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Brian Bilbrey writes: |
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> Then, at the user end, after performing an emerge sync, |
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> the process is run again, by portage: |
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> export FILENAME=`cat /usr/portage/serial_number` |
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> wget http://www.gentoo.org/$FILENAME |
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The process breaks at this point because if someone can |
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redirect your access to a sync mirror, he can redirect your |
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access to the web server, too. So the hash will always match |
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the portage tree because the attacker generated both. |
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> Let's be useful to the developers here, folks. |
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I have posted a concrete proposal that does fix the problem |
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long before this thread spun out of control. |
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Peter |
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-- |
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gentoo-security@g.o mailing list |