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Oliver Schad wrote: |
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> Am Donnerstag, 8. Januar 2004 18:57 schrieb mir Daniel Privratsky: |
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> |
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>>Wrong. |
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>> |
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>>1) If you don't receive "destination unreachable" packet, you know |
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>>nothing about the target host yet. This is not perfect-network world. |
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>>There can be other fw/router anywhere in the way, killing this type of |
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>>icmp traffic. |
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>> |
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>>2) It slows scans a lot. You can of course do scannig in parallel, but |
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>>don't be surprised, when you find yourself killed with no mercy by IDS, |
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>>after matching SYN threshold. 1000+ syns/sec form IP adress to |
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>>monitored system is sure ban. |
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> |
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> |
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> What the fuck... |
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> I don't understand this, we want to break internet standards because some |
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> script kids could be (under some circumstances) a little bit slower with |
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> their attacks, which can only be successful, when an administrator is too |
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> stupid to configure his systems. Is that the argumentation for breaking |
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> internet standards? |
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> |
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> *argh* |
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|
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It is not about script kiddies. It's about security philosophy. REJECT |
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means system alive & port closed or firewall in the way and that IS the |
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information. DROP covers it with a fog of uncertainty. |
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Yas, it's bad to standards. Yes, it's good to security. You can choose |
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what is good to you. |
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Same applies to NAT, transparent proxies, syn defenders etc. Bad for |
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pure-internet utopia, but sometimes good for security. |
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And that's what is discussed here. |
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|
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btw: I still don't get it with the icmp "destination unrechable" idea. |
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does it mean, that some ultra tight checkpoint firewall should be |
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reconfigured, to propagete to the outer space it's interfaces just |
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because someone tries to reach non working system? you must be joking. |
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|
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Regards |
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|
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Daniel |
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|
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-- |
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