Gentoo Archives: gentoo-hardened

From: Kevin Chadwick <ma1l1ists@××××××××.uk>
To: gentoo-hardened@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 11:13:04
Message-Id: 20111214110531.5764c2bd.ma1l1ists@yahoo.co.uk
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... by "Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón"
1 On Tue, 13 Dec 2011 22:20:00 +0100
2 Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón wrote:
3
4 > Give me an example of direct attack via memory as you say, accessible
5 > devices and anything else said you before.
6
7 I suggest you do some more reading at grsecurity.net or even the
8 OpenBSD mailing list. I haven't got time to hunt down the two references
9 that stick in my mind but keep your ears open and you may realise one
10 of the kernel exploits could/can/will do just that. Do you really
11 believe it's impossible??!!
12
13
14 >> Shall we get rid of file permissions because we have RBAC. We could
15 >> but I can't see that happening and for good reason.
16
17 > file permissions are discrectional, rbac mostly mandatory
18
19 I have no idea what you are arguing with, you just keep trying to twist
20 what I say because you have a bee in your bonnet about MACs as the
21 answer to everything and a panacea, they aren't but they are useful as I
22 have said. Personally I wouldn't swap an OpenBSD kernel for the Linux
23 one with RBAC on my servers atleast. One day with a risky setup, I
24 might in that instance. I wonder why kernel.org didn't use RBACs,
25 especially RSBAC or even chroot. How embarrassing for such an automated
26 attack to get through. Is bugzilla.kernel.org still down? That wouldn't
27 have happened if they were using OpenBSD. It might be a good idea to use
28 a different kernel to the one they are hosting anyway even with many
29 eyes. And before you think well this is just me clutching at straws with
30 your tunnel vision, it relates exactly to what I was talking about
31 of likelihood of use.
32
33 >> don't try to compare them.
34
35 Of course you should and I was saying much of RBACs can be replaced and
36 you use both and it adds to defence in depth. Your notion of replacing
37 DACs? I see good and bad in that.
38
39
40 >> It does not restrict root, it erase it. The concept of root doesn't
41 >> exists anymore.
42
43 What is root, it is the root of the system not just a user. If it
44 didn't exist the kernel wouldn't be able to turn RBAC off now would it.
45 You have been drawn in by the wonderful marketing of imagine a system
46 where root doesn't exist. Would your analogy be the kernel recreates
47 root. If so, fine it makes no difference but is less correct.
48
49
50 > I use rsbac because it reachs to B1 security level, level that openbsd
51 > will never reach, it supports even secure_delete, and has some B2
52 > charateristics as device labels are.
53
54
55 And yet your kernel has bugs added every day without much security
56 consideration. What you don't understand is that RBAC is a security
57 layer that the root of the system has control of. What can
58 your /sbin/init do, what can the kernel do? Some rootkits can actually
59 go the other side of the kernel even, far above where RBACs are.
60
61 Yeah and Cisco's are certified for use by some enterprise manager and
62 yet they have proven full of root exploits. Certified encryptions are
63 often less secure than others.
64
65 I repeat it ALL depends on the application, even the hardware. You
66 could reduce the Linux kernel right down to protect the RBAC. Which
67 was my original point.
68
69 Of course then I wonder if the RBAC would actually ever be needed but
70 it's ALL GOOD.

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Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... "Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón" <tazok.id0@×××××.com>