> Or to turn it around, on a user managed workstation its both
> inconvenient and adds little to security.  In fact, its easiest to just
> keep a root window open and run it from there - which is insecure if 
> you walk away and leave it running.
>
> The point I am trying to make is that forcing useful tools to run as
> root for everyone makes little sense on a user managed workstation 
> and can be counter-productive as above when users just work around 
> the restrictions in an insecure manner.

If you produced a product, would you want it to be considered secure or 
insecure out of the box?  I think anyone currently looking at the various 
worms and virii bombarding thier internet connections can answer that one.  
I personally would rather have a secure product.  With Gentoo, who's theme 
is "totally configurable", the product will only be as insecure as you make 
it.  
 
> Perhaps a "secure_options" use flag to cater for those who work in
> multiuser/insecure environments?  I would rather not suffer an unusable
> system because a few users have special requirements.

I think we should call it the "insecure_worm-promoting_microsoftesc_options" 
use flag.  Once again, typing sudo really isn't that big of an 
inconvienece.  You could even write an alias for traceroute to 
exec "sudo /usr/sbin/traceroute".

-bill
> BillK
> On Wed, 2003-12-17 at 09:16, Bill Moritz wrote:
> > > SUID exploits are based on the premise that you've already access to 
> > > the system in question. If you don't trust people with accounts on 
> > > your system, they shouldn't have it.
> > 
> > What about people that run shell servers?  Should I have an interview 
> > process and a background check on anyone that wants to pay for access to 
my 
> > systems?
> > 
> > > Just another $.02
> > > 
> > > -d
> > 
> > -bill
> > 
> > --
> > gentoo-security@g.o mailing list
> 
> --
> gentoo-security@g.o mailing list
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