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W dniu pon, 09.04.2018 o godzinie 05∶24 -0500, użytkownik Matthew Thode |
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napisał: |
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> Gentoo has been known to be a two headed entity for a while. While the |
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> fact is that only one of the heads has legal standing to be called |
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> Gentoo, the other head has been doing most of the technical work. |
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> Unfortunately having two heads means that there can be fighting between |
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> them. In order to finally put the matter to some rest I seek to define |
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> Gentoo's org structure. |
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|
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Currently, legally, it only consists of the following: |
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> 1. foundation members |
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> 2. trustees |
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> 3. officers (don't have to be foundation members or trustees) |
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> |
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> I wish to extend that to the following. |
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> 1. foundation members |
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> 2. trustees |
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> 3. officers (don't have to be foundation members or trustees) |
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> 3.1 infra members (or at least the lead) |
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> 3.2 comrel members (or at least the lead) |
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> 3.3 council members |
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> |
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> Infrastructure has a clearly defined role in Gentoo. Namely that of |
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> managing foundation infrastructure resources. Bringing those members |
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> under the foundation's umbrella formalizes this. Infra has previously |
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> been fairly nebulous as to who directs them (having been directed by |
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> council, trustees and comrel). |
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> |
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> Comrel has the clear analog of being the HR (human relations). HR |
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> is three to protect the business from human related infighting. Comrel |
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> was previously under the direction of the council, primarily for |
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> historical reasons (the foundation was not well staffed or run until |
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> recently). I thank the council for managing this. |
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> |
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> Council is supposed to be the technical leadership within Gentoo, over |
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> the last decade or so this responsibility has ballooned to encompass |
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> things out side this scope. This seeks to clearly define the powers of |
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> the council to that of technical leadership. |
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> |
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> |
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> One of the drawbacks of this is that being an officer means being an |
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> 'organ' of the business, meaning that some of the current members may |
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> have conflicts with their current job. To this I ask 'Is what you are |
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> doing now not vital? If it is doesn't that make you an organ (even if |
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> not explicitly stated as such)?' |
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> |
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> One of the good things about this (other than clearly defining roles and |
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> boundaries) is that it allows council members to server as Trustees. |
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> This would require a bylaw change, but has been something often |
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> complained about. |
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> |
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Matthew, I'm not sure where to start. |
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|
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Maybe I should start by apologizing for the length of this mail. |
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I really hate to waste your time having to read all of this but in this |
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case I believe things have gone too far just to leave things half- |
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answered or risk misinterpretation. |
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|
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|
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I find this proposal outrageous. It is a clear attack on Gentoo |
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developers' right to self-govern. While I wouldn't call Gentoo an exact |
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democracy, your proposal sounds like bureaucrat dictatorship. I will |
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detail on it later on. |
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|
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|
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But before that, I would like to ask why do you keep pushing forward |
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a proposal that has seen so much negative feedback? And why do you try |
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to push it via gentoo-nfp when you are perfectly aware that the previous |
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discussions on gentoo-project have brought much negative feedback? Are |
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you trying to avoid this feedback? |
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|
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Do you believe that the minor changes you've made meet the expectations |
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of all the developers who did not like your initial proposal? Do you |
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believe in it so much that you do not feel it appropriate to ask for |
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their opinion on the updated proposal? |
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|
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Do you believe that the developers have suddenly changed their mind |
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and are ready to abandon self-governing themselves in favor of |
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dictatorship of bureaucrats? Do you believe that the recent attacks of |
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William L. Thompson Jr., Daniel Campbell or Daniel Robbins have achieved |
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that goal? Or maybe the gentoo-dev posting restrictions? Do you know |
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that for sure? |
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|
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Or are you just trying to use sheer force of repetition? Are you going |
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to push the same proposal over and over again until people agree with it |
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just to be done with hearing about it? Or just until they get |
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frustrated enough and stop replying? Then you could claim you had no |
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negative feedback on 15th reiteration of the same proposal. |
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|
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But let's get to the details. |
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Your proposal -- once again -- makes Trustees the highest-level |
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governing body of Gentoo and reduces Council to technical matters. This |
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is against GLEP 39 which clearly states that Council is responsible for |
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all global decisions and as far as I'm aware is the most recent policy |
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defining the role of Council. Unless you have a strong reason to |
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believe that this policy has been illegally forced upon Gentoo, you are |
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not 'formalizing' anything but attempting to change well-established |
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metastructure and outright lying to the community that the current state |
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is undefined. |
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I believe that Trustees can't be the highest governing body of Gentoo |
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for a number of reasons. I will enumerate those I can think of below: |
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1. Trustee elections are not even half as democractic as Council |
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elections. |
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With no 'reopen nominations', with the ability to accept Trustees |
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without a vote or for existing Trustees to appoint new Trustees for |
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missing slots, and finally with low interest in developers becoming |
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Trustees, this is effectively 'Trustee seat giveaway' and not |
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an election. This is already bad enough for governing the Foundation |
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and I am fully against extending this to governing the whole of Gentoo. |
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And if you believe that reducing the power of Council will suddenly |
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convince developers to increase their interest in becoming Trustees, you |
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are wrong, for reasons outlined in further points. |
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2. Bad Trustee work... increases their chances of re-election. |
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Given that each new Trustee takes legal responsibility about the state |
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of Foundation, he/she is directly endangered by repercussions of any |
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problems within the Foundation, including problems caused by previous |
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Trustees. As far as I'm aware, we hadn't established any clear way of |
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new Trustees protecting themselves against this, and most of the new |
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candidates aren't really capable of suing previous board 'just in case' |
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as Kristian suggested. |
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As a result, if Trustees leave Foundation in a bad state (which has been |
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the case so far), then a number of candidates is going to refuse |
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the nomination because they do not want to take responsibility for |
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mistakes of their predecessors. And this goes on recursively. At this |
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point, even if Trustees finally managed to finish IRS as they claim |
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they'll do, I personally would still have serious doubt whether I could |
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really trust things are fully solved. |
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3. Trustees have direct control over their electorate. |
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Who votes for Trustees? Foundation members. And who appoints |
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and removes Foundation members? Trustees, of course. So we're talking |
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about giving away governing the whole distribution to people who |
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directly decide who can vote for them, and who can't, and do that |
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in rather arbitrary way. |
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Before somebody claims that Council is in the same situation -- not |
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exactly. The Council doesn't directly interfere with recruitment |
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or retirement -- it only takes care of appeals. Not to mention that |
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the rules for becoming a developer are far more precise than rules for |
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becoming a Foundation member. |
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4. Not everyone can be a legal Foundation representative. |
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This has been the argument a lot of people mentioned. Some of our |
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developers simply can't legally be an Officer, not to mention Trustee |
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because of their employment or other legal positions. Your proposal |
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unjustly prevents them from having any governing position. |
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5. You are conflating governing and bureaucracy. |
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What we have right now is two disjoint bodies: Council which is elected |
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as representatives of developers, and Trustees who are responsible for |
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dealing with the bureaucracy. With your proposal, developers are now |
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partially governed by bureaucrats for no real reason except... we need |
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bureaucrats, and bureaucrats want to rule us. |
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What you're doing here is blocking competent people who were doing a |
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good job dealing with non-technical matters on the Council just because |
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they do not have the necessary skills or experience to do the Trustee |
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work. And on the other hand, giving power to people who may not be |
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trusted developer representatives just because they claim they're going |
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to take care of the bureaucracy. |
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6. Trustees have serious problems dealing with their own work. |
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Let's be honest. Trustees haven't been exactly the perfect caretakers |
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of legal and financial matters. Even skipping the tax problems, let's |
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talk about copyright problems. Rich Freeman has started the work on |
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solving them long time ago. Then Trustees were responsible for it |
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and did not manage to do anything except for copying the Rich's text |
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with minor changes (also made by him) to Wiki. |
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The whole copyright effort started again when I established the 'joint |
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venture'. Which was pretty much a nice way of saying 'we will do most |
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of it for you because otherwise it will never happen'. But sure, that |
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was a complex problem. |
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Just take a look at their meeting logs and see how many items keep being |
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moved from month to month with no action taken: |
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https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Foundation:Meetings |
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At some point, you start thinking that Trustees are putting more effort |
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in trying to replace Council than in actually doing the things they were |
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elected to do. Do you really think they will be doing a better job with |
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more responsibilities at hand? |
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7. Who will oversee the Trustees? |
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Right now, the Council handles all the global decisions and appeals |
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in Gentoo. However, if Council goes rogue and starts working against |
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the goals of Gentoo, Trustees can intervene. If Trustees become the |
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highest authority for decisions and appeals, who is going to intervene? |
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That's all I can think of now. But I think that's 7 reasons too many |
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for Trustees to claim any direct leadership position. Trustees have |
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a clearly defined role in serving and protecting Gentoo. Extending that |
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to exercising daily power in leading Gentoo is not going to be good |
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for the community, and certainly it is not going to be fair to other |
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developers. |
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |