1 |
Am Donnerstag, 8. Januar 2004 21:50 schrieb mir Daniel Privratsky: |
2 |
> Oliver Schad wrote: |
3 |
> > Am Donnerstag, 8. Januar 2004 18:57 schrieb mir Daniel Privratsky: |
4 |
> > What the fuck... |
5 |
> > I don't understand this, we want to break internet standards because |
6 |
> > some script kids could be (under some circumstances) a little bit |
7 |
> > slower with their attacks, which can only be successful, when an |
8 |
> > administrator is too stupid to configure his systems. Is that the |
9 |
> > argumentation for breaking internet standards? |
10 |
> > |
11 |
> > *argh* |
12 |
> |
13 |
> It is not about script kiddies. It's about security philosophy. REJECT |
14 |
> means system alive & port closed or firewall in the way and that IS the |
15 |
> information. DROP covers it with a fog of uncertainty. |
16 |
|
17 |
Hey somebody should decide for one argumentation. Now we don't care about |
18 |
script kids? Ok, let's take a look to advanced attackers. |
19 |
A closed port is a closed port is a closed port. Should an attacker take |
20 |
an can opener for it? When I know the port is filtered, this is an |
21 |
information too. So what? |
22 |
|
23 |
> Yas, it's bad to standards. Yes, it's good to security. You can choose |
24 |
> what is good to you. |
25 |
|
26 |
It's good for nothing. |
27 |
|
28 |
> Same applies to NAT, transparent proxies, syn defenders etc. Bad for |
29 |
> pure-internet utopia, but sometimes good for security. |
30 |
> And that's what is discussed here. |
31 |
|
32 |
NAT is no security feature, NAT is still for NAT. If you want to protect a |
33 |
network from establishing an connection from outside take a packet |
34 |
filter. But that should be treated in another discussion. You can be |
35 |
secure and don't break internet standards. You can run proxies, packet |
36 |
filters etc. without breaking internet standards. It works fine and you |
37 |
don't have to revert to security by obscurity. |
38 |
|
39 |
> btw: I still don't get it with the icmp "destination unrechable" idea. |
40 |
> does it mean, that some ultra tight checkpoint firewall should be |
41 |
> reconfigured, to propagete to the outer space it's interfaces just |
42 |
> because someone tries to reach non working system? you must be joking. |
43 |
|
44 |
Reject incoming connections, it works and it agrees with internet |
45 |
standards. |
46 |
|
47 |
mfg |
48 |
Oli |
49 |
|
50 |
|
51 |
-- |
52 |
gentoo-security@g.o mailing list |