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On Wed, Apr 26, 2006 at 02:54:15PM -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote: |
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> Niels Provos wrote: |
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> |
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> That is fair. If noone involved considers systrace MAC then I'm less |
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> inclined to care about its availability, I'm still very concerned about |
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> privilege escalation and user interaction. I will not concede that this |
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> sort of activity (particularly the privilege escalation) is very dangerous. |
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> |
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Even if it's only allowed to root and/or systraced processes ? |
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(let's remember that systrace is something that must be very selectively |
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enabled and that the privilege elevation thing is only available to root on |
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processes started with systrace) |
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-- |
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Andrea Barisani <lcars@g.o> .*. |
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Gentoo Linux Infrastructure Developer V |
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( ) |
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PGP-Key 0x864C9B9E http://dev.gentoo.org/~lcars/pubkey.asc ( ) |
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0A76 074A 02CD E989 CE7F AC3F DA47 578E 864C 9B9E ^^_^^ |
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"Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate" |
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-- |
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