Gentoo Archives: gentoo-security

From: Brian Klauss <brklauss@×××××××××.net>
To: gentoo-security@l.g.o, Heikki Levanto <heikki@×××.dk>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-security] Thoughts on Package Security
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2004 05:06:21
Message-Id: 000c01c3f5dc$e9828080$0702a8c0@neo
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-security] Thoughts on Package Security by Heikki Levanto
1 What I don't understand then is the problem with security of ebuilds. If we
2 can validate that the MD5 hash is consistent with the published hash, then
3 the package would be considered secure and case is effectively closed?
4 Right?
5
6
7 ----- Original Message -----
8 From: "Heikki Levanto" <heikki@×××.dk>
9 To: <gentoo-security@l.g.o>
10 Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2004 1:01 AM
11 Subject: Re: [gentoo-security] Thoughts on Package Security
12
13
14 > On Mon, 2004-02-16 at 22:20, Brian Klauss wrote:
15 > > Why not take package security one step deeper to ensure the validity
16 > > of every ebuild and source-tree?
17 > >
18 > > Instead of relying upon a master hash of the compressed package,
19 > > create a hash for each source file, documentation, makefile, etc.
20 >
21 > Sorry, I don't see what that would give. If the md5 of the compressed
22 > archive is fine, then we know already that it has not been tampered
23 > with. Ergo, all contained files are fine.
24 >
25 > (except for the theoretical possibility of md5-sum collision, which is
26 > unlikely to an astronomical degree, and not worth worrying about in real
27 > world)
28 >
29 > Heikki
30 >
31 > --
32 > Heikki Levanto LSD - Levanto Software Development <heikki@×××.dk>
33 >
34 >
35 > --
36 > gentoo-security@g.o mailing list
37 >
38 >
39 >
40
41
42 --
43 gentoo-security@g.o mailing list

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-security] Thoughts on Package Security Ed Grimm <paranoid@××××××××××××××××××××××.org>