[gentoo-commits] proj/hardened-patchset:master commit in: 3.14.8/, 3.14.6/, 3.2.60/

[Anthony G. Basile]

commit:     03a14056c44091c6c4d1a75e9145a62a3b6531a8
Author:     Anthony G. Basile <blueness <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Sat Jun 21 00:55:46 2014 +0000
Commit:     Anthony G. Basile <blueness <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Sat Jun 21 00:55:46 2014 +0000
URL:        http://git.overlays.gentoo.org/gitweb/?p=proj/hardened-patchset.git;a=commit;h=03a14056

Grsec/PaX: 3.0-{3.2.60,3.14.8}-201406191347

---
 {3.14.6 => 3.14.8}/0000_README                     |   2 +-
 .../4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.8-201406191347.patch  | 649 ++++++++++++---------
 {3.14.6 => 3.14.8}/4425_grsec_remove_EI_PAX.patch  |   0
 .../4427_force_XATTR_PAX_tmpfs.patch               |   4 +-
 .../4430_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch     |   0
 {3.14.6 => 3.14.8}/4435_grsec-mute-warnings.patch  |   0
 .../4440_grsec-remove-protected-paths.patch        |   0
 .../4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch          |  12 +-
 .../4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch       |   2 +-
 {3.14.6 => 3.14.8}/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch  |   0
 {3.14.6 => 3.14.8}/4475_emutramp_default_on.patch  |   0
 3.2.60/0000_README                                 |   2 +-
 ... 4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406191345.patch} | 231 +++++---
 3.2.60/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch       |  12 +-
 3.2.60/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch    |   2 +-
 15 files changed, 549 insertions(+), 367 deletions(-)

diff --git a/3.14.6/0000_README b/3.14.8/0000_README
similarity index 96%
rename from 3.14.6/0000_README
rename to 3.14.8/0000_README
index 982ffca..d9d0e9a 100644
--- a/3.14.6/0000_README
+++ b/3.14.8/0000_README
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ README
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Individual Patch Descriptions:
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Patch:	4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.6-201406101411.patch
+Patch:	4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.8-201406191347.patch
 From:	http://www.grsecurity.net
 Desc:	hardened-sources base patch from upstream grsecurity
 

diff --git a/3.14.6/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.6-201406101411.patch b/3.14.8/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.8-201406191347.patch
similarity index 99%
rename from 3.14.6/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.6-201406101411.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.8-201406191347.patch
index 274a809..cf0e6f3 100644
--- a/3.14.6/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.6-201406101411.patch
+++ b/3.14.8/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.14.8-201406191347.patch
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ index 7116fda..d8ed6e8 100644
  
  	pcd.		[PARIDE]
 diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
-index 0d499e6..2318683 100644
+index ef1d59b..7030652 100644
 --- a/Makefile
 +++ b/Makefile
 @@ -244,8 +244,9 @@ CONFIG_SHELL := $(shell if [ -x "$$BASH" ]; then echo $$BASH; \
@@ -2170,7 +2170,7 @@ index 71a06b2..8bb9ae1 100644
  /*
   * Change these and you break ASM code in entry-common.S
 diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
-index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
+index 7f3f3cc..bdf0665 100644
 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
 +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
 @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
@@ -2235,7 +2235,7 @@ index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
  	 })
  
  extern int __put_user_1(void *, unsigned int);
-@@ -195,8 +227,12 @@ extern int __put_user_8(void *, unsigned long long);
+@@ -196,8 +228,12 @@ extern int __put_user_8(void *, unsigned long long);
  
  #define put_user(x,p)							\
  	({								\
@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
  	 })
  
  #else /* CONFIG_MMU */
-@@ -220,6 +256,7 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
+@@ -221,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
  
  #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
  
@@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
  #define access_ok(type,addr,size)	(__range_ok(addr,size) == 0)
  
  #define user_addr_max() \
-@@ -237,13 +274,17 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
+@@ -238,13 +275,17 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
  #define __get_user(x,ptr)						\
  ({									\
  	long __gu_err = 0;						\
@@ -2275,7 +2275,7 @@ index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
  	(void) 0;							\
  })
  
-@@ -319,13 +360,17 @@ do {									\
+@@ -320,13 +361,17 @@ do {									\
  #define __put_user(x,ptr)						\
  ({									\
  	long __pu_err = 0;						\
@@ -2293,7 +2293,7 @@ index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
  	(void) 0;							\
  })
  
-@@ -425,11 +470,44 @@ do {									\
+@@ -426,11 +471,44 @@ do {									\
  
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
@@ -2341,7 +2341,7 @@ index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
  #else
  #define __copy_from_user(to,from,n)	(memcpy(to, (void __force *)from, n), 0)
  #define __copy_to_user(to,from,n)	(memcpy((void __force *)to, from, n), 0)
-@@ -438,6 +516,9 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user_std(void __user *addr, unsigned l
+@@ -439,6 +517,9 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user_std(void __user *addr, unsigned l
  
  static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
  {
@@ -2351,7 +2351,7 @@ index 72abdc5..35acac1 100644
  	if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
  		n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n);
  	else /* security hole - plug it */
-@@ -447,6 +528,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u
+@@ -448,6 +529,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u
  
  static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
  {
@@ -2665,10 +2665,10 @@ index a2dcafd..1048b5a 100644
  
  #if defined(CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT)
 diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
-index 39f89fb..d612bd9 100644
+index 88c6bab..652981b 100644
 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
 +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
-@@ -184,6 +184,60 @@
+@@ -188,6 +188,60 @@
  	msr	cpsr_c, \rtemp			@ switch back to the SVC mode
  	.endm
  
@@ -2729,7 +2729,7 @@ index 39f89fb..d612bd9 100644
  #ifndef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
  	.macro	svc_exit, rpsr, irq = 0
  	.if	\irq != 0
-@@ -203,6 +257,9 @@
+@@ -207,6 +261,9 @@
  	blne	trace_hardirqs_off
  #endif
  	.endif
@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@ index 39f89fb..d612bd9 100644
  	msr	spsr_cxsf, \rpsr
  #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_V6)
  	ldr	r0, [sp]
-@@ -266,6 +323,9 @@
+@@ -270,6 +327,9 @@
  	blne	trace_hardirqs_off
  #endif
  	.endif
@@ -6739,7 +6739,7 @@ index 25da651..ae2a259 100644
  
  #endif /* __ASM_SMTC_PROC_H */
 diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
-index 24846f9..61c49f0 100644
+index e80ae50..4404147 100644
 --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
 +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
 @@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
@@ -6751,15 +6751,16 @@ index 24846f9..61c49f0 100644
  #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	31	/* syscall trace active */
  
  #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	(1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
-@@ -134,13 +136,14 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
+@@ -134,14 +136,15 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
  #define _TIF_LOAD_WATCH		(1<<TIF_LOAD_WATCH)
  #define _TIF_32BIT_FPREGS	(1<<TIF_32BIT_FPREGS)
  #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT	(1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
 +#define _TIF_GRSEC_SETXID	(1<<TIF_GRSEC_SETXID)
  
  #define _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY	(_TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE |	\
--				 _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
-+				 _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_GRSEC_SETXID)
+ 				 _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
+-				 _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP)
++				 _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP | _TIF_GRSEC_SETXID)
  
  /* work to do in syscall_trace_leave() */
  #define _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT	(_TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE |	\
@@ -6768,7 +6769,7 @@ index 24846f9..61c49f0 100644
  
  /* work to do on interrupt/exception return */
  #define _TIF_WORK_MASK		\
-@@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
+@@ -149,7 +152,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
  /* work to do on any return to u-space */
  #define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK	(_TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_WORK_MASK |		\
  				 _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT |		\
@@ -7088,7 +7089,7 @@ index c24ad5f..9983ab2 100644
  	}
  	/* Arrange for an interrupt in a short while */
 diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
-index e0b4996..6b43ce7 100644
+index 81e6ae0..6ab6e79 100644
 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
 +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
 @@ -691,7 +691,18 @@ asmlinkage void do_ov(struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -36699,7 +36700,7 @@ index 36605ab..6ef6d4b 100644
  				unsigned long timeout_msec)
  {
 diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
-index bb26636..09cbdb4 100644
+index 62fda16..8063873 100644
 --- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
 +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
 @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_dev_set_xfermode(struct ata_device *dev);
@@ -39505,7 +39506,7 @@ index 199b52b..e3503bb 100644
  		ret = cpufreq_sysfs_create_file(&boost.attr);
  		if (ret) {
 diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_governor.c b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_governor.c
-index ba43991..23858ffb 100644
+index e1c6433..31203ae 100644
 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_governor.c
 +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_governor.c
 @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int cpufreq_governor_dbs(struct cpufreq_policy *policy,
@@ -39592,10 +39593,10 @@ index 18d4091..434be15 100644
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(od_unregister_powersave_bias_handler);
 diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c b/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c
-index 9ac3783..652b033 100644
+index de9ef4a..0b29fc9 100644
 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c
 +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c
-@@ -126,10 +126,10 @@ struct pstate_funcs {
+@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ struct pstate_funcs {
  struct cpu_defaults {
  	struct pstate_adjust_policy pid_policy;
  	struct pstate_funcs funcs;
@@ -39608,7 +39609,7 @@ index 9ac3783..652b033 100644
  
  struct perf_limits {
  	int no_turbo;
-@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static void intel_pstate_set_pstate(struct cpudata *cpu, int pstate)
+@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static void intel_pstate_set_pstate(struct cpudata *cpu, int pstate)
  
  	cpu->pstate.current_pstate = pstate;
  
@@ -39617,7 +39618,7 @@ index 9ac3783..652b033 100644
  }
  
  static inline void intel_pstate_pstate_increase(struct cpudata *cpu, int steps)
-@@ -549,12 +549,12 @@ static void intel_pstate_get_cpu_pstates(struct cpudata *cpu)
+@@ -551,12 +551,12 @@ static void intel_pstate_get_cpu_pstates(struct cpudata *cpu)
  {
  	sprintf(cpu->name, "Intel 2nd generation core");
  
@@ -39635,7 +39636,7 @@ index 9ac3783..652b033 100644
  	intel_pstate_set_pstate(cpu, cpu->pstate.min_pstate);
  }
  
-@@ -830,9 +830,9 @@ static int intel_pstate_msrs_not_valid(void)
+@@ -838,9 +838,9 @@ static int intel_pstate_msrs_not_valid(void)
  	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_APERF, aperf);
  	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MPERF, mperf);
  
@@ -39648,7 +39649,7 @@ index 9ac3783..652b033 100644
  		return -ENODEV;
  
  	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_APERF, tmp);
-@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ static int intel_pstate_msrs_not_valid(void)
+@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static int intel_pstate_msrs_not_valid(void)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -39657,7 +39658,7 @@ index 9ac3783..652b033 100644
  {
  	pid_params.sample_rate_ms = policy->sample_rate_ms;
  	pid_params.p_gain_pct = policy->p_gain_pct;
-@@ -858,11 +858,7 @@ static void copy_pid_params(struct pstate_adjust_policy *policy)
+@@ -866,11 +866,7 @@ static void copy_pid_params(struct pstate_adjust_policy *policy)
  
  static void copy_cpu_funcs(struct pstate_funcs *funcs)
  {
@@ -40176,7 +40177,7 @@ index eb6935c..3cc2bfa 100644
  #include <asm/byteorder.h>
  
 diff --git a/drivers/firewire/core.h b/drivers/firewire/core.h
-index c98764a..551b520 100644
+index f477308..2795f24 100644
 --- a/drivers/firewire/core.h
 +++ b/drivers/firewire/core.h
 @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct fw_card_driver {
@@ -40188,7 +40189,7 @@ index c98764a..551b520 100644
  void fw_card_initialize(struct fw_card *card,
  		const struct fw_card_driver *driver, struct device *device);
 diff --git a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c
-index 8db6632..9bbc8ca 100644
+index 586f2f7..3545ad2 100644
 --- a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c
 +++ b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c
 @@ -2049,10 +2049,12 @@ static void bus_reset_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -40680,7 +40681,7 @@ index 15a74f9..4278889 100644
  	return can_switch;
  }
 diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.h
-index 697f215..6f89b7f 100644
+index 4677af9..cd79971 100644
 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.h
 +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.h
 @@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ typedef struct drm_i915_private {
@@ -40693,7 +40694,7 @@ index 697f215..6f89b7f 100644
  	/* protects the irq masks */
  	spinlock_t irq_lock;
 diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
-index d269ecf..6d857bc 100644
+index 768e666..68cf44d 100644
 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
 +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
 @@ -860,9 +860,9 @@ i915_gem_check_execbuffer(struct drm_i915_gem_execbuffer2 *exec)
@@ -40865,7 +40866,7 @@ index 4050450..f67c5c1 100644
  	iir = I915_READ(IIR);
  
 diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
-index 9d4d837..6836e22 100644
+index b6fb3eb..e0fa1e1 100644
 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
 +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
 @@ -10798,13 +10798,13 @@ struct intel_quirk {
@@ -41462,7 +41463,7 @@ index 4a85bb6..aaea819 100644
  	if (regcomp
  	    (&mask_rex, "(0x[0-9a-fA-F]*) *([_a-zA-Z0-9]*)", REG_EXTENDED)) {
 diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_device.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_device.c
-index 7f370b3..4e92ca6 100644
+index 0bf6f4a..18e2437 100644
 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_device.c
 +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_device.c
 @@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ static bool radeon_switcheroo_can_switch(struct pci_dev *pdev)
@@ -44516,7 +44517,7 @@ index 8c53b09..f1fb2b0 100644
  
  void dm_uevent_add(struct mapped_device *md, struct list_head *elist)
 diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c
-index 51c431c..be0fbd6 100644
+index 8b013f8..93eed41 100644
 --- a/drivers/md/md.c
 +++ b/drivers/md/md.c
 @@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_clone_mddev);
@@ -44773,10 +44774,33 @@ index cb882aa..9bd076e 100644
  
  			rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
 diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5.c b/drivers/md/raid5.c
-index 16f5c21..4df20dc 100644
+index 16f5c21..522b82e 100644
 --- a/drivers/md/raid5.c
 +++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c
-@@ -1991,21 +1991,21 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
+@@ -1707,6 +1707,10 @@ static int grow_one_stripe(struct r5conf *conf, int hash)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++static atomic_unchecked_t raid5_cache_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
++#endif
++
+ static int grow_stripes(struct r5conf *conf, int num)
+ {
+ 	struct kmem_cache *sc;
+@@ -1718,7 +1722,11 @@ static int grow_stripes(struct r5conf *conf, int num)
+ 			"raid%d-%s", conf->level, mdname(conf->mddev));
+ 	else
+ 		sprintf(conf->cache_name[0],
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++			"raid%d-%08lx", conf->level, atomic_inc_return_unchecked(&raid5_cache_id));
++#else
+ 			"raid%d-%p", conf->level, conf->mddev);
++#endif
+ 	sprintf(conf->cache_name[1], "%s-alt", conf->cache_name[0]);
+ 
+ 	conf->active_name = 0;
+@@ -1991,21 +1999,21 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
  				mdname(conf->mddev), STRIPE_SECTORS,
  				(unsigned long long)s,
  				bdevname(rdev->bdev, b));
@@ -44802,7 +44826,7 @@ index 16f5c21..4df20dc 100644
  		if (test_bit(R5_ReadRepl, &sh->dev[i].flags))
  			printk_ratelimited(
  				KERN_WARNING
-@@ -2033,7 +2033,7 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
+@@ -2033,7 +2041,7 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
  				mdname(conf->mddev),
  				(unsigned long long)s,
  				bdn);
@@ -48190,7 +48214,7 @@ index 53b58de..4479896 100644
  	int retval = -ENOMEM;
  
 diff --git a/drivers/pci/msi.c b/drivers/pci/msi.c
-index 955ab79..d1df9c7 100644
+index fb02fc2..83dc2c3 100644
 --- a/drivers/pci/msi.c
 +++ b/drivers/pci/msi.c
 @@ -524,8 +524,8 @@ static int populate_msi_sysfs(struct pci_dev *pdev)
@@ -52475,7 +52499,7 @@ index 2518c32..1c201bb 100644
  			wake_up(&usb_kill_urb_queue);
  		usb_put_urb(urb);
 diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
-index d498d03..e26f959 100644
+index 3baa51b..92907cf 100644
 --- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
 +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
@@ -52486,7 +52510,7 @@ index d498d03..e26f959 100644
  
  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
  #include <asm/byteorder.h>
-@@ -4472,6 +4473,10 @@ static void hub_port_connect_change(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
+@@ -4483,6 +4484,10 @@ static void hub_port_connect_change(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
  			goto done;
  		return;
  	}
@@ -56472,7 +56496,7 @@ index 04cd768..25949c1 100644
  
  	file = aio_private_file(ctx, nr_pages);
 diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
-index 5d4e59d..fd02418 100644
+index 6530ced..4a827e2 100644
 --- a/fs/attr.c
 +++ b/fs/attr.c
 @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ int inode_newsize_ok(const struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
@@ -58847,7 +58871,7 @@ index e4141f2..d8263e8 100644
  		i += packet_length_size;
  		if (copy_to_user(&buf[i], msg_ctx->msg, msg_ctx->msg_size))
 diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
-index 31e46b1..f5c70a3 100644
+index 31e46b1..88754df 100644
 --- a/fs/exec.c
 +++ b/fs/exec.c
 @@ -55,8 +55,20 @@
@@ -59595,8 +59619,8 @@ index 31e46b1..f5c70a3 100644
 +#ifndef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
 +	unsigned long stackstart = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current);
 +	unsigned long currentsp = (unsigned long)&stackstart;
-+	if (unlikely(currentsp < stackstart + 512 ||
-+		     currentsp >= stackstart + THREAD_SIZE))
++	if (unlikely((currentsp < stackstart + 512 ||
++		     currentsp >= stackstart + THREAD_SIZE) && !in_interrupt()))
 +		BUG();
 +#endif
 +
@@ -59978,10 +60002,18 @@ index ef68665..5deacdc 100644
  	return 0;
  }
 diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c
-index 999ff5c..41f4109 100644
+index 999ff5c..ac037c9 100644
 --- a/fs/fhandle.c
 +++ b/fs/fhandle.c
-@@ -67,8 +67,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path,
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
+ #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+ #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "internal.h"
+ #include "mount.h"
+@@ -67,8 +68,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path,
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  	/* copy the mount id */
@@ -59991,6 +60023,15 @@ index 999ff5c..41f4109 100644
  	    copy_to_user(ufh, handle,
  			 sizeof(struct file_handle) + handle_bytes))
  		retval = -EFAULT;
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ static int handle_to_path(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
+ 	 * the directory. Ideally we would like CAP_DAC_SEARCH.
+ 	 * But we don't have that
+ 	 */
+-	if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) {
++	if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) || !gr_chroot_fhandle()) {
+ 		retval = -EPERM;
+ 		goto out_err;
+ 	}
 diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
 index eb56a13..ccee850 100644
 --- a/fs/file.c
@@ -61655,7 +61696,7 @@ index d19b30a..ef89c36 100644
  static int can_do_hugetlb_shm(void)
  {
 diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
-index 4bcdad3..1883822 100644
+index e846a32..6b22e15 100644
 --- a/fs/inode.c
 +++ b/fs/inode.c
 @@ -841,8 +841,8 @@ unsigned int get_next_ino(void)
@@ -61904,10 +61945,10 @@ index b29e42f..5ea7fdf 100644
  #define MNT_NS_INTERNAL ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) /* distinct from any mnt_namespace */
  
 diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
-index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
+index 8274c8d..922e189 100644
 --- a/fs/namei.c
 +++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -330,16 +330,32 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+@@ -330,17 +330,34 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
  	if (ret != -EACCES)
  		return ret;
  
@@ -61919,14 +61960,16 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
 +
  	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
  		/* DACs are overridable for directories */
--		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+-		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 -			return 0;
  		if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
--			if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
-+			if (inode_capable_nolog(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) ||
-+			    inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+-			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
++			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid_nolog(inode,
++				CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) ||
++			    capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+ 						     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
  				return 0;
-+		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
++		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 +			return 0;
  		return -EACCES;
  	}
@@ -61935,16 +61978,16 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
 +	 */
 +	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
 +	if (mask == MAY_READ)
-+		if (inode_capable_nolog(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) ||
-+		    inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
++		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid_nolog(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) ||
++		    capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 +			return 0;
 +
 +	/*
  	 * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
  	 * Executable DACs are overridable when there is
  	 * at least one exec bit set.
-@@ -348,14 +364,6 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
- 		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+@@ -349,14 +366,6 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+ 		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
  			return 0;
  
 -	/*
@@ -61952,13 +61995,13 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
 -	 */
 -	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
 -	if (mask == MAY_READ)
--		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+-		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 -			return 0;
 -
  	return -EACCES;
  }
  
-@@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
+@@ -822,7 +831,7 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
  {
  	struct dentry *dentry = link->dentry;
  	int error;
@@ -61967,7 +62010,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  
  	BUG_ON(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU);
  
-@@ -842,6 +850,12 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
+@@ -843,6 +852,12 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
  	if (error)
  		goto out_put_nd_path;
  
@@ -61980,7 +62023,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	nd->last_type = LAST_BIND;
  	*p = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
  	error = PTR_ERR(*p);
-@@ -1590,6 +1604,8 @@ static inline int nested_symlink(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
+@@ -1591,6 +1606,8 @@ static inline int nested_symlink(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
  		if (res)
  			break;
  		res = walk_component(nd, path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW);
@@ -61989,7 +62032,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  		put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
  	} while (res > 0);
  
-@@ -1663,7 +1679,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(full_name_hash);
+@@ -1664,7 +1681,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(full_name_hash);
  static inline unsigned long hash_name(const char *name, unsigned int *hashp)
  {
  	unsigned long a, b, adata, bdata, mask, hash, len;
@@ -61998,7 +62041,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  
  	hash = a = 0;
  	len = -sizeof(unsigned long);
-@@ -1947,6 +1963,8 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name,
+@@ -1948,6 +1965,8 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name,
  			if (err)
  				break;
  			err = lookup_last(nd, &path);
@@ -62007,7 +62050,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  			put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
  		}
  	}
-@@ -1954,6 +1972,13 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name,
+@@ -1955,6 +1974,13 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name,
  	if (!err)
  		err = complete_walk(nd);
  
@@ -62021,7 +62064,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	if (!err && nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) {
  		if (!d_is_directory(nd->path.dentry)) {
  			path_put(&nd->path);
-@@ -1981,8 +2006,15 @@ static int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name,
+@@ -1982,8 +2008,15 @@ static int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name,
  		retval = path_lookupat(dfd, name->name,
  						flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, nd);
  
@@ -62038,7 +62081,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	return retval;
  }
  
-@@ -2556,6 +2588,13 @@ static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
+@@ -2557,6 +2590,13 @@ static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
  	if (flag & O_NOATIME && !inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
  		return -EPERM;
  
@@ -62052,7 +62095,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	return 0;
  }
  
-@@ -2787,7 +2826,7 @@ looked_up:
+@@ -2788,7 +2828,7 @@ looked_up:
   * cleared otherwise prior to returning.
   */
  static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
@@ -62061,7 +62104,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  			const struct open_flags *op,
  			bool got_write, int *opened)
  {
-@@ -2822,6 +2861,17 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
+@@ -2823,6 +2863,17 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
  	/* Negative dentry, just create the file */
  	if (!dentry->d_inode && (op->open_flag & O_CREAT)) {
  		umode_t mode = op->mode;
@@ -62079,7 +62122,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  		if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
  			mode &= ~current_umask();
  		/*
-@@ -2843,6 +2893,8 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
+@@ -2844,6 +2895,8 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
  				   nd->flags & LOOKUP_EXCL);
  		if (error)
  			goto out_dput;
@@ -62088,7 +62131,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	}
  out_no_open:
  	path->dentry = dentry;
-@@ -2857,7 +2909,7 @@ out_dput:
+@@ -2858,7 +2911,7 @@ out_dput:
  /*
   * Handle the last step of open()
   */
@@ -62097,7 +62140,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  		   struct file *file, const struct open_flags *op,
  		   int *opened, struct filename *name)
  {
-@@ -2907,6 +2959,15 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
+@@ -2908,6 +2961,15 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
  		if (error)
  			return error;
  
@@ -62113,7 +62156,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  		audit_inode(name, dir, LOOKUP_PARENT);
  		error = -EISDIR;
  		/* trailing slashes? */
-@@ -2926,7 +2987,7 @@ retry_lookup:
+@@ -2927,7 +2989,7 @@ retry_lookup:
  		 */
  	}
  	mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
@@ -62122,7 +62165,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
  
  	if (error <= 0) {
-@@ -2950,11 +3011,28 @@ retry_lookup:
+@@ -2951,11 +3013,28 @@ retry_lookup:
  		goto finish_open_created;
  	}
  
@@ -62152,7 +62195,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  
  	/*
  	 * If atomic_open() acquired write access it is dropped now due to
-@@ -2995,6 +3073,11 @@ finish_lookup:
+@@ -2996,6 +3075,11 @@ finish_lookup:
  			}
  		}
  		BUG_ON(inode != path->dentry->d_inode);
@@ -62164,7 +62207,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  		return 1;
  	}
  
-@@ -3004,7 +3087,6 @@ finish_lookup:
+@@ -3005,7 +3089,6 @@ finish_lookup:
  		save_parent.dentry = nd->path.dentry;
  		save_parent.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
  		nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
@@ -62172,7 +62215,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	}
  	nd->inode = inode;
  	/* Why this, you ask?  _Now_ we might have grown LOOKUP_JUMPED... */
-@@ -3014,7 +3096,18 @@ finish_open:
+@@ -3015,7 +3098,18 @@ finish_open:
  		path_put(&save_parent);
  		return error;
  	}
@@ -62191,7 +62234,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	error = -EISDIR;
  	if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) &&
  	    (d_is_directory(nd->path.dentry) || d_is_autodir(nd->path.dentry)))
-@@ -3178,7 +3271,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
+@@ -3179,7 +3273,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
  	if (unlikely(error))
  		goto out;
  
@@ -62200,7 +62243,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	while (unlikely(error > 0)) { /* trailing symlink */
  		struct path link = path;
  		void *cookie;
-@@ -3196,7 +3289,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
+@@ -3197,7 +3291,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
  		error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
  		if (unlikely(error))
  			break;
@@ -62209,7 +62252,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  		put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
  	}
  out:
-@@ -3296,9 +3389,11 @@ struct dentry *kern_path_create(int dfd, const char *pathname,
+@@ -3297,9 +3391,11 @@ struct dentry *kern_path_create(int dfd, const char *pathname,
  		goto unlock;
  
  	error = -EEXIST;
@@ -62223,7 +62266,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	/*
  	 * Special case - lookup gave negative, but... we had foo/bar/
  	 * From the vfs_mknod() POV we just have a negative dentry -
-@@ -3350,6 +3445,20 @@ struct dentry *user_path_create(int dfd, const char __user *pathname,
+@@ -3351,6 +3447,20 @@ struct dentry *user_path_create(int dfd, const char __user *pathname,
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_create);
  
@@ -62244,7 +62287,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
  {
  	int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
-@@ -3412,6 +3521,17 @@ retry:
+@@ -3413,6 +3523,17 @@ retry:
  
  	if (!IS_POSIXACL(path.dentry->d_inode))
  		mode &= ~current_umask();
@@ -62262,7 +62305,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	error = security_path_mknod(&path, dentry, mode, dev);
  	if (error)
  		goto out;
-@@ -3428,6 +3548,8 @@ retry:
+@@ -3429,6 +3550,8 @@ retry:
  			break;
  	}
  out:
@@ -62271,7 +62314,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	done_path_create(&path, dentry);
  	if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
  		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
-@@ -3480,9 +3602,16 @@ retry:
+@@ -3481,9 +3604,16 @@ retry:
  
  	if (!IS_POSIXACL(path.dentry->d_inode))
  		mode &= ~current_umask();
@@ -62288,7 +62331,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	done_path_create(&path, dentry);
  	if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
  		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
-@@ -3563,6 +3692,8 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char __user *pathname)
+@@ -3564,6 +3694,8 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char __user *pathname)
  	struct filename *name;
  	struct dentry *dentry;
  	struct nameidata nd;
@@ -62297,7 +62340,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	unsigned int lookup_flags = 0;
  retry:
  	name = user_path_parent(dfd, pathname, &nd, lookup_flags);
-@@ -3595,10 +3726,21 @@ retry:
+@@ -3596,10 +3728,21 @@ retry:
  		error = -ENOENT;
  		goto exit3;
  	}
@@ -62319,7 +62362,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  exit3:
  	dput(dentry);
  exit2:
-@@ -3688,6 +3830,8 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const char __user *pathname)
+@@ -3689,6 +3832,8 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const char __user *pathname)
  	struct nameidata nd;
  	struct inode *inode = NULL;
  	struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
@@ -62328,7 +62371,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	unsigned int lookup_flags = 0;
  retry:
  	name = user_path_parent(dfd, pathname, &nd, lookup_flags);
-@@ -3714,10 +3858,22 @@ retry_deleg:
+@@ -3715,10 +3860,22 @@ retry_deleg:
  		if (d_is_negative(dentry))
  			goto slashes;
  		ihold(inode);
@@ -62351,7 +62394,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  exit2:
  		dput(dentry);
  	}
-@@ -3805,9 +3961,17 @@ retry:
+@@ -3806,9 +3963,17 @@ retry:
  	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
  		goto out_putname;
  
@@ -62369,7 +62412,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	done_path_create(&path, dentry);
  	if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
  		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
-@@ -3910,6 +4074,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname,
+@@ -3911,6 +4076,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname,
  	struct dentry *new_dentry;
  	struct path old_path, new_path;
  	struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
@@ -62377,7 +62420,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	int how = 0;
  	int error;
  
-@@ -3933,7 +4098,7 @@ retry:
+@@ -3934,7 +4100,7 @@ retry:
  	if (error)
  		return error;
  
@@ -62386,7 +62429,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  					(how & LOOKUP_REVAL));
  	error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
  	if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
-@@ -3945,11 +4110,28 @@ retry:
+@@ -3946,11 +4112,28 @@ retry:
  	error = may_linkat(&old_path);
  	if (unlikely(error))
  		goto out_dput;
@@ -62415,7 +62458,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	done_path_create(&new_path, new_dentry);
  	if (delegated_inode) {
  		error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
-@@ -4236,6 +4418,12 @@ retry_deleg:
+@@ -4237,6 +4420,12 @@ retry_deleg:
  	if (new_dentry == trap)
  		goto exit5;
  
@@ -62428,7 +62471,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	error = security_path_rename(&oldnd.path, old_dentry,
  				     &newnd.path, new_dentry);
  	if (error)
-@@ -4243,6 +4431,9 @@ retry_deleg:
+@@ -4244,6 +4433,9 @@ retry_deleg:
  	error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
  				   new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry,
  				   &delegated_inode);
@@ -62438,7 +62481,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  exit5:
  	dput(new_dentry);
  exit4:
-@@ -4279,6 +4470,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(rename, const char __user *, oldname, const char __user *, newna
+@@ -4280,6 +4472,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(rename, const char __user *, oldname, const char __user *, newna
  
  int vfs_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen, const char *link)
  {
@@ -62447,7 +62490,7 @@ index 4a3c105..0d718f4 100644
  	int len;
  
  	len = PTR_ERR(link);
-@@ -4288,7 +4481,14 @@ int vfs_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen, const c
+@@ -4289,7 +4483,14 @@ int vfs_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen, const c
  	len = strlen(link);
  	if (len > (unsigned) buflen)
  		len = buflen;
@@ -64809,7 +64852,7 @@ index 6f599c6..bd00271 100644
  	seq_printf(p, "softirq %llu", (unsigned long long)sum_softirq);
  
 diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
-index fb52b54..5fc7c14 100644
+index 8f78819..ba6c272 100644
 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
 +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
 @@ -12,12 +12,19 @@
@@ -65965,7 +66008,7 @@ index aead369..0dfecfd 100644
  			return 0;
  		sfep = dp->d_ops->sf_nextentry(sfp, sfep);
 diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
-index bcfe612..aa399c0 100644
+index 78e62cc..eec3706 100644
 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
 +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
 @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ xfs_find_handle(
@@ -65979,10 +66022,10 @@ index bcfe612..aa399c0 100644
  
 diff --git a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..a14eb52
+index 0000000..bfd482c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig
-@@ -0,0 +1,1174 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,1176 @@
 +#
 +# grecurity configuration
 +#
@@ -66544,14 +66587,16 @@ index 0000000..a14eb52
 +	  created.
 +
 +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot"
++	bool "Deny fchdir and fhandle out of chroot"
 +	default y if GRKERNSEC_CONFIG_AUTO
 +	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
 +	help
 +	  If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
 +	  to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
-+	  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  If the sysctl option
-+	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
++	  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  Additionally, this option prevents
++	  use of the recently-created syscall for opening files by a guessable "file
++	  handle" inside a chroot.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
 +
 +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
 +	bool "Deny mknod"
@@ -73707,10 +73752,10 @@ index 0000000..bc0be01
 +}
 diff --git a/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c b/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..651d6c2
+index 0000000..baa635c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
 +#include <linux/module.h>
 +#include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -73885,6 +73930,23 @@ index 0000000..651d6c2
 +}
 +
 +int
++gr_chroot_fhandle(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
++		return 1;
++	else {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_FHANDLE_MSG);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
 +gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
 +		const time_t shm_createtime)
 +{
@@ -77916,16 +77978,16 @@ index 17e7e82..1d7da26 100644
  #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
  #endif
 diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
-index a6ee1f9..e1ca49d 100644
+index 84b13ad..d7b6550 100644
 --- a/include/linux/capability.h
 +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
 @@ -212,8 +212,13 @@ extern bool capable(int cap);
  extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
- extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+ extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
  extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 +extern bool capable_nolog(int cap);
 +extern bool ns_capable_nolog(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-+extern bool inode_capable_nolog(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
++extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid_nolog(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
  
  /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
  extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
@@ -79749,10 +79811,10 @@ index 0000000..d25522e
 +#endif
 diff --git a/include/linux/grmsg.h b/include/linux/grmsg.h
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ba93581
+index 0000000..b02ba9d
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/include/linux/grmsg.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
 +#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
 +#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%pI4 TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%pI4 TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
 +#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by "
@@ -79799,6 +79861,7 @@ index 0000000..ba93581
 +#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied chmod +s of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "denied fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by "
++#define GR_CHROOT_FHANDLE_MSG "denied use of file handles inside chroot by "
 +#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_SETXATTR_ACL_MSG "%s setting extended attribute of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_REMOVEXATTR_ACL_MSG "%s removing extended attribute of %.950s by "
@@ -79871,10 +79934,10 @@ index 0000000..ba93581
 +#define GR_MSRWRITE_MSG "denied write to CPU MSR by "
 diff --git a/include/linux/grsecurity.h b/include/linux/grsecurity.h
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f2d8c6c
+index 0000000..5c4bdee
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/include/linux/grsecurity.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
 +#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
 +#define GR_SECURITY_H
 +#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -79920,6 +79983,7 @@ index 0000000..f2d8c6c
 +int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p,
 +					const int niceval);
 +int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
++int gr_chroot_fhandle(void);
 +int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
 +				   const struct vfsmount *mnt);
 +void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(const struct path *path);
@@ -81565,37 +81629,6 @@ index 5f2e559..7d59314 100644
  
  /**
   * struct hotplug_slot_info - used to notify the hotplug pci core of the state of the slot
-diff --git a/include/linux/percpu-refcount.h b/include/linux/percpu-refcount.h
-index 95961f0..0afb48f 100644
---- a/include/linux/percpu-refcount.h
-+++ b/include/linux/percpu-refcount.h
-@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static inline void percpu_ref_get(struct percpu_ref *ref)
- 	pcpu_count = ACCESS_ONCE(ref->pcpu_count);
- 
- 	if (likely(REF_STATUS(pcpu_count) == PCPU_REF_PTR))
--		__this_cpu_inc(*pcpu_count);
-+		this_cpu_inc(*pcpu_count);
- 	else
- 		atomic_inc(&ref->count);
- 
-@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static inline bool percpu_ref_tryget(struct percpu_ref *ref)
- 	pcpu_count = ACCESS_ONCE(ref->pcpu_count);
- 
- 	if (likely(REF_STATUS(pcpu_count) == PCPU_REF_PTR)) {
--		__this_cpu_inc(*pcpu_count);
-+		this_cpu_inc(*pcpu_count);
- 		ret = true;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static inline void percpu_ref_put(struct percpu_ref *ref)
- 	pcpu_count = ACCESS_ONCE(ref->pcpu_count);
- 
- 	if (likely(REF_STATUS(pcpu_count) == PCPU_REF_PTR))
--		__this_cpu_dec(*pcpu_count);
-+		this_cpu_dec(*pcpu_count);
- 	else if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&ref->count)))
- 		ref->release(ref);
- 
 diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
 index e56b07f..aef789b 100644
 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -85752,68 +85785,10 @@ index d5f31c1..06646e1 100644
  		s.version		= AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST;
  		s.backlog_wait_time	= audit_backlog_wait_time;
 diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
-index 3b29605..3604797 100644
+index 37e6216..3604797 100644
 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
 +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
-@@ -720,6 +720,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
- 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
- }
- 
-+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
-+{
-+	int word, bit;
-+
-+	if (val > 0xffffffff)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
-+	if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
-+
-+	return rule->mask[word] & bit;
-+}
-+
- /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
-  * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
-  * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
-@@ -737,11 +753,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
- 
- 	rcu_read_lock();
- 	if (!list_empty(list)) {
--		int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
--		int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
--
- 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
--			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
-+			if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
- 			    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
- 					       &state, false)) {
- 				rcu_read_unlock();
-@@ -761,20 +774,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
- static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
- 				   struct audit_names *n,
- 				   struct audit_context *ctx) {
--	int word, bit;
- 	int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
- 	struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
- 	struct audit_entry *e;
- 	enum audit_state state;
- 
--	word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
--	bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
--
- 	if (list_empty(list))
- 		return 0;
- 
- 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
--		if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
-+		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
- 		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
- 			ctx->current_state = state;
- 			return 1;
-@@ -1945,7 +1954,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+@@ -1954,7 +1954,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  }
  
  /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
@@ -85822,7 +85797,7 @@ index 3b29605..3604797 100644
  
  static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
  {
-@@ -2014,7 +2023,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
+@@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
  
  	/* are we setting or clearing? */
  	if (uid_valid(loginuid))
@@ -85832,7 +85807,7 @@ index 3b29605..3604797 100644
  	task->sessionid = sessionid;
  	task->loginuid = loginuid;
 diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
-index 34019c5..363f279 100644
+index 1191a44..7c81292 100644
 --- a/kernel/capability.c
 +++ b/kernel/capability.c
 @@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
@@ -85914,20 +85889,21 @@ index 34019c5..363f279 100644
 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog);
 +
  /**
-  * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
+  * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
   * @inode: The inode in question
-@@ -453,3 +478,11 @@ bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
- 	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
+@@ -449,3 +474,12 @@ bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
+ 		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
  }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
 +
-+bool inode_capable_nolog(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
++bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid_nolog(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 +{
 +	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 +
-+	return ns_capable_nolog(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
++	return ns_capable_nolog(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
++		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
 +}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable_nolog);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid_nolog);
 diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
 index 0c753dd..dd7d3d6 100644
 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -86358,7 +86334,7 @@ index 0b097c8..11dd5c5 100644
  #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD
  		{
 diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
-index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
+index 0e7fea7..f869fde 100644
 --- a/kernel/events/core.c
 +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
 @@ -158,8 +158,15 @@ static struct srcu_struct pmus_srcu;
@@ -86396,7 +86372,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  
  static void cpu_ctx_sched_out(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
  			      enum event_type_t event_type);
-@@ -2986,7 +2993,7 @@ static void __perf_event_read(void *info)
+@@ -3000,7 +3007,7 @@ static void __perf_event_read(void *info)
  
  static inline u64 perf_event_count(struct perf_event *event)
  {
@@ -86405,7 +86381,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  }
  
  static u64 perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
-@@ -3354,9 +3361,9 @@ u64 perf_event_read_value(struct perf_event *event, u64 *enabled, u64 *running)
+@@ -3365,9 +3372,9 @@ u64 perf_event_read_value(struct perf_event *event, u64 *enabled, u64 *running)
  	mutex_lock(&event->child_mutex);
  	total += perf_event_read(event);
  	*enabled += event->total_time_enabled +
@@ -86417,7 +86393,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  
  	list_for_each_entry(child, &event->child_list, child_list) {
  		total += perf_event_read(child);
-@@ -3785,10 +3792,10 @@ void perf_event_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event)
+@@ -3796,10 +3803,10 @@ void perf_event_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event)
  		userpg->offset -= local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
  
  	userpg->time_enabled = enabled +
@@ -86430,7 +86406,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  
  	arch_perf_update_userpage(userpg, now);
  
-@@ -4339,7 +4346,7 @@ perf_output_sample_ustack(struct perf_output_handle *handle, u64 dump_size,
+@@ -4350,7 +4357,7 @@ perf_output_sample_ustack(struct perf_output_handle *handle, u64 dump_size,
  
  		/* Data. */
  		sp = perf_user_stack_pointer(regs);
@@ -86439,7 +86415,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  		dyn_size = dump_size - rem;
  
  		perf_output_skip(handle, rem);
-@@ -4430,11 +4437,11 @@ static void perf_output_read_one(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
+@@ -4441,11 +4448,11 @@ static void perf_output_read_one(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
  	values[n++] = perf_event_count(event);
  	if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED) {
  		values[n++] = enabled +
@@ -86453,7 +86429,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  	}
  	if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
  		values[n++] = primary_event_id(event);
-@@ -6704,7 +6711,7 @@ perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
+@@ -6724,7 +6731,7 @@ perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
  	event->parent		= parent_event;
  
  	event->ns		= get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
@@ -86462,7 +86438,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  
  	event->state		= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
  
-@@ -7004,6 +7011,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
+@@ -7024,6 +7031,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
  	if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
  		return -EINVAL;
  
@@ -86474,7 +86450,7 @@ index fa0b2d4..67a1c7a 100644
  	err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
  	if (err)
  		return err;
-@@ -7339,10 +7351,10 @@ static void sync_child_event(struct perf_event *child_event,
+@@ -7362,10 +7374,10 @@ static void sync_child_event(struct perf_event *child_event,
  	/*
  	 * Add back the child's count to the parent's count:
  	 */
@@ -90051,7 +90027,7 @@ index a63f4dc..349bbb0 100644
  				     unsigned long timeout)
  {
 diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
-index f5c6635..7133356 100644
+index 0aae0fc..2ba2b81 100644
 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
 +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
 @@ -1775,7 +1775,7 @@ void set_numabalancing_state(bool enabled)
@@ -90094,7 +90070,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  		return -EPERM;
  
  	retval = security_task_setnice(current, nice);
-@@ -3332,6 +3337,7 @@ recheck:
+@@ -3355,6 +3360,7 @@ recheck:
  			if (policy != p->policy && !rlim_rtprio)
  				return -EPERM;
  
@@ -90102,7 +90078,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  			/* can't increase priority */
  			if (attr->sched_priority > p->rt_priority &&
  			    attr->sched_priority > rlim_rtprio)
-@@ -4702,8 +4708,10 @@ void idle_task_exit(void)
+@@ -4726,8 +4732,10 @@ void idle_task_exit(void)
  
  	BUG_ON(cpu_online(smp_processor_id()));
  
@@ -90114,7 +90090,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  	mmdrop(mm);
  }
  
-@@ -4781,7 +4789,7 @@ static void migrate_tasks(unsigned int dead_cpu)
+@@ -4805,7 +4813,7 @@ static void migrate_tasks(unsigned int dead_cpu)
  
  #if defined(CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG) && defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
  
@@ -90123,7 +90099,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  	{
  		.procname	= "sched_domain",
  		.mode		= 0555,
-@@ -4798,17 +4806,17 @@ static struct ctl_table sd_ctl_root[] = {
+@@ -4822,17 +4830,17 @@ static struct ctl_table sd_ctl_root[] = {
  	{}
  };
  
@@ -90145,7 +90121,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  
  	/*
  	 * In the intermediate directories, both the child directory and
-@@ -4816,22 +4824,25 @@ static void sd_free_ctl_entry(struct ctl_table **tablep)
+@@ -4840,22 +4848,25 @@ static void sd_free_ctl_entry(struct ctl_table **tablep)
  	 * will always be set. In the lowest directory the names are
  	 * static strings and all have proc handlers.
  	 */
@@ -90177,7 +90153,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  		const char *procname, void *data, int maxlen,
  		umode_t mode, proc_handler *proc_handler,
  		bool load_idx)
-@@ -4851,7 +4862,7 @@ set_table_entry(struct ctl_table *entry,
+@@ -4875,7 +4886,7 @@ set_table_entry(struct ctl_table *entry,
  static struct ctl_table *
  sd_alloc_ctl_domain_table(struct sched_domain *sd)
  {
@@ -90186,7 +90162,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  
  	if (table == NULL)
  		return NULL;
-@@ -4886,9 +4897,9 @@ sd_alloc_ctl_domain_table(struct sched_domain *sd)
+@@ -4910,9 +4921,9 @@ sd_alloc_ctl_domain_table(struct sched_domain *sd)
  	return table;
  }
  
@@ -90198,7 +90174,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  	struct sched_domain *sd;
  	int domain_num = 0, i;
  	char buf[32];
-@@ -4915,11 +4926,13 @@ static struct ctl_table_header *sd_sysctl_header;
+@@ -4939,11 +4950,13 @@ static struct ctl_table_header *sd_sysctl_header;
  static void register_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
  {
  	int i, cpu_num = num_possible_cpus();
@@ -90213,7 +90189,7 @@ index f5c6635..7133356 100644
  
  	if (entry == NULL)
  		return;
-@@ -4942,8 +4955,12 @@ static void unregister_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
+@@ -4966,8 +4979,12 @@ static void unregister_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
  	if (sd_sysctl_header)
  		unregister_sysctl_table(sd_sysctl_header);
  	sd_sysctl_header = NULL;
@@ -92905,7 +92881,7 @@ index 539eeb9..e24a987 100644
  	if (end == start)
  		return error;
 diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
-index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
+index e346fa9..5d32f0a 100644
 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c
 +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
 @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill __read_mostly = 0;
@@ -92953,7 +92929,15 @@ index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
  					unlock_page(hpage);
  					return 0;
  				}
-@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int trapno, int flags)
+@@ -1157,14 +1157,14 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int trapno, int flags)
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!PageHWPoison(p)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "MCE %#lx: just unpoisoned\n", pfn);
+-		atomic_long_sub(nr_pages, &num_poisoned_pages);
++		atomic_long_sub_unchecked(nr_pages, &num_poisoned_pages);
+ 		put_page(hpage);
+ 		res = 0;
+ 		goto out;
  	}
  	if (hwpoison_filter(p)) {
  		if (TestClearPageHWPoison(p))
@@ -92962,7 +92946,7 @@ index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
  		unlock_page(hpage);
  		put_page(hpage);
  		return 0;
-@@ -1384,7 +1384,7 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
+@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
  			return 0;
  		}
  		if (TestClearPageHWPoison(p))
@@ -92971,7 +92955,7 @@ index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
  		pr_info("MCE: Software-unpoisoned free page %#lx\n", pfn);
  		return 0;
  	}
-@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
+@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
  	 */
  	if (TestClearPageHWPoison(page)) {
  		pr_info("MCE: Software-unpoisoned page %#lx\n", pfn);
@@ -92980,7 +92964,7 @@ index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
  		freeit = 1;
  		if (PageHuge(page))
  			clear_page_hwpoison_huge_page(page);
-@@ -1523,11 +1523,11 @@ static int soft_offline_huge_page(struct page *page, int flags)
+@@ -1525,11 +1525,11 @@ static int soft_offline_huge_page(struct page *page, int flags)
  		if (PageHuge(page)) {
  			set_page_hwpoison_huge_page(hpage);
  			dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page(hpage);
@@ -92994,7 +92978,7 @@ index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
  		}
  	}
  	return ret;
-@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ static int __soft_offline_page(struct page *page, int flags)
+@@ -1568,7 +1568,7 @@ static int __soft_offline_page(struct page *page, int flags)
  		put_page(page);
  		pr_info("soft_offline: %#lx: invalidated\n", pfn);
  		SetPageHWPoison(page);
@@ -93003,7 +92987,7 @@ index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
  		return 0;
  	}
  
-@@ -1617,7 +1617,7 @@ static int __soft_offline_page(struct page *page, int flags)
+@@ -1619,7 +1619,7 @@ static int __soft_offline_page(struct page *page, int flags)
  			if (!is_free_buddy_page(page))
  				pr_info("soft offline: %#lx: page leaked\n",
  					pfn);
@@ -93012,7 +92996,7 @@ index 66586bb..73ab487 100644
  		}
  	} else {
  		pr_info("soft offline: %#lx: isolation failed: %d, page count %d, type %lx\n",
-@@ -1691,11 +1691,11 @@ int soft_offline_page(struct page *page, int flags)
+@@ -1693,11 +1693,11 @@ int soft_offline_page(struct page *page, int flags)
  		if (PageHuge(page)) {
  			set_page_hwpoison_huge_page(hpage);
  			dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page(hpage);
@@ -93722,10 +93706,10 @@ index 49e930f..90d7ec5 100644
  	mm = get_task_mm(tsk);
  	if (!mm)
 diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
-index ae3c8f3..fa4ee8e 100644
+index 56224d9..a74c77e 100644
 --- a/mm/mempolicy.c
 +++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
-@@ -746,6 +746,10 @@ static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+@@ -750,6 +750,10 @@ static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
  	unsigned long vmstart;
  	unsigned long vmend;
  
@@ -93736,7 +93720,7 @@ index ae3c8f3..fa4ee8e 100644
  	vma = find_vma(mm, start);
  	if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
  		return -EFAULT;
-@@ -789,6 +793,16 @@ static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+@@ -793,6 +797,16 @@ static int mbind_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
  		err = vma_replace_policy(vma, new_pol);
  		if (err)
  			goto out;
@@ -93753,7 +93737,7 @@ index ae3c8f3..fa4ee8e 100644
  	}
  
   out:
-@@ -1252,6 +1266,17 @@ static long do_mbind(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
+@@ -1256,6 +1270,17 @@ static long do_mbind(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
  
  	if (end < start)
  		return -EINVAL;
@@ -93771,7 +93755,7 @@ index ae3c8f3..fa4ee8e 100644
  	if (end == start)
  		return 0;
  
-@@ -1480,8 +1505,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, maxnode,
+@@ -1484,8 +1509,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, maxnode,
  	 */
  	tcred = __task_cred(task);
  	if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
@@ -93781,7 +93765,7 @@ index ae3c8f3..fa4ee8e 100644
  		rcu_read_unlock();
  		err = -EPERM;
  		goto out_put;
-@@ -1512,6 +1536,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, maxnode,
+@@ -1516,6 +1540,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, maxnode,
  		goto out;
  	}
  
@@ -95742,7 +95726,7 @@ index fd26d04..0cea1b0 100644
  	if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
  		rc = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
 diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c
-index d3cbac5..3784601 100644
+index 5d91bb7..3784601 100644
 --- a/mm/rmap.c
 +++ b/mm/rmap.c
 @@ -163,6 +163,10 @@ int anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
@@ -95844,20 +95828,8 @@ index d3cbac5..3784601 100644
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1554,10 +1590,9 @@ void __put_anon_vma(struct anon_vma *anon_vma)
- {
- 	struct anon_vma *root = anon_vma->root;
- 
-+	anon_vma_free(anon_vma);
- 	if (root != anon_vma && atomic_dec_and_test(&root->refcount))
- 		anon_vma_free(root);
--
--	anon_vma_free(anon_vma);
- }
- 
- static struct anon_vma *rmap_walk_anon_lock(struct page *page,
 diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
-index 1f18c9d..3e03d33 100644
+index 1f18c9d..b550bab 100644
 --- a/mm/shmem.c
 +++ b/mm/shmem.c
 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
@@ -95869,7 +95841,7 @@ index 1f18c9d..3e03d33 100644
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM
  /*
-@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
+@@ -77,14 +77,15 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
  #define BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE 20
  
  /* Symlink up to this size is kmalloc'ed instead of using a swappable page */
@@ -95877,8 +95849,99 @@ index 1f18c9d..3e03d33 100644
 +#define SHORT_SYMLINK_LEN 64
  
  /*
-  * shmem_fallocate and shmem_writepage communicate via inode->i_private
-@@ -2218,6 +2218,11 @@ static const struct xattr_handler *shmem_xattr_handlers[] = {
+- * shmem_fallocate and shmem_writepage communicate via inode->i_private
+- * (with i_mutex making sure that it has only one user at a time):
+- * we would prefer not to enlarge the shmem inode just for that.
++ * shmem_fallocate communicates with shmem_fault or shmem_writepage via
++ * inode->i_private (with i_mutex making sure that it has only one user at
++ * a time): we would prefer not to enlarge the shmem inode just for that.
+  */
+ struct shmem_falloc {
++	int	mode;		/* FALLOC_FL mode currently operating */
+ 	pgoff_t start;		/* start of range currently being fallocated */
+ 	pgoff_t next;		/* the next page offset to be fallocated */
+ 	pgoff_t nr_falloced;	/* how many new pages have been fallocated */
+@@ -824,6 +825,7 @@ static int shmem_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc)
+ 			spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+ 			shmem_falloc = inode->i_private;
+ 			if (shmem_falloc &&
++			    !shmem_falloc->mode &&
+ 			    index >= shmem_falloc->start &&
+ 			    index < shmem_falloc->next)
+ 				shmem_falloc->nr_unswapped++;
+@@ -1298,6 +1300,43 @@ static int shmem_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
+ 	int error;
+ 	int ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Trinity finds that probing a hole which tmpfs is punching can
++	 * prevent the hole-punch from ever completing: which in turn
++	 * locks writers out with its hold on i_mutex.  So refrain from
++	 * faulting pages into the hole while it's being punched, and
++	 * wait on i_mutex to be released if vmf->flags permits, 
++	 */
++	if (unlikely(inode->i_private)) {
++		struct shmem_falloc *shmem_falloc;
++		spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
++		shmem_falloc = inode->i_private;
++		if (!shmem_falloc ||
++		    shmem_falloc->mode != FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE ||
++		    vmf->pgoff < shmem_falloc->start ||
++		    vmf->pgoff >= shmem_falloc->next)
++			shmem_falloc = NULL;
++		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
++		/*
++		 * i_lock has protected us from taking shmem_falloc seriously
++		 * once return from shmem_fallocate() went back up that stack.
++		 * i_lock does not serialize with i_mutex at all, but it does
++		 * not matter if sometimes we wait unnecessarily, or sometimes
++		 * miss out on waiting: we just need to make those cases rare.
++		 */
++		if (shmem_falloc) {
++			if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) &&
++			   !(vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT)) {
++				up_read(&vma->vm_mm->mmap_sem);
++				mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
++				mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
++				return VM_FAULT_RETRY;
++			}
++			/* cond_resched? Leave that to GUP or return to user */
++			return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	error = shmem_getpage(inode, vmf->pgoff, &vmf->page, SGP_CACHE, &ret);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return ((error == -ENOMEM) ? VM_FAULT_OOM : VM_FAULT_SIGBUS);
+@@ -1813,18 +1852,26 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ 
++	shmem_falloc.mode = mode & ~FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE;
++
+ 	if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
+ 		struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+ 		loff_t unmap_start = round_up(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
+ 		loff_t unmap_end = round_down(offset + len, PAGE_SIZE) - 1;
+ 
++		shmem_falloc.start = unmap_start >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		shmem_falloc.next = (unmap_end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
++		inode->i_private = &shmem_falloc;
++		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
++
+ 		if ((u64)unmap_end > (u64)unmap_start)
+ 			unmap_mapping_range(mapping, unmap_start,
+ 					    1 + unmap_end - unmap_start, 0);
+ 		shmem_truncate_range(inode, offset, offset + len - 1);
+ 		/* No need to unmap again: hole-punching leaves COWed pages */
+ 		error = 0;
+-		goto out;
++		goto undone;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* We need to check rlimit even when FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE */
+@@ -2218,6 +2265,11 @@ static const struct xattr_handler *shmem_xattr_handlers[] = {
  static int shmem_xattr_validate(const char *name)
  {
  	struct { const char *prefix; size_t len; } arr[] = {
@@ -95890,7 +95953,7 @@ index 1f18c9d..3e03d33 100644
  		{ XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN },
  		{ XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN }
  	};
-@@ -2273,6 +2278,15 @@ static int shmem_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+@@ -2273,6 +2325,15 @@ static int shmem_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
  	if (err)
  		return err;
  
@@ -95906,7 +95969,7 @@ index 1f18c9d..3e03d33 100644
  	return simple_xattr_set(&info->xattrs, name, value, size, flags);
  }
  
-@@ -2585,8 +2599,7 @@ int shmem_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+@@ -2585,8 +2646,7 @@ int shmem_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
  	int err = -ENOMEM;
  
  	/* Round up to L1_CACHE_BYTES to resist false sharing */
@@ -97743,7 +97806,7 @@ index 7552f9e..074ce29 100644
  			err = -EFAULT;
  			break;
 diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
-index b0ad2c7..96f6a5e 100644
+index 6afa3b4..7a14180 100644
 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
 +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
 @@ -3740,8 +3740,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len,
@@ -99470,7 +99533,7 @@ index 2510c02..cfb34fa 100644
  		pr_err("Unable to proc dir entry\n");
  		return -ENOMEM;
 diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
-index e21934b..16f52a6 100644
+index e21934b..3ae545c 100644
 --- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
 +++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
 @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct ping_table {
@@ -99482,15 +99545,6 @@ index e21934b..16f52a6 100644
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pingv6_ops);
  
  static u16 ping_port_rover;
-@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int ping_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
- 
- 	inet_get_ping_group_range_net(net, &low, &high);
- 	if (gid_lte(low, group) && gid_lte(group, high))
--		return 0;
-+		goto out_release_group;
- 
- 	group_info = get_current_groups();
- 	count = group_info->ngroups;
 @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int ping_check_bind_addr(struct sock *sk, struct inet_sock *isk,
  				return -ENODEV;
  			}
@@ -104111,26 +104165,53 @@ index 078fe1d..fbdb363 100644
  		fprintf(stderr, "fixdep: sizeof(int) != 4 or wrong endianness? %#x\n",
 diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh b/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..edcbc3a
+index 0000000..3fd3699
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 +#!/bin/bash
 +srctree=$(dirname "$0")
 +gccplugins_dir=$($3 -print-file-name=plugin)
-+plugincc=$($1 -E -shared - -o /dev/null -I${srctree}/../tools/gcc -I${gccplugins_dir}/include 2>&1 <<EOF
++plugincc=$($1 -E - -o /dev/null -I${srctree}/../tools/gcc -I${gccplugins_dir}/include 2>&1 <<EOF
 +#include "gcc-common.h"
 +#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4008 || defined(ENABLE_BUILD_WITH_CXX)
-+#warning $2
++#warning $2 CXX
 +#else
-+#warning $1
++#warning $1 CC
 +#endif
 +EOF
 +)
++
++if [ $? -ne 0 ]
++then
++	exit 1
++fi
++
++if [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$1 CC" ]]
++then
++	echo "$1"
++	exit 0
++fi
++
++if [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$2 CXX" ]]
++then
++plugincc=$($1 -c -x c++ -std=gnu++98 - -o /dev/null -I${srctree}/../tools/gcc -I${gccplugins_dir}/include 2>&1 <<EOF
++#include "gcc-common.h"
++class test {
++public:
++	int test;
++} test = {
++	.test = 1
++};
++EOF
++)
 +if [ $? -eq 0 ]
 +then
-+	( [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$1" ]] && echo "$1" ) || ( [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$2" ]] && echo "$2" )
++	echo "$2"
++	exit 0
++fi
 +fi
++exit 1
 diff --git a/scripts/headers_install.sh b/scripts/headers_install.sh
 index 5de5660..d3deb89 100644
 --- a/scripts/headers_install.sh
@@ -104414,7 +104495,7 @@ index 8fac3fd..32ff38d 100644
  	unsigned int secindex_strings;
  
 diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
-index beb86b5..1776e5eb7 100644
+index beb86b5..40b1edb 100644
 --- a/security/Kconfig
 +++ b/security/Kconfig
 @@ -4,6 +4,957 @@
@@ -104727,13 +104808,13 @@ index beb86b5..1776e5eb7 100644
 +	bool 'Use filesystem extended attributes marking'
 +	default y if GRKERNSEC_CONFIG_AUTO
 +	select CIFS_XATTR if CIFS
++	select F2FS_FS_XATTR if F2FS_FS
 +	select EXT2_FS_XATTR if EXT2_FS
 +	select EXT3_FS_XATTR if EXT3_FS
 +	select JFFS2_FS_XATTR if JFFS2_FS
 +	select REISERFS_FS_XATTR if REISERFS_FS
 +	select SQUASHFS_XATTR if SQUASHFS
 +	select TMPFS_XATTR if TMPFS
-+	select UBIFS_FS_XATTR if UBIFS_FS
 +	help
 +	  Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
 +	  a per executable basis via the 'setfattr' utility.  The control

diff --git a/3.14.6/4425_grsec_remove_EI_PAX.patch b/3.14.8/4425_grsec_remove_EI_PAX.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from 3.14.6/4425_grsec_remove_EI_PAX.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4425_grsec_remove_EI_PAX.patch

diff --git a/3.14.6/4427_force_XATTR_PAX_tmpfs.patch b/3.14.8/4427_force_XATTR_PAX_tmpfs.patch
similarity index 95%
rename from 3.14.6/4427_force_XATTR_PAX_tmpfs.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4427_force_XATTR_PAX_tmpfs.patch
index bbcef41..3db2112 100644
--- a/3.14.6/4427_force_XATTR_PAX_tmpfs.patch
+++ b/3.14.8/4427_force_XATTR_PAX_tmpfs.patch
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ namespace supported on tmpfs so that the PaX markings survive emerge.
 diff -Naur a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
 --- a/mm/shmem.c	2013-06-11 21:00:18.000000000 -0400
 +++ b/mm/shmem.c	2013-06-11 21:08:18.000000000 -0400
-@@ -2218,11 +2218,7 @@
+@@ -2265,11 +2265,7 @@
  static int shmem_xattr_validate(const char *name)
  {
  	struct { const char *prefix; size_t len; } arr[] = {
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ diff -Naur a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
  		{ XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN },
  		{ XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN }
  	};
-@@ -2278,14 +2274,12 @@
+@@ -2325,14 +2321,12 @@
  	if (err)
  		return err;
  

diff --git a/3.14.6/4430_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch b/3.14.8/4430_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from 3.14.6/4430_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4430_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch

diff --git a/3.14.6/4435_grsec-mute-warnings.patch b/3.14.8/4435_grsec-mute-warnings.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from 3.14.6/4435_grsec-mute-warnings.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4435_grsec-mute-warnings.patch

diff --git a/3.14.6/4440_grsec-remove-protected-paths.patch b/3.14.8/4440_grsec-remove-protected-paths.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from 3.14.6/4440_grsec-remove-protected-paths.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4440_grsec-remove-protected-paths.patch

diff --git a/3.14.6/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch b/3.14.8/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
similarity index 96%
rename from 3.14.6/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
index 19a4285..af218a8 100644
--- a/3.14.6/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
+++ b/3.14.8/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from shooting themselves in the foot.
 diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
 --- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2012-10-13 09:51:35.000000000 -0400
 +++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2012-10-13 09:52:32.000000000 -0400
-@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@
+@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
  	int "GID for auditing"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  
  config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
  	bool "Exec logging"
-@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@
+@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID
  	int "GID for TPE-untrusted users"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && !GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
  	  *enabled* for.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@
+@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_TPE_TRUSTED_GID
  	int "GID for TPE-trusted users"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
  	  *disabled* for.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@
+@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
  	int "GID to deny all sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
  	  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
-@@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@
+@@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
  	int "GID to deny client sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
  	  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
-@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@
+@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
  	int "GID to deny server sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER

diff --git a/3.14.6/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch b/3.14.8/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
similarity index 99%
rename from 3.14.6/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
index 2765cdc..fb528d0 100644
--- a/3.14.6/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
+++ b/3.14.8/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@×××.org>
 diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
 --- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-04-17 19:25:54.000000000 -0400
 +++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-04-17 19:32:53.000000000 -0400
-@@ -1145,6 +1145,27 @@
+@@ -1147,6 +1147,27 @@
  menu "Logging Options"
  depends on GRKERNSEC
  

diff --git a/3.14.6/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch b/3.14.8/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from 3.14.6/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch

diff --git a/3.14.6/4475_emutramp_default_on.patch b/3.14.8/4475_emutramp_default_on.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from 3.14.6/4475_emutramp_default_on.patch
rename to 3.14.8/4475_emutramp_default_on.patch

diff --git a/3.2.60/0000_README b/3.2.60/0000_README
index daa1871..b5b1f29 100644
--- a/3.2.60/0000_README
+++ b/3.2.60/0000_README
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ Patch:	1059_linux-3.2.60.patch
 From:	http://www.kernel.org
 Desc:	Linux 3.2.60
 
-Patch:	4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406101410.patch
+Patch:	4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406191345.patch
 From:	http://www.grsecurity.net
 Desc:	hardened-sources base patch from upstream grsecurity
 

diff --git a/3.2.60/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406101410.patch b/3.2.60/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406191345.patch
similarity index 99%
rename from 3.2.60/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406101410.patch
rename to 3.2.60/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406191345.patch
index c00f5cd..9f3ccfb 100644
--- a/3.2.60/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406101410.patch
+++ b/3.2.60/4420_grsecurity-3.0-3.2.60-201406191345.patch
@@ -3951,7 +3951,7 @@ index 6018c80..7c37203 100644
  
  #endif /* _ASM_SYSTEM_H */
 diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
-index adda036..e0f33bb 100644
+index adda036..d4f1f45 100644
 --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
 +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/thread_info.h
 @@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ register struct thread_info *__current_thread_info __asm__("$28");
@@ -3969,7 +3969,7 @@ index adda036..e0f33bb 100644
  #define _TIF_LOAD_WATCH		(1<<TIF_LOAD_WATCH)
 +#define _TIF_GRSEC_SETXID	(1<<TIF_GRSEC_SETXID)
 +
-+#define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK	(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | _TIF_GRSEC_SETXID)
++#define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK	(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | _TIF_SECCOMP | _TIF_GRSEC_SETXID)
  
  /* work to do in syscall_trace_leave() */
 -#define _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT	(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
@@ -15936,7 +15936,7 @@ index d7ef849..b1b009a 100644
  #endif
  #endif /* _ASM_X86_THREAD_INFO_H */
 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
-index 36361bf..be257d9 100644
+index 36361bf..9efdc12 100644
 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
 +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
 @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
@@ -15960,6 +15960,15 @@ index 36361bf..be257d9 100644
  
  #define segment_eq(a, b)	((a).seg == (b).seg)
  
+@@ -52,7 +58,7 @@
+ 	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
+ 	asm("add %3,%1 ; sbb %0,%0 ; cmp %1,%4 ; sbb $0,%0"		\
+ 	    : "=&r" (flag), "=r" (roksum)				\
+-	    : "1" (addr), "g" ((long)(size)),				\
++	    : "1" (addr), "rm" ((long)(size)),				\
+ 	      "rm" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg));		\
+ 	flag;								\
+ })
 @@ -76,7 +82,35 @@
   * checks that the pointer is in the user space range - after calling
   * this function, memory access functions may still return -EFAULT.
@@ -34901,7 +34910,7 @@ index da3cfee..a5a6606 100644
  
  	*ppos = i;
 diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
-index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
+index c244f0e..8b3452f 100644
 --- a/drivers/char/random.c
 +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
 @@ -255,10 +255,8 @@
@@ -35639,7 +35648,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  }
  #endif
  
-@@ -835,104 +915,130 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+@@ -835,104 +915,131 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
   * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
   * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
   */
@@ -35733,7 +35742,6 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		      int reserved)
  {
 -	unsigned long flags;
-+	int have_bytes;
 +	int entropy_count, orig;
 +	size_t ibytes;
  
@@ -35756,17 +35764,10 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
 -		if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= entropy_count / 8)
 -			nbytes = entropy_count/8 - reserved;
 +	entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
-+	have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
 +	ibytes = nbytes;
 +	/* If limited, never pull more than available */
-+	if (r->limit)
-+		ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, max(0, have_bytes - reserved));
-+	if (ibytes < min)
-+		ibytes = 0;
-+	if (have_bytes >= ibytes + reserved)
-+		entropy_count -= ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-+	else
-+		entropy_count = reserved << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
++	if (r->limit) {
++		int have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
  
 -		if (entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved) {
 -			entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
@@ -35777,25 +35778,33 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
 -			if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
 -				goto retry;
 -		}
-+	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
-+		goto retry;
- 
+-
 -		if (entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh) {
 -			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
 -			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
 -		}
++		if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
++			have_bytes = 0;
++		ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
+ 	}
++	if (ibytes < min)
++		ibytes = 0;
++	if ((entropy_count -= ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) < 0)
++		entropy_count = 0;
+ 
+-	DEBUG_ENT("debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
+-		  nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit ? "" : " (unlimited)");
++	if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
++		goto retry;
+ 
+-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 +	trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
 +	if (ibytes &&
 +	    (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
 +		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
 +		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
- 	}
++	}
  
--	DEBUG_ENT("debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
--		  nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit ? "" : " (unlimited)");
--
--	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
--
 -	return nbytes;
 +	return ibytes;
  }
@@ -35835,7 +35844,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
  	for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
  		sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
-@@ -966,27 +1072,43 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+@@ -966,27 +1073,43 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
  	hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
  	hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
  
@@ -35890,7 +35899,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
  	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
  
-@@ -994,8 +1116,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+@@ -994,8 +1117,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
  		extract_buf(r, tmp);
  
  		if (fips_enabled) {
@@ -35899,7 +35908,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  			spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
  			if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
  				panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
-@@ -1015,12 +1135,17 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
+@@ -1015,12 +1136,17 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -35917,7 +35926,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  	xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
  	nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
  
-@@ -1036,7 +1161,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
+@@ -1036,7 +1162,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
  
  		extract_buf(r, tmp);
  		i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
@@ -35926,7 +35935,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  			ret = -EFAULT;
  			break;
  		}
-@@ -1055,11 +1180,20 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
+@@ -1055,11 +1181,20 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
  /*
   * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
   * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
@@ -35949,7 +35958,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  	extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0);
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
-@@ -1078,6 +1212,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+@@ -1078,6 +1213,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
  {
  	char *p = buf;
  
@@ -35957,7 +35966,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  	while (nbytes) {
  		unsigned long v;
  		int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
-@@ -1111,12 +1246,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+@@ -1111,12 +1247,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
  	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
  	unsigned long rv;
  
@@ -35973,7 +35982,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
  	}
  	mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
-@@ -1139,25 +1273,7 @@ static int rand_initialize(void)
+@@ -1139,25 +1274,7 @@ static int rand_initialize(void)
  	init_std_data(&nonblocking_pool);
  	return 0;
  }
@@ -36000,7 +36009,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
  void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
-@@ -1169,71 +1285,59 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+@@ -1169,71 +1286,59 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
  	 * source.
  	 */
  	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -36108,7 +36117,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  }
  
  static unsigned int
-@@ -1244,9 +1348,9 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+@@ -1244,9 +1349,9 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
  	poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
  	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
  	mask = 0;
@@ -36120,7 +36129,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
  	return mask;
  }
-@@ -1297,7 +1401,8 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+@@ -1297,7 +1402,8 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
  	switch (cmd) {
  	case RNDGETENTCNT:
  		/* inherently racy, no point locking */
@@ -36130,7 +36139,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  			return -EFAULT;
  		return 0;
  	case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
-@@ -1305,7 +1410,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+@@ -1305,7 +1411,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
  			return -EPERM;
  		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
  			return -EFAULT;
@@ -36139,7 +36148,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		return 0;
  	case RNDADDENTROPY:
  		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-@@ -1320,14 +1425,19 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+@@ -1320,14 +1426,19 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
  				    size);
  		if (retval < 0)
  			return retval;
@@ -36162,7 +36171,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		return 0;
  	default:
  		return -EINVAL;
-@@ -1387,23 +1497,23 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);
+@@ -1387,23 +1498,23 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);
  #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  
  static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
@@ -36193,7 +36202,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  	unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
  
  	uuid = table->data;
-@@ -1427,8 +1537,26 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
+@@ -1427,8 +1538,26 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write,
  	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
  }
  
@@ -36221,7 +36230,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  	{
  		.procname	= "poolsize",
  		.data		= &sysctl_poolsize,
-@@ -1440,12 +1568,12 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
+@@ -1440,12 +1569,12 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
  		.procname	= "entropy_avail",
  		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
  		.mode		= 0444,
@@ -36236,7 +36245,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
  		.mode		= 0644,
  		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
-@@ -1454,7 +1582,7 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
+@@ -1454,7 +1583,7 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
  	},
  	{
  		.procname	= "write_wakeup_threshold",
@@ -36245,7 +36254,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
  		.mode		= 0644,
  		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
-@@ -1462,6 +1590,13 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
+@@ -1462,6 +1591,13 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
  		.extra2		= &max_write_thresh,
  	},
  	{
@@ -36259,7 +36268,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  		.procname	= "boot_id",
  		.data		= &sysctl_bootid,
  		.maxlen		= 16,
-@@ -1492,7 +1627,7 @@ int random_int_secret_init(void)
+@@ -1492,7 +1628,7 @@ int random_int_secret_init(void)
   * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
   * depleting entropy is too high
   */
@@ -36268,7 +36277,7 @@ index c244f0e..0fa19d6 100644
  unsigned int get_random_int(void)
  {
  	__u32 *hash;
-@@ -1510,6 +1645,7 @@ unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+@@ -1510,6 +1646,7 @@ unsigned int get_random_int(void)
  
  	return ret;
  }
@@ -42173,10 +42182,33 @@ index 6d05e26..a579e8c 100644
  
  			rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
 diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5.c b/drivers/md/raid5.c
-index 7c963c4..1204886 100644
+index 7c963c4..8d07287e 100644
 --- a/drivers/md/raid5.c
 +++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c
-@@ -1618,19 +1618,19 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
+@@ -1364,6 +1364,10 @@ static int grow_one_stripe(struct r5conf *conf)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++static atomic_unchecked_t raid5_cache_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
++#endif
++
+ static int grow_stripes(struct r5conf *conf, int num)
+ {
+ 	struct kmem_cache *sc;
+@@ -1374,7 +1378,11 @@ static int grow_stripes(struct r5conf *conf, int num)
+ 			"raid%d-%s", conf->level, mdname(conf->mddev));
+ 	else
+ 		sprintf(conf->cache_name[0],
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++			"raid%d-%08lx", conf->level, atomic_inc_return_unchecked(&raid5_cache_id));
++#else
+ 			"raid%d-%p", conf->level, conf->mddev);
++#endif
+ 	sprintf(conf->cache_name[1], "%s-alt", conf->cache_name[0]);
+ 
+ 	conf->active_name = 0;
+@@ -1618,19 +1626,19 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
  				(unsigned long long)(sh->sector
  						     + rdev->data_offset),
  				bdevname(rdev->bdev, b));
@@ -42200,7 +42232,7 @@ index 7c963c4..1204886 100644
  		if (conf->mddev->degraded >= conf->max_degraded)
  			printk_ratelimited(
  				KERN_WARNING
-@@ -1650,7 +1650,7 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
+@@ -1650,7 +1658,7 @@ static void raid5_end_read_request(struct bio * bi, int error)
  				(unsigned long long)(sh->sector
  						     + rdev->data_offset),
  				bdn);
@@ -58189,6 +58221,27 @@ index 22764c7..86372c9 100644
  		if (arg >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE))
  			break;
  		err = alloc_fd(arg, cmd == F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC ? O_CLOEXEC : 0);
+diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c
+index 6b08864..4b42b2d 100644
+--- a/fs/fhandle.c
++++ b/fs/fhandle.c
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
+ #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+ #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "internal.h"
+ 
+@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ static int handle_to_path(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
+ 	 * the directory. Ideally we would like CAP_DAC_SEARCH.
+ 	 * But we don't have that
+ 	 */
+-	if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) {
++	if (!capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) || !gr_chroot_fhandle()) {
+ 		retval = -EPERM;
+ 		goto out_err;
+ 	}
 diff --git a/fs/fifo.c b/fs/fifo.c
 index cf6f434..3d7942c 100644
 --- a/fs/fifo.c
@@ -64823,10 +64876,10 @@ index 8a89949..6776861 100644
  xfs_init_zones(void)
 diff --git a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ddeec00
+index 0000000..155d9f5
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig
-@@ -0,0 +1,1160 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,1162 @@
 +#
 +# grecurity configuration
 +#
@@ -65374,14 +65427,16 @@ index 0000000..ddeec00
 +	  created.
 +
 +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot"
++	bool "Deny fchdir and fhandle out of chroot"
 +	default y if GRKERNSEC_CONFIG_AUTO
 +	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
 +	help
 +	  If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
 +	  to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
-+	  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  If the sysctl option
-+	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
++	  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  Additionally, this option prevents
++	  use of the recently-created syscall for opening files by a guessable "file
++	  handle" inside a chroot.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
 +
 +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
 +	bool "Deny mknod"
@@ -72671,10 +72726,10 @@ index 0000000..bc0be01
 +}
 diff --git a/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c b/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..12eb2bd
+index 0000000..60b786f
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
 +#include <linux/module.h>
 +#include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -72849,6 +72904,23 @@ index 0000000..12eb2bd
 +}
 +
 +int
++gr_chroot_fhandle(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
++		return 1;
++	else {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_FHANDLE_MSG);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
 +gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
 +		const time_t shm_createtime)
 +{
@@ -78952,10 +79024,10 @@ index 0000000..7dc4203
 +#endif
 diff --git a/include/linux/grmsg.h b/include/linux/grmsg.h
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ba93581
+index 0000000..b02ba9d
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/include/linux/grmsg.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
 +#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
 +#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%pI4 TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%pI4 TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
 +#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by "
@@ -79002,6 +79074,7 @@ index 0000000..ba93581
 +#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied chmod +s of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "denied fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by "
++#define GR_CHROOT_FHANDLE_MSG "denied use of file handles inside chroot by "
 +#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_SETXATTR_ACL_MSG "%s setting extended attribute of %.950s by "
 +#define GR_REMOVEXATTR_ACL_MSG "%s removing extended attribute of %.950s by "
@@ -79074,10 +79147,10 @@ index 0000000..ba93581
 +#define GR_MSRWRITE_MSG "denied write to CPU MSR by "
 diff --git a/include/linux/grsecurity.h b/include/linux/grsecurity.h
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..053a2fa
+index 0000000..2a0fe35
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/include/linux/grsecurity.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
 +#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
 +#define GR_SECURITY_H
 +#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -79121,6 +79194,7 @@ index 0000000..053a2fa
 +int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p,
 +					const int niceval);
 +int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
++int gr_chroot_fhandle(void);
 +int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
 +				   const struct vfsmount *mnt);
 +void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct path *path);
@@ -106609,7 +106683,7 @@ index 3626666..4d873cd 100644
 +
 +clean-files := randstruct.seed
 diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.build b/scripts/Makefile.build
-index d2b366c..2d5a6f8 100644
+index d2b366c1..2d5a6f8 100644
 --- a/scripts/Makefile.build
 +++ b/scripts/Makefile.build
 @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ endif
@@ -106797,26 +106871,53 @@ index cb1f50c..cef2a7c 100644
  		fprintf(stderr, "fixdep: sizeof(int) != 4 or wrong endianess? %#x\n",
 diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh b/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..edcbc3a
+index 0000000..3fd3699
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 +#!/bin/bash
 +srctree=$(dirname "$0")
 +gccplugins_dir=$($3 -print-file-name=plugin)
-+plugincc=$($1 -E -shared - -o /dev/null -I${srctree}/../tools/gcc -I${gccplugins_dir}/include 2>&1 <<EOF
++plugincc=$($1 -E - -o /dev/null -I${srctree}/../tools/gcc -I${gccplugins_dir}/include 2>&1 <<EOF
 +#include "gcc-common.h"
 +#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4008 || defined(ENABLE_BUILD_WITH_CXX)
-+#warning $2
++#warning $2 CXX
 +#else
-+#warning $1
++#warning $1 CC
 +#endif
 +EOF
 +)
++
++if [ $? -ne 0 ]
++then
++	exit 1
++fi
++
++if [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$1 CC" ]]
++then
++	echo "$1"
++	exit 0
++fi
++
++if [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$2 CXX" ]]
++then
++plugincc=$($1 -c -x c++ -std=gnu++98 - -o /dev/null -I${srctree}/../tools/gcc -I${gccplugins_dir}/include 2>&1 <<EOF
++#include "gcc-common.h"
++class test {
++public:
++	int test;
++} test = {
++	.test = 1
++};
++EOF
++)
 +if [ $? -eq 0 ]
 +then
-+	( [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$1" ]] && echo "$1" ) || ( [[ "$plugincc" =~ "$2" ]] && echo "$2" )
++	echo "$2"
++	exit 0
++fi
 +fi
++exit 1
 diff --git a/scripts/headers_install.pl b/scripts/headers_install.pl
 index 48462be..3e08f94 100644
 --- a/scripts/headers_install.pl

diff --git a/3.2.60/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch b/3.2.60/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
index f3f6f14..e3c7c72 100644
--- a/3.2.60/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
+++ b/3.2.60/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from shooting themselves in the foot.
 diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
 --- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2012-10-13 09:51:35.000000000 -0400
 +++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2012-10-13 09:52:32.000000000 -0400
-@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@
+@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
  	int "GID for auditing"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  
  config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
  	bool "Exec logging"
-@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@
+@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_TPE_UNTRUSTED_GID
  	int "GID for TPE-untrusted users"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && !GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
  	  *enabled* for.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@
+@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_TPE_TRUSTED_GID
  	int "GID for TPE-trusted users"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
  	  *disabled* for.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@
+@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
  	int "GID to deny all sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
  	  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
-@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@
+@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
  	int "GID to deny client sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
  	  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
-@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
  	int "GID to deny server sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER

diff --git a/3.2.60/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch b/3.2.60/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
index e10ec6d..035fe2d 100644
--- a/3.2.60/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
+++ b/3.2.60/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@×××.org>
 diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
 --- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-04-17 19:25:54.000000000 -0400
 +++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-04-17 19:32:53.000000000 -0400
-@@ -1131,6 +1131,27 @@
+@@ -1133,6 +1133,27 @@
  menu "Logging Options"
  depends on GRKERNSEC