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I can help also... i have limited free time but am willing to put in |
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some hours... |
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|
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I have medium C knowledge, reasonable kernel experience, and also a |
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strong linux background |
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|
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On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 8:02 AM, Arthur Bispo de Castro |
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<arthur@××××××××××××××.br> wrote: |
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> I'm interested... little C knowledge, very curious about kernel, strong |
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> linux background... |
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> |
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> is there another prereq to join this? |
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> |
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> |
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> |
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> On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 04:20:02AM -0200, Juan Pablo Olivera wrote: |
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> > I am interested too :) |
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> > |
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> > No C knowledge but strong linux background and very organized guy. |
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> > |
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> > On Thu, 2008-02-21 at 01:05 -0500, Casey Link wrote: |
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> > > It would probably help if we knew how many people were interested. |
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> > > |
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> > > I am. +1 |
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> > > |
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> > > Casey |
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> > > |
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> > > On Wed, Feb 20, 2008 at 10:16 PM, Eduardo Tongson <propolice@×××××.com> wrote: |
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> > > > Alright how do we proceed to get this team started. |
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> > > > |
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> > > > ed*eonsec |
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> > > > |
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> > > > |
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> > > > |
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> > > > On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 6:55 AM, Ned Ludd <solar@g.o> wrote: |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > On Wed, 2008-02-20 at 13:59 -0500, Harlan Lieberman-Berg wrote: |
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> > > > > > On Sunday 17 February 2008 23:12:35 Robert Buchholz wrote: |
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> > > > > > > On Sunday, 17. February 2008, Eduardo Tongson wrote: |
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> > > > > > > > What specific kernel knowledge is needed to get a Kernel advisory up |
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> > > > > > > > and running ? |
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> > > > > > > |
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> > > > > > > Between becoming aware of a vulnerability in Linux and drafting an advisory |
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> > > > > > > for one or all kernel sources comes the part where you review which |
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> > > > > > > versions of which kernel sources are affected and unaffected. You also |
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> > > > > > > need to pay attention to specifics of the added patchsets, which might |
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> > > > > > > duplicate vulnerabilities. |
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> > > > > > > |
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> > > > > > > Parts of the job can indeed be done without Kernel and C knowledge, but |
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> > > > > > > some cannot. So if we draft a new kernel security *team*, people without C |
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> > > > > > > and kernel knowledge are helpful -- some others need to have it, though. |
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> > > > > > > |
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> > > > > > > Robert |
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> > > > > > |
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> > > > > > To be honest, 99% of what is done in the kernel security team can be done with |
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> > > > > > no C knowledge at all. |
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> > > > > > |
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> > > > > > I'm not an expert C person - far from it - but I eventually became the head of |
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> > > > > > Kernel Security until I retired a few months ago. |
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> > > > > > |
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> > > > > > Most of it is bug handling. The major problem is a social, not a technical |
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> > > > > > one. Because of the manner in which our kernels are organized, a single |
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> > > > > > vulnerability involves checking upstream version numbers, coordinating them |
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> > > > > > into our downstream version numbers for all sources, checking to see if the |
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> > > > > > sources are effected, figuring out who to CC for the bugs, then harassing |
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> > > > > > them until they do it. |
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> > > > > > |
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> > > > > > Unlike other security sources, any attempt to hardmask the package is shutdown |
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> > > > > > instantly. The chaos that would result from a kernel hardmask, even one of |
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> > > > > > the lesser used ones, caused me to only successfully order one over my entire |
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> > > > > > career in Gentoo Kernsec... even though more around 30 would have been |
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> > > > > > needed. It is not infrequently that bugs will last six months without any |
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> > > > > > action coming about them, and users are blissfully unaware. |
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> > > > > > |
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> > > > > > I am happy to give my input as the former head of Kernel Security, but it is |
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> > > > > > my personal opinion that any advances in kernel security will require the |
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> > > > > > full cooperation of security, and letting the head of kernel security be able |
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> > > > > > to actually enforce threats, as that seems to be the only way bugs ever get |
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> > > > > > resolved. Pleading didn't work - I tried. |
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> > > > > > |
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> > > > > > -Harlan Lieberman-Berg |
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> > > > > > Gentoo Developer Emeritus |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > Every word of what you said is painfully true. The only way to |
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> > > > > accomplish this would be with an Iron Fist(fail) or a team of ~15 guys |
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> > > > > who do nothing but patch and push new kernels and the PR that goes along |
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> > > > > with them every few days. |
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> > > > > -- |
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> > > > > Ned Ludd <solar@g.o> |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > -- |
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> > > > > gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > > |
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> > > > -- |
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> > > > gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list |
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> > > > |
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> > > > |
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> > |
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> > -- |
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> > gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list |
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> |
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> -- |
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> Arthur Bispo de Castro |
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> Laboratório de Administração e Segurança (LAS/IC) |
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> Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
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> -- |
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> |
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> |
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> gentoo-security@l.g.o mailing list |
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> |
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> |
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|
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|
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-- |
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Nick Loeve |
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www.trickie.org |