Re: [gentoo-portage-dev] [PATCH v2] misc: Distribute a repo.postsync.d hook to run gemato verification

[Michał Górny]

W dniu czw, 18.01.2018 o godzinie 09∶27 -0800, użytkownik Zac Medico
napisał:
> On 01/16/2018 08:43 AM, Michał Górny wrote:
> > Include a repo.postsync.d hook to verify the rsync checkout using
> > gemato. Given that not all people will want to have it enabled
> > unconditionally, no setup.py rules are included -- instead, the file
> > would be installed conditionally by the ebuild.
> >
> > [v2: included link to the wiki page]
> > ---
> >  MANIFEST.in                   |  2 +-
> >  misc/repo.postsync.d/00gemato | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >  create mode 100644 misc/repo.postsync.d/00gemato
> >
> > diff --git a/MANIFEST.in b/MANIFEST.in
> > index 4f6cac162..edc6704e7 100644
> > --- a/MANIFEST.in
> > +++ b/MANIFEST.in
> > @@ -14,4 +14,4 @@ include cnf/make.conf.example.*
> >  include .portage_not_installed
> >
> >  # extra scripts
> > -include misc/*
> > +graft misc
> > diff --git a/misc/repo.postsync.d/00gemato b/misc/repo.postsync.d/00gemato
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000..f2af50925
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/misc/repo.postsync.d/00gemato
> > @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
> > +#!/bin/bash
> > +# repo.postsync.d hook to verify ::gentoo checkout using gemato
> > +
> > +name=${1}
> > +url=${2}
> > +path=${3}
> > +
> > +# keyring installed by gentoo-keys
> > +openpgp_key=/var/lib/gentoo/gkeys/keyrings/gentoo/release/pubring.gpg
> > +
> > +# apply only to ::gentoo, when synced over rsync.
> > +if [[ ${name} == gentoo && ${url} == rsync://* ]]; then
> > +	if ! gemato verify -K "${openpgp_key}" -s "${path}"; then
> > +		eerror "For troubleshooting the verification failures, please see:"
> > +		eerror "  https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Project:Portage/Repository_Verification"
> > +		return 1
> > +	fi
> > +fi
> >
>
> The fact that this hook doesn't check online for revoked keys means it's
> vulnerable to a MITM attack if our keys ever get stolen and revealed to
> the world. That means it gives a false sense of security, and if we
> release it then we're guaranteed to have an immediate GLSA because of it.

I'm currently working on a solution to this problem. I've tried to
establish if we have some 'official' solution to it but it doesn't seem
like it, so I suppose checking keyservers is the way to go forward.

-- 
Best regards,
Michał Górny