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>> Except that a fork doesn't limit the foundations powers, it just |
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>> influences the state of Gentoo after all the developers abandon it. |
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>> |
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> |
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> If a majority of developers abandon Gentoo (a drastic outcome, I'll |
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> admit), I think we can all agree that the state of Gentoo will be far |
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> worse than it is now. This is something to be avoided, which in |
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> practice limits the foundation's powers, unless the foundation is more |
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> focused on proving a point than furthering Gentoo. |
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Exactly, if they are focussed on proving a point then it doesn't limit |
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there powers at all. |
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Even if they have the best interests of Gentoo at heart their powers |
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ain't limited, only their options are. |
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|
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> No argument there. But keep in mind that the devs should drive the |
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> rules - not the other way around. |
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Not sure I really understand this. When you refer to dev's do you mean |
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all dev's individually or devs that are represented by say the Council? |
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Also how would rules drive a dev? |
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> Again, that is fine - as long as both have the same constituency. If |
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> they have different constituencies then this could turn into a huge mess |
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> - as both groups would keep getting re-elected by their different |
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> constituencies, and the issues wouldn't actually get resolved. |
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> |
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While I understand the point I have to ask, do the Foundation and |
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Council really have different Constituencies? It isn't like one is dev |
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only and the other is open to anybody. Any differences between the 2 |
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Constituencies are minor at worse. |
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|
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> My argument isn't really one of what the council/trustee's authority |
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> should be. My point is that for gentoo to be successful these groups |
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> need to work well together. We can't really afford for either group to |
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> discover a mandate to be an overseer to the other - it will just lead to |
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> a massive waste of resources that will only serve to weaken the distro. |
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> I don't think it is constructive when we dream up all kinds of |
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> scenarios where the two bodies can enter into open war against the other. |
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Which I completely agree with. The Foundation and Council need to work |
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together. But I would also like both of them to know exactly where they |
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stand. I would also like a structure that acknowledges that even tho |
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the 2 groups need to work together that there is a possibility that they |
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might not. If the rules ain't clear then are we too have another |
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incident where we argue about whether an new Council election is to be |
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held? I believe that at least with my suggestion the Foundation could |
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have said, yes elections needs to be held, or no they do not. That |
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wouldn't stop dev's from voting the Council in again, but it would have |
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provided clarity (<hypothetically> whether you agree with the clarity |
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would be a matter to bring up at the "next" election). Another |
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important fact is that it wouldn't involve the Council deciding its own |
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fate. |
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-- |
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