[gentoo-commits] repo/gentoo:master commit in: net-misc/openssh/files/, net-misc/openssh/

[Patrick McLean]

commit:     4df896235ee386a1c1830b94bc86cb7a790c0fd7
Author:     Patrick McLean <chutzpah <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Thu Aug 26 21:28:53 2021 +0000
Commit:     Patrick McLean <chutzpah <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Fri Aug 27 00:13:02 2021 +0000
URL:        https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=4df89623

net-misc/openssh-8.7_p1: Version bump, no X509 yet

Package-Manager: Portage-3.0.22, Repoman-3.0.3
Signed-off-by: Patrick McLean <chutzpah <AT> gentoo.org>

 net-misc/openssh/Manifest                          |   2 +
 .../openssh/files/openssh-8.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch  | 357 ++++++++++++++
 .../files/openssh-8.7_p1-hpn-15.2-glue.patch       | 198 ++++++++
 net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.7_p1.ebuild             | 513 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 1070 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest
index 7e7889daada..b6ea0efce2b 100644
--- a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ DIST openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz 1779733 BLAKE2B f4e4bd39e2dd275d4811e06ca994f2239ad27c
 DIST openssh-8.6p1+x509-13.1.diff.gz 1011666 BLAKE2B 0ac0cf2ff962b8ef677c49de0bb586f375f14d8964e077c10f6a88ec15734807940ab6c0277e44ebdfde0e50c2c80103cff614a6cde4d66e9986152032eeaa90 SHA512 ae4986dd079678c7b0cfd805136ff7ac940d1049fdddeb5a7c4ea2141bfcca70463b951485fb2b113bc930f519b1b41562900ced0269f5673dbdad867f464251
 DIST openssh-8.6p1-sctp-1.2.patch.xz 7696 BLAKE2B 37f9e943a1881af05d9cf2234433711dc45ca30c60af4c0ea38a1d361df02abb491fa114f3698285f582b40b838414c1a048c4f09aa4f7ae9499adb09201d2ac SHA512 ba8c4d38a3d90854e79dc18918fffde246d7609a3f1c3a35e06c0fbe33d3688ed29b0ec33556ae37d1654e1dc2133d892613ad8d1ecbdce9aaa5b9eb10dcbb7a
 DIST openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz 1786328 BLAKE2B 261a0f1a6235275894d487cce37537755c86835e3a34871462fe29bfe72b49cd9a6b6a547aea4bd554f0957e110c84458cc75a5f2560717fb04804d62228562a SHA512 9854eda0b773c64c9f1f74844ce466b2b42ee8845f58ad062b73141d617af944fa4ebafdf72069f400106d2c2bd0a69c92fe805ec1fc26d4f0faadf06c3fbbe6
+DIST openssh-8.7p1-sctp-1.2.patch.xz 6740 BLAKE2B 468a455018ffddf4fa64d63acb732ad3e1fb722ae8b24d06cf3a683167a4580626b477bbc286f296c83d39dd36c101ac58597a21daa63de83ad55af00aa3a6be SHA512 aa9067c9025b6e4edfad5e45ec92da43db14edb11aae02cbbc296e66b48377cbbf62cdafcdd5edfd1fd4bf69420ee017223ab52e50a42b1976002d767984777c
+DIST openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz 1814595 BLAKE2B 9fdb8898485053d08c9eca419c15d0d03b7a60152cf6a9d7f1beed3a21c9e6ac3bd9f854580e6e474fb0c871f3d4be9ef4b49bee8c355d9e5769a5505f4e6ea9 SHA512 08c81024d9e1248abfda6cc874886ff5ae916669b93cd6aff640e0614ee8cbcbc3fe87a9ce47136b6443ddbb1168b114367c74e117551905994e1a7e3fa2c0c2
 DIST openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-15.2.diff 30096 BLAKE2B f0c020dd2403806c79d4c37a019996d275655b04997301e247f5c4dd7fad35d12b3b7c25afb1b078d915ef2a4ae02f736f0aec9ba2a8c56a405d7ca303bcadf7 SHA512 4c2dbf99a9b5953fdb955f700272bbaeaa025f108a8860d2190197962b849f8385327af82c4d6a3a130a7fba35a74a8ec9437d642867601acb29817c49632a8f
 DIST openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-15.2.diff 51428 BLAKE2B 370b88a7da7f148bf5a4d445f05cf593b486e9df53bba027e2e179726f534b68cf9d94edd6e53024e0b6ff5f20e568727bc9d26c94d0d415603602a80d3ad241 SHA512 2d8d887901164b33b2799ff3ec72e86a39ae4a1696e52bcee0872dbae7772fcc534351e6e7f87126ee71b164c74e9091350f14b782f4b242a09f09b4f50d047a
 DIST openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-PeakTput-15.2.diff 2429 BLAKE2B 849bf3c313719ab7a25c75e82d5dc5ac98365a038b2a66fe58d01eae5b20c7777258b94b5830e799d6909e75c69753cda05a910f3bdab9606fb7d5efa68e05f1 SHA512 c4a56fab55fabd1d902d45f235b603708d43f969920e45c9a57e557dccfa9cade2ec61f26d1ace938f6f73e79f17b12f119b5aea9166cbda8e3435b910500914

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ffc40b70ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index 00b168b4..8ee93581 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -729,118 +729,6 @@ fakepw(void)
+ 	return (&fake);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return xstrdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return xstrdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+- * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+- * several times.
+- */
+-
+-const char *
+-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+-{
+-	static char *dnsname;
+-
+-	if (!use_dns)
+-		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+-		return dnsname;
+-	else {
+-		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-		return dnsname;
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ /* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
+ 
+ /* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
+diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
+index a810da0e..18e9d8d4 100644
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++static char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
++	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++	/* Get IP address of client. */
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
++		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++		return xstrdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
++		return xstrdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++		    name, ntop);
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
++		return xstrdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++	lowercase(name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
++	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++	 * the domain).
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
++		return xstrdup(ntop);
++	}
++	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++				break;
++	}
++	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++	if (ai == NULL) {
++		/* Address not found for the host name. */
++		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
++		return xstrdup(ntop);
++	}
++	return xstrdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++	static char *dnsname;
++
++	if (!use_dns)
++		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	else if (dnsname != NULL)
++		return dnsname;
++	else {
++		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++		return dnsname;
++	}
++}
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 03369a08..b45898ce 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -207,9 +208,11 @@ static struct {
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ # else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
+@@ -1117,6 +1120,10 @@ parse_time:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2307,6 +2314,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -2465,6 +2473,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index f7d53b06..c3a91898 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index cd0eea86..27101943 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -832,6 +832,16 @@ The default is
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index fea50fab..aeff639b 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -776,6 +776,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int r, ok = 0;
+ 	gss_OID mech = NULL;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
++		gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, 1);
++	} else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -790,7 +797,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+-		    mech, authctxt->host)) {
++		    mech, gss_host)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			authctxt->mech_tried++;

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.7_p1-hpn-15.2-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.7_p1-hpn-15.2-glue.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..309e57e8864
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.7_p1-hpn-15.2-glue.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+diff -ur '--exclude=.*.un~' a/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-15.2.diff b/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-15.2.diff
+--- a/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-15.2.diff	2021-08-20 11:49:32.351767063 -0700
++++ b/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-15.2.diff	2021-08-20 11:58:08.746214945 -0700
+@@ -1026,9 +1026,9 @@
+ +	}
+ +#endif
+ +
+- 	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+- }
+- 
++ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
++ 		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host,
++ 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+ index 6277e6d6..bf3d6e4a 100644
+ --- a/sshd.c
+diff -ur '--exclude=.*.un~' a/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-15.2.diff b/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-15.2.diff
+--- a/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-15.2.diff	2021-08-20 11:49:32.351767063 -0700
++++ b/openssh-8_5_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-15.2.diff	2021-08-20 12:04:45.008038085 -0700
+@@ -536,18 +536,10 @@
+  	if (state->rekey_limit)
+  		*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
+  		    state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+-@@ -954,6 +963,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
++@@ -954,6 +963,16 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+  	return 0;
+  }
+  
+-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
+-+int rekey_requested = 0;
+-+void
+-+packet_request_rekeying(void)
+-+{
+-+	rekey_requested = 1;
+-+}
+-+
+ +/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
+ + * and none cipher switch */
+ +int
+@@ -561,20 +553,6 @@
+  #define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
+  static int
+  ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+-@@ -980,6 +1007,13 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+- 	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
+- 		return 0;
+- 
+-+	/* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
+-+         * cipher switch methods -cjr */
+-+        if (rekey_requested == 1) {
+-+                rekey_requested = 0;
+-+                return 1;
+-+        }
+-+
+- 	/* Time-based rekeying */
+- 	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
+- 	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+ @@ -1317,7 +1351,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+  	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+  	int len, r, ms_remain;
+@@ -598,12 +576,11 @@
+  };
+  
+  typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *,
+-@@ -155,6 +158,10 @@ int	 ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *);
++@@ -155,6 +158,9 @@ int	 ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *);
+  int	 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
+  u_int	 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
+  
+ +/* for forced packet rekeying post auth */
+-+void	 packet_request_rekeying(void);
+ +int	 packet_authentication_state(const struct ssh *);
+ +
+  int	 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+@@ -627,9 +604,9 @@
+  	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
+ +	oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize,
+ +	oNoneEnabled, oNoneMacEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
++ 	oDisableMTAES,
+  	oVisualHostKey,
+  	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+- 	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+ @@ -297,6 +300,9 @@ static struct {
+  	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+  	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
+@@ -637,9 +614,9 @@
+ +	{ "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
+ +	{ "nonemacenabled", oNoneMacEnabled },
+ +	{ "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
+- 	{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
+- 	{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
+- 	{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
++ 	{ "sessiontype", oSessionType },
++ 	{ "stdinnull", oStdinNull },
++ 	{ "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication },
+ @@ -317,6 +323,11 @@ static struct {
+  	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+  	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+@@ -717,9 +694,9 @@
+ +	options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
+ +	options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
+ +	options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
+- 	options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
+- 	options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
+- 	options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
++ 	options->session_type = -1;
++ 	options->stdin_null = -1;
++ 	options->fork_after_authentication = -1;
+ @@ -2426,6 +2484,41 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+  		options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+  	if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+@@ -778,9 +755,9 @@
+  	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+  	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+ @@ -120,7 +124,11 @@ typedef struct {
+- 
+  	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+  	int64_t rekey_limit;
++ 	int     disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/
+ +	int     none_switch;    /* Use none cipher */
+ +	int     none_enabled;   /* Allow none cipher to be used */
+ +  	int     nonemac_enabled;   /* Allow none MAC to be used */
+@@ -842,9 +819,9 @@
+  	/* Portable-specific options */
+  	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+ @@ -424,6 +434,49 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+- 	}
+- 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+  		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
++ 	if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
++ 		options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
+ +	if (options->none_enabled == -1)
+ +		options->none_enabled = 0;
+ +	if (options->nonemac_enabled == -1)
+@@ -1047,17 +1024,17 @@
+  Note that
+ diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+ index fb3c08d1..89bebbb2 100644
+---- a/sftp.c
+-+++ b/sftp.c
+-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typedef void EditLine;
+- #include "sftp-client.h"
+- 
+- #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN	32768	/* Size of buffer for up/download */
+--#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	64	/* # concurrent outstanding requests */
+-+#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	256	/* # concurrent outstanding requests */
++--- a/sftp-client.c
+++++ b/sftp-client.c
++@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ typedef void EditLine;
++ #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN	32768
++ 
++ /* Default number of concurrent outstanding requests */
++-#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	64
+++#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	256
+  
+- /* File to read commands from */
+- FILE* infile;
++ /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
++ #define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
+ diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+ index cfb5f115..36a6e519 100644
+ --- a/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -1330,9 +1307,9 @@
+ +		}
+ +	}
+ +
+- 	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+- }
+  
++ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++ 	if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
+ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+ index 6277e6d6..d66fa41a 100644
+ --- a/sshd.c
+@@ -1359,8 +1336,8 @@
+  		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+  			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+ @@ -1727,6 +1734,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
++ 		fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
++ 		    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
+  
+ +	if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
+ +		char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers;
+@@ -1375,9 +1352,9 @@
+ +		}
+ +	}
+ +
+- 	/* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
+- 	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+- 		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
++ 	/*
++ 	 * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
++ 	 * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
+ @@ -2166,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+  	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
+  	free(laddr);

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.7_p1.ebuild b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.7_p1.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2b26a0f2548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-8.7_p1.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2021 Gentoo Authors
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI=7
+
+inherit user-info flag-o-matic autotools pam systemd toolchain-funcs
+
+# Make it more portable between straight releases
+# and _p? releases.
+PARCH=${P/_}
+
+# PV to USE for HPN patches
+#HPN_PV="${PV^^}"
+HPN_PV="8.5_P1"
+
+HPN_VER="15.2"
+HPN_PATCHES=(
+	${PN}-${HPN_PV/./_}-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-${HPN_VER}.diff
+	${PN}-${HPN_PV/./_}-hpn-AES-CTR-${HPN_VER}.diff
+	${PN}-${HPN_PV/./_}-hpn-PeakTput-${HPN_VER}.diff
+)
+
+SCTP_VER="1.2" SCTP_PATCH="${PARCH}-sctp-${SCTP_VER}.patch.xz"
+#X509_VER="13.1" X509_PATCH="${PARCH}+x509-${X509_VER}.diff.gz"
+
+DESCRIPTION="Port of OpenBSD's free SSH release"
+HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssh.com/"
+SRC_URI="mirror://openbsd/OpenSSH/portable/${PARCH}.tar.gz
+	${SCTP_PATCH:+sctp? ( https://dev.gentoo.org/~chutzpah/dist/openssh/${SCTP_PATCH} )}
+	${HPN_VER:+hpn? ( $(printf "mirror://sourceforge/project/hpnssh/Patches/HPN-SSH%%20${HPN_VER/./v}%%20${HPN_PV/_P/p}/%s\n" "${HPN_PATCHES[@]}") )}
+	${X509_PATCH:+X509? ( https://roumenpetrov.info/openssh/x509-${X509_VER}/${X509_PATCH} )}
+"
+S="${WORKDIR}/${PARCH}"
+
+LICENSE="BSD GPL-2"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~x64-cygwin ~amd64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris"
+# Probably want to drop ssl defaulting to on in a future version.
+IUSE="abi_mips_n32 audit bindist debug hpn kerberos kernel_linux ldns libedit livecd pam +pie +scp sctp security-key selinux +ssl static test X X509 xmss"
+
+RESTRICT="!test? ( test )"
+
+REQUIRED_USE="
+	hpn? ( ssl )
+	ldns? ( ssl )
+	pie? ( !static )
+	static? ( !kerberos !pam )
+	X509? ( !sctp !security-key ssl !xmss )
+	xmss? ( ssl  )
+	test? ( ssl )
+"
+
+# tests currently fail with XMSS
+REQUIRED_USE+="test? ( !xmss )"
+
+LIB_DEPEND="
+	audit? ( sys-process/audit[static-libs(+)] )
+	ldns? (
+		net-libs/ldns[static-libs(+)]
+		!bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[ecdsa,ssl(+)] )
+		bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[-ecdsa,ssl(+)] )
+	)
+	libedit? ( dev-libs/libedit:=[static-libs(+)] )
+	sctp? ( net-misc/lksctp-tools[static-libs(+)] )
+	security-key? ( >=dev-libs/libfido2-1.5.0:=[static-libs(+)] )
+	selinux? ( >=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28[static-libs(+)] )
+	ssl? (
+			|| (
+				(
+					>=dev-libs/openssl-1.0.1:0[bindist(-)=]
+					<dev-libs/openssl-1.1.0:0[bindist(-)=]
+				)
+				>=dev-libs/openssl-1.1.0g:0[bindist(-)=]
+			)
+			dev-libs/openssl:0=[static-libs(+)]
+	)
+	virtual/libcrypt:=[static-libs(+)]
+	>=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.3:=[static-libs(+)]
+"
+RDEPEND="
+	acct-group/sshd
+	acct-user/sshd
+	!static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND//\[static-libs(+)]} )
+	pam? ( sys-libs/pam )
+	kerberos? ( virtual/krb5 )
+"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND}
+	virtual/os-headers
+	kernel_linux? ( !prefix-guest? ( >=sys-kernel/linux-headers-5.1 ) )
+	static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND} )
+"
+RDEPEND="${RDEPEND}
+	pam? ( >=sys-auth/pambase-20081028 )
+	userland_GNU? ( !prefix? ( sys-apps/shadow ) )
+	X? ( x11-apps/xauth )
+"
+BDEPEND="
+	virtual/pkgconfig
+	sys-devel/autoconf
+"
+
+pkg_pretend() {
+	# this sucks, but i'd rather have people unable to `emerge -u openssh`
+	# than not be able to log in to their server any more
+	maybe_fail() { [[ -z ${!2} ]] && echo "$1" ; }
+	local fail="
+		$(use hpn && maybe_fail hpn HPN_VER)
+		$(use sctp && maybe_fail sctp SCTP_PATCH)
+		$(use X509 && maybe_fail X509 X509_PATCH)
+	"
+	fail=$(echo ${fail})
+	if [[ -n ${fail} ]] ; then
+		eerror "Sorry, but this version does not yet support features"
+		eerror "that you requested:	 ${fail}"
+		eerror "Please mask ${PF} for now and check back later:"
+		eerror " # echo '=${CATEGORY}/${PF}' >> /etc/portage/package.mask"
+		die "Missing requested third party patch."
+	fi
+
+	# Make sure people who are using tcp wrappers are notified of its removal. #531156
+	if grep -qs '^ *sshd *:' "${EROOT}"/etc/hosts.{allow,deny} ; then
+		ewarn "Sorry, but openssh no longer supports tcp-wrappers, and it seems like"
+		ewarn "you're trying to use it.  Update your ${EROOT}/etc/hosts.{allow,deny} please."
+	fi
+}
+
+src_prepare() {
+	sed -i \
+		-e "/_PATH_XAUTH/s:/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth:${EPREFIX}/usr/bin/xauth:" \
+		pathnames.h || die
+
+	# don't break .ssh/authorized_keys2 for fun
+	sed -i '/^AuthorizedKeysFile/s:^:#:' sshd_config || die
+
+	eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch
+	eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch #165444 integrated into gsskex
+	eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch
+	eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch
+	eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch
+	eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch
+
+	[[ -d ${WORKDIR}/patches ]] && eapply "${WORKDIR}"/patches
+
+	local PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS=()
+
+	if use X509 ; then
+		pushd "${WORKDIR}" &>/dev/null || die
+		eapply "${FILESDIR}/${P}-X509-glue-"${X509_VER}".patch"
+		popd &>/dev/null || die
+
+		eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${X509_PATCH%.*}
+
+		# We need to patch package version or any X.509 sshd will reject our ssh client
+		# with "userauth_pubkey: could not parse key: string is too large [preauth]"
+		# error
+		einfo "Patching package version for X.509 patch set ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "s/^AC_INIT(\[OpenSSH\], \[Portable\]/AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [${X509_VER}]/" \
+			"${S}"/configure.ac || die "Failed to patch package version for X.509 patch"
+
+		einfo "Patching version.h to expose X.509 patch set ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE.*/a #define SSH_X509               \"-PKIXSSH-${X509_VER}\"" \
+			"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in X.509 patch version"
+		PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_X509' )
+	fi
+
+	if use sctp ; then
+		eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${SCTP_PATCH%.*}
+
+		einfo "Patching version.h to expose SCTP patch set ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_SCTP        \"-sctp-${SCTP_VER}\"" \
+			"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in SCTP patch version"
+		PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_SCTP' )
+
+		einfo "Disabling know failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "/\t\tcfgparse \\\/d" \
+			"${S}"/regress/Makefile || die "Failed to disable known failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch"
+	fi
+
+	if use hpn ; then
+		local hpn_patchdir="${T}/${P}-hpn${HPN_VER}"
+		mkdir "${hpn_patchdir}" || die
+		cp $(printf -- "${DISTDIR}/%s\n" "${HPN_PATCHES[@]}") "${hpn_patchdir}" || die
+		pushd "${hpn_patchdir}" &>/dev/null || die
+		eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-hpn-${HPN_VER}-glue.patch
+		use X509 && eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.6_p1-hpn-${HPN_VER}-X509-glue.patch
+		use sctp && eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.5_p1-hpn-${HPN_VER}-sctp-glue.patch
+		popd &>/dev/null || die
+
+		eapply "${hpn_patchdir}"
+
+		use X509 || eapply "${FILESDIR}/openssh-8.6_p1-hpn-version.patch"
+
+		einfo "Patching Makefile.in for HPN patch set ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "/^LIBS=/ s/\$/ -lpthread/" \
+			"${S}"/Makefile.in || die "Failed to patch Makefile.in"
+
+		einfo "Patching version.h to expose HPN patch set ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_HPN         \"-hpn${HPN_VER//./v}\"" \
+			"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in HPN patch version"
+		PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_HPN' )
+
+		if [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then
+			einfo "Disabling known non-working MT AES cipher per default ..."
+
+			cat > "${T}"/disable_mtaes.conf <<- EOF
+
+			# HPN's Multi-Threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken
+			# and therefore disabled per default.
+			DisableMTAES yes
+			EOF
+			sed -i \
+				-e "/^#HPNDisabled.*/r ${T}/disable_mtaes.conf" \
+				"${S}"/sshd_config || die "Failed to disabled MT AES ciphers in sshd_config"
+
+			sed -i \
+				-e "/AcceptEnv.*_XXX_TEST$/a \\\tDisableMTAES\t\tyes" \
+				"${S}"/regress/test-exec.sh || die "Failed to disable MT AES ciphers in test config"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if use X509 || use sctp || use hpn ; then
+		einfo "Patching sshconnect.c to use SSH_RELEASE in send_client_banner() ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \
+			"${S}"/sshconnect.c || die "Failed to patch send_client_banner() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshconnect.c)"
+
+		einfo "Patching sshd.c to use SSH_RELEASE in sshd_exchange_identification() ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \
+			"${S}"/sshd.c || die "Failed to patch sshd_exchange_identification() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshd.c)"
+
+		einfo "Patching version.h to add our patch sets to SSH_RELEASE ..."
+		sed -i \
+			-e "s/^#define SSH_RELEASE.*/#define SSH_RELEASE     SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE ${PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS[*]}/" \
+			"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to patch SSH_RELEASE (version.h)"
+	fi
+
+	sed -i \
+		-e "/#UseLogin no/d" \
+		"${S}"/sshd_config || die "Failed to remove removed UseLogin option (sshd_config)"
+
+	eapply_user #473004
+
+	# These tests are currently incompatible with PORTAGE_TMPDIR/sandbox
+	sed -e '/\t\tpercent \\/ d' \
+		-i regress/Makefile || die
+
+	tc-export PKG_CONFIG
+	local sed_args=(
+		-e "s:-lcrypto:$(${PKG_CONFIG} --libs openssl):"
+		# Disable PATH reset, trust what portage gives us #254615
+		-e 's:^PATH=/:#PATH=/:'
+		# Disable fortify flags ... our gcc does this for us
+		-e 's:-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2::'
+	)
+
+	# The -ftrapv flag ICEs on hppa #505182
+	use hppa && sed_args+=(
+		-e '/CFLAGS/s:-ftrapv:-fdisable-this-test:'
+		-e '/OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK.*-ftrapv/d'
+	)
+	# _XOPEN_SOURCE causes header conflicts on Solaris
+	[[ ${CHOST} == *-solaris* ]] && sed_args+=(
+		-e 's/-D_XOPEN_SOURCE//'
+	)
+	sed -i "${sed_args[@]}" configure{.ac,} || die
+
+	eautoreconf
+}
+
+src_configure() {
+	addwrite /dev/ptmx
+
+	use debug && append-cppflags -DSANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+	use static && append-ldflags -static
+	use xmss && append-cflags -DWITH_XMSS
+
+	if [[ ${CHOST} == *-solaris* ]] ; then
+		# Solaris' glob.h doesn't have things like GLOB_TILDE, configure
+		# doesn't check for this, so force the replacement to be put in
+		# place
+		append-cppflags -DBROKEN_GLOB
+	fi
+
+	# use replacement, RPF_ECHO_ON doesn't exist here
+	[[ ${CHOST} == *-darwin* ]] && export ac_cv_func_readpassphrase=no
+
+	local myconf=(
+		--with-ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
+		--disable-strip
+		--with-pid-dir="${EPREFIX}"$(usex kernel_linux '' '/var')/run
+		--sysconfdir="${EPREFIX}"/etc/ssh
+		--libexecdir="${EPREFIX}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/misc
+		--datadir="${EPREFIX}"/usr/share/openssh
+		--with-privsep-path="${EPREFIX}"/var/empty
+		--with-privsep-user=sshd
+		$(use_with audit audit linux)
+		$(use_with kerberos kerberos5 "${EPREFIX}"/usr)
+		# We apply the sctp patch conditionally, so can't pass --without-sctp
+		# unconditionally else we get unknown flag warnings.
+		$(use sctp && use_with sctp)
+		$(use_with ldns ldns "${EPREFIX}"/usr)
+		$(use_with libedit)
+		$(use_with pam)
+		$(use_with pie)
+		$(use_with selinux)
+		$(usex X509 '' "$(use_with security-key security-key-builtin)")
+		$(use_with ssl openssl)
+		$(use_with ssl md5-passwords)
+		$(use_with ssl ssl-engine)
+		$(use_with !elibc_Cygwin hardening) #659210
+	)
+
+	if use elibc_musl; then
+		# stackprotect is broken on musl x86 and ppc
+		if use x86 || use ppc; then
+			myconf+=( --without-stackprotect )
+		fi
+
+		# musl defines bogus values for UTMP_FILE and WTMP_FILE
+		# https://bugs.gentoo.org/753230
+		myconf+=( --disable-utmp --disable-wtmp )
+	fi
+
+	# The seccomp sandbox is broken on x32, so use the older method for now. #553748
+	use amd64 && [[ ${ABI} == "x32" ]] && myconf+=( --with-sandbox=rlimit )
+
+	econf "${myconf[@]}"
+}
+
+src_test() {
+	local t skipped=() failed=() passed=()
+	local tests=( interop-tests compat-tests )
+
+	local shell=$(egetshell "${UID}")
+	if [[ ${shell} == */nologin ]] || [[ ${shell} == */false ]] ; then
+		elog "Running the full OpenSSH testsuite requires a usable shell for the 'portage'"
+		elog "user, so we will run a subset only."
+		skipped+=( tests )
+	else
+		tests+=( tests )
+	fi
+
+	# It will also attempt to write to the homedir .ssh.
+	local sshhome=${T}/homedir
+	mkdir -p "${sshhome}"/.ssh
+	for t in "${tests[@]}" ; do
+		# Some tests read from stdin ...
+		HOMEDIR="${sshhome}" HOME="${sshhome}" TMPDIR="${T}" \
+			SUDO="" SSH_SK_PROVIDER="" \
+			TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1 \
+			emake -k -j1 ${t} </dev/null \
+				&& passed+=( "${t}" ) \
+				|| failed+=( "${t}" )
+	done
+
+	einfo "Passed tests: ${passed[*]}"
+	[[ ${#skipped[@]} -gt 0 ]] && ewarn "Skipped tests: ${skipped[*]}"
+	[[ ${#failed[@]}  -gt 0 ]] && die "Some tests failed: ${failed[*]}"
+}
+
+# Gentoo tweaks to default config files.
+tweak_ssh_configs() {
+	local locale_vars=(
+		# These are language variables that POSIX defines.
+		# http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_02
+		LANG LC_ALL LC_COLLATE LC_CTYPE LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME
+
+		# These are the GNU extensions.
+		# https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/html_node/Special-Shell-Variables.html
+		LANGUAGE LC_ADDRESS LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT LC_NAME LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE
+	)
+
+	# First the server config.
+	cat <<-EOF >> "${ED}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config
+
+	# Allow client to pass locale environment variables. #367017
+	AcceptEnv ${locale_vars[*]}
+
+	# Allow client to pass COLORTERM to match TERM. #658540
+	AcceptEnv COLORTERM
+	EOF
+
+	# Then the client config.
+	cat <<-EOF >> "${ED}"/etc/ssh/ssh_config
+
+	# Send locale environment variables. #367017
+	SendEnv ${locale_vars[*]}
+
+	# Send COLORTERM to match TERM. #658540
+	SendEnv COLORTERM
+	EOF
+
+	if use pam ; then
+		sed -i \
+			-e "/^#UsePAM /s:.*:UsePAM yes:" \
+			-e "/^#PasswordAuthentication /s:.*:PasswordAuthentication no:" \
+			-e "/^#PrintMotd /s:.*:PrintMotd no:" \
+			-e "/^#PrintLastLog /s:.*:PrintLastLog no:" \
+			"${ED}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die
+	fi
+
+	if use livecd ; then
+		sed -i \
+			-e '/^#PermitRootLogin/c# Allow root login with password on livecds.\nPermitRootLogin Yes' \
+			"${ED}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die
+	fi
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	emake install-nokeys DESTDIR="${D}"
+	fperms 600 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+	dobin contrib/ssh-copy-id
+	newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd-r1.initd sshd
+	newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd-r1.confd sshd
+
+	if use pam; then
+		newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.pam_include.2 sshd
+	fi
+
+	tweak_ssh_configs
+
+	doman contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+	dodoc CREDITS OVERVIEW README* TODO sshd_config
+	use hpn && dodoc HPN-README
+	use X509 || dodoc ChangeLog
+
+	diropts -m 0700
+	dodir /etc/skel/.ssh
+
+	# https://bugs.gentoo.org/733802
+	if ! use scp; then
+		rm -f "${ED}"/usr/{bin/scp,share/man/man1/scp.1} \
+			|| die "failed to remove scp"
+	fi
+
+	rmdir "${ED}"/var/empty || die
+
+	systemd_dounit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.{service,socket}
+	systemd_newunit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd_at.service 'sshd@.service'
+}
+
+pkg_preinst() {
+	if ! use ssl && has_version "${CATEGORY}/${PN}[ssl]"; then
+		show_ssl_warning=1
+	fi
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	local old_ver
+	for old_ver in ${REPLACING_VERSIONS}; do
+		if ver_test "${old_ver}" -lt "5.8_p1"; then
+			elog "Starting with openssh-5.8p1, the server will default to a newer key"
+			elog "algorithm (ECDSA).  You are encouraged to manually update your stored"
+			elog "keys list as servers update theirs.  See ssh-keyscan(1) for more info."
+		fi
+		if ver_test "${old_ver}" -lt "7.0_p1"; then
+			elog "Starting with openssh-6.7, support for USE=tcpd has been dropped by upstream."
+			elog "Make sure to update any configs that you might have.  Note that xinetd might"
+			elog "be an alternative for you as it supports USE=tcpd."
+		fi
+		if ver_test "${old_ver}" -lt "7.1_p1"; then #557388 #555518
+			elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, support for ssh-dss keys were disabled due to their"
+			elog "weak sizes.  If you rely on these key types, you can re-enable the key types by"
+			elog "adding to your sshd_config or ~/.ssh/config files:"
+			elog "	PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=+ssh-dss"
+			elog "You should however generate new keys using rsa or ed25519."
+
+			elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, the default for PermitRootLogin changed from 'yes'"
+			elog "to 'prohibit-password'.  That means password auth for root users no longer works"
+			elog "out of the box.  If you need this, please update your sshd_config explicitly."
+		fi
+		if ver_test "${old_ver}" -lt "7.6_p1"; then
+			elog "Starting with openssh-7.6p1, openssh upstream has removed ssh1 support entirely."
+			elog "Furthermore, rsa keys with less than 1024 bits will be refused."
+		fi
+		if ver_test "${old_ver}" -lt "7.7_p1"; then
+			elog "Starting with openssh-7.7p1, we no longer patch openssh to provide LDAP functionality."
+			elog "Install sys-auth/ssh-ldap-pubkey and use OpenSSH's \"AuthorizedKeysCommand\" option"
+			elog "if you need to authenticate against LDAP."
+			elog "See https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/SSH/LDAP_migration for more details."
+		fi
+		if ver_test "${old_ver}" -lt "8.2_p1"; then
+			ewarn "After upgrading to openssh-8.2p1 please restart sshd, otherwise you"
+			ewarn "will not be able to establish new sessions. Restarting sshd over a ssh"
+			ewarn "connection is generally safe."
+		fi
+	done
+
+	if [[ -n ${show_ssl_warning} ]]; then
+		elog "Be aware that by disabling openssl support in openssh, the server and clients"
+		elog "no longer support dss/rsa/ecdsa keys.  You will need to generate ed25519 keys"
+		elog "and update all clients/servers that utilize them."
+	fi
+
+	if use hpn && [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then
+		elog ""
+		elog "HPN's multi-threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken"
+		elog "and therefore disabled at runtime per default."
+		elog "Make sure your sshd_config is up to date and contains"
+		elog ""
+		elog "  DisableMTAES yes"
+		elog ""
+		elog "Otherwise you maybe unable to connect to this sshd using any AES CTR cipher."
+		elog ""
+	fi
+}