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c.f. bug 424647
List Archive: gentoo-security
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To: Stephen Clowater <steve@...>
From: aeonflux <aeonflux@...>
Subject: Re: grSecurity Information
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2004 01:28:01 -0400
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Stephen Clowater wrote:
| Compiling from stage 1 is a very important step, by compiling everythig,
| and by turning on the memory randomization features in GRsecurity
| (random mallac() base as a _very_ good one that I sorly miss on 2.6.0 as
| I wait like a 18 year old girl on prom night for the 2.6.0 GRsecurity
| patch :)) you will do alot to protect yourself.
Actually that's wrong.  The system call is changed in the kernel, so
regardless of whether or not the program was compiled/linked before or
after it will have the same effect. malloc() will return an integer
that's more random then before.

You could put grsecurity kernel on a stock redhat box, and still benefit
as much as recompiling everything from scratch.

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--
gentoo-security@g.o mailing list

References:
grSecurity Information
-- Steve B.
Re: grSecurity Information
-- Stephen Clowater
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Updated Jun 17, 2009

Summary: Archive of the gentoo-security mailing list.

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