Gentoo Archives: gentoo-commits

From: "Richard Farina (zerochaos)" <zerochaos@g.o>
To: gentoo-commits@l.g.o
Subject: [gentoo-commits] gentoo-x86 commit in net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files: wpa_supplicant-2.4-cve-2015-1863.patch
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 14:41:24
Message-Id: 20150427182640.A912D99C@oystercatcher.gentoo.org
1 zerochaos 15/04/27 18:26:39
2
3 Added: wpa_supplicant-2.4-cve-2015-1863.patch
4 Log:
5 add patch for bug #547492 while not loading arch teams working on bug #524928
6
7 (Portage version: 2.2.18/cvs/Linux x86_64, RepoMan options: --force, signed Manifest commit with key DD11F94A)
8
9 Revision Changes Path
10 1.1 net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-cve-2015-1863.patch
11
12 file : http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo-x86/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-cve-2015-1863.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
13 plain: http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo-x86/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/wpa_supplicant-2.4-cve-2015-1863.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain
14
15 Index: wpa_supplicant-2.4-cve-2015-1863.patch
16 ===================================================================
17 From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
18 From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@××××××××××××.com>
19 Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2015 08:32:11 +0000
20 Subject: P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it (CVE-2015-1863)
21
22 This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
23 p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
24 was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
25 arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
26 dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
27 heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
28 peer discovery purposes.
29
30 This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
31 behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
32 due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
33 and potentially arbitrary code execution.
34
35 Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
36 hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
37
38 Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@××××××××××××.com>
39 ---
40 diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
41 index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
42 --- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
43 +++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
44 @@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
45 if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
46 os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
47 if (msg.ssid &&
48 + msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
49 (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
50 os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
51 != 0)) {
52 --
53 cgit v0.9.2