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So to avoid "spamming" with 20+ Thank You emails I'll send out just one and thank you all collectively for the information provided (I hope this isn't rude - I'm not sure of proper protocol in this situation). |
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|
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I have a lot more insight now and some new ideas of where I need to look to learn more. This is a great community and it reflects in the OS - I don't know why I waited so long to try Gentoo.(??)! |
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-john |
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|
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-----Original Message----- |
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From: Mansour Moufid [mailto:mansourmoufid@×××××.com] |
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Sent: Tuesday, April 06, 2010 10:15 PM |
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To: gentoo-security@l.g.o |
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Subject: Re: [gentoo-security] portage/rsync question |
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|
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On Tue, Apr 6, 2010 at 2:56 PM, Butterworth, John W. |
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<jbutterworth@×××××.org> wrote: |
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> If someone makes a change to a copy of a program (say a backdoor added to |
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> apache) hosted on a public mirror, will the sync’ing between the public |
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> mirror and the main rotation mirror determine that it's corrupted (via 'bad' |
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> checksum) on the public-mirror side and replace it? |
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|
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Package files themselves aren't part of the Portage tree (i.e. they |
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aren't hosted by the Portage mirrors). Only the ebuilds (and |
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accompanying metadata files) are. Ebuilds (generally) will point to |
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the package files on public websites. |
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|
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If an attacker has access to the package files (say at apache.org), |
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then your local Portage would indeed notice the corruption. On the |
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other hand, if they have access to the ebuilds and Manifest files of |
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the mirror you rsync to, Portage checks protect against nothing. At |
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that point, unless the attacker also controls the mirror server's |
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syncing with the main Gentoo tree, then yes, any malicious changes |
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would be overwritten during its next sync. That's not something to |
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count on. |
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|
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-- |
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Mansour Moufid |