Gentoo Archives: gentoo-hardened

From: "Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón" <tazok.id0@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-hardened@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 21:20:59
Message-Id: CAD98N_FOoJ9=0qzNgpvBRqertCRtyoJbT4-77DSK0PFHT+Y=-w@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... by Kevin Chadwick
1 > It is an extra security measure for defense in depth.
2 >
3 > It allows easy use and a better default widely understood and
4 > blanket setting that almost any user can understand and switch off and
5 > so is more likely (not very) to be applied across the board.
6 >
7 > It gives admins extra control.
8 >
9
10 A inefficient and useless layer if not complemented with extra measures.
11
12 > Shall we get rid of file permissions because we have RBAC. We could
13 > but I can't see that happening and for good reason.
14
15 file permissions are discrectional, rbac mostly mandatory, don't try
16 to compare them.
17
18
19 > I do and I disagree here though we are both right really as has been
20 > the case for most of this discussion. RBAC can restrict root and
21 > root has the potential to make Direct attacks on the kernel via the
22 > memory, accessible devices and perhaps even RBAC itself. Things do
23 > require priviledges and RBAC reduces those granted and is good but if
24 > RBAC removed root the kernel wouldn't be able to turn on and off RBAC
25 > and the boot phase wouldn't be vulnerable. I already realised that RBACs
26 > were path and Role based, some inode based and probably many other
27 > flavours. I looked over that pdf but I do have far better ones that
28 > don't belittle systrace like you do.
29
30 It does not restrict root, it erase it. The concept of root doesn't
31 exists anymore.
32 Give me an example of direct attack via memory as you say, accessible
33 devices and anything else said you before.
34
35 Raw access is fully controlled and forbidden to root, raw access to
36 ttys and block devices too, controlled the mount of devices etc etc
37 etc
38
39 You don't know what rbac is so don't speak about it because you can't
40 understand it
41
42
43 >
44 > Lets make this constructive. Maybe you can tell me which RBAC you use
45 > and why you chose it.
46 >
47 > Thanks
48 >
49 > Kc
50 >
51 I use rsbac as framework, with modules RC, ACL, exclusive UM, RES,
52 JAIL, MAC, PAX, AUTH and CAP running.
53
54 Root has not capabilities, not CAP_SYS_RAWIO, no DAC_OVERRIDE, not
55 SYS_MODULES etc etc he can only execute binaries in /sbin and /bin,
56 map /lib libraries and nothing else, halt has its own role and type,
57 so root even can't switch down the machine for example. Master role of
58 sshd even has more privileges than root itself.
59
60 I use rsbac because it reachs to B1 security level, level that openbsd
61 will never reach, it supports even secure_delete, and has some B2
62 charateristics as device labels are.

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm... Kevin Chadwick <ma1l1ists@××××××××.uk>