32 > bypass mount restrictions it may bypass both it may only bypass one, in
33 > which case they are both again useful.
34 >
35 > And OpenBSDs systrace can restrict a lot. System calls are the
36 > hearts heart of an OS.
37
38 I have said to you that rbac can make impossible to launch untrusted
39 code (even exploits) executed and interpreted as in perl myperlscript.
40 In one of my first mail I pointed you ways in that root can do harm
41 and how rbac can avoid them. Root is not important because root is
42 only important in DAC not in RBAC. Read the link I sen't to you before
43 because you stills not understood this point.
44
45 Yes an system dead long ago, and not it only do this: after this bind
46 you can only get a listen. It gives not flexibility, granularity at
47 all.

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... Kevin Chadwick <ma1l1ists@××××××××.uk>