Gentoo Archives: gentoo-kernel

From: Tim Yamin <plasmaroo@g.o>
To: gentoo-kernel@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-kernel] Gentoo Kernel Security Policy (DRAFT)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 23:43:01
Message-Id: 20060315234233.GA6852@toucan.gentoo.org
In Reply to: [gentoo-kernel] Gentoo Kernel Security Policy (DRAFT) by John Mylchreest
1 On Wed, Mar 15, 2006 at 11:31:01PM +0000, John Mylchreest wrote:
2 > ============================
3 > Kernel Security Policy
4 > ============================
5 >
6 > As the QA and Security awareness within Gentoo continues to grow, so must the
7 > contraints placed around distributed kernels to support it. As part of our
8 > progression to accompany these efforts I would like to draw your attention to
9 > the following policy.
10 >
11 > At the moment, this is heavily draft, and your opinions are most welcome. Rip
12 > this apart and lets see what we can come up with :)
13
14 :)
15
16 > 1. Security Tagging
17 >
18 > Security tagging is an important part of marking sources as to their
19 > expected response time to security vulnerabilities and to their current
20 > situation.
21 >
22 > Certain situations cause a weight to be added to the security tag of a
23 > given ebuild. A lot of this can be handled in the eclass, such as
24 > non-standard kernel versioning, not using K_WANT_GENPATCHES,
25 > genpatches version is outdated (with a 2 sectag pentalty for each
26 > version it falls behind this can be tracked through the eclass but
27 > of a high expense and might prove unfeasible), use of UNIPATCH_EXCLUDE.
28 > Also, a modifier can be set within the kernel ebuild to alter this,
29 > K_SECTAG. K_SECTAG is a signed int value.
30
31 How does the eclass know the latest genpatches so it can beancount the penalty
32 scores correctly?
33
34 > 2. Naming Scheme
35
36 Naming -> Versioning
37
38 > To help keep a consistant scheme which we can easily track using KISS
39 > we also need to have a consitant version scheme for our sources. In
40 > almost every instance, this exists. However kernel sources which are
41 > untrackable through regular means (such as openvz-sources,
42 > vserver-sources) cause problems when tracing vulnerable sources in an
43 > automated way. This is immediate cause for a security warning to be
44 > displayed.
45 >
46 > 3. Genpatches-Base Support
47 >
48 > For as long as there is a kernel package in the tree using genpatches,
49 > the corresponding genpatches-base will be maintained from a security
50 > point of view. Announcements for each update follow the normal
51 > procedure, however there is a caveat. Kernel sources which use
52 > genpatches should not lapse more than 2 minor releases from upstream.
53 > IE: kernel sources should not fall behind 2.6.14 if the most recent
54 > upstream release is 2.6.16. In the extreme case where this is not
55 > technically possible, this will require it being addressed on a
56 > case-by-case basis, and a sectag penalty of 10 applied if appropriate.
57 >
58 > 4. Vanilla-sources
59 >
60 > This is a bit of a unique scenario. Vanilla-sources will fall directly
61 > under the management of upstream, and KISS. Since we add no additional
62 > patches to vanilla-sources and we keep it actively maintained pushing
63 > security fixes to stable it is almost exempt to the above.
64
65 Just upstream, we don't track vanilla-sources in KISS... but we could? Should
66 we? The same applies for mm-sources and any other fast-paced /experimental/
67 trees should they be produced by upstream. Those trees won't even be tracked
68 by KISS.
69
70 > 5. 2.4 based sources.
71 >
72 > Since we dont distribute genpatches for 2.4, but we do manage it
73 > through KISS, the only difference for 2.4 based kernels is that the
74 > security tag which get automagically modified is exempt to the
75 > genpatches test.
76 >
77 > 6. New kernel packages
78 >
79 > Kernela which are not maintained by an active member of the kernel
80 > herd, or by the kernel herd as a whole are not exempt from this policy.
81 > Every new addition should adhere to this policy.
82
83 Kernels :)
84
85 > 7. Three Strike Removal
86 >
87 > Kernel packages which fall behind on security vulnerabilities without
88 > valid reasoning, and are not maintained by the herd will be masked. If
89 > a package gets masked, then unmasked repeatedly because of known
90 > vulnerabilities then it will get hardmasked with expectation of it
91 > being removed, or properly looked after. This will need to be dealt
92 > with by discussion on gentoo-kernel & gentoo-security, or if
93 > appropriate by dev-rel.
94
95 I think devrel is a bit overreactive here... QA team.
96
97 Great otherwise,
98
99 Thanks,
100
101 Tim
102 --
103 gentoo-kernel@g.o mailing list