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On Sun, Nov 07, 2004 at 03:45:21PM +0000, Rui Covelo wrote: |
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> | > (1) the server has not been compromised |
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> | |
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> | How do I very this? Is there a list of SHA1 hashes of all |
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> | files /usr/portage is supposed to contain? |
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> |
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> Where would you store that list? In a trusted server? Would you trust |
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> the server admin of that server? |
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The point is not to eliminate the need to trust some entity. The point |
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is to have to worry about the integrity of as few entities as possible. |
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A single vulnerability is better than multiple vulnerabilities. |
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> | > IMO the purely technical issues have been solved mostly. |
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> | > However, those are smallest and least important part. |
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> | |
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> | So how long will it (approximately) take until this problem |
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> | is fixed? |
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> |
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> Well... I guess until someone comes up with a solution! Not the problem! |
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> The problem is already known. |
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So is the solution. It was posted a few messages back. We just need some |
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admin to drop a find script on the main server and setup the required |
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keys. Once the signatures are there, anyone can write the userland script |
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to do the verification, but until then, there's no point to write it since |
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the server implementation is not known. |
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- Chris |
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-- |
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