Gentoo Archives: gentoo-security

From: Casey Link <unnamedrambler@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-security@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-security] Kernel Security + KISS
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 06:05:52
Message-Id: fb3727060802202205n1e86c89es3a37034cc1abb240@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-security] Kernel Security + KISS by Eduardo Tongson
It would probably help if we knew how many people were interested.

I am. +1

Casey

On Wed, Feb 20, 2008 at 10:16 PM, Eduardo Tongson <propolice@×××××.com> wrote:
> Alright how do we proceed to get this team started. > > ed*eonsec > > > > On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 6:55 AM, Ned Ludd <solar@g.o> wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, 2008-02-20 at 13:59 -0500, Harlan Lieberman-Berg wrote: > > > On Sunday 17 February 2008 23:12:35 Robert Buchholz wrote: > > > > On Sunday, 17. February 2008, Eduardo Tongson wrote: > > > > > What specific kernel knowledge is needed to get a Kernel advisory up > > > > > and running ? > > > > > > > > Between becoming aware of a vulnerability in Linux and drafting an advisory > > > > for one or all kernel sources comes the part where you review which > > > > versions of which kernel sources are affected and unaffected. You also > > > > need to pay attention to specifics of the added patchsets, which might > > > > duplicate vulnerabilities. > > > > > > > > Parts of the job can indeed be done without Kernel and C knowledge, but > > > > some cannot. So if we draft a new kernel security *team*, people without C > > > > and kernel knowledge are helpful -- some others need to have it, though. > > > > > > > > Robert > > > > > > To be honest, 99% of what is done in the kernel security team can be done with > > > no C knowledge at all. > > > > > > I'm not an expert C person - far from it - but I eventually became the head of > > > Kernel Security until I retired a few months ago. > > > > > > Most of it is bug handling. The major problem is a social, not a technical > > > one. Because of the manner in which our kernels are organized, a single > > > vulnerability involves checking upstream version numbers, coordinating them > > > into our downstream version numbers for all sources, checking to see if the > > > sources are effected, figuring out who to CC for the bugs, then harassing > > > them until they do it. > > > > > > Unlike other security sources, any attempt to hardmask the package is shutdown > > > instantly. The chaos that would result from a kernel hardmask, even one of > > > the lesser used ones, caused me to only successfully order one over my entire > > > career in Gentoo Kernsec... even though more around 30 would have been > > > needed. It is not infrequently that bugs will last six months without any > > > action coming about them, and users are blissfully unaware. > > > > > > I am happy to give my input as the former head of Kernel Security, but it is > > > my personal opinion that any advances in kernel security will require the > > > full cooperation of security, and letting the head of kernel security be able > > > to actually enforce threats, as that seems to be the only way bugs ever get > > > resolved. Pleading didn't work - I tried. > > > > > > -Harlan Lieberman-Berg > > > Gentoo Developer Emeritus > > > > > > Every word of what you said is painfully true. The only way to > > accomplish this would be with an Iron Fist(fail) or a team of ~15 guys > > who do nothing but patch and push new kernels and the PR that goes along > > with them every few days. > > -- > > Ned Ludd <solar@g.o> > > > > > > > > -- > > gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list > > > > > -- > gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list > >
-- gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-security] Kernel Security + KISS Juan Pablo Olivera <jolivera@×××××××.uy>