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I like that idea very much, but it seems quite impractical. There are |
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many stages where things could go wrong and it will make things more |
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complicate for packagers and end-users alike. |
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It might be more feasible if there are two separate options added to |
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emerge, one being to not check sums on packages and then the second to |
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not check sums on the individual files. |
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Then there is the issue of clutter and wasting space. I guess you could |
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put them all in a folder like Manifest or Sums or something, but |
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still... |
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|
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Don't know how well it'd go over -- |
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buts a good idea. :) |
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|
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* Anthony |
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|
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On Mon, 2004-02-16 at 22:20, Brian Klauss wrote: |
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> Why not take package security one step deeper to ensure the validity |
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> of every ebuild and source-tree? |
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> |
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> Instead of relying upon a master hash of the compressed package, |
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> create a hash for each source file, documentation, makefile, etc., and |
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> as part of the emerge process, the application validates the |
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> compressed hash, then looks at each decompressed file and compares the |
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> hash value of it against a master repository. |
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> |
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> Once everything checks out, we then guarantee that the compressed |
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> package and all related source files are true to the source as it was |
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> created since the master hash tables are contained in the master |
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> repository instead of within the compressed file (which can be |
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> altered). |
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> |
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> Just an idea, and if I am way off, let me know. |
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> |
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> Brian... |
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-- |
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Please avoid sending me Word or PowerPoint attachments. |
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See http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html |
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|
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-- |
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