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Hey all, |
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|
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I wrote this text up some months ago when Ian Delaney and Roy were making first |
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noises that the Gentoo foundation should be in overall control of the |
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distribution. At that time I didn't know about SPI and umbrella corporations |
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yet. Now, I see an umbrella organization as e.g. SPI as the better choice, |
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since it relieves us from the jobs that noone (not even the trustees) want to |
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do. |
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|
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Mostly I am sending this text (slightly edited) now out as alternative |
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proposal for the unfortunate case when (for whatever reason) working with an |
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umbrella organization such as SPI were not possible. |
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|
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I've shown the text to a few people in the meantime, so don't be surprised if |
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it has text overlap with other e-mails or reorganization proposals. |
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|
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Cheers, Andreas |
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|
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------------ |
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|
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Motivation: In recent vivid debates the Gentoo metastructure and the |
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responsibilities of its organs have been called into question by a vocal |
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minority. Compared with how the distribution has been running over the last |
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years, most of the proposals aim to adapt reality to organizational |
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structures. This proposal instead aims - in a very similar way as Michael's |
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SPI proposal - to adapt organizational structures to reality. |
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|
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Letters [z] are textual footnotes, numbers [9] point to web links as source |
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material. |
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|
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Proposal: [a] |
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The Gentoo Foundation bylaws are amended such that: |
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* Gentoo Foundation trustee positions are appointed by the elected Gentoo |
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Council via majority vote, for a fixed term. Each appointed person has to be |
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confirmed by a yes/no vote of the Foundation members. A non-quorate member vote |
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(less than 1/3 member participation) counts as confirmation. |
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* The Gentoo Council acts as independent, voter-appointed review and oversight |
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body for the Gentoo Foundation and has full access to Gentoo Foundation data. |
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It can require regular status updates from Gentoo Foundation trustees and |
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officers. |
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* The Gentoo Council can dismiss Gentoo Foundation trustees before their term |
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runs out by unanimous vote of Gentoo Council members. |
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|
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Implementation: |
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While changing the role of the Gentoo Council requires changes to GLEP 39 and |
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thereby a vote of all developers, the above changes to the Gentoo Foundation |
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bylaws can be implemented by the trustees alone. So, in principle this change |
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could be done during the next Gentoo Foundation trustee meeting and be |
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immediately in effect. |
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|
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Rationale (the long part): [b] |
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|
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A] Philosophy – should the „suits“ lead? |
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The main purpose of the Gentoo Foundation is to administrate Gentoo finances |
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and protect Gentoo intellectual property. We are talking about two important |
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tasks here that require high dedication and are central to the daily |
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functioning of Gentoo. However, Gentoo is not a corporation, but an open |
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source initiative by volunteers. Most people investing time into Gentoo as |
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developers [c] are focussing on the technical aspect, and a community without |
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code is worthless in our context. I am aware that current trustees are |
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investing also much time and effort into technical aspects of Gentoo. However, |
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having people direct the course of the distribution due to occupying a non- |
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technical, finance and administrative *role* means having the tail wag the dog. |
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If anything, in a community-driven, non commercial Linux distribution |
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administration should follow technical requirements. |
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|
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B] Practicality – the two-headed snake |
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The separation of tasks and responsibilities between Gentoo Council and the |
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Gentoo Foundation trustees has worked out fine for years. Any one-sided attempt |
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to change the balance, however, easily provides cause for conflict and endless |
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bikeshedding. This not only binds efforts and slows down decision processes, |
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but also makes Gentoo as a whole vulnerable to outside manipulation. By |
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playing the Gentoo Foundation trustees against the Gentoo Council or vice |
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versa, and searching supporters whereever it just suits, third parties can |
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induce friction and attempt to work around established procedures. |
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|
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C] Mandate – manifestos and voter perception |
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Given the background of the previous years and the election manifestos of the |
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two 2016 elected Gentoo Foundation trustees [1,2] I see no voter intent to |
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extend the powers of the Gentoo Foundation trustees into topics previously |
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handled by the Gentoo Council. Conversely, manifestos of the 2016 elected |
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Gentoo Council members cover a very wide range of topics [3,4,5,6,7,8], in |
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particular including also community oversight and public relations. |
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|
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D] Oversight – past inactivity of the trustees to protect Gentoo assets |
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As already stated above, the current role of the Gentoo Foundation and its |
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trustees is very important for the daily running of Gentoo – without it there |
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would be no infrastructure, no funds for equipment, and so on. However, past |
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events (failing to renew corporate registration, failing to submit tax filings, |
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the treasurer disappearing for many months without anyone panicking, an |
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apparent 5-digit mismatch in finances) do not really recommend the Gentoo |
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Foundation as top level oversight body. On the contrary, a compliance board |
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(as in this proposal the Gentoo Council) should be instated which is able to |
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oversee and take corrective action. |
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|
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E] Legalese – formal legitimization of the current trustee election |
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The current method of electing the Gentoo Foundation trustees is legally |
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shaky. I have no doubts that the election process fairly expresses the wishes |
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of the voters. However, it leads to a rather strange conundrum in the Gentoo |
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Foundation bylaws: The bylaws require that the Board of Trustees is elected by |
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an annual meeting of the foundation members [Sec. 3.2], which is supposed to |
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normally take place on IRC in the #gentoo-trustees channel [Sec. 3.1]. A |
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meeting requires a quorum of 1/3 of the members entitled to vote, „represented |
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in person“ [Sec. 3.9]. If this is taken verbatim, none of the trustees of the |
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past years would have been elected; I can't remember any meeting where a |
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quorum of foundation *members* would have been present. A completely |
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different, conflicting set of instructions covering the current method and |
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condorcet voting, is set out in a later paragraph [Sec. 5.5]. |
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|
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--------- |
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|
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|
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[a] In case this is not legally possible for a New Mexico nonprofit, a re- |
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incorporation in a different legal system (e.g., EU, where many Gentoo |
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developers now reside) should be pursued. |
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|
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[b] I have taken the liberty to freely use arguments here which have |
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originally been posted by, e.g., rich0 or neddyseagoon. Nevertheless, opinions |
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expressed here are mine and should not be construed as a Gentoo Council or |
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ComRel team statement. |
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|
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[c] A developer is a person who has passed the recruitment process and has a |
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@gentoo.org e-mail address. This is independent of push access to the main |
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Gentoo ebuild repository. |
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|
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[1] http://dev.gentoo.org/~dabbott/manifest.html |
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[2] https://dev.gentoo.org/~prometheanfire/trustee-manifesto.html |
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[3] https://dev.gentoo.org/~blueness/manifesto-2016.txt |
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[4] https://dev.gentoo.org/~dilfridge/Manifest-2016.txt |
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[5] https://archives.gentoo.org/gentoo-project/message/ |
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368c35c8337e00d5e22686c782a917b7 |
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[6] https://dev.gentoo.org/~k_f/Manifest-2016.txt |
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[7] https://dev.gentoo.org/~rich0/council-manifesto-2016.txt |
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[8] https://archives.gentoo.org/gentoo-project/message/ |
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92961cfdbe56960fa2c78a04662c3547 |