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On 04/22/2010 07:41 AM, Jorge Manuel B. S. Vicetto wrote: |
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> My concern here is the idea that the council should be able to "disband" |
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> a project or turn it around 180 degrees. If we open the door to this, |
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> then we'll be throwing away the principles that any developer can create |
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> a project, that a team acts as its members choose to and that in the end |
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> some choices fall to those who do the work. |
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Not at all - developers could still do all of this, as long as they |
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don't do anything so drastically bad for the distro that the council |
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would need to step in. |
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The council should of course use discretion in its actions, and it |
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should always just talk to somebody before they go booting people/etc. |
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> Besides, if the council |
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> were to "disband" a team or try to force a policy on it, how do you |
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> think that would work if there were no team members left and no one |
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> stepped up? |
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Again, a good reason for the council to use discretion. However, in |
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some cases it would be better to not have a team at all than to have a |
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team acting contrary to the overall distro's interests. |
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> Finally, in extreme cases, the council can also have a word |
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> regarding individual developers and or projects. |
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How? This is exactly what I'm proposing - that in extreme cases the |
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council can intervene directly as needed. If the council can't do this, |
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then how can they "have a word" unless you literally mean nothing more |
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than words. |
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> Gentoo isn't exactly a "democracy" and therefore such comparisons |
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> usually are not adequate for us. |
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Perhaps not purely so, it is a bit more of a meritocracy, but it is |
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essentially democratic. I don't see why democracy is a bad thing, as |
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long as it doesn't involve those who don't do anything wielding power |
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over those who do. Having at least a little control over the membership |
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roles should mitigate this. |
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> Gentoo (the distribution) is not a Corporation, so that comparison isn't |
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> adequate as well. |
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What is a corporation? It is essentially a body of people aligned to a |
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common purpose. The same governance models apply to everything from |
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businesses to clubs to professional organizations to churches to |
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parliaments. Perhaps all these organizations have figured out that this |
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model works fairly well - or at least better than the alternatives. |
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Honestly, I don't really see what cohesive alternative you're offering |
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other than a loose confederation with oversight by closed bodies. |
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> But Developer Relations isn't a "Boy's Club" or the only "not so open" |
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> group in Gentoo. There's also User Relations. The infrastructure team, |
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> for its own responsibility and abilities, as far as I know, has always |
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> invited members in and doesn't have open membership. To a certain extent |
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> the QA team has worked that way too and I'm sure most of us would like |
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> QA members to exhibit certain qualities. Then there's PR. |
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I don't think that any of these organizations are doing a bad job. I'm |
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not sure they should be open to anybody who wants to sign up. However, |
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there should always be oversight. That is really all I'm proposing. |
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Having council oversight actually frees up these organzations to not |
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feel as beholden to admit devs at large, since the council can hold them |
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accountable. |
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In the end there will always be oversight - right now it isn't written |
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down, but in the end SOMEBODY or some group is in charge. I guess it |
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effectively is whoever has root on the servers, or perhaps the trustees |
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since they can determine who can use the name Gentoo. All I'm saying is |
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that we should realize that governance is necessary and set up the best |
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form of governance we can have. |
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> A former council did have some influence, not directly in the KDE |
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> project, but by having DevRel evaluate and act on one of its members - |
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> at the time the Lead. That action did had a profound impact in the |
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> project - it almost killed it and it took a long time for KDE to get |
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> back in shape. |
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And in the end, was Gentoo as a whole better off or worse off? |
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Sometimes you need to take a step back to take a step forward. I have |
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no idea what the specifics of this situation were, so I can't comment on |
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whether I agree or disagree with what the council did. However, if a |
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key contributor to Gentoo is doing more harm than good by driving others |
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away, then it might be better for them to not be around. |
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Donnie gave a good talk to this effect: |
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http://www.mefeedia.com/watch/21519531 |
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> To be clear, I do want the Council to have influence over Gentoo, but I |
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> don't like the idea of "carte blanche" and therefore am concerned about |
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> the degree and method by which the council should "leverage" its influence. |
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Well, are there any alternatives short of the Council being able to do |
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nothing but ask people nicely to not destroy the distro? I'm fine with |
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checks and balances, but in the end somebody needs to have the final |
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say, and I'd rather see that be a body elected by all - either the |
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trustees or the council. |
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Maybe there are some ways to address the concern of a runaway council. |
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Rich |
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