[gentoo-commits] linux-patches r1478 - in hardened/2.6/tags: . 2.6.25-13

[Gordon Malm (gengor)]

Author: gengor
Date: 2009-01-20 21:27:53 +0000 (Tue, 20 Jan 2009)
New Revision: 1478

Added:
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/0000_README
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1017_linux-2.6.25.18.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1018_linux-2.6.25.19.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1019_linux-2.6.25.20.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1401_cgroups-fix-invalid-cgrp-dentry-before-cgroup-has-been-completely-removed.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1402_cpqarry-fix-return-value-of-cpqarray_init.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1403_ext3-wait-on-all-pending-commits-in-ext3_sync_fs.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1404_hid-fix-incorrent-length-condition-in-hidraw_write.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1405_i-oat-fix-async_tx.callback-checking.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1406_i-oat-fix-channel-resources-free-for-not-allocated-channels.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1407_i-oat-fix-dma_pin_iovec_pages-error-handling.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1408_jffs2-fix-lack-of-locking-in-thread_should_wake.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1409_jffs2-fix-race-condition-in-jffs2_lzo_compress.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1410_md-linear-fix-a-division-by-zero-bug-for-very-small-arrays.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1411_mmc-increase-sd-write-timeout-for-crappy-cards.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1412_net-unix-fix-inflight-counting-bug-in-garbage-collector.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1413_block-fix-nr_phys_segments-miscalculation-bug.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1414_dm-raid1-flush-workqueue-before-destruction.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1415_net-fix-proc-net-snmp-as-memory-corruptor.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1416_touch_mnt_namespace-when-the-mount-flags-change.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1417_usb-ehci-remove-obsolete-workaround-for-bogus-IRQs.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1418_usb-ehci-fix-handling-of-dead-controllers.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1419_usb-don-t-register-endpoints-for-interfaces-that-are-going-away.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1420_usb-ehci-fix-divide-by-zero-bug.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1421_usb-fix-ps3-usb-shutdown-problems.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1422_v4l-dvb-cve-2008-5033-fix-oops-on-tvaudio-when-controlling-bass-treble.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1423_net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1424_atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1425_enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1503_hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1504_hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1505_hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1506_inotify-fix-watch-removal-or-umount-races.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1507_sctp-avoid_memory_overflow_with_bad_stream_ID.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1800_sched-disable-hrtick.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4420_grsec-2.1.12-2.6.25.16-200808201644.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4421_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4422_grsec-mute-warnings.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4425_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4430_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4435_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4440_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4445_disable-compat_vdso.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4450_pax-remove-read_implies_exec-for-pax-binaries.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4455_pax-fix-uvesafb-compile-and-misc.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4460_pax-fix-mmap-BUG_ON-task-size-check.patch
   hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4465_pax-fix-false-RLIMIT_STACK-warnings.patch
Log:
Tag 2.6.25-13 hardened-extras patchset

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/0000_README
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/0000_README	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/0000_README	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+README
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Individual Patch Descriptions:
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Patch:	1017_linux-2.6.25.18.patch
+From:	http://www.kernel.org
+Desc:	Linux 2.6.25.18
+
+Patch:	1018_linux-2.6.25.19.patch
+From:	http://www.kernel.org
+Desc:	Linux 2.6.25.19
+
+Patch:	1019_linux-2.6.25.20.patch
+From:	http://www.kernel.org
+Desc:	Linux 2.6.25.20
+
+Patch:	1401* -> 1412*
+From:	http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;
+	a=commit;h=ff413e9814b3914ddf3d4634e9a6cc1c6b21e787
+Desc:	Backported subset of 2.6.27.6 -stable release patches
+
+Patch:	1413* -> 1422*
+From:	http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;
+	a=commit;h=526550b7f86d9d395ee1b27ed804e6ffc3feb17c
+Desc:	Backported subset of 2.6.27.7 -stable release patches
+
+Patch:	1423*
+From:	http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;
+	a=commit;h=1db886b63e735c3439e5c2f6813c5207c2206895
+Desc:	Backported subset of 2.6.27.8 -stable release patches
+
+Patch:	1424* -> 1425*
+From:	http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;
+	a=commit;h=2ef6627be7502193f7c42f694a651fa710507089
+Desc:	Backported subset of 2.6.27.9 -stable release patches
+
+Patch:	1503_hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch
+From:	Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Desc:	hfsplus: check return value of read_mapping_page()
+
+Patch:	1504_hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch
+From:	Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Desc:	hfsplus: fix buffer overflow when mounting corrupted image
+
+Patch:	1505_hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch
+From:	Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Desc:	hfsplug: Fix stack corruption due to corrupted hfs filesystem
+
+Patch:	1506_inotify-fix-watch-removal-or-umount-races.patch
+From:	Al Viro <viro@×××××××××××××××.uk>
+Desc:	Fix inotify watch removal/umount races (bug #248754)
+
+Patch:	1507_sctp-avoid_memory_overflow_with_bad_stream_ID.patch
+From:	Wei Yongjun <yjwei@××××××××××.com>
+Desc:	Avoid memory overflow while FWD-TSN chunk received with bad stream ID
+	(bug #254907)
+
+Patch:	1800_sched-disable-hrtick.patch
+From:	Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+Desc:	Disable high-resolution scheduler ticks (bug #247453)
+
+Patch:	4420_grsec-2.1.12-2.6.25.16-200808201644.patch
+From:	http://www.grsecurity.net
+Desc:	hardened-sources base patch from upstream grsecurity
+Note:	Ported to 2.6.25.16, adding PaX -test27 through -test30, fixed
+	missing check in arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c -> do_iopl()
+	
+Patch:	4421_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch
+From:	Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+Desc:	Removes grsecurity's localversion-grsec file
+
+Patch:	4422_grsec-mute-warnings.patch
+From:	Alexander Gabert <gaberta@××××××××.de>
+	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+Desc:	Removes verbose compile warning settings from grsecurity, restores
+	mainline Linux kernel behavior
+
+Patch:	4425_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+Desc:	Allows PaX features to be selected without enabling GRKERNSEC
+
+Patch:	4430_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
+From:	Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+Desc:	Sets sane(r) default GIDs on various grsecurity group-dependent
+	features
+
+Patch:	4435_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+	Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+Desc:	Adds Hardened Gentoo [server/workstation] security levels, sets
+	Hardened Gentoo [workstation] as default
+
+Patch:	4440_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+Desc:	Configurable option to add src IP address to SELinux log messages
+
+Patch:	4445_disable-compat_vdso.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+	Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+Desc:	Disables VDSO_COMPAT operation completely
+
+Patch:	4450_pax-remove-read_implies_exec-for-pax-binaries.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+Desc:	Remove READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality for PaX controlled binaries
+
+Patch:	4455_pax-fix-uvesafb-compile-and-misc.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+Desc:	Fixes compilation and miscellaneous other problems in uvesafb
+
+Patch:	4460_pax-fix-mmap-BUG_ON-task-size-check.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+Desc:	Fix incorrect vma task size check under SEGMEXEC
+
+Patch:	4465_pax-fix-false-RLIMIT_STACK-warnings.patch
+From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+Desc:	Fix false-positive RLIMIT_STACK warnings

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1017_linux-2.6.25.18.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1017_linux-2.6.25.18.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1017_linux-2.6.25.18.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,1023 @@
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
+index 36652ea..bec6496 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
+@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ static void hpet_legacy_clockevent_register(void)
+ 	/* Calculate the min / max delta */
+ 	hpet_clockevent.max_delta_ns = clockevent_delta2ns(0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 							   &hpet_clockevent);
+-	hpet_clockevent.min_delta_ns = clockevent_delta2ns(0x30,
+-							   &hpet_clockevent);
++	/* 5 usec minimum reprogramming delta. */
++	hpet_clockevent.min_delta_ns = 5000;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Start hpet with the boot cpu mask and make it
+@@ -282,15 +282,22 @@ static void hpet_legacy_set_mode(enum clock_event_mode mode,
+ }
+ 
+ static int hpet_legacy_next_event(unsigned long delta,
+-			   struct clock_event_device *evt)
++				  struct clock_event_device *evt)
+ {
+-	unsigned long cnt;
++	u32 cnt;
+ 
+ 	cnt = hpet_readl(HPET_COUNTER);
+-	cnt += delta;
++	cnt += (u32) delta;
+ 	hpet_writel(cnt, HPET_T0_CMP);
+ 
+-	return ((long)(hpet_readl(HPET_COUNTER) - cnt ) > 0) ? -ETIME : 0;
++	/*
++	 * We need to read back the CMP register to make sure that
++	 * what we wrote hit the chip before we compare it to the
++	 * counter.
++	 */
++	WARN_ON((u32)hpet_readl(HPET_T0_CMP) != cnt);
++
++	return (s32)((u32)hpet_readl(HPET_COUNTER) - cnt) >= 0 ? -ETIME : 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/io_delay.c b/arch/x86/kernel/io_delay.c
+index 5921e5f..84ec3cd 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/io_delay.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/io_delay.c
+@@ -92,6 +92,14 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata io_delay_0xed_port_dmi_table[] = {
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "30BF")
+ 		}
+ 	},
++	{
++		.callback	= dmi_io_delay_0xed_port,
++		.ident		= "Presario F700",
++		.matches	= {
++			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "Quanta"),
++			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "30D3")
++		}
++	},
+ 	{ }
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c
+index 12affe1..72f9826 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c
+@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static void vmi_write_ldt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry,
+ 				const void *desc)
+ {
+ 	u32 *ldt_entry = (u32 *)desc;
+-	vmi_ops.write_idt_entry(dt, entry, ldt_entry[0], ldt_entry[1]);
++	vmi_ops.write_ldt_entry(dt, entry, ldt_entry[0], ldt_entry[1]);
+ }
+ 
+ static void vmi_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss,
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/ec.c b/drivers/acpi/ec.c
+index 7222a18..a9b8796 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/ec.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/ec.c
+@@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ static int acpi_ec_wait(struct acpi_ec *ec, enum ec_event event, int force_poll)
+ 			if (acpi_ec_check_status(ec, event))
+ 				goto end;
+ 		}
++		if (acpi_ec_check_status(ec,event))
++			return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	pr_err(PREFIX "acpi_ec_wait timeout,"
+ 			       " status = %d, expect_event = %d\n",
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c b/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c
+index 42fb635..87b9a17 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_perflib.c
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(performance_mutex);
+  *  0 -> cpufreq low level drivers initialized -> consider _PPC values
+  *  1 -> ignore _PPC totally -> forced by user through boot param
+  */
+-static unsigned int ignore_ppc = -1;
++static int ignore_ppc = -1;
+ module_param(ignore_ppc, uint, 0644);
+ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ignore_ppc, "If the frequency of your machine gets wrongly" \
+ 		 "limited by BIOS, this should help");
+diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c
+index 393e679..342255b 100644
+--- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c
++++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c
+@@ -574,8 +574,10 @@ static int __init i2c_dev_init(void)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	i2c_dev_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "i2c-dev");
+-	if (IS_ERR(i2c_dev_class))
++	if (IS_ERR(i2c_dev_class)) {
++		res = PTR_ERR(i2c_dev_class);
+ 		goto out_unreg_chrdev;
++	}
+ 
+ 	res = i2c_add_driver(&i2cdev_driver);
+ 	if (res)
+diff --git a/drivers/mmc/card/block.c b/drivers/mmc/card/block.c
+index 91ded3e..3318642 100644
+--- a/drivers/mmc/card/block.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/card/block.c
+@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ static int mmc_blk_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+ 			check_disk_change(inode->i_bdev);
+ 		ret = 0;
+ 
+-		if ((filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && md->read_only)
++		if ((filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && md->read_only) {
++			mmc_blk_put(md);
+ 			ret = -EROFS;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+diff --git a/drivers/net/niu.c b/drivers/net/niu.c
+index d11ba61..5fd6a65 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/niu.c
++++ b/drivers/net/niu.c
+@@ -5230,6 +5230,56 @@ static void niu_netif_start(struct niu *np)
+ 	niu_enable_interrupts(np, 1);
+ }
+ 
++static void niu_reset_buffers(struct niu *np)
++{
++	int i, j, k, err;
++
++	if (np->rx_rings) {
++		for (i = 0; i < np->num_rx_rings; i++) {
++			struct rx_ring_info *rp = &np->rx_rings[i];
++
++			for (j = 0, k = 0; j < MAX_RBR_RING_SIZE; j++) {
++				struct page *page;
++
++				page = rp->rxhash[j];
++				while (page) {
++					struct page *next =
++						(struct page *) page->mapping;
++					u64 base = page->index;
++					base = base >> RBR_DESCR_ADDR_SHIFT;
++					rp->rbr[k++] = cpu_to_le32(base);
++					page = next;
++				}
++			}
++			for (; k < MAX_RBR_RING_SIZE; k++) {
++				err = niu_rbr_add_page(np, rp, GFP_ATOMIC, k);
++				if (unlikely(err))
++					break;
++			}
++
++			rp->rbr_index = rp->rbr_table_size - 1;
++			rp->rcr_index = 0;
++			rp->rbr_pending = 0;
++			rp->rbr_refill_pending = 0;
++		}
++	}
++	if (np->tx_rings) {
++		for (i = 0; i < np->num_tx_rings; i++) {
++			struct tx_ring_info *rp = &np->tx_rings[i];
++
++			for (j = 0; j < MAX_TX_RING_SIZE; j++) {
++				if (rp->tx_buffs[j].skb)
++					(void) release_tx_packet(np, rp, j);
++			}
++
++			rp->pending = MAX_TX_RING_SIZE;
++			rp->prod = 0;
++			rp->cons = 0;
++			rp->wrap_bit = 0;
++		}
++	}
++}
++
+ static void niu_reset_task(struct work_struct *work)
+ {
+ 	struct niu *np = container_of(work, struct niu, reset_task);
+@@ -5252,6 +5302,12 @@ static void niu_reset_task(struct work_struct *work)
+ 
+ 	niu_stop_hw(np);
+ 
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&np->lock, flags);
++
++	niu_reset_buffers(np);
++
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&np->lock, flags);
++
+ 	err = niu_init_hw(np);
+ 	if (!err) {
+ 		np->timer.expires = jiffies + HZ;
+diff --git a/drivers/spi/pxa2xx_spi.c b/drivers/spi/pxa2xx_spi.c
+index 147e26a..1dcc79f 100644
+--- a/drivers/spi/pxa2xx_spi.c
++++ b/drivers/spi/pxa2xx_spi.c
+@@ -48,9 +48,10 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("platform:pxa2xx-spi");
+ 
+ #define MAX_BUSES 3
+ 
+-#define DMA_INT_MASK (DCSR_ENDINTR | DCSR_STARTINTR | DCSR_BUSERR)
+-#define RESET_DMA_CHANNEL (DCSR_NODESC | DMA_INT_MASK)
+-#define IS_DMA_ALIGNED(x) (((u32)(x)&0x07)==0)
++#define DMA_INT_MASK		(DCSR_ENDINTR | DCSR_STARTINTR | DCSR_BUSERR)
++#define RESET_DMA_CHANNEL	(DCSR_NODESC | DMA_INT_MASK)
++#define IS_DMA_ALIGNED(x)	((((u32)(x)) & 0x07) == 0)
++#define MAX_DMA_LEN		8191
+ 
+ /*
+  * for testing SSCR1 changes that require SSP restart, basically
+@@ -142,7 +143,6 @@ struct driver_data {
+ 	size_t tx_map_len;
+ 	u8 n_bytes;
+ 	u32 dma_width;
+-	int cs_change;
+ 	int (*write)(struct driver_data *drv_data);
+ 	int (*read)(struct driver_data *drv_data);
+ 	irqreturn_t (*transfer_handler)(struct driver_data *drv_data);
+@@ -404,8 +404,45 @@ static void giveback(struct driver_data *drv_data)
+ 					struct spi_transfer,
+ 					transfer_list);
+ 
++	/* Delay if requested before any change in chip select */
++	if (last_transfer->delay_usecs)
++		udelay(last_transfer->delay_usecs);
++
++	/* Drop chip select UNLESS cs_change is true or we are returning
++	 * a message with an error, or next message is for another chip
++	 */
+ 	if (!last_transfer->cs_change)
+ 		drv_data->cs_control(PXA2XX_CS_DEASSERT);
++	else {
++		struct spi_message *next_msg;
++
++		/* Holding of cs was hinted, but we need to make sure
++		 * the next message is for the same chip.  Don't waste
++		 * time with the following tests unless this was hinted.
++		 *
++		 * We cannot postpone this until pump_messages, because
++		 * after calling msg->complete (below) the driver that
++		 * sent the current message could be unloaded, which
++		 * could invalidate the cs_control() callback...
++		 */
++
++		/* get a pointer to the next message, if any */
++		spin_lock_irqsave(&drv_data->lock, flags);
++		if (list_empty(&drv_data->queue))
++			next_msg = NULL;
++		else
++			next_msg = list_entry(drv_data->queue.next,
++					struct spi_message, queue);
++		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&drv_data->lock, flags);
++
++		/* see if the next and current messages point
++		 * to the same chip
++		 */
++		if (next_msg && next_msg->spi != msg->spi)
++			next_msg = NULL;
++		if (!next_msg || msg->state == ERROR_STATE)
++			drv_data->cs_control(PXA2XX_CS_DEASSERT);
++	}
+ 
+ 	msg->state = NULL;
+ 	if (msg->complete)
+@@ -488,10 +525,9 @@ static void dma_transfer_complete(struct driver_data *drv_data)
+ 	msg->actual_length += drv_data->len -
+ 				(drv_data->rx_end - drv_data->rx);
+ 
+-	/* Release chip select if requested, transfer delays are
+-	 * handled in pump_transfers */
+-	if (drv_data->cs_change)
+-		drv_data->cs_control(PXA2XX_CS_DEASSERT);
++	/* Transfer delays and chip select release are
++	 * handled in pump_transfers or giveback
++	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Move to next transfer */
+ 	msg->state = next_transfer(drv_data);
+@@ -600,10 +636,9 @@ static void int_transfer_complete(struct driver_data *drv_data)
+ 	drv_data->cur_msg->actual_length += drv_data->len -
+ 				(drv_data->rx_end - drv_data->rx);
+ 
+-	/* Release chip select if requested, transfer delays are
+-	 * handled in pump_transfers */
+-	if (drv_data->cs_change)
+-		drv_data->cs_control(PXA2XX_CS_DEASSERT);
++	/* Transfer delays and chip select release are
++	 * handled in pump_transfers or giveback
++	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Move to next transfer */
+ 	drv_data->cur_msg->state = next_transfer(drv_data);
+@@ -837,23 +872,40 @@ static void pump_transfers(unsigned long data)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Delay if requested at end of transfer*/
++	/* Delay if requested at end of transfer before CS change */
+ 	if (message->state == RUNNING_STATE) {
+ 		previous = list_entry(transfer->transfer_list.prev,
+ 					struct spi_transfer,
+ 					transfer_list);
+ 		if (previous->delay_usecs)
+ 			udelay(previous->delay_usecs);
++
++		/* Drop chip select only if cs_change is requested */
++		if (previous->cs_change)
++			drv_data->cs_control(PXA2XX_CS_DEASSERT);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check transfer length */
+-	if (transfer->len > 8191)
+-	{
+-		dev_warn(&drv_data->pdev->dev, "pump_transfers: transfer "
+-				"length greater than 8191\n");
+-		message->status = -EINVAL;
+-		giveback(drv_data);
+-		return;
++	/* Check for transfers that need multiple DMA segments */
++	if (transfer->len > MAX_DMA_LEN && chip->enable_dma) {
++
++		/* reject already-mapped transfers; PIO won't always work */
++		if (message->is_dma_mapped
++				|| transfer->rx_dma || transfer->tx_dma) {
++			dev_err(&drv_data->pdev->dev,
++				"pump_transfers: mapped transfer length "
++				"of %u is greater than %d\n",
++				transfer->len, MAX_DMA_LEN);
++			message->status = -EINVAL;
++			giveback(drv_data);
++			return;
++		}
++
++		/* warn ... we force this to PIO mode */
++		if (printk_ratelimit())
++			dev_warn(&message->spi->dev, "pump_transfers: "
++				"DMA disabled for transfer length %ld "
++				"greater than %d\n",
++				(long)drv_data->len, MAX_DMA_LEN);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Setup the transfer state based on the type of transfer */
+@@ -875,7 +927,6 @@ static void pump_transfers(unsigned long data)
+ 	drv_data->len = transfer->len & DCMD_LENGTH;
+ 	drv_data->write = drv_data->tx ? chip->write : null_writer;
+ 	drv_data->read = drv_data->rx ? chip->read : null_reader;
+-	drv_data->cs_change = transfer->cs_change;
+ 
+ 	/* Change speed and bit per word on a per transfer */
+ 	cr0 = chip->cr0;
+@@ -922,7 +973,7 @@ static void pump_transfers(unsigned long data)
+ 							&dma_thresh))
+ 				if (printk_ratelimit())
+ 					dev_warn(&message->spi->dev,
+-						"pump_transfer: "
++						"pump_transfers: "
+ 						"DMA burst size reduced to "
+ 						"match bits_per_word\n");
+ 		}
+@@ -936,8 +987,23 @@ static void pump_transfers(unsigned long data)
+ 
+ 	message->state = RUNNING_STATE;
+ 
+-	/* Try to map dma buffer and do a dma transfer if successful */
+-	if ((drv_data->dma_mapped = map_dma_buffers(drv_data))) {
++	/* Try to map dma buffer and do a dma transfer if successful, but
++	 * only if the length is non-zero and less than MAX_DMA_LEN.
++	 *
++	 * Zero-length non-descriptor DMA is illegal on PXA2xx; force use
++	 * of PIO instead.  Care is needed above because the transfer may
++	 * have have been passed with buffers that are already dma mapped.
++	 * A zero-length transfer in PIO mode will not try to write/read
++	 * to/from the buffers
++	 *
++	 * REVISIT large transfers are exactly where we most want to be
++	 * using DMA.  If this happens much, split those transfers into
++	 * multiple DMA segments rather than forcing PIO.
++	 */
++	drv_data->dma_mapped = 0;
++	if (drv_data->len > 0 && drv_data->len <= MAX_DMA_LEN)
++		drv_data->dma_mapped = map_dma_buffers(drv_data);
++	if (drv_data->dma_mapped) {
+ 
+ 		/* Ensure we have the correct interrupt handler */
+ 		drv_data->transfer_handler = dma_transfer;
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c b/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c
+index 27533b3..ed7b123 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/core/hcd.c
+@@ -1877,7 +1877,8 @@ int usb_add_hcd(struct usb_hcd *hcd,
+ 		 * with IRQF_SHARED. As usb_hcd_irq() will always disable
+ 		 * interrupts we can remove it here.
+ 		 */
+-		irqflags &= ~IRQF_DISABLED;
++		if (irqflags & IRQF_SHARED)
++			irqflags &= ~IRQF_DISABLED;
+ 
+ 		snprintf(hcd->irq_descr, sizeof(hcd->irq_descr), "%s:usb%d",
+ 				hcd->driver->description, hcd->self.busnum);
+diff --git a/include/asm-generic/rtc.h b/include/asm-generic/rtc.h
+index dd1bed8..85286fb 100644
+--- a/include/asm-generic/rtc.h
++++ b/include/asm-generic/rtc.h
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
+ #include <linux/rtc.h>
+ #include <linux/bcd.h>
++#include <linux/delay.h>
+ 
+ #define RTC_PIE 0x40		/* periodic interrupt enable */
+ #define RTC_AIE 0x20		/* alarm interrupt enable */
+@@ -45,7 +46,6 @@ static inline unsigned char rtc_is_updating(void)
+ 
+ static inline unsigned int get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *time)
+ {
+-	unsigned long uip_watchdog = jiffies;
+ 	unsigned char ctrl;
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+ 
+@@ -55,19 +55,15 @@ static inline unsigned int get_rtc_time(struct rtc_time *time)
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * read RTC once any update in progress is done. The update
+-	 * can take just over 2ms. We wait 10 to 20ms. There is no need to
++	 * can take just over 2ms. We wait 20ms. There is no need to
+ 	 * to poll-wait (up to 1s - eeccch) for the falling edge of RTC_UIP.
+ 	 * If you need to know *exactly* when a second has started, enable
+ 	 * periodic update complete interrupts, (via ioctl) and then 
+ 	 * immediately read /dev/rtc which will block until you get the IRQ.
+ 	 * Once the read clears, read the RTC time (again via ioctl). Easy.
+ 	 */
+-
+-	if (rtc_is_updating() != 0)
+-		while (jiffies - uip_watchdog < 2*HZ/100) {
+-			barrier();
+-			cpu_relax();
+-		}
++	if (rtc_is_updating())
++		mdelay(20);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Only the values that we read from the RTC are set. We leave
+diff --git a/include/linux/clockchips.h b/include/linux/clockchips.h
+index c33b0dc..ed3a5d4 100644
+--- a/include/linux/clockchips.h
++++ b/include/linux/clockchips.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ extern int clockevents_register_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+ extern int clockevents_program_event(struct clock_event_device *dev,
+ 				     ktime_t expires, ktime_t now);
+ 
++extern void clockevents_handle_noop(struct clock_event_device *dev);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
+ extern void clockevents_notify(unsigned long reason, void *arg);
+ #else
+diff --git a/include/net/netlink.h b/include/net/netlink.h
+index 112dcdf..5383fdf 100644
+--- a/include/net/netlink.h
++++ b/include/net/netlink.h
+@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla)
+  */
+ static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)
+ {
+-	return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
++	return remaining >= (int) sizeof(*nla) &&
+ 	       nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
+ 	       nla->nla_len <= remaining;
+ }
+diff --git a/kernel/time/clockevents.c b/kernel/time/clockevents.c
+index 3d1e3e1..1876b52 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/clockevents.c
++++ b/kernel/time/clockevents.c
+@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ void clockevents_register_device(struct clock_event_device *dev)
+ /*
+  * Noop handler when we shut down an event device
+  */
+-static void clockevents_handle_noop(struct clock_event_device *dev)
++void clockevents_handle_noop(struct clock_event_device *dev)
+ {
+ }
+ 
+@@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ void clockevents_exchange_device(struct clock_event_device *old,
+ 	 * released list and do a notify add later.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (old) {
+-		old->event_handler = clockevents_handle_noop;
+ 		clockevents_set_mode(old, CLOCK_EVT_MODE_UNUSED);
+ 		list_del(&old->list);
+ 		list_add(&old->list, &clockevents_released);
+diff --git a/kernel/time/ntp.c b/kernel/time/ntp.c
+index 5fd9b94..a1dac40 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/ntp.c
++++ b/kernel/time/ntp.c
+@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static void sync_cmos_clock(unsigned long dummy)
+ 	if (abs(now.tv_nsec - (NSEC_PER_SEC / 2)) <= tick_nsec / 2)
+ 		fail = update_persistent_clock(now);
+ 
+-	next.tv_nsec = (NSEC_PER_SEC / 2) - now.tv_nsec;
++	next.tv_nsec = (NSEC_PER_SEC / 2) - now.tv_nsec - (TICK_NSEC / 2);
+ 	if (next.tv_nsec <= 0)
+ 		next.tv_nsec += NSEC_PER_SEC;
+ 
+diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
+index e1bd50c..0edd345 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
++++ b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
+@@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ static void tick_do_periodic_broadcast(void)
+  */
+ static void tick_handle_periodic_broadcast(struct clock_event_device *dev)
+ {
++	ktime_t next;
++
+ 	tick_do_periodic_broadcast();
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -184,10 +186,13 @@ static void tick_handle_periodic_broadcast(struct clock_event_device *dev)
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Setup the next period for devices, which do not have
+-	 * periodic mode:
++	 * periodic mode. We read dev->next_event first and add to it
++	 * when the event alrady expired. clockevents_program_event()
++	 * sets dev->next_event only when the event is really
++	 * programmed to the device.
+ 	 */
+-	for (;;) {
+-		ktime_t next = ktime_add(dev->next_event, tick_period);
++	for (next = dev->next_event; ;) {
++		next = ktime_add(next, tick_period);
+ 
+ 		if (!clockevents_program_event(dev, next, ktime_get()))
+ 			return;
+@@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ static void tick_do_broadcast_on_off(void *why)
+ 	struct clock_event_device *bc, *dev;
+ 	struct tick_device *td;
+ 	unsigned long flags, *reason = why;
+-	int cpu;
++	int cpu, bc_stopped;
+ 
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&tick_broadcast_lock, flags);
+ 
+@@ -222,6 +227,8 @@ static void tick_do_broadcast_on_off(void *why)
+ 	if (!tick_device_is_functional(dev))
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	bc_stopped = cpus_empty(tick_broadcast_mask);
++
+ 	switch (*reason) {
+ 	case CLOCK_EVT_NOTIFY_BROADCAST_ON:
+ 	case CLOCK_EVT_NOTIFY_BROADCAST_FORCE:
+@@ -243,9 +250,10 @@ static void tick_do_broadcast_on_off(void *why)
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (cpus_empty(tick_broadcast_mask))
+-		clockevents_set_mode(bc, CLOCK_EVT_MODE_SHUTDOWN);
+-	else {
++	if (cpus_empty(tick_broadcast_mask)) {
++		if (!bc_stopped)
++			clockevents_set_mode(bc, CLOCK_EVT_MODE_SHUTDOWN);
++	} else if (bc_stopped) {
+ 		if (tick_broadcast_device.mode == TICKDEV_MODE_PERIODIC)
+ 			tick_broadcast_start_periodic(bc);
+ 		else
+@@ -362,16 +370,8 @@ cpumask_t *tick_get_broadcast_oneshot_mask(void)
+ static int tick_broadcast_set_event(ktime_t expires, int force)
+ {
+ 	struct clock_event_device *bc = tick_broadcast_device.evtdev;
+-	ktime_t now = ktime_get();
+-	int res;
+-
+-	for(;;) {
+-		res = clockevents_program_event(bc, expires, now);
+-		if (!res || !force)
+-			return res;
+-		now = ktime_get();
+-		expires = ktime_add(now, ktime_set(0, bc->min_delta_ns));
+-	}
++
++	return tick_dev_program_event(bc, expires, force);
+ }
+ 
+ int tick_resume_broadcast_oneshot(struct clock_event_device *bc)
+@@ -490,14 +490,52 @@ static void tick_broadcast_clear_oneshot(int cpu)
+ 	cpu_clear(cpu, tick_broadcast_oneshot_mask);
+ }
+ 
++static void tick_broadcast_init_next_event(cpumask_t *mask, ktime_t expires)
++{
++	struct tick_device *td;
++	int cpu;
++
++	for_each_cpu_mask(cpu, *mask) {
++		td = &per_cpu(tick_cpu_device, cpu);
++		if (td->evtdev)
++			td->evtdev->next_event = expires;
++	}
++}
++
+ /**
+  * tick_broadcast_setup_oneshot - setup the broadcast device
+  */
+ void tick_broadcast_setup_oneshot(struct clock_event_device *bc)
+ {
+-	bc->event_handler = tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast;
+-	clockevents_set_mode(bc, CLOCK_EVT_MODE_ONESHOT);
+-	bc->next_event.tv64 = KTIME_MAX;
++	/* Set it up only once ! */
++	if (bc->event_handler != tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast) {
++		int was_periodic = bc->mode == CLOCK_EVT_MODE_PERIODIC;
++		int cpu = smp_processor_id();
++		cpumask_t mask;
++
++		bc->event_handler = tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast;
++		clockevents_set_mode(bc, CLOCK_EVT_MODE_ONESHOT);
++
++		/* Take the do_timer update */
++		tick_do_timer_cpu = cpu;
++
++		/*
++		 * We must be careful here. There might be other CPUs
++		 * waiting for periodic broadcast. We need to set the
++		 * oneshot_mask bits for those and program the
++		 * broadcast device to fire.
++		 */
++		mask = tick_broadcast_mask;
++		cpu_clear(cpu, mask);
++		cpus_or(tick_broadcast_oneshot_mask,
++			tick_broadcast_oneshot_mask, mask);
++
++		if (was_periodic && !cpus_empty(mask)) {
++			tick_broadcast_init_next_event(&mask, tick_next_period);
++			tick_broadcast_set_event(tick_next_period, 1);
++		} else
++			bc->next_event.tv64 = KTIME_MAX;
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-common.c b/kernel/time/tick-common.c
+index 1bea399..d106d61 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/tick-common.c
++++ b/kernel/time/tick-common.c
+@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static void tick_setup_device(struct tick_device *td,
+ 	} else {
+ 		handler = td->evtdev->event_handler;
+ 		next_event = td->evtdev->next_event;
++		td->evtdev->event_handler = clockevents_handle_noop;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	td->evtdev = newdev;
+diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-internal.h b/kernel/time/tick-internal.h
+index f13f2b7..0ffc291 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/tick-internal.h
++++ b/kernel/time/tick-internal.h
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ extern void tick_handle_periodic(struct clock_event_device *dev);
+ extern void tick_setup_oneshot(struct clock_event_device *newdev,
+ 			       void (*handler)(struct clock_event_device *),
+ 			       ktime_t nextevt);
++extern int tick_dev_program_event(struct clock_event_device *dev,
++				  ktime_t expires, int force);
+ extern int tick_program_event(ktime_t expires, int force);
+ extern void tick_oneshot_notify(void);
+ extern int tick_switch_to_oneshot(void (*handler)(struct clock_event_device *));
+diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-oneshot.c b/kernel/time/tick-oneshot.c
+index 0258d31..0737da0 100644
+--- a/kernel/time/tick-oneshot.c
++++ b/kernel/time/tick-oneshot.c
+@@ -23,24 +23,56 @@
+ #include "tick-internal.h"
+ 
+ /**
+- * tick_program_event
++ * tick_program_event internal worker function
+  */
+-int tick_program_event(ktime_t expires, int force)
++int tick_dev_program_event(struct clock_event_device *dev, ktime_t expires,
++			   int force)
+ {
+-	struct clock_event_device *dev = __get_cpu_var(tick_cpu_device).evtdev;
+ 	ktime_t now = ktime_get();
++	int i;
+ 
+-	while (1) {
++	for (i = 0;;) {
+ 		int ret = clockevents_program_event(dev, expires, now);
+ 
+ 		if (!ret || !force)
+ 			return ret;
++
++		/*
++		 * We tried 2 times to program the device with the given
++		 * min_delta_ns. If that's not working then we double it
++		 * and emit a warning.
++		 */
++		if (++i > 2) {
++			/* Increase the min. delta and try again */
++			if (!dev->min_delta_ns)
++				dev->min_delta_ns = 5000;
++			else
++				dev->min_delta_ns += dev->min_delta_ns >> 1;
++
++			printk(KERN_WARNING
++			       "CE: %s increasing min_delta_ns to %lu nsec\n",
++			       dev->name ? dev->name : "?",
++			       dev->min_delta_ns << 1);
++
++			i = 0;
++		}
++
+ 		now = ktime_get();
+-		expires = ktime_add(now, ktime_set(0, dev->min_delta_ns));
++		expires = ktime_add_ns(now, dev->min_delta_ns);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ /**
++ * tick_program_event
++ */
++int tick_program_event(ktime_t expires, int force)
++{
++	struct clock_event_device *dev = __get_cpu_var(tick_cpu_device).evtdev;
++
++	return tick_dev_program_event(dev, expires, force);
++}
++
++/**
+  * tick_resume_onshot - resume oneshot mode
+  */
+ void tick_resume_oneshot(void)
+@@ -61,7 +93,7 @@ void tick_setup_oneshot(struct clock_event_device *newdev,
+ {
+ 	newdev->event_handler = handler;
+ 	clockevents_set_mode(newdev, CLOCK_EVT_MODE_ONESHOT);
+-	clockevents_program_event(newdev, next_event, ktime_get());
++	tick_dev_program_event(newdev, next_event, 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+index 9703c87..b924502 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+@@ -956,6 +956,27 @@ int udp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static int __udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++	int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
++	int rc;
++
++	if ((rc = sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb)) < 0) {
++		/* Note that an ENOMEM error is charged twice */
++		if (rc == -ENOMEM)
++			UDP_INC_STATS_BH(UDP_MIB_RCVBUFERRORS,
++					 is_udplite);
++		goto drop;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++
++drop:
++	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
++	kfree_skb(skb);
++	return -1;
++}
++
+ /* returns:
+  *  -1: error
+  *   0: success
+@@ -1046,14 +1067,16 @@ int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock * sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ 			goto drop;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((rc = sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk,skb)) < 0) {
+-		/* Note that an ENOMEM error is charged twice */
+-		if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+-			UDP_INC_STATS_BH(UDP_MIB_RCVBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
+-		goto drop;
+-	}
++	rc = 0;
+ 
+-	return 0;
++	bh_lock_sock(sk);
++	if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
++		rc = __udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
++	else
++		sk_add_backlog(sk, skb);
++	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
++
++	return rc;
+ 
+ drop:
+ 	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
+@@ -1091,15 +1114,7 @@ static int __udp4_lib_mcast_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ 				skb1 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ 
+ 			if (skb1) {
+-				int ret = 0;
+-
+-				bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+-				if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+-					ret = udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb1);
+-				else
+-					sk_add_backlog(sk, skb1);
+-				bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+-
++				int ret = udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb1);
+ 				if (ret > 0)
+ 					/* we should probably re-process instead
+ 					 * of dropping packets here. */
+@@ -1192,13 +1207,7 @@ int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct hlist_head udptable[],
+ 			uh->dest, inet_iif(skb), udptable);
+ 
+ 	if (sk != NULL) {
+-		int ret = 0;
+-		bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+-		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+-			ret = udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+-		else
+-			sk_add_backlog(sk, skb);
+-		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
++		int ret = udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+ 		sock_put(sk);
+ 
+ 		/* a return value > 0 means to resubmit the input, but
+@@ -1493,7 +1502,7 @@ struct proto udp_prot = {
+ 	.sendmsg	   = udp_sendmsg,
+ 	.recvmsg	   = udp_recvmsg,
+ 	.sendpage	   = udp_sendpage,
+-	.backlog_rcv	   = udp_queue_rcv_skb,
++	.backlog_rcv	   = __udp_queue_rcv_skb,
+ 	.hash		   = udp_lib_hash,
+ 	.unhash		   = udp_lib_unhash,
+ 	.get_port	   = udp_v4_get_port,
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+index fb1c192..d650e10 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -930,39 +930,39 @@ static int ip6_dst_lookup_tail(struct sock *sk,
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_OPTIMISTIC_DAD
+-		/*
+-		 * Here if the dst entry we've looked up
+-		 * has a neighbour entry that is in the INCOMPLETE
+-		 * state and the src address from the flow is
+-		 * marked as OPTIMISTIC, we release the found
+-		 * dst entry and replace it instead with the
+-		 * dst entry of the nexthop router
+-		 */
+-		if (!((*dst)->neighbour->nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
+-			struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
+-			struct flowi fl_gw;
+-			int redirect;
+-
+-			ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(&init_net, &fl->fl6_src,
+-					      (*dst)->dev, 1);
+-
+-			redirect = (ifp && ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC);
+-			if (ifp)
+-				in6_ifa_put(ifp);
+-
+-			if (redirect) {
+-				/*
+-				 * We need to get the dst entry for the
+-				 * default router instead
+-				 */
+-				dst_release(*dst);
+-				memcpy(&fl_gw, fl, sizeof(struct flowi));
+-				memset(&fl_gw.fl6_dst, 0, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+-				*dst = ip6_route_output(sk, &fl_gw);
+-				if ((err = (*dst)->error))
+-					goto out_err_release;
+-			}
++	/*
++	 * Here if the dst entry we've looked up
++	 * has a neighbour entry that is in the INCOMPLETE
++	 * state and the src address from the flow is
++	 * marked as OPTIMISTIC, we release the found
++	 * dst entry and replace it instead with the
++	 * dst entry of the nexthop router
++	 */
++	if ((*dst)->neighbour && !((*dst)->neighbour->nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
++		struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
++		struct flowi fl_gw;
++		int redirect;
++
++		ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(&init_net, &fl->fl6_src,
++				      (*dst)->dev, 1);
++
++		redirect = (ifp && ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC);
++		if (ifp)
++			in6_ifa_put(ifp);
++
++		if (redirect) {
++			/*
++			 * We need to get the dst entry for the
++			 * default router instead
++			 */
++			dst_release(*dst);
++			memcpy(&fl_gw, fl, sizeof(struct flowi));
++			memset(&fl_gw.fl6_dst, 0, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
++			*dst = ip6_route_output(sk, &fl_gw);
++			if ((err = (*dst)->error))
++				goto out_err_release;
+ 		}
++	}
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
+index 53739de..4e36c57 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
+@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int __udp6_lib_mcast_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ 					uh->source, saddr, dif))) {
+ 		struct sk_buff *buff = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ 		if (buff) {
+-			bh_lock_sock_nested(sk2);
++			bh_lock_sock(sk2);
+ 			if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk2))
+ 				udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(sk2, buff);
+ 			else
+@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ static int __udp6_lib_mcast_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, struct in6_addr *saddr,
+ 			bh_unlock_sock(sk2);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
++	bh_lock_sock(sk);
+ 	if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+ 		udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+ 	else
+@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct hlist_head udptable[],
+ 
+ 	/* deliver */
+ 
+-	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
++	bh_lock_sock(sk);
+ 	if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+ 		udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+ 	else
+diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
+index d29f792..1eefac2 100644
+--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
++++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
+@@ -588,11 +588,12 @@ struct sctp_transport *sctp_assoc_add_peer(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ 	/* Check to see if this is a duplicate. */
+ 	peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, addr);
+ 	if (peer) {
++		/* An UNKNOWN state is only set on transports added by
++		 * user in sctp_connectx() call.  Such transports should be
++		 * considered CONFIRMED per RFC 4960, Section 5.4.
++		 */
+ 		if (peer->state == SCTP_UNKNOWN) {
+-			if (peer_state == SCTP_ACTIVE)
+-				peer->state = SCTP_ACTIVE;
+-			if (peer_state == SCTP_UNCONFIRMED)
+-				peer->state = SCTP_UNCONFIRMED;
++			peer->state = SCTP_ACTIVE;
+ 		}
+ 		return peer;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+index 36ebb39..d024fd0 100644
+--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+@@ -1886,11 +1886,13 @@ static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ 			    /* if the peer reports AUTH, assume that he
+ 			     * supports AUTH.
+ 			     */
+-			    asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1;
++			    if (sctp_auth_enable)
++				    asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1;
+ 			    break;
+ 		    case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
+ 		    case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
+-			    asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
++			    if (sctp_addip_enable)
++				    asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
+ 			    break;
+ 		    default:
+ 			    break;
+@@ -2319,12 +2321,10 @@ clean_up:
+ 	/* Release the transport structures. */
+ 	list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
+ 		transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
+-		list_del_init(pos);
+-		sctp_transport_free(transport);
++		if (transport->state != SCTP_ACTIVE)
++			sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, transport);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	asoc->peer.transport_count = 0;
+-
+ nomem:
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -2454,6 +2454,9 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
++		if (!sctp_addip_enable)
++			goto fall_through;
++
+ 		addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
+ 
+ 		af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1018_linux-2.6.25.19.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1018_linux-2.6.25.19.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1018_linux-2.6.25.19.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+index 5fed98c..2fb2dfe 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void)
+ 					    _text, _etext);
+ 
+ 		/* Only switch to UP mode if we don't immediately boot others */
+-		if (num_possible_cpus() == 1 || setup_max_cpus <= 1)
++		if (num_present_cpus() == 1 || setup_max_cpus <= 1)
+ 			alternatives_smp_switch(0);
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+index f49c970..ca21808 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+@@ -251,7 +251,12 @@ static void generic_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
+ 		tmp |= ~((1<<(hi - 1)) - 1);
+ 
+ 		if (tmp != mask_lo) {
+-			WARN_ON("mtrr: your BIOS has set up an incorrect mask, fixing it up.\n");
++			static int once = 1;
++
++			if (once) {
++				printk(KERN_INFO "mtrr: your BIOS has set up an incorrect mask, fixing it up.\n");
++				once = 0;
++			}
+ 			mask_lo = tmp;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/io_apic_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/io_apic_32.c
+index f239b30..0338d89 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/io_apic_32.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/io_apic_32.c
+@@ -2305,6 +2305,9 @@ void __init setup_IO_APIC(void)
+ 	for (i = FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR; i < NR_VECTORS; i++)
+ 		set_bit(i, used_vectors);
+ 
++	/* Mark FIRST_DEVICE_VECTOR which is assigned to IRQ0 as used. */
++	set_bit(FIRST_DEVICE_VECTOR, used_vectors);
++
+ 	enable_IO_APIC();
+ 
+ 	if (acpi_ioapic)
+diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+index f96b2e4..4f8b47e 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ void __init *early_ioremap(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size)
+ 	 */
+ 	offset = phys_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ 	phys_addr &= PAGE_MASK;
+-	size = PAGE_ALIGN(last_addr) - phys_addr;
++	size = PAGE_ALIGN(last_addr + 1) - phys_addr;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Mappings have to fit in the FIX_BTMAP area.
+diff --git a/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c b/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c
+index a043bb1..ed2a83f 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c
++++ b/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c
+@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ struct drm_ioctl_desc i915_ioctls[] = {
+ 	DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_SET_VBLANK_PIPE,  i915_vblank_pipe_set, DRM_AUTH|DRM_MASTER|DRM_ROOT_ONLY ),
+ 	DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_GET_VBLANK_PIPE,  i915_vblank_pipe_get, DRM_AUTH ),
+ 	DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_VBLANK_SWAP, i915_vblank_swap, DRM_AUTH),
+-	DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_HWS_ADDR, i915_set_status_page, DRM_AUTH),
++	DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_HWS_ADDR, i915_set_status_page, DRM_AUTH|DRM_MASTER|DRM_ROOT_ONLY),
+ };
+ 
+ int i915_max_ioctl = DRM_ARRAY_SIZE(i915_ioctls);
+diff --git a/drivers/char/tty_io.c b/drivers/char/tty_io.c
+index 613ec81..31143e9 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/tty_io.c
++++ b/drivers/char/tty_io.c
+@@ -3373,7 +3373,7 @@ int tty_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+ 	case TIOCSTI:
+ 		return tiocsti(tty, p);
+ 	case TIOCGWINSZ:
+-		return tiocgwinsz(tty, p);
++		return tiocgwinsz(real_tty, p);
+ 	case TIOCSWINSZ:
+ 		return tiocswinsz(tty, real_tty, p);
+ 	case TIOCCONS:
+diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/it87.c b/drivers/hwmon/it87.c
+index e12c132..48b9f28 100644
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/it87.c
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/it87.c
+@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+ #include <linux/mutex.h>
+ #include <linux/sysfs.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++#include <linux/dmi.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+ 
+ #define DRVNAME "it87"
+@@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ struct it87_sio_data {
+ 	enum chips type;
+ 	/* Values read from Super-I/O config space */
+ 	u8 vid_value;
++	/* Values set based on DMI strings */
++	u8 skip_pwm;
+ };
+ 
+ /* For each registered chip, we need to keep some data in memory.
+@@ -952,6 +956,7 @@ static int __init it87_find(unsigned short *address,
+ {
+ 	int err = -ENODEV;
+ 	u16 chip_type;
++	const char *board_vendor, *board_name;
+ 
+ 	superio_enter();
+ 	chip_type = force_id ? force_id : superio_inw(DEVID);
+@@ -1009,6 +1014,25 @@ static int __init it87_find(unsigned short *address,
+ 			pr_info("it87: in7 is VCCH (+5V Stand-By)\n");
+ 	}
+ 
++	sio_data->skip_pwm = 0;
++	/* Disable specific features based on DMI strings */
++	board_vendor = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR);
++	board_name = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_BOARD_NAME);
++	if (board_vendor && board_name) {
++		if (strcmp(board_vendor, "nVIDIA") == 0
++		 && strcmp(board_name, "FN68PT") == 0) {
++			/* On the Shuttle SN68PT, FAN_CTL2 is apparently not
++			   connected to a fan, but to something else. One user
++			   has reported instant system power-off when changing
++			   the PWM2 duty cycle, so we disable it.
++			   I use the board name string as the trigger in case
++			   the same board is ever used in other systems. */
++			pr_info("it87: Disabling pwm2 due to "
++				"hardware constraints\n");
++			sio_data->skip_pwm = (1 << 1);
++		}
++	}
++
+ exit:
+ 	superio_exit();
+ 	return err;
+@@ -1157,22 +1181,25 @@ static int __devinit it87_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ 		if ((err = device_create_file(dev,
+ 		     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm1_enable.dev_attr))
+ 		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+-		     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm2_enable.dev_attr))
+-		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+ 		     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm3_enable.dev_attr))
+ 		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+ 		     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm1.dev_attr))
+ 		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+-		     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm2.dev_attr))
+-		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+ 		     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm3.dev_attr))
+ 		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+ 		     &dev_attr_pwm1_freq))
+ 		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+-		     &dev_attr_pwm2_freq))
+-		 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
+ 		     &dev_attr_pwm3_freq)))
+ 			goto ERROR4;
++		if (!(sio_data->skip_pwm & (1 << 1))) {
++			if ((err = device_create_file(dev,
++			     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm2_enable.dev_attr))
++			 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
++			     &sensor_dev_attr_pwm2.dev_attr))
++			 || (err = device_create_file(dev,
++			     &dev_attr_pwm2_freq)))
++				goto ERROR4;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (data->type == it8712 || data->type == it8716
+diff --git a/drivers/media/video/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c b/drivers/media/video/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c
+index 594522a..b1cca43 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/video/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c
++++ b/drivers/media/video/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c
+@@ -3422,7 +3422,7 @@ static int radio_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+ 	dprintk("bttv: open minor=%d\n",minor);
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < bttv_num; i++) {
+-		if (bttvs[i].radio_dev->minor == minor) {
++		if (bttvs[i].radio_dev && bttvs[i].radio_dev->minor == minor) {
+ 			btv = &bttvs[i];
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+diff --git a/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c b/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c
+index 01ebcec..db55c5c 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c
++++ b/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c
+@@ -1804,7 +1804,7 @@ static int chip_command(struct i2c_client *client,
+ 		break;
+ 	case VIDIOC_S_FREQUENCY:
+ 		chip->mode = 0; /* automatic */
+-		if (desc->checkmode) {
++		if (desc->checkmode && desc->setmode) {
+ 			desc->setmode(chip,V4L2_TUNER_MODE_MONO);
+ 			if (chip->prevmode != V4L2_TUNER_MODE_MONO)
+ 				chip->prevmode = -1; /* reset previous mode */
+diff --git a/drivers/media/video/zoran_driver.c b/drivers/media/video/zoran_driver.c
+index fea4946..2e9a4e2 100644
+--- a/drivers/media/video/zoran_driver.c
++++ b/drivers/media/video/zoran_driver.c
+@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ const struct zoran_format zoran_formats[] = {
+ 	}, {
+ 		.name = "16-bit RGB BE",
+ 		ZFMT(-1,
+-		     V4L2_PIX_FMT_RGB565, V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB),
++		     V4L2_PIX_FMT_RGB565X, V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB),
+ 		.depth = 16,
+ 		.flags = ZORAN_FORMAT_CAPTURE |
+ 			 ZORAN_FORMAT_OVERLAY,
+diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/xmit.c b/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/xmit.c
+index d84408a..d7bd408 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/xmit.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/xmit.c
+@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ void b43legacy_handle_hwtxstatus(struct b43legacy_wldev *dev,
+ 	tmp = hw->count;
+ 	status.frame_count = (tmp >> 4);
+ 	status.rts_count = (tmp & 0x0F);
+-	tmp = hw->flags;
++	tmp = hw->flags << 1;
+ 	status.supp_reason = ((tmp & 0x1C) >> 2);
+ 	status.pm_indicated = !!(tmp & 0x80);
+ 	status.intermediate = !!(tmp & 0x40);
+diff --git a/drivers/video/console/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/console/fbcon.c
+index 0222824..66fd680 100644
+--- a/drivers/video/console/fbcon.c
++++ b/drivers/video/console/fbcon.c
+@@ -2974,8 +2974,8 @@ static void fbcon_set_all_vcs(struct fb_info *info)
+ 		p = &fb_display[vc->vc_num];
+ 		set_blitting_type(vc, info);
+ 		var_to_display(p, &info->var, info);
+-		cols = FBCON_SWAP(p->rotate, info->var.xres, info->var.yres);
+-		rows = FBCON_SWAP(p->rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres);
++		cols = FBCON_SWAP(ops->rotate, info->var.xres, info->var.yres);
++		rows = FBCON_SWAP(ops->rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres);
+ 		cols /= vc->vc_font.width;
+ 		rows /= vc->vc_font.height;
+ 		vc_resize(vc, cols, rows);
+diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
+index 69a2e19..9f341b8 100644
+--- a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
++++ b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
+@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ struct cifs_search_info {
+ 	__u32 resume_key;
+ 	char *ntwrk_buf_start;
+ 	char *srch_entries_start;
++	char *last_entry;
+ 	char *presume_name;
+ 	unsigned int resume_name_len;
+ 	unsigned endOfSearch:1;
+diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
+index 30bbe44..6fe47f7 100644
+--- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
++++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
+@@ -3598,6 +3598,8 @@ findFirstRetry:
+ 					le16_to_cpu(parms->SearchCount);
+ 			psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry = 2 /* skip . and .. */ +
+ 				psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer;
++			psrch_inf->last_entry = psrch_inf->srch_entries_start +
++					le16_to_cpu(parms->LastNameOffset);
+ 			*pnetfid = parms->SearchHandle;
+ 		} else {
+ 			cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
+@@ -3712,6 +3714,8 @@ int CIFSFindNext(const int xid, struct cifsTconInfo *tcon,
+ 						le16_to_cpu(parms->SearchCount);
+ 			psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry +=
+ 				psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer;
++			psrch_inf->last_entry = psrch_inf->srch_entries_start +
++					le16_to_cpu(parms->LastNameOffset);
+ /*  cFYI(1,("fnxt2 entries in buf %d index_of_last %d",
+ 	    psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer, psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry)); */
+ 
+diff --git a/fs/cifs/readdir.c b/fs/cifs/readdir.c
+index 32b445e..2948aab 100644
+--- a/fs/cifs/readdir.c
++++ b/fs/cifs/readdir.c
+@@ -633,6 +633,70 @@ static int is_dir_changed(struct file *file)
+ 
+ }
+ 
++static int cifs_save_resume_key(const char *current_entry,
++	struct cifsFileInfo *cifsFile)
++{
++	int rc = 0;
++	unsigned int len = 0;
++	__u16 level;
++	char *filename;
++
++	if ((cifsFile == NULL) || (current_entry == NULL))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	level = cifsFile->srch_inf.info_level;
++
++	if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX) {
++		FILE_UNIX_INFO *pFindData = (FILE_UNIX_INFO *)current_entry;
++
++		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
++		if (cifsFile->srch_inf.unicode) {
++			len = cifs_unicode_bytelen(filename);
++		} else {
++			/* BB should we make this strnlen of PATH_MAX? */
++			len = strnlen(filename, PATH_MAX);
++		}
++		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->ResumeKey;
++	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO) {
++		FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO *pFindData =
++			(FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO *)current_entry;
++		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
++		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
++		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
++	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFO) {
++		FILE_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFO *pFindData =
++			(FILE_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFO *)current_entry;
++		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
++		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
++		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
++	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO) {
++		SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO *pFindData =
++			(SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO *)current_entry;
++		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
++		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
++		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
++	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_BOTH_DIRECTORY_INFO) {
++		FILE_BOTH_DIRECTORY_INFO *pFindData =
++			(FILE_BOTH_DIRECTORY_INFO *)current_entry;
++		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
++		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
++		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
++	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_INFO_STANDARD) {
++		FIND_FILE_STANDARD_INFO *pFindData =
++			(FIND_FILE_STANDARD_INFO *)current_entry;
++		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
++		/* one byte length, no name conversion */
++		len = (unsigned int)pFindData->FileNameLength;
++		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->ResumeKey;
++	} else {
++		cFYI(1, ("Unknown findfirst level %d", level));
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++	cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_name_len = len;
++	cifsFile->srch_inf.presume_name = filename;
++	return rc;
++}
++
+ /* find the corresponding entry in the search */
+ /* Note that the SMB server returns search entries for . and .. which
+    complicates logic here if we choose to parse for them and we do not
+@@ -694,6 +758,7 @@ static int find_cifs_entry(const int xid, struct cifsTconInfo *pTcon,
+ 	while ((index_to_find >= cifsFile->srch_inf.index_of_last_entry) &&
+ 	      (rc == 0) && (cifsFile->srch_inf.endOfSearch == FALSE)) {
+ 		cFYI(1, ("calling findnext2"));
++		cifs_save_resume_key(cifsFile->srch_inf.last_entry, cifsFile);
+ 		rc = CIFSFindNext(xid, pTcon, cifsFile->netfid,
+ 				  &cifsFile->srch_inf);
+ 		if (rc)
+@@ -910,69 +975,6 @@ static int cifs_filldir(char *pfindEntry, struct file *file,
+ 	return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-static int cifs_save_resume_key(const char *current_entry,
+-	struct cifsFileInfo *cifsFile)
+-{
+-	int rc = 0;
+-	unsigned int len = 0;
+-	__u16 level;
+-	char *filename;
+-
+-	if ((cifsFile == NULL) || (current_entry == NULL))
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	level = cifsFile->srch_inf.info_level;
+-
+-	if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_UNIX) {
+-		FILE_UNIX_INFO *pFindData = (FILE_UNIX_INFO *)current_entry;
+-
+-		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
+-		if (cifsFile->srch_inf.unicode) {
+-			len = cifs_unicode_bytelen(filename);
+-		} else {
+-			/* BB should we make this strnlen of PATH_MAX? */
+-			len = strnlen(filename, PATH_MAX);
+-		}
+-		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->ResumeKey;
+-	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO) {
+-		FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO *pFindData =
+-			(FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO *)current_entry;
+-		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
+-		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
+-		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
+-	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFO) {
+-		FILE_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFO *pFindData =
+-			(FILE_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFO *)current_entry;
+-		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
+-		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
+-		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
+-	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO) {
+-		SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO *pFindData =
+-			(SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO *)current_entry;
+-		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
+-		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
+-		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
+-	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_BOTH_DIRECTORY_INFO) {
+-		FILE_BOTH_DIRECTORY_INFO *pFindData =
+-			(FILE_BOTH_DIRECTORY_INFO *)current_entry;
+-		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
+-		len = le32_to_cpu(pFindData->FileNameLength);
+-		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->FileIndex;
+-	} else if (level == SMB_FIND_FILE_INFO_STANDARD) {
+-		FIND_FILE_STANDARD_INFO *pFindData =
+-			(FIND_FILE_STANDARD_INFO *)current_entry;
+-		filename = &pFindData->FileName[0];
+-		/* one byte length, no name conversion */
+-		len = (unsigned int)pFindData->FileNameLength;
+-		cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_key = pFindData->ResumeKey;
+-	} else {
+-		cFYI(1, ("Unknown findfirst level %d", level));
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+-	cifsFile->srch_inf.resume_name_len = len;
+-	cifsFile->srch_inf.presume_name = filename;
+-	return rc;
+-}
+ 
+ int cifs_readdir(struct file *file, void *direntry, filldir_t filldir)
+ {
+diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c
+index eeb1a86..51d7c85 100644
+--- a/fs/splice.c
++++ b/fs/splice.c
+@@ -891,6 +891,9 @@ static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
+ 	if (unlikely(!(out->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
+ 		return -EBADF;
+ 
++	if (unlikely(out->f_flags & O_APPEND))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	ret = rw_verify_area(WRITE, out, ppos, len);
+ 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+ 		return ret;
+diff --git a/kernel/sched_rt.c b/kernel/sched_rt.c
+index 0a6d2e5..cdeaffe 100644
+--- a/kernel/sched_rt.c
++++ b/kernel/sched_rt.c
+@@ -91,12 +91,12 @@ static void dequeue_rt_entity(struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se);
+ 
+ static void sched_rt_rq_enqueue(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
+ {
++	struct task_struct *curr = rq_of_rt_rq(rt_rq)->curr;
+ 	struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se = rt_rq->rt_se;
+ 
+-	if (rt_se && !on_rt_rq(rt_se) && rt_rq->rt_nr_running) {
+-		struct task_struct *curr = rq_of_rt_rq(rt_rq)->curr;
+-
+-		enqueue_rt_entity(rt_se);
++	if (rt_rq->rt_nr_running) {
++		if (rt_se && !on_rt_rq(rt_se))
++			enqueue_rt_entity(rt_se);
+ 		if (rt_rq->highest_prio < curr->prio)
+ 			resched_task(curr);
+ 	}

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1019_linux-2.6.25.20.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1019_linux-2.6.25.20.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1019_linux-2.6.25.20.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,796 @@
+diff --git a/arch/sparc64/kernel/trampoline.S b/arch/sparc64/kernel/trampoline.S
+index 56ff552..d9f3f51 100644
+--- a/arch/sparc64/kernel/trampoline.S
++++ b/arch/sparc64/kernel/trampoline.S
+@@ -328,6 +328,12 @@ after_lock_tlb:
+ 
+ 	wrpr		%g0, 0, %wstate
+ 
++	sethi		%hi(prom_entry_lock), %g2
++1:	ldstub		[%g2 + %lo(prom_entry_lock)], %g1
++	membar		#StoreLoad | #StoreStore
++	brnz,pn		%g1, 1b
++	 nop
++
+ 	/* As a hack, put &init_thread_union into %g6.
+ 	 * prom_world() loads from here to restore the %asi
+ 	 * register.
+@@ -337,7 +343,7 @@ after_lock_tlb:
+ 
+ 	sethi		%hi(is_sun4v), %o0
+ 	lduw		[%o0 + %lo(is_sun4v)], %o0
+-	brz,pt		%o0, 1f
++	brz,pt		%o0, 2f
+ 	 nop
+ 
+ 	TRAP_LOAD_TRAP_BLOCK(%g2, %g3)
+@@ -369,10 +375,10 @@ after_lock_tlb:
+ 	call		%o1
+ 	 add		%sp, (2047 + 128), %o0
+ 
+-	ba,pt		%xcc, 2f
++	ba,pt		%xcc, 3f
+ 	 nop
+ 
+-1:	sethi		%hi(sparc64_ttable_tl0), %o0
++2:	sethi		%hi(sparc64_ttable_tl0), %o0
+ 	set		prom_set_trap_table_name, %g2
+ 	stx		%g2, [%sp + 2047 + 128 + 0x00]
+ 	mov		1, %g2
+@@ -386,7 +392,11 @@ after_lock_tlb:
+ 	call		%o1
+ 	 add		%sp, (2047 + 128), %o0
+ 
+-2:	ldx		[%l0], %g6
++3:	sethi		%hi(prom_entry_lock), %g2
++	stb		%g0, [%g2 + %lo(prom_entry_lock)]
++	membar		#StoreStore | #StoreLoad
++
++	ldx		[%l0], %g6
+ 	ldx		[%g6 + TI_TASK], %g4
+ 
+ 	mov		1, %g5
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/dock.c b/drivers/acpi/dock.c
+index fa44fb9..4fdd886 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/dock.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/dock.c
+@@ -599,14 +599,17 @@ static int handle_eject_request(struct dock_station *ds, u32 event)
+ static void dock_notify(acpi_handle handle, u32 event, void *data)
+ {
+ 	struct dock_station *ds = data;
++	struct acpi_device *tmp;
+ 
+ 	switch (event) {
+ 	case ACPI_NOTIFY_BUS_CHECK:
+-		if (!dock_in_progress(ds) && dock_present(ds)) {
++		if (!dock_in_progress(ds) && acpi_bus_get_device(ds->handle,
++		   &tmp)) {
+ 			begin_dock(ds);
+ 			dock(ds);
+ 			if (!dock_present(ds)) {
+ 				printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX "Unable to dock!\n");
++				complete_dock(ds);
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			atomic_notifier_call_chain(&dock_notifier_list,
+diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video.c b/drivers/acpi/video.c
+index 980a741..4f65f59 100644
+--- a/drivers/acpi/video.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/video.c
+@@ -624,6 +624,76 @@ acpi_video_bus_DOS(struct acpi_video_bus *video, int bios_flag, int lcd_flag)
+  *  	device	: video output device (LCD, CRT, ..)
+  *
+  *  Return Value:
++ *	Maximum brightness level
++ *
++ *  Allocate and initialize device->brightness.
++ */
++
++static int
++acpi_video_init_brightness(struct acpi_video_device *device)
++{
++	union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
++	int i, max_level = 0, count = 0;
++	union acpi_object *o;
++	struct acpi_video_device_brightness *br = NULL;
++
++	if (!ACPI_SUCCESS(acpi_video_device_lcd_query_levels(device, &obj))) {
++		ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO, "Could not query available "
++						"LCD brightness level\n"));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (obj->package.count < 2)
++		goto out;
++
++	br = kzalloc(sizeof(*br), GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!br) {
++		printk(KERN_ERR "can't allocate memory\n");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	br->levels = kmalloc(obj->package.count * sizeof *(br->levels),
++				GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!br->levels)
++		goto out_free;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < obj->package.count; i++) {
++		o = (union acpi_object *)&obj->package.elements[i];
++		if (o->type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) {
++			printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX "Invalid data\n");
++			continue;
++		}
++		br->levels[count] = (u32) o->integer.value;
++
++		if (br->levels[count] > max_level)
++			max_level = br->levels[count];
++		count++;
++	}
++
++	if (count < 2)
++		goto out_free_levels;
++
++	br->count = count;
++	device->brightness = br;
++	ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO, "found %d brightness levels\n", count));
++	kfree(obj);
++	return max_level;
++
++out_free_levels:
++	kfree(br->levels);
++out_free:
++	kfree(br);
++out:
++	device->brightness = NULL;
++	kfree(obj);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  Arg:
++ *	device	: video output device (LCD, CRT, ..)
++ *
++ *  Return Value:
+  *  	None
+  *
+  *  Find out all required AML methods defined under the output
+@@ -633,10 +703,7 @@ acpi_video_bus_DOS(struct acpi_video_bus *video, int bios_flag, int lcd_flag)
+ static void acpi_video_device_find_cap(struct acpi_video_device *device)
+ {
+ 	acpi_handle h_dummy1;
+-	int i;
+ 	u32 max_level = 0;
+-	union acpi_object *obj = NULL;
+-	struct acpi_video_device_brightness *br = NULL;
+ 
+ 
+ 	memset(&device->cap, 0, sizeof(device->cap));
+@@ -665,53 +732,7 @@ static void acpi_video_device_find_cap(struct acpi_video_device *device)
+ 		device->cap._DSS = 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (ACPI_SUCCESS(acpi_video_device_lcd_query_levels(device, &obj))) {
+-
+-		if (obj->package.count >= 2) {
+-			int count = 0;
+-			union acpi_object *o;
+-
+-			br = kzalloc(sizeof(*br), GFP_KERNEL);
+-			if (!br) {
+-				printk(KERN_ERR "can't allocate memory\n");
+-			} else {
+-				br->levels = kmalloc(obj->package.count *
+-						     sizeof *(br->levels), GFP_KERNEL);
+-				if (!br->levels)
+-					goto out;
+-
+-				for (i = 0; i < obj->package.count; i++) {
+-					o = (union acpi_object *)&obj->package.
+-					    elements[i];
+-					if (o->type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+-						printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX "Invalid data\n");
+-						continue;
+-					}
+-					br->levels[count] = (u32) o->integer.value;
+-
+-					if (br->levels[count] > max_level)
+-						max_level = br->levels[count];
+-					count++;
+-				}
+-			      out:
+-				if (count < 2) {
+-					kfree(br->levels);
+-					kfree(br);
+-				} else {
+-					br->count = count;
+-					device->brightness = br;
+-					ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO,
+-							  "found %d brightness levels\n",
+-							  count));
+-				}
+-			}
+-		}
+-
+-	} else {
+-		ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO, "Could not query available LCD brightness level\n"));
+-	}
+-
+-	kfree(obj);
++	max_level = acpi_video_init_brightness(device);
+ 
+ 	if (device->cap._BCL && device->cap._BCM && device->cap._BQC && max_level > 0){
+ 		int result;
+@@ -1710,6 +1731,8 @@ static void
+ acpi_video_switch_brightness(struct acpi_video_device *device, int event)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long level_current, level_next;
++	if (!device->brightness)
++		return;
+ 	acpi_video_device_lcd_get_level_current(device, &level_current);
+ 	level_next = acpi_video_get_next_level(device, level_current, event);
+ 	acpi_video_device_lcd_set_level(device, level_next);
+diff --git a/drivers/edac/cell_edac.c b/drivers/edac/cell_edac.c
+index b54112f..00b8539 100644
+--- a/drivers/edac/cell_edac.c
++++ b/drivers/edac/cell_edac.c
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void __devinit cell_edac_init_csrows(struct mem_ctl_info *mci)
+ 		csrow->nr_pages = (r.end - r.start + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 		csrow->last_page = csrow->first_page + csrow->nr_pages - 1;
+ 		csrow->mtype = MEM_XDR;
+-		csrow->edac_mode = EDAC_FLAG_EC | EDAC_FLAG_SECDED;
++		csrow->edac_mode = EDAC_SECDED;
+ 		dev_dbg(mci->dev,
+ 			"Initialized on node %d, chanmask=0x%x,"
+ 			" first_page=0x%lx, nr_pages=0x%x\n",
+diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
+index d8db2f8..5ca1916 100644
+--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
++++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
+@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ int gpio_get_value_cansleep(unsigned gpio)
+ 
+ 	might_sleep_if(extra_checks);
+ 	chip = gpio_to_chip(gpio);
+-	return chip->get(chip, gpio - chip->base);
++	return chip->get ? chip->get(chip, gpio - chip->base) : 0;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gpio_get_value_cansleep);
+ 
+diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/scan.c
+index 69f94c9..9335d71 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/scan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/libertas/scan.c
+@@ -787,8 +787,8 @@ static int lbs_process_bss(struct bss_descriptor *bss,
+ 
+ 		switch (elem->id) {
+ 		case MFIE_TYPE_SSID:
+-			bss->ssid_len = elem->len;
+-			memcpy(bss->ssid, elem->data, elem->len);
++			bss->ssid_len = min_t(int, 32, elem->len);
++			memcpy(bss->ssid, elem->data, bss->ssid_len);
+ 			lbs_deb_scan("got SSID IE: '%s', len %u\n",
+ 			             escape_essid(bss->ssid, bss->ssid_len),
+ 			             bss->ssid_len);
+diff --git a/fs/ext2/dir.c b/fs/ext2/dir.c
+index 8dededd..bd54e81 100644
+--- a/fs/ext2/dir.c
++++ b/fs/ext2/dir.c
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int ext2_commit_chunk(struct page *page, loff_t pos, unsigned len)
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+-static void ext2_check_page(struct page *page)
++static void ext2_check_page(struct page *page, int quiet)
+ {
+ 	struct inode *dir = page->mapping->host;
+ 	struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
+@@ -146,10 +146,10 @@ out:
+ 	/* Too bad, we had an error */
+ 
+ Ebadsize:
+-	ext2_error(sb, "ext2_check_page",
+-		"size of directory #%lu is not a multiple of chunk size",
+-		dir->i_ino
+-	);
++	if (!quiet)
++		ext2_error(sb, __func__,
++			"size of directory #%lu is not a multiple "
++			"of chunk size", dir->i_ino);
+ 	goto fail;
+ Eshort:
+ 	error = "rec_len is smaller than minimal";
+@@ -166,32 +166,36 @@ Espan:
+ Einumber:
+ 	error = "inode out of bounds";
+ bad_entry:
+-	ext2_error (sb, "ext2_check_page", "bad entry in directory #%lu: %s - "
+-		"offset=%lu, inode=%lu, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d",
+-		dir->i_ino, error, (page->index<<PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)+offs,
+-		(unsigned long) le32_to_cpu(p->inode),
+-		rec_len, p->name_len);
++	if (!quiet)
++		ext2_error(sb, __func__, "bad entry in directory #%lu: : %s - "
++			"offset=%lu, inode=%lu, rec_len=%d, name_len=%d",
++			dir->i_ino, error, (page->index<<PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)+offs,
++			(unsigned long) le32_to_cpu(p->inode),
++			rec_len, p->name_len);
+ 	goto fail;
+ Eend:
+-	p = (ext2_dirent *)(kaddr + offs);
+-	ext2_error (sb, "ext2_check_page",
+-		"entry in directory #%lu spans the page boundary"
+-		"offset=%lu, inode=%lu",
+-		dir->i_ino, (page->index<<PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)+offs,
+-		(unsigned long) le32_to_cpu(p->inode));
++	if (!quiet) {
++		p = (ext2_dirent *)(kaddr + offs);
++		ext2_error(sb, "ext2_check_page",
++			"entry in directory #%lu spans the page boundary"
++			"offset=%lu, inode=%lu",
++			dir->i_ino, (page->index<<PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)+offs,
++			(unsigned long) le32_to_cpu(p->inode));
++	}
+ fail:
+ 	SetPageChecked(page);
+ 	SetPageError(page);
+ }
+ 
+-static struct page * ext2_get_page(struct inode *dir, unsigned long n)
++static struct page * ext2_get_page(struct inode *dir, unsigned long n,
++				   int quiet)
+ {
+ 	struct address_space *mapping = dir->i_mapping;
+ 	struct page *page = read_mapping_page(mapping, n, NULL);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(page)) {
+ 		kmap(page);
+ 		if (!PageChecked(page))
+-			ext2_check_page(page);
++			ext2_check_page(page, quiet);
+ 		if (PageError(page))
+ 			goto fail;
+ 	}
+@@ -292,7 +296,7 @@ ext2_readdir (struct file * filp, void * dirent, filldir_t filldir)
+ 	for ( ; n < npages; n++, offset = 0) {
+ 		char *kaddr, *limit;
+ 		ext2_dirent *de;
+-		struct page *page = ext2_get_page(inode, n);
++		struct page *page = ext2_get_page(inode, n, 0);
+ 
+ 		if (IS_ERR(page)) {
+ 			ext2_error(sb, __FUNCTION__,
+@@ -361,6 +365,7 @@ struct ext2_dir_entry_2 * ext2_find_entry (struct inode * dir,
+ 	struct page *page = NULL;
+ 	struct ext2_inode_info *ei = EXT2_I(dir);
+ 	ext2_dirent * de;
++	int dir_has_error = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (npages == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -374,7 +379,7 @@ struct ext2_dir_entry_2 * ext2_find_entry (struct inode * dir,
+ 	n = start;
+ 	do {
+ 		char *kaddr;
+-		page = ext2_get_page(dir, n);
++		page = ext2_get_page(dir, n, dir_has_error);
+ 		if (!IS_ERR(page)) {
+ 			kaddr = page_address(page);
+ 			de = (ext2_dirent *) kaddr;
+@@ -391,7 +396,9 @@ struct ext2_dir_entry_2 * ext2_find_entry (struct inode * dir,
+ 				de = ext2_next_entry(de);
+ 			}
+ 			ext2_put_page(page);
+-		}
++		} else
++			dir_has_error = 1;
++
+ 		if (++n >= npages)
+ 			n = 0;
+ 		/* next page is past the blocks we've got */
+@@ -414,7 +421,7 @@ found:
+ 
+ struct ext2_dir_entry_2 * ext2_dotdot (struct inode *dir, struct page **p)
+ {
+-	struct page *page = ext2_get_page(dir, 0);
++	struct page *page = ext2_get_page(dir, 0, 0);
+ 	ext2_dirent *de = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(page)) {
+@@ -487,7 +494,7 @@ int ext2_add_link (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+ 	for (n = 0; n <= npages; n++) {
+ 		char *dir_end;
+ 
+-		page = ext2_get_page(dir, n);
++		page = ext2_get_page(dir, n, 0);
+ 		err = PTR_ERR(page);
+ 		if (IS_ERR(page))
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -655,14 +662,17 @@ int ext2_empty_dir (struct inode * inode)
+ {
+ 	struct page *page = NULL;
+ 	unsigned long i, npages = dir_pages(inode);
++	int dir_has_error = 0;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ 		char *kaddr;
+ 		ext2_dirent * de;
+-		page = ext2_get_page(inode, i);
++		page = ext2_get_page(inode, i, dir_has_error);
+ 
+-		if (IS_ERR(page))
++		if (IS_ERR(page)) {
++			dir_has_error = 1;
+ 			continue;
++		}
+ 
+ 		kaddr = page_address(page);
+ 		de = (ext2_dirent *)kaddr;
+diff --git a/fs/ext3/dir.c b/fs/ext3/dir.c
+index 8ca3bfd..fba60c0 100644
+--- a/fs/ext3/dir.c
++++ b/fs/ext3/dir.c
+@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static int ext3_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ 	int err;
+ 	struct inode *inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ 	int ret = 0;
++	int dir_has_error = 0;
+ 
+ 	sb = inode->i_sb;
+ 
+@@ -148,9 +149,12 @@ static int ext3_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ 		 * of recovering data when there's a bad sector
+ 		 */
+ 		if (!bh) {
+-			ext3_error (sb, "ext3_readdir",
+-				"directory #%lu contains a hole at offset %lu",
+-				inode->i_ino, (unsigned long)filp->f_pos);
++			if (!dir_has_error) {
++				ext3_error(sb, __func__, "directory #%lu "
++					"contains a hole at offset %lld",
++					inode->i_ino, filp->f_pos);
++				dir_has_error = 1;
++			}
+ 			/* corrupt size?  Maybe no more blocks to read */
+ 			if (filp->f_pos > inode->i_blocks << 9)
+ 				break;
+diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c
+index 2c23bad..50ea8ed 100644
+--- a/fs/ext4/dir.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c
+@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ 	int err;
+ 	struct inode *inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ 	int ret = 0;
++	int dir_has_error = 0;
+ 
+ 	sb = inode->i_sb;
+ 
+@@ -147,9 +148,13 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ 		 * of recovering data when there's a bad sector
+ 		 */
+ 		if (!bh) {
+-			ext4_error (sb, "ext4_readdir",
+-				"directory #%lu contains a hole at offset %lu",
+-				inode->i_ino, (unsigned long)filp->f_pos);
++			if (!dir_has_error) {
++				ext4_error(sb, __func__, "directory #%lu "
++					   "contains a hole at offset %Lu",
++					   inode->i_ino,
++					   (unsigned long long) filp->f_pos);
++				dir_has_error = 1;
++			}
+ 			/* corrupt size?  Maybe no more blocks to read */
+ 			if (filp->f_pos > inode->i_blocks << 9)
+ 				break;
+diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
+index 6a1e7af..b9254bc 100644
+--- a/include/linux/sched.h
++++ b/include/linux/sched.h
+@@ -1256,6 +1256,8 @@ struct task_struct {
+ 	atomic_t fs_excl;	/* holding fs exclusive resources */
+ 	struct rcu_head rcu;
+ 
++	struct list_head	*scm_work_list;
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * cache last used pipe for splice
+ 	 */
+diff --git a/include/math-emu/op-common.h b/include/math-emu/op-common.h
+index bb46e76..408f743 100644
+--- a/include/math-emu/op-common.h
++++ b/include/math-emu/op-common.h
+@@ -139,18 +139,27 @@ do {								\
+ 	if (X##_e <= _FP_WFRACBITS_##fs)			\
+ 	  {							\
+ 	    _FP_FRAC_SRS_##wc(X, X##_e, _FP_WFRACBITS_##fs);	\
+-	    _FP_ROUND(wc, X);					\
+ 	    if (_FP_FRAC_HIGH_##fs(X)				\
+ 		& (_FP_OVERFLOW_##fs >> 1))			\
+ 	      {							\
+ 	        X##_e = 1;					\
+ 	        _FP_FRAC_SET_##wc(X, _FP_ZEROFRAC_##wc);	\
+-	        FP_SET_EXCEPTION(FP_EX_INEXACT);		\
+ 	      }							\
+ 	    else						\
+ 	      {							\
+-		X##_e = 0;					\
+-		_FP_FRAC_SRL_##wc(X, _FP_WORKBITS);		\
++		_FP_ROUND(wc, X);				\
++		if (_FP_FRAC_HIGH_##fs(X)			\
++		   & (_FP_OVERFLOW_##fs >> 1))			\
++		  {						\
++		    X##_e = 1;					\
++		    _FP_FRAC_SET_##wc(X, _FP_ZEROFRAC_##wc);	\
++		    FP_SET_EXCEPTION(FP_EX_INEXACT);		\
++		  }						\
++		else						\
++		  {						\
++		    X##_e = 0;					\
++		    _FP_FRAC_SRL_##wc(X, _FP_WORKBITS);		\
++		  }						\
+ 	      }							\
+ 	    if ((FP_CUR_EXCEPTIONS & FP_EX_INEXACT) ||		\
+ 		(FP_TRAPPING_EXCEPTIONS & FP_EX_UNDERFLOW))	\
+diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
+index 06df126..33e9986 100644
+--- a/include/net/scm.h
++++ b/include/net/scm.h
+@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@
+ 
+ struct scm_fp_list
+ {
+-	int		count;
+-	struct file	*fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
++	struct list_head	list;
++	int			count;
++	struct file		*fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
+ };
+ 
+ struct scm_cookie
+diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
+index 37ffd7a..bd08aa7 100644
+--- a/net/core/dev.c
++++ b/net/core/dev.c
+@@ -3593,14 +3593,11 @@ static int dev_new_index(struct net *net)
+ }
+ 
+ /* Delayed registration/unregisteration */
+-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(net_todo_list_lock);
+ static LIST_HEAD(net_todo_list);
+ 
+ static void net_set_todo(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+-	spin_lock(&net_todo_list_lock);
+ 	list_add_tail(&dev->todo_list, &net_todo_list);
+-	spin_unlock(&net_todo_list_lock);
+ }
+ 
+ static void rollback_registered(struct net_device *dev)
+@@ -3909,33 +3906,24 @@ static void netdev_wait_allrefs(struct net_device *dev)
+  *	free_netdev(y1);
+  *	free_netdev(y2);
+  *
+- * We are invoked by rtnl_unlock() after it drops the semaphore.
++ * We are invoked by rtnl_unlock().
+  * This allows us to deal with problems:
+  * 1) We can delete sysfs objects which invoke hotplug
+  *    without deadlocking with linkwatch via keventd.
+  * 2) Since we run with the RTNL semaphore not held, we can sleep
+  *    safely in order to wait for the netdev refcnt to drop to zero.
++ *
++ * We must not return until all unregister events added during
++ * the interval the lock was held have been completed.
+  */
+-static DEFINE_MUTEX(net_todo_run_mutex);
+ void netdev_run_todo(void)
+ {
+ 	struct list_head list;
+ 
+-	/* Need to guard against multiple cpu's getting out of order. */
+-	mutex_lock(&net_todo_run_mutex);
+-
+-	/* Not safe to do outside the semaphore.  We must not return
+-	 * until all unregister events invoked by the local processor
+-	 * have been completed (either by this todo run, or one on
+-	 * another cpu).
+-	 */
+-	if (list_empty(&net_todo_list))
+-		goto out;
+-
+ 	/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */
+-	spin_lock(&net_todo_list_lock);
+ 	list_replace_init(&net_todo_list, &list);
+-	spin_unlock(&net_todo_list_lock);
++
++	__rtnl_unlock();
+ 
+ 	while (!list_empty(&list)) {
+ 		struct net_device *dev
+@@ -3965,9 +3953,6 @@ void netdev_run_todo(void)
+ 		/* Free network device */
+ 		kobject_put(&dev->dev.kobj);
+ 	}
+-
+-out:
+-	mutex_unlock(&net_todo_run_mutex);
+ }
+ 
+ static struct net_device_stats *internal_stats(struct net_device *dev)
+diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+index 0cb2772..aa53778 100644
+--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
++++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ void __rtnl_unlock(void)
+ 
+ void rtnl_unlock(void)
+ {
+-	mutex_unlock(&rtnl_mutex);
++	/* This fellow will unlock it for us. */
+ 	netdev_run_todo();
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
+index 10f5c65..ab242cc 100644
+--- a/net/core/scm.c
++++ b/net/core/scm.c
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
+ 		if (!fpl)
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+ 		*fplp = fpl;
++		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fpl->list);
+ 		fpl->count = 0;
+ 	}
+ 	fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
+@@ -106,9 +107,25 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+ 
+ 	if (fpl) {
+ 		scm->fp = NULL;
+-		for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
+-			fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+-		kfree(fpl);
++		if (current->scm_work_list) {
++			list_add_tail(&fpl->list, current->scm_work_list);
++		} else {
++			LIST_HEAD(work_list);
++
++			current->scm_work_list = &work_list;
++
++			list_add(&fpl->list, &work_list);
++			while (!list_empty(&work_list)) {
++				fpl = list_first_entry(&work_list, struct scm_fp_list, list);
++
++				list_del(&fpl->list);
++				for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
++					fput(fpl->fp[i]);
++				kfree(fpl);
++			}
++
++			current->scm_work_list = NULL;
++		}
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+@@ -284,6 +301,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
+ 
+ 	new_fpl = kmalloc(sizeof(*fpl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ 	if (new_fpl) {
++		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_fpl->list);
+ 		for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
+ 			get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
+ 		memcpy(new_fpl, fpl, sizeof(*fpl));
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c
+index 50ad6ef..4618ea0 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c
+@@ -138,10 +138,12 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_conntrack_defrag(unsigned int hooknum,
+ 					  const struct net_device *out,
+ 					  int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+ {
++#if !defined(CONFIG_NF_NAT) && !defined(CONFIG_NF_NAT_MODULE)
+ 	/* Previously seen (loopback)?  Ignore.  Do this before
+ 	   fragment check. */
+ 	if (skb->nfct)
+ 		return NF_ACCEPT;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Gather fragments. */
+ 	if (ip_hdr(skb)->frag_off & htons(IP_MF | IP_OFFSET)) {
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c
+index 8e4148d..1b0a738 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c
+@@ -742,6 +742,7 @@ static unsigned char snmp_object_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
+ 			*obj = kmalloc(sizeof(struct snmp_object) + len,
+ 				       GFP_ATOMIC);
+ 			if (*obj == NULL) {
++				kfree(p);
+ 				kfree(id);
+ 				if (net_ratelimit())
+ 					printk("OOM in bsalg (%d)\n", __LINE__);
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+index 12750f2..4d18fd2 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_ack(struct tcp_timewait_sock *tw,
+ 		*topt++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
+ 				(TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) | TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP);
+ 		*topt++ = htonl(tcp_time_stamp);
+-		*topt = htonl(ts);
++		*topt++ = htonl(ts);
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_iprange.c b/net/netfilter/xt_iprange.c
+index c63e933..4b5741b 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/xt_iprange.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/xt_iprange.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ iprange_mt4(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in,
+ 	if (info->flags & IPRANGE_SRC) {
+ 		m  = ntohl(iph->saddr) < ntohl(info->src_min.ip);
+ 		m |= ntohl(iph->saddr) > ntohl(info->src_max.ip);
+-		m ^= info->flags & IPRANGE_SRC_INV;
++		m ^= !!(info->flags & IPRANGE_SRC_INV);
+ 		if (m) {
+ 			pr_debug("src IP " NIPQUAD_FMT " NOT in range %s"
+ 			         NIPQUAD_FMT "-" NIPQUAD_FMT "\n",
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ iprange_mt4(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in,
+ 	if (info->flags & IPRANGE_DST) {
+ 		m  = ntohl(iph->daddr) < ntohl(info->dst_min.ip);
+ 		m |= ntohl(iph->daddr) > ntohl(info->dst_max.ip);
+-		m ^= info->flags & IPRANGE_DST_INV;
++		m ^= !!(info->flags & IPRANGE_DST_INV);
+ 		if (m) {
+ 			pr_debug("dst IP " NIPQUAD_FMT " NOT in range %s"
+ 			         NIPQUAD_FMT "-" NIPQUAD_FMT "\n",
+@@ -123,14 +123,14 @@ iprange_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in,
+ 	if (info->flags & IPRANGE_SRC) {
+ 		m  = iprange_ipv6_sub(&iph->saddr, &info->src_min.in6) < 0;
+ 		m |= iprange_ipv6_sub(&iph->saddr, &info->src_max.in6) > 0;
+-		m ^= info->flags & IPRANGE_SRC_INV;
++		m ^= !!(info->flags & IPRANGE_SRC_INV);
+ 		if (m)
+ 			return false;
+ 	}
+ 	if (info->flags & IPRANGE_DST) {
+ 		m  = iprange_ipv6_sub(&iph->daddr, &info->dst_min.in6) < 0;
+ 		m |= iprange_ipv6_sub(&iph->daddr, &info->dst_max.in6) > 0;
+-		m ^= info->flags & IPRANGE_DST_INV;
++		m ^= !!(info->flags & IPRANGE_DST_INV);
+ 		if (m)
+ 			return false;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
+index 06d5c94..37205a1 100644
+--- a/security/commoncap.c
++++ b/security/commoncap.c
+@@ -244,10 +244,10 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ 	struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
+ 	struct inode *inode;
+ 
+-	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
+-		bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
++	bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
++
++	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ 		return 0;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
+ 	inode = dentry->d_inode;
+diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
+index 01a1a5a..7ac4bbb 100644
+--- a/sound/core/control.c
++++ b/sound/core/control.c
+@@ -1426,12 +1426,12 @@ static int snd_ctl_dev_disconnect(struct snd_device *device)
+ 	cardnum = card->number;
+ 	snd_assert(cardnum >= 0 && cardnum < SNDRV_CARDS, return -ENXIO);
+ 
+-	down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
++	read_lock(&card->ctl_files_rwlock);
+ 	list_for_each_entry(ctl, &card->ctl_files, list) {
+ 		wake_up(&ctl->change_sleep);
+ 		kill_fasync(&ctl->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_ERR);
+ 	}
+-	up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
++	read_unlock(&card->ctl_files_rwlock);
+ 
+ 	if ((err = snd_unregister_device(SNDRV_DEVICE_TYPE_CONTROL,
+ 					 card, -1)) < 0)

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1401_cgroups-fix-invalid-cgrp-dentry-before-cgroup-has-been-completely-removed.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1401_cgroups-fix-invalid-cgrp-dentry-before-cgroup-has-been-completely-removed.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1401_cgroups-fix-invalid-cgrp-dentry-before-cgroup-has-been-completely-removed.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Mon Nov 10 15:14:35 2008
+From: Li Zefan <lizf@××××××××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 00:05:48 GMT
+Subject: cgroups: fix invalid cgrp->dentry before cgroup has been completely removed
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811070005.mA705mbU003066@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Li Zefan <lizf@××××××××××.com>
+
+commit 24eb089950ce44603b30a3145a2c8520e2b55bb1 upstream
+
+This fixes an oops when reading /proc/sched_debug.
+
+A cgroup won't be removed completely until finishing cgroup_diput(), so we
+shouldn't invalidate cgrp->dentry in cgroup_rmdir().  Otherwise, when a
+group is being removed while cgroup_path() gets called, we may trigger
+NULL dereference BUG.
+
+The bug can be reproduced:
+
+ # cat test.sh
+ #!/bin/sh
+ mount -t cgroup -o cpu xxx /mnt
+ for (( ; ; ))
+ {
+	mkdir /mnt/sub
+	rmdir /mnt/sub
+ }
+ # ./test.sh &
+ # cat /proc/sched_debug
+
+BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000038
+IP: [<c045a47f>] cgroup_path+0x39/0x90
+..
+Call Trace:
+ [<c0420344>] ? print_cfs_rq+0x6e/0x75d
+ [<c0421160>] ? sched_debug_show+0x72d/0xc1e
+..
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@××××××××××.com>
+Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@××××××.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@××××××.nl>
+Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@××××.hu>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ kernel/cgroup.c |    1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
++++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
+@@ -2443,7 +2443,6 @@ static int cgroup_rmdir(struct inode *un
+ 	list_del(&cgrp->sibling);
+ 	spin_lock(&cgrp->dentry->d_lock);
+ 	d = dget(cgrp->dentry);
+-	cgrp->dentry = NULL;
+ 	spin_unlock(&d->d_lock);
+ 
+ 	cgroup_d_remove_dir(d);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1402_cpqarry-fix-return-value-of-cpqarray_init.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1402_cpqarry-fix-return-value-of-cpqarray_init.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1402_cpqarry-fix-return-value-of-cpqarray_init.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 2197d18ded232ef6eef63cce57b6b21eddf1b7b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrey Borzenkov <arvidjaar@××××.ru>
+Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 12:53:15 -0800
+Subject: cpqarry: fix return value of cpqarray_init()
+
+From: Andrey Borzenkov <arvidjaar@××××.ru>
+
+commit 2197d18ded232ef6eef63cce57b6b21eddf1b7b6 upstream.
+
+As reported by Dick Gevers on Compaq ProLiant:
+
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel: Compaq SMART2 Driver (v 2.6.0)
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel: sys_init_module: 'cpqarray'->init
+suspiciously returned 1, it should follow 0/-E convention
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel: sys_init_module: loading module anyway...
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel: Pid: 315, comm: modprobe Not tainted
+2.6.27-desktop-0.rc8.2mnb #1
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel:  [<c0380612>] ? printk+0x18/0x1e
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel:  [<c0158f85>] sys_init_module+0x155/0x1c0
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel:  [<c0103f06>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
+Oct 13 18:06:51 dvgcpl kernel:  =======================
+
+Make it return 0 on success and -ENODEV if no array was found.
+
+Reported-by: Dick Gevers <dvgevers@××××××.nl>
+Signed-off-by: Andrey Borzenkov <arvidjaar@××××.ru>
+Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/block/cpqarray.c |    7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/block/cpqarray.c
++++ b/drivers/block/cpqarray.c
+@@ -567,7 +567,12 @@ static int __init cpqarray_init(void)
+ 			num_cntlrs_reg++;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return(num_cntlrs_reg);
++	if (num_cntlrs_reg)
++		return 0;
++	else {
++		pci_unregister_driver(&cpqarray_pci_driver);
++		return -ENODEV;
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /* Function to find the first free pointer into our hba[] array */

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1403_ext3-wait-on-all-pending-commits-in-ext3_sync_fs.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1403_ext3-wait-on-all-pending-commits-in-ext3_sync_fs.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1403_ext3-wait-on-all-pending-commits-in-ext3_sync_fs.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Mon Nov 10 15:08:55 2008
+From: Arthur Jones <ajones@××××××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 00:05:17 GMT
+Subject: ext3: wait on all pending commits in ext3_sync_fs
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811070005.mA705Htq002320@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Arthur Jones <ajones@××××××××.com>
+
+commit c87591b719737b4e91eb1a9fa8fd55a4ff1886d6 upstream
+
+In ext3_sync_fs, we only wait for a commit to finish if we started it, but
+there may be one already in progress which will not be synced.
+
+In the case of a data=ordered umount with pending long symlinks which are
+delayed due to a long list of other I/O on the backing block device, this
+causes the buffer associated with the long symlinks to not be moved to the
+inode dirty list in the second phase of fsync_super.  Then, before they
+can be dirtied again, kjournald exits, seeing the UMOUNT flag and the
+dirty pages are never written to the backing block device, causing long
+symlink corruption and exposing new or previously freed block data to
+userspace.
+
+This can be reproduced with a script created
+by Eric Sandeen <sandeen@××××××.com>:
+
+	#!/bin/bash
+
+	umount /mnt/test2
+	mount /dev/sdb4 /mnt/test2
+	rm -f /mnt/test2/*
+	dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/test2/bigfile bs=1M count=512
+	touch
+	/mnt/test2/thisisveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryverylongfilename
+	ln -s
+	/mnt/test2/thisisveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryveryverylongfilename
+	/mnt/test2/link
+	umount /mnt/test2
+	mount /dev/sdb4 /mnt/test2
+	ls /mnt/test2/
+	umount /mnt/test2
+
+To ensure all commits are synced, we flush all journal commits now when
+sync_fs'ing ext3.
+
+Signed-off-by: Arthur Jones <ajones@××××××××.com>
+Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@××××××.com>
+Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@×××.edu>
+Cc: <linux-ext4@×××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ fs/ext3/super.c |   11 +++++------
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext3/super.c
++++ b/fs/ext3/super.c
+@@ -2365,13 +2365,12 @@ static void ext3_write_super (struct sup
+ 
+ static int ext3_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
+ {
+-	tid_t target;
+-
+ 	sb->s_dirt = 0;
+-	if (journal_start_commit(EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal, &target)) {
+-		if (wait)
+-			log_wait_commit(EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal, target);
+-	}
++	if (wait)
++		ext3_force_commit(sb);
++	else
++		journal_start_commit(EXT3_SB(sb)->s_journal, NULL);
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1404_hid-fix-incorrent-length-condition-in-hidraw_write.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1404_hid-fix-incorrent-length-condition-in-hidraw_write.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1404_hid-fix-incorrent-length-condition-in-hidraw_write.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From jkosina@××××.cz  Tue Nov 11 15:52:41 2008
+From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@××××.cz>
+Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2008 23:45:38 +0100 (CET)
+Subject: HID: fix incorrent length condition in hidraw_write()
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Cc: Paul Stoffregen <paul@××××.com>
+Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.1.10.0811112344180.24889@××××××××××.cz>
+
+From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@××××.cz>
+
+upstream commit 2b107d629dc0c35de606bb7b010b829cd247a93a
+
+From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@××××.cz>
+
+The bound check on the buffer length
+
+	if (count > HID_MIN_BUFFER_SIZE)
+
+is of course incorrent, the proper check is
+
+	if (count > HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
+
+Fix it.
+
+Reported-by: Jerry Ryle <jerry@×××××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@××××.cz>
+Cc: Paul Stoffregen <paul@××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/hid/hidraw.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/hid/hidraw.c
++++ b/drivers/hid/hidraw.c
+@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t hidraw_write(struct file 
+ 	if (!dev->hid_output_raw_report)
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+ 
+-	if (count > HID_MIN_BUFFER_SIZE) {
++	if (count > HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "hidraw: pid %d passed too large report\n",
+ 				task_pid_nr(current));
+ 		return -EINVAL;

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1405_i-oat-fix-async_tx.callback-checking.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1405_i-oat-fix-async_tx.callback-checking.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1405_i-oat-fix-async_tx.callback-checking.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Backported to earlier kernels. Original message included below.
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Tue Nov 11 10:17:05 2008
+From: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2008 17:50:05 GMT
+Subject: I/OAT: fix async_tx.callback checking
+To: jejb@××××××.org, stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811111750.mABHo5Ai025612@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+
+commit 12ccea24e309d815d058cdc6ee8bf2c4b85f0c5f upstream
+
+async_tx.callback should be checked for the first
+not the last descriptor in the chain.
+
+Signed-off-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@×××××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/dma/ioat_dma.c |    4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/dma/ioat_dma.c
++++ b/drivers/dma/ioat_dma.c
+@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static dma_cookie_t ioat1_tx_submit(stru
+ 	} while (len && (new = ioat1_dma_get_next_descriptor(ioat_chan)));
+ 
+ 	hw->ctl = IOAT_DMA_DESCRIPTOR_CTL_CP_STS;
+-	if (new->async_tx.callback) {
++	if (first->async_tx.callback) {
+ 		hw->ctl |= IOAT_DMA_DESCRIPTOR_CTL_INT_GN;
+ 		if (first != new) {
+ 			/* move callback into to last desc */
+@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static dma_cookie_t ioat2_tx_submit(stru
+ 	} while (len && (new = ioat2_dma_get_next_descriptor(ioat_chan)));
+ 
+ 	hw->ctl = IOAT_DMA_DESCRIPTOR_CTL_CP_STS;
+-	if (new->async_tx.callback) {
++	if (first->async_tx.callback) {
+ 		hw->ctl |= IOAT_DMA_DESCRIPTOR_CTL_INT_GN;
+ 		if (first != new) {
+ 			/* move callback into to last desc */

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1406_i-oat-fix-channel-resources-free-for-not-allocated-channels.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1406_i-oat-fix-channel-resources-free-for-not-allocated-channels.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1406_i-oat-fix-channel-resources-free-for-not-allocated-channels.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Backported to earlier kernels.  Original message below.
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Tue Nov 11 10:15:37 2008
+From: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2008 17:50:09 GMT
+Subject: I/OAT: fix channel resources free for not allocated channels
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811111750.mABHo9IU025655@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+
+commit c3d4f44f50b65b0b0290e357f8739cfb3f4bcaca upstream
+
+If the ioatdma driver is loaded but not used it does not allocate descriptors.
+Before it frees channel resources it should first be sure
+that they have been previously allocated.
+
+Signed-off-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+Tested-by: Tom Picard <tom.s.picard@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@×××××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/dma/ioat_dma.c |    7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/dma/ioat_dma.c
++++ b/drivers/dma/ioat_dma.c
+@@ -524,6 +524,12 @@ static void ioat_dma_free_chan_resources
+ 	struct ioat_desc_sw *desc, *_desc;
+ 	int in_use_descs = 0;
+ 
++	/* Before freeing channel resources first check
++	* if they have been previously allocated for this channel.
++	*/
++	if (ioat_chan->desccount == 0)
++		return;
++
+ 	tasklet_disable(&ioat_chan->cleanup_task);
+ 	ioat_dma_memcpy_cleanup(ioat_chan);
+ 
+@@ -585,6 +591,7 @@ static void ioat_dma_free_chan_resources
+ 	ioat_chan->last_completion = ioat_chan->completion_addr = 0;
+ 	ioat_chan->pending = 0;
+ 	ioat_chan->dmacount = 0;
++	ioat_chan->desccount = 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /**

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1407_i-oat-fix-dma_pin_iovec_pages-error-handling.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1407_i-oat-fix-dma_pin_iovec_pages-error-handling.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1407_i-oat-fix-dma_pin_iovec_pages-error-handling.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Tue Nov 11 10:16:31 2008
+From: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2008 17:50:07 GMT
+Subject: I/OAT: fix dma_pin_iovec_pages() error handling
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811111750.mABHo7v5025633@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+
+commit c2c0b4c5434c0a25f7f7796b29155d53805909f5 upstream
+
+Error handling needs to be modified in dma_pin_iovec_pages().
+It should return NULL instead of ERR_PTR
+(pinned_list is checked for NULL in tcp_recvmsg() to determine
+if iovec pages have been successfully pinned down).
+In case of error for the first iovec,
+local_list->nr_iovecs needs to be initialized.
+
+Signed-off-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@×××××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/dma/iovlock.c |   17 ++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/dma/iovlock.c
++++ b/drivers/dma/iovlock.c
+@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ struct dma_pinned_list *dma_pin_iovec_pa
+ 	int nr_iovecs = 0;
+ 	int iovec_len_used = 0;
+ 	int iovec_pages_used = 0;
+-	long err;
+ 
+ 	/* don't pin down non-user-based iovecs */
+ 	if (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
+@@ -72,23 +71,21 @@ struct dma_pinned_list *dma_pin_iovec_pa
+ 	local_list = kmalloc(sizeof(*local_list)
+ 		+ (nr_iovecs * sizeof (struct dma_page_list))
+ 		+ (iovec_pages_used * sizeof (struct page*)), GFP_KERNEL);
+-	if (!local_list) {
+-		err = -ENOMEM;
++	if (!local_list)
+ 		goto out;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	/* list of pages starts right after the page list array */
+ 	pages = (struct page **) &local_list->page_list[nr_iovecs];
+ 
++	local_list->nr_iovecs = 0;
++
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nr_iovecs; i++) {
+ 		struct dma_page_list *page_list = &local_list->page_list[i];
+ 
+ 		len -= iov[i].iov_len;
+ 
+-		if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len)) {
+-			err = -EFAULT;
++		if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len))
+ 			goto unpin;
+-		}
+ 
+ 		page_list->nr_pages = num_pages_spanned(&iov[i]);
+ 		page_list->base_address = iov[i].iov_base;
+@@ -109,10 +106,8 @@ struct dma_pinned_list *dma_pin_iovec_pa
+ 			NULL);
+ 		up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 
+-		if (ret != page_list->nr_pages) {
+-			err = -ENOMEM;
++		if (ret != page_list->nr_pages)
+ 			goto unpin;
+-		}
+ 
+ 		local_list->nr_iovecs = i + 1;
+ 	}
+@@ -122,7 +117,7 @@ struct dma_pinned_list *dma_pin_iovec_pa
+ unpin:
+ 	dma_unpin_iovec_pages(local_list);
+ out:
+-	return ERR_PTR(err);
++	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+ void dma_unpin_iovec_pages(struct dma_pinned_list *pinned_list)

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1408_jffs2-fix-lack-of-locking-in-thread_should_wake.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1408_jffs2-fix-lack-of-locking-in-thread_should_wake.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1408_jffs2-fix-lack-of-locking-in-thread_should_wake.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Tue Nov 11 09:53:44 2008
+From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@×××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 00:08:59 GMT
+Subject: JFFS2: Fix lack of locking in thread_should_wake()
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811070008.mA708xQE008191@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@×××××.com>
+
+commit b27cf88e9592953ae292d05324887f2f44979433 upstream
+
+The thread_should_wake() function trawls through the list of 'very
+dirty' eraseblocks, determining whether the background GC thread should
+wake. Doing this without holding the appropriate locks is a bad idea.
+
+OLPC Trac #8615
+
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ fs/jffs2/background.c |   10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/jffs2/background.c
++++ b/fs/jffs2/background.c
+@@ -85,15 +85,15 @@ static int jffs2_garbage_collect_thread(
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		allow_signal(SIGHUP);
+ 	again:
++		spin_lock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
+ 		if (!jffs2_thread_should_wake(c)) {
+ 			set_current_state (TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
++			spin_unlock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
+ 			D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_garbage_collect_thread sleeping...\n"));
+-			/* Yes, there's a race here; we checked jffs2_thread_should_wake()
+-			   before setting current->state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. But it doesn't
+-			   matter - We don't care if we miss a wakeup, because the GC thread
+-			   is only an optimisation anyway. */
+ 			schedule();
+-		}
++		} else
++			spin_unlock(&c->erase_completion_lock);
++
+ 
+ 		/* This thread is purely an optimisation. But if it runs when
+ 		   other things could be running, it actually makes things a

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1409_jffs2-fix-race-condition-in-jffs2_lzo_compress.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1409_jffs2-fix-race-condition-in-jffs2_lzo_compress.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1409_jffs2-fix-race-condition-in-jffs2_lzo_compress.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Tue Nov 11 09:53:08 2008
+From: Geert Uytterhoeven <Geert.Uytterhoeven@×××××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 00:08:19 GMT
+Subject: JFFS2: fix race condition in jffs2_lzo_compress()
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811070008.mA708Jdo007031@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Geert Uytterhoeven <Geert.Uytterhoeven@×××××××.com>
+
+commit dc8a0843a435b2c0891e7eaea64faaf1ebec9b11 upstream
+
+deflate_mutex protects the globals lzo_mem and lzo_compress_buf.  However,
+jffs2_lzo_compress() unlocks deflate_mutex _before_ it has copied out the
+compressed data from lzo_compress_buf.  Correct this by moving the mutex
+unlock after the copy.
+
+In addition, document what deflate_mutex actually protects.
+
+Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <Geert.Uytterhoeven@×××××××.com>
+Acked-by: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@××××××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ fs/jffs2/compr_lzo.c |   15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/jffs2/compr_lzo.c
++++ b/fs/jffs2/compr_lzo.c
+@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
+ 
+ static void *lzo_mem;
+ static void *lzo_compress_buf;
+-static DEFINE_MUTEX(deflate_mutex);
++static DEFINE_MUTEX(deflate_mutex);	/* for lzo_mem and lzo_compress_buf */
+ 
+ static void free_workspace(void)
+ {
+@@ -49,18 +49,21 @@ static int jffs2_lzo_compress(unsigned c
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&deflate_mutex);
+ 	ret = lzo1x_1_compress(data_in, *sourcelen, lzo_compress_buf, &compress_size, lzo_mem);
+-	mutex_unlock(&deflate_mutex);
+-
+ 	if (ret != LZO_E_OK)
+-		return -1;
++		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	if (compress_size > *dstlen)
+-		return -1;
++		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	memcpy(cpage_out, lzo_compress_buf, compress_size);
+-	*dstlen = compress_size;
++	mutex_unlock(&deflate_mutex);
+ 
++	*dstlen = compress_size;
+ 	return 0;
++
++ fail:
++	mutex_unlock(&deflate_mutex);
++	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+ static int jffs2_lzo_decompress(unsigned char *data_in, unsigned char *cpage_out,

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1410_md-linear-fix-a-division-by-zero-bug-for-very-small-arrays.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1410_md-linear-fix-a-division-by-zero-bug-for-very-small-arrays.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1410_md-linear-fix-a-division-by-zero-bug-for-very-small-arrays.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Changed patch slightly to eliminate fuzz.
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Tue Nov 11 09:47:32 2008
+From: Andre Noll <maan@×××××××××××.org>
+Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 00:07:46 GMT
+Subject: md: linear: Fix a division by zero bug for very small arrays.
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811070007.mA707k6d006270@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Andre Noll <maan@×××××××××××.org>
+
+commit f1cd14ae52985634d0389e934eba25b5ecf24565 upstream
+
+Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2008 19:41:24 +1100
+Subject: md: linear: Fix a division by zero bug for very small arrays.
+
+We currently oops with a divide error on starting a linear software
+raid array consisting of at least two very small (< 500K) devices.
+
+The bug is caused by the calculation of the hash table size which
+tries to compute sector_div(sz, base) with "base" being zero due to
+the small size of the component devices of the array.
+
+Fix this by requiring the hash spacing to be at least one which
+implies that also "base" is non-zero.
+
+This bug has existed since about 2.6.14.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andre Noll <maan@×××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@××××.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/md/linear.c |    2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/md/linear.c
++++ b/drivers/md/linear.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ static linear_conf_t *linear_conf(mddev_
+ 
+ 	min_spacing = conf->array_size;
+ 	sector_div(min_spacing, PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct dev_info *));
++	if (min_spacing == 0)
++		min_spacing = 1;
+ 
+ 	/* min_spacing is the minimum spacing that will fit the hash
+ 	 * table in one PAGE.  This may be much smaller than needed.

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1411_mmc-increase-sd-write-timeout-for-crappy-cards.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1411_mmc-increase-sd-write-timeout-for-crappy-cards.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1411_mmc-increase-sd-write-timeout-for-crappy-cards.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 493890e75d98810a3470b4aae23be628ee5e9667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pierre Ossman <drzeus@××××××.cx>
+Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2008 12:37:25 +0100
+Subject: mmc: increase SD write timeout for crappy cards
+
+From: Pierre Ossman <drzeus@××××××.cx>
+
+commit 493890e75d98810a3470b4aae23be628ee5e9667 upstream.
+
+It seems that some cards are slightly out of spec and occasionally
+will not be able to complete a write in the alloted 250 ms [1].
+Incease the timeout slightly to allow even these cards to function
+properly.
+
+[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/9/23/390
+
+Signed-off-by: Pierre Ossman <drzeus@××××××.cx>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/mmc/core/core.c |    6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mmc/core/core.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/core/core.c
+@@ -280,7 +280,11 @@ void mmc_set_data_timeout(struct mmc_dat
+ 			(card->host->ios.clock / 1000);
+ 
+ 		if (data->flags & MMC_DATA_WRITE)
+-			limit_us = 250000;
++			/*
++			 * The limit is really 250 ms, but that is
++			 * insufficient for some crappy cards.
++			 */
++			limit_us = 300000;
+ 		else
+ 			limit_us = 100000;
+ 

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1412_net-unix-fix-inflight-counting-bug-in-garbage-collector.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1412_net-unix-fix-inflight-counting-bug-in-garbage-collector.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1412_net-unix-fix-inflight-counting-bug-in-garbage-collector.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Backported to ealier kernels.  Original message included below.
+
+---
+
+From jejb@××××××.org  Tue Nov 11 09:59:05 2008
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@××××.cz>
+Date: Sun, 9 Nov 2008 19:50:02 GMT
+Subject: net: unix: fix inflight counting bug in garbage collector
+To: stable@××××××.org
+Message-ID: <200811091950.mA9Jo2iL003804@×××××××××××.org>
+
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@××××.cz>
+
+commit 6209344f5a3795d34b7f2c0061f49802283b6bdd upstream
+
+Previously I assumed that the receive queues of candidates don't
+change during the GC.  This is only half true, nothing can be received
+from the queues (see comment in unix_gc()), but buffers could be added
+through the other half of the socket pair, which may still have file
+descriptors referring to it.
+
+This can result in inc_inflight_move_tail() erronously increasing the
+"inflight" counter for a unix socket for which dec_inflight() wasn't
+previously called.  This in turn can trigger the "BUG_ON(total_refs <
+inflight_refs)" in a later garbage collection run.
+
+Fix this by only manipulating the "inflight" counter for sockets which
+are candidates themselves.  Duplicating the file references in
+unix_attach_fds() is also needed to prevent a socket becoming a
+candidate for GC while the skb that contains it is not yet queued.
+
+Reported-by: Andrea Bittau <a.bittau@×××××××××.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@××××.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ include/net/af_unix.h |    1 +
+ net/unix/af_unix.c    |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ net/unix/garbage.c    |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
++++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
+         atomic_t                inflight;
+         spinlock_t		lock;
+ 	unsigned int		gc_candidate : 1;
++	unsigned int		gc_maybe_cycle : 1;
+         wait_queue_head_t       peer_wait;
+ };
+ #define unix_sk(__sk) ((struct unix_sock *)__sk)
+--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
++++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
+@@ -1302,14 +1302,23 @@ static void unix_destruct_fds(struct sk_
+ 	sock_wfree(skb);
+ }
+ 
+-static void unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
++static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++
++	/*
++	 * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
++	 * collection.  Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
++	 * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
++	 */
++	UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
++	if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
+ 	for (i=scm->fp->count-1; i>=0; i--)
+ 		unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+-	UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm->fp;
+ 	skb->destructor = unix_destruct_fds;
+-	scm->fp = NULL;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1368,8 +1377,11 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kio
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	memcpy(UNIXCREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
+-	if (siocb->scm->fp)
+-		unix_attach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
++	if (siocb->scm->fp) {
++		err = unix_attach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
++		if (err)
++			goto out_free;
++	}
+ 	unix_get_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
+ 
+ 	skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
+@@ -1538,8 +1550,13 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct ki
+ 		size = min_t(int, size, skb_tailroom(skb));
+ 
+ 		memcpy(UNIXCREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
+-		if (siocb->scm->fp)
+-			unix_attach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
++		if (siocb->scm->fp) {
++			err = unix_attach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
++			if (err) {
++				kfree_skb(skb);
++				goto out_err;
++			}
++		}
+ 
+ 		if ((err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb,size), msg->msg_iov, size)) != 0) {
+ 			kfree_skb(skb);
+--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
++++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
+@@ -186,8 +186,17 @@ static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x
+ 				 */
+ 				struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(*fp++);
+ 				if (sk) {
+-					hit = true;
+-					func(unix_sk(sk));
++					struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
++
++					/*
++					 * Ignore non-candidates, they could
++					 * have been added to the queues after
++					 * starting the garbage collection
++					 */
++					if (u->gc_candidate) {
++						hit = true;
++						func(u);
++					}
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 			if (hit && hitlist != NULL) {
+@@ -249,11 +258,11 @@ static void inc_inflight_move_tail(struc
+ {
+ 	atomic_inc(&u->inflight);
+ 	/*
+-	 * If this is still a candidate, move it to the end of the
+-	 * list, so that it's checked even if it was already passed
+-	 * over
++	 * If this still might be part of a cycle, move it to the end
++	 * of the list, so that it's checked even if it was already
++	 * passed over
+ 	 */
+-	if (u->gc_candidate)
++	if (u->gc_maybe_cycle)
+ 		list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_candidates);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -267,6 +276,7 @@ void unix_gc(void)
+ 	struct unix_sock *next;
+ 	struct sk_buff_head hitlist;
+ 	struct list_head cursor;
++	LIST_HEAD(not_cycle_list);
+ 
+ 	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ 
+@@ -282,10 +292,14 @@ void unix_gc(void)
+ 	 *
+ 	 * Holding unix_gc_lock will protect these candidates from
+ 	 * being detached, and hence from gaining an external
+-	 * reference.  This also means, that since there are no
+-	 * possible receivers, the receive queues of these sockets are
+-	 * static during the GC, even though the dequeue is done
+-	 * before the detach without atomicity guarantees.
++	 * reference.  Since there are no possible receivers, all
++	 * buffers currently on the candidates' queues stay there
++	 * during the garbage collection.
++	 *
++	 * We also know that no new candidate can be added onto the
++	 * receive queues.  Other, non candidate sockets _can_ be
++	 * added to queue, so we must make sure only to touch
++	 * candidates.
+ 	 */
+ 	list_for_each_entry_safe(u, next, &gc_inflight_list, link) {
+ 		int total_refs;
+@@ -299,6 +313,7 @@ void unix_gc(void)
+ 		if (total_refs == inflight_refs) {
+ 			list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_candidates);
+ 			u->gc_candidate = 1;
++			u->gc_maybe_cycle = 1;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -325,14 +340,24 @@ void unix_gc(void)
+ 		list_move(&cursor, &u->link);
+ 
+ 		if (atomic_read(&u->inflight) > 0) {
+-			list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
+-			u->gc_candidate = 0;
++			list_move_tail(&u->link, &not_cycle_list);
++			u->gc_maybe_cycle = 0;
+ 			scan_children(&u->sk, inc_inflight_move_tail, NULL);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	list_del(&cursor);
+ 
+ 	/*
++	 * not_cycle_list contains those sockets which do not make up a
++	 * cycle.  Restore these to the inflight list.
++	 */
++	while (!list_empty(&not_cycle_list)) {
++		u = list_entry(not_cycle_list.next, struct unix_sock, link);
++		u->gc_candidate = 0;
++		list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
++	}
++
++	/*
+ 	 * Now gc_candidates contains only garbage.  Restore original
+ 	 * inflight counters for these as well, and remove the skbuffs
+ 	 * which are creating the cycle(s).

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1413_block-fix-nr_phys_segments-miscalculation-bug.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1413_block-fix-nr_phys_segments-miscalculation-bug.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1413_block-fix-nr_phys_segments-miscalculation-bug.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From knikanth@××××.de  Thu Nov 13 14:07:47 2008
+From: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@××××××××××.jp>
+Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2008 11:33:54 +0530
+Subject: block: fix nr_phys_segments miscalculation bug
+To: Greg KH <greg@×××××.com>
+Cc: stable@××××××.org, FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@××××××××××.jp>
+Message-ID: <200811121133.55404.knikanth@××××.de>
+Content-Disposition: inline
+
+From: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@××××××××××.jp>
+
+commit 8677142710516d986d932d6f1fba7be8382c1fec upstream
+backported by Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@××××.de> to the 2.6.27.y tree.
+
+block: fix nr_phys_segments miscalculation bug
+
+This fixes the bug reported by Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@××××.de>:
+
+http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/10/2/203
+
+The root cause of the bug is that blk_phys_contig_segment
+miscalculates q->max_segment_size.
+
+blk_phys_contig_segment checks:
+
+req->biotail->bi_size + next_req->bio->bi_size > q->max_segment_size
+
+But blk_recalc_rq_segments might expect that req->biotail and the
+previous bio in the req are supposed be merged into one
+segment. blk_recalc_rq_segments might also expect that next_req->bio
+and the next bio in the next_req are supposed be merged into one
+segment. In such case, we merge two requests that can't be merged
+here. Later, blk_rq_map_sg gives more segments than it should.
+
+We need to keep track of segment size in blk_recalc_rq_segments and
+use it to see if two requests can be merged. This patch implements it
+in the similar way that we used to do for hw merging (virtual
+merging).
+
+Signed-off-by: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@××××××××××.jp>
+Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@××××××.com>
+Cc: Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@××××.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ block/blk-merge.c   |   19 +++++++++++++++++--
+ include/linux/bio.h |    7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/block/blk-merge.c
++++ b/block/blk-merge.c
+@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ new_hw_segment:
+ 			nr_hw_segs++;
+ 		}
+ 
++		if (nr_phys_segs == 1 && seg_size > rq->bio->bi_seg_front_size)
++			rq->bio->bi_seg_front_size = seg_size;
++
+ 		nr_phys_segs++;
+ 		bvprv = bv;
+ 		seg_size = bv->bv_len;
+@@ -106,6 +109,10 @@ new_hw_segment:
+ 		rq->bio->bi_hw_front_size = hw_seg_size;
+ 	if (hw_seg_size > rq->biotail->bi_hw_back_size)
+ 		rq->biotail->bi_hw_back_size = hw_seg_size;
++	if (nr_phys_segs == 1 && seg_size > rq->bio->bi_seg_front_size)
++		rq->bio->bi_seg_front_size = seg_size;
++	if (seg_size > rq->biotail->bi_seg_back_size)
++		rq->biotail->bi_seg_back_size = seg_size;
+ 	rq->nr_phys_segments = nr_phys_segs;
+ 	rq->nr_hw_segments = nr_hw_segs;
+ }
+@@ -133,7 +140,8 @@ static int blk_phys_contig_segment(struc
+ 
+ 	if (!BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE(__BVEC_END(bio), __BVEC_START(nxt)))
+ 		return 0;
+-	if (bio->bi_size + nxt->bi_size > q->max_segment_size)
++	if (bio->bi_seg_back_size + nxt->bi_seg_front_size >
++	    q->max_segment_size)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -377,6 +385,8 @@ static int ll_merge_requests_fn(struct r
+ {
+ 	int total_phys_segments;
+ 	int total_hw_segments;
++	unsigned int seg_size =
++		req->biotail->bi_seg_back_size + next->bio->bi_seg_front_size;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * First check if the either of the requests are re-queued
+@@ -392,8 +402,13 @@ static int ll_merge_requests_fn(struct r
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	total_phys_segments = req->nr_phys_segments + next->nr_phys_segments;
+-	if (blk_phys_contig_segment(q, req->biotail, next->bio))
++	if (blk_phys_contig_segment(q, req->biotail, next->bio)) {
++		if (req->nr_phys_segments == 1)
++			req->bio->bi_seg_front_size = seg_size;
++		if (next->nr_phys_segments == 1)
++			next->biotail->bi_seg_back_size = seg_size;
+ 		total_phys_segments--;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (total_phys_segments > q->max_phys_segments)
+ 		return 0;
+--- a/include/linux/bio.h
++++ b/include/linux/bio.h
+@@ -98,6 +98,13 @@ struct bio {
+ 	unsigned int		bi_size;	/* residual I/O count */
+ 
+ 	/*
++	 * To keep track of the max segment size, we account for the
++	 * sizes of the first and last mergeable segments in this bio.
++	 */
++	unsigned int            bi_seg_front_size;
++	unsigned int            bi_seg_back_size;
++
++	/*
+ 	 * To keep track of the max hw size, we account for the
+ 	 * sizes of the first and last virtually mergeable segments
+ 	 * in this bio

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1414_dm-raid1-flush-workqueue-before-destruction.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1414_dm-raid1-flush-workqueue-before-destruction.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1414_dm-raid1-flush-workqueue-before-destruction.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Backported to 2.6.25.  Original message included below.
+
+---
+
+From 18776c7316545482a02bfaa2629a2aa1afc48357 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@××××××.com>
+Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2008 23:38:52 +0000
+Subject: dm raid1: flush workqueue before destruction
+
+From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@××××××.com>
+
+commit 18776c7316545482a02bfaa2629a2aa1afc48357 upstream.
+
+We queue work on keventd queue --- so this queue must be flushed in the
+destructor. Otherwise, keventd could access mirror_set after it was freed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/md/dm-raid1.c |    1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/md/dm-raid1.c
++++ b/drivers/md/dm-raid1.c
+@@ -1590,6 +1590,7 @@ static void mirror_dtr(struct dm_target 
+ 	struct mirror_set *ms = (struct mirror_set *) ti->private;
+ 
+ 	flush_workqueue(ms->kmirrord_wq);
++	flush_scheduled_work();
+ 	kcopyd_client_destroy(ms->kcopyd_client);
+ 	destroy_workqueue(ms->kmirrord_wq);
+ 	free_context(ms, ti, ms->nr_mirrors);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1415_net-fix-proc-net-snmp-as-memory-corruptor.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1415_net-fix-proc-net-snmp-as-memory-corruptor.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1415_net-fix-proc-net-snmp-as-memory-corruptor.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Backported to earlier kernels. Original message included below.
+
+---
+
+From b971e7ac834e9f4bda96d5a96ae9abccd01c1dd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Dumazet <dada1@×××××××××.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2008 21:43:08 -0800
+Subject: net: fix /proc/net/snmp as memory corruptor
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <dada1@×××××××××.com>
+
+commit b971e7ac834e9f4bda96d5a96ae9abccd01c1dd8 upstream.
+
+icmpmsg_put() can happily corrupt kernel memory, using a static
+table and forgetting to reset an array index in a loop.
+
+Remove the static array since its not safe without proper locking.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@×××××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@×××××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ net/ipv4/proc.c |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/proc.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/proc.c
+@@ -262,42 +262,44 @@ static const struct snmp_mib snmp4_net_l
+ 	SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL
+ };
+ 
+-static void icmpmsg_put(struct seq_file *seq)
++static void icmpmsg_put_line(struct seq_file *seq, unsigned long *vals,
++				unsigned short *type, int count)
+ {
+-#define PERLINE	16
+-
+-	int j, i, count;
+-	static int out[PERLINE];
+-
+-	count = 0;
+-	for (i = 0; i < ICMPMSG_MIB_MAX; i++) {
+-
+-		if (snmp_fold_field((void **) icmpmsg_statistics, i))
+-			out[count++] = i;
+-		if (count < PERLINE)
+-			continue;
++	int j;
+ 
+-		seq_printf(seq, "\nIcmpMsg:");
+-		for (j = 0; j < PERLINE; ++j)
+-			seq_printf(seq, " %sType%u", i & 0x100 ? "Out" : "In",
+-					i & 0xff);
+-		seq_printf(seq, "\nIcmpMsg: ");
+-		for (j = 0; j < PERLINE; ++j)
+-			seq_printf(seq, " %lu",
+-				snmp_fold_field((void **) icmpmsg_statistics,
+-				out[j]));
+-		seq_putc(seq, '\n');
+-	}
+ 	if (count) {
+ 		seq_printf(seq, "\nIcmpMsg:");
+ 		for (j = 0; j < count; ++j)
+-			seq_printf(seq, " %sType%u", out[j] & 0x100 ? "Out" :
+-				"In", out[j] & 0xff);
++			seq_printf(seq, " %sType%u",
++				type[j] & 0x100 ? "Out" : "In",
++				type[j] & 0xff);
+ 		seq_printf(seq, "\nIcmpMsg:");
+ 		for (j = 0; j < count; ++j)
+-			seq_printf(seq, " %lu", snmp_fold_field((void **)
+-				icmpmsg_statistics, out[j]));
++			seq_printf(seq, " %lu", vals[j]);
++	}
++}
++
++static void icmpmsg_put(struct seq_file *seq)
++{
++#define PERLINE	16
++
++	int i, count;
++	unsigned short type[PERLINE];
++	unsigned long vals[PERLINE], val;
++
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < ICMPMSG_MIB_MAX; i++) {
++		val = snmp_fold_field((void **) icmpmsg_statistics, i);
++		if (val) {
++			type[count] = i;
++			vals[count++] = val;
++		}
++		if (count == PERLINE) {
++			icmpmsg_put_line(seq, vals, type, count);
++			count = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
++	icmpmsg_put_line(seq, vals, type, count);
+ 
+ #undef PERLINE
+ }

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1416_touch_mnt_namespace-when-the-mount-flags-change.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1416_touch_mnt_namespace-when-the-mount-flags-change.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1416_touch_mnt_namespace-when-the-mount-flags-change.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 0e55a7cca4b66f625d67b292f80b6a976e77c51b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@×××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2008 19:01:20 -0700
+Subject: touch_mnt_namespace when the mount flags change
+
+From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@×××××.com>
+
+commit 0e55a7cca4b66f625d67b292f80b6a976e77c51b upstream
+
+Daemons that need to be launched while the rootfs is read-only can now
+poll /proc/mounts to be notified when their O_RDWR requests may no
+longer end in EROFS.
+
+Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@××××.org>
+Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@××××.de>
+Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ fs/namespace.c |    7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/namespace.c
++++ b/fs/namespace.c
+@@ -1553,8 +1553,13 @@ static noinline int do_remount(struct na
+ 	if (!err)
+ 		nd->path.mnt->mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
+ 	up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+-	if (!err)
++	if (!err) {
+ 		security_sb_post_remount(nd->path.mnt, flags, data);
++
++		spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
++		touch_mnt_namespace(nd->path.mnt->mnt_ns);
++		spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
++	}
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1417_usb-ehci-remove-obsolete-workaround-for-bogus-IRQs.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1417_usb-ehci-remove-obsolete-workaround-for-bogus-IRQs.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1417_usb-ehci-remove-obsolete-workaround-for-bogus-IRQs.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From: David Brownell <david-b@×××××××.net>
+Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 07:37:52 +0000 (-0800)
+Subject: USB: ehci: remove obsolete workaround for bogus IRQs
+X-Git-Tag: v2.6.26-rc1~1061^2~74
+X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=d1b1842c393cf322712b669ec887397b89ed2312
+
+USB: ehci: remove obsolete workaround for bogus IRQs
+
+It was pointed out that we found and fixed the cause of the "bogus"
+fatal IRQ reports some time ago ... this patch removes the code
+which was working around that bug ("status" got clobbered), and a
+comment which needlessly confused folk reading this code.
+
+This also includes a minor cleanup to the code which fixed that bug.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Brownell <dbrownell@×××××××××××××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+---
+
+diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c
+index 40f7391..8c3e860 100644
+--- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c
+@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ static irqreturn_t ehci_irq (struct usb_hcd *hcd)
+ 	/* remote wakeup [4.3.1] */
+ 	if (status & STS_PCD) {
+ 		unsigned	i = HCS_N_PORTS (ehci->hcs_params);
++
++		/* kick root hub later */
+ 		pcd_status = status;
+ 
+ 		/* resume root hub? */
+@@ -714,8 +716,6 @@ static irqreturn_t ehci_irq (struct usb_hcd *hcd)
+ 
+ 	/* PCI errors [4.15.2.4] */
+ 	if (unlikely ((status & STS_FATAL) != 0)) {
+-		/* bogus "fatal" IRQs appear on some chips... why?  */
+-		status = ehci_readl(ehci, &ehci->regs->status);
+ 		dbg_cmd (ehci, "fatal", ehci_readl(ehci,
+ 						   &ehci->regs->command));
+ 		dbg_status (ehci, "fatal", status);
+@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ dead:
+ 	if (bh)
+ 		ehci_work (ehci);
+ 	spin_unlock (&ehci->lock);
+-	if (pcd_status & STS_PCD)
++	if (pcd_status)
+ 		usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(hcd);
+ 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
+ }

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1418_usb-ehci-fix-handling-of-dead-controllers.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1418_usb-ehci-fix-handling-of-dead-controllers.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1418_usb-ehci-fix-handling-of-dead-controllers.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 67b2e029743a52670d77864723b4d0d40f7733b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2008 17:04:53 -0500
+Subject: USB: EHCI: fix handling of dead controllers
+
+From: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+
+commit 67b2e029743a52670d77864723b4d0d40f7733b5 upstream.
+
+This patch (as1165) makes a few small changes in the logic used by
+ehci-hcd when it encounters a controller error:
+
+	Instead of printing out the masked status, it prints the
+	original status as read directly from the hardware.
+
+	It doesn't check for the STS_HALT status bit before taking
+	action.  The mere fact that the STS_FATAL bit is set means
+	that something bad has happened and the controller needs to
+	be reset.  With the old code this test could never succeed
+	because the STS_HALT bit was masked out from the status.
+
+I anticipate that this will prevent the occasional "irq X: nobody cared"
+problem people encounter when their EHCI controllers die.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+Cc: David Brownell <david-b@×××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c |   25 ++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c
+@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ static int ehci_run (struct usb_hcd *hcd
+ static irqreturn_t ehci_irq (struct usb_hcd *hcd)
+ {
+ 	struct ehci_hcd		*ehci = hcd_to_ehci (hcd);
+-	u32			status, pcd_status = 0, cmd;
++	u32			status, masked_status, pcd_status = 0, cmd;
+ 	int			bh;
+ 
+ 	spin_lock (&ehci->lock);
+@@ -656,14 +656,14 @@ static irqreturn_t ehci_irq (struct usb_
+ 		goto dead;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	status &= INTR_MASK;
+-	if (!status) {			/* irq sharing? */
++	masked_status = status & INTR_MASK;
++	if (!masked_status) {		/* irq sharing? */
+ 		spin_unlock(&ehci->lock);
+ 		return IRQ_NONE;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* clear (just) interrupts */
+-	ehci_writel(ehci, status, &ehci->regs->status);
++	ehci_writel(ehci, masked_status, &ehci->regs->status);
+ 	cmd = ehci_readl(ehci, &ehci->regs->command);
+ 	bh = 0;
+ 
+@@ -731,19 +731,18 @@ static irqreturn_t ehci_irq (struct usb_
+ 
+ 	/* PCI errors [4.15.2.4] */
+ 	if (unlikely ((status & STS_FATAL) != 0)) {
++		ehci_err(ehci, "fatal error\n");
+ 		dbg_cmd (ehci, "fatal", ehci_readl(ehci,
+ 						   &ehci->regs->command));
+ 		dbg_status (ehci, "fatal", status);
+-		if (status & STS_HALT) {
+-			ehci_err (ehci, "fatal error\n");
++		ehci_halt(ehci);
+ dead:
+-			ehci_reset (ehci);
+-			ehci_writel(ehci, 0, &ehci->regs->configured_flag);
+-			/* generic layer kills/unlinks all urbs, then
+-			 * uses ehci_stop to clean up the rest
+-			 */
+-			bh = 1;
+-		}
++		ehci_reset(ehci);
++		ehci_writel(ehci, 0, &ehci->regs->configured_flag);
++		/* generic layer kills/unlinks all urbs, then
++		 * uses ehci_stop to clean up the rest
++		 */
++		bh = 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (bh)

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1419_usb-don-t-register-endpoints-for-interfaces-that-are-going-away.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1419_usb-don-t-register-endpoints-for-interfaces-that-are-going-away.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1419_usb-don-t-register-endpoints-for-interfaces-that-are-going-away.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Backported to kernel 2.6.25.  Original message included below.
+
+---
+
+From 352d026338378b1f13f044e33c1047da6e470056 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2008 15:16:58 -0400
+Subject: USB: don't register endpoints for interfaces that are going away
+
+From: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+
+commit 352d026338378b1f13f044e33c1047da6e470056 upstream.
+
+This patch (as1155) fixes a bug in usbcore.  When interfaces are
+deleted, either because the device was disconnected or because of a
+configuration change, the extra attribute files and child endpoint
+devices may get left behind.  This is because the core removes them
+before calling device_del().  But during device_del(), after the
+driver is unbound the core will reinstall altsetting 0 and recreate
+those extra attributes and children.
+
+The patch prevents this by adding a flag to record when the interface
+is in the midst of being unregistered.  When the flag is set, the
+attribute files and child devices will not be created.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/usb/core/message.c |    1 +
+ drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c   |    2 +-
+ include/linux/usb.h        |    2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c
+@@ -1089,6 +1089,7 @@ void usb_disable_device(struct usb_devic
+ 				continue;
+ 			dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "unregistering interface %s\n",
+ 				interface->dev.bus_id);
++			interface->unregistering = 1;
+ 			usb_remove_sysfs_intf_files(interface);
+ 			device_del(&interface->dev);
+ 		}
+--- a/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
+@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ int usb_create_sysfs_intf_files(struct u
+ 	struct usb_host_interface *alt = intf->cur_altsetting;
+ 	int retval;
+ 
+-	if (intf->sysfs_files_created)
++	if (intf->sysfs_files_created || intf->unregistering)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	retval = sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, &intf_attr_grp);
+ 	if (retval)
+--- a/include/linux/usb.h
++++ b/include/linux/usb.h
+@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ enum usb_interface_condition {
+  *	(in probe()), bound to a driver, or unbinding (in disconnect())
+  * @is_active: flag set when the interface is bound and not suspended.
+  * @sysfs_files_created: sysfs attributes exist
++ * @unregistering: flag set when the interface is being unregistered
+  * @needs_remote_wakeup: flag set when the driver requires remote-wakeup
+  *	capability during autosuspend.
+  * @dev: driver model's view of this device
+@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ struct usb_interface {
+ 	enum usb_interface_condition condition;		/* state of binding */
+ 	unsigned is_active:1;		/* the interface is not suspended */
+ 	unsigned sysfs_files_created:1;	/* the sysfs attributes exist */
++	unsigned unregistering:1;	/* unregistration is in progress */
+ 	unsigned needs_remote_wakeup:1;	/* driver requires remote wakeup */
+ 
+ 	struct device dev;		/* interface specific device info */

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1420_usb-ehci-fix-divide-by-zero-bug.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1420_usb-ehci-fix-divide-by-zero-bug.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1420_usb-ehci-fix-divide-by-zero-bug.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 372dd6e8ed924e876f3beb598721e813ad7fa323 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2008 17:02:57 -0500
+Subject: USB: EHCI: fix divide-by-zero bug
+
+From: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+
+commit 372dd6e8ed924e876f3beb598721e813ad7fa323 upstream.
+
+This patch (as1164) fixes a bug in the EHCI scheduler.  The interval
+value it uses is already in linear format, not logarithmically coded.
+The existing code can sometimes crash the system by trying to divide
+by zero.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@×××××××××××××××.edu>
+Cc: David Brownell <david-b@×××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c |    4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c
+@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ iso_stream_init (
+ 		 */
+ 		stream->usecs = HS_USECS_ISO (maxp);
+ 		bandwidth = stream->usecs * 8;
+-		bandwidth /= 1 << (interval - 1);
++		bandwidth /= interval;
+ 
+ 	} else {
+ 		u32		addr;
+@@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ iso_stream_init (
+ 		} else
+ 			stream->raw_mask = smask_out [hs_transfers - 1];
+ 		bandwidth = stream->usecs + stream->c_usecs;
+-		bandwidth /= 1 << (interval + 2);
++		bandwidth /= interval << 3;
+ 
+ 		/* stream->splits gets created from raw_mask later */
+ 		stream->address = cpu_to_hc32(ehci, addr);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1421_usb-fix-ps3-usb-shutdown-problems.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1421_usb-fix-ps3-usb-shutdown-problems.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1421_usb-fix-ps3-usb-shutdown-problems.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From ddcb01ff9bf49c4dbbb058423559f7bc90b89374 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Geoff Levand <geoffrey.levand@×××××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2008 13:52:54 -0700
+Subject: USB: Fix PS3 USB shutdown problems
+
+From: Geoff Levand <geoffrey.levand@×××××××.com>
+
+commit ddcb01ff9bf49c4dbbb058423559f7bc90b89374 upstream.
+
+Add ehci_shutdown() or ohci_shutdown() calls to the USB
+PS3 bus glue.  ehci_shutdown() and ohci_shutdown() do some
+controller specific cleanups not done by usb_remove_hcd().
+
+Fixes errors on shutdown or reboot similar to these:
+
+  ps3-ehci-driver sb_07: HC died; cleaning up
+  irq 51: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option)
+
+Related bugzilla reports:
+
+  http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11819
+  http://bugzilla.terrasoftsolutions.com/show_bug.cgi?id=317
+
+Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoffrey.levand@×××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/usb/host/ehci-ps3.c |    1 +
+ drivers/usb/host/ohci-ps3.c |    3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-ps3.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-ps3.c
+@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static int ps3_ehci_remove(struct ps3_sy
+ 
+ 	tmp = hcd->irq;
+ 
++	ehci_shutdown(hcd);
+ 	usb_remove_hcd(hcd);
+ 
+ 	ps3_system_bus_set_driver_data(dev, NULL);
+--- a/drivers/usb/host/ohci-ps3.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/host/ohci-ps3.c
+@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ fail_start:
+ 	return result;
+ }
+ 
+-static int ps3_ohci_remove (struct ps3_system_bus_device *dev)
++static int ps3_ohci_remove(struct ps3_system_bus_device *dev)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int tmp;
+ 	struct usb_hcd *hcd =
+@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static int ps3_ohci_remove (struct ps3_s
+ 
+ 	tmp = hcd->irq;
+ 
++	ohci_shutdown(hcd);
+ 	usb_remove_hcd(hcd);
+ 
+ 	ps3_system_bus_set_driver_data(dev, NULL);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1422_v4l-dvb-cve-2008-5033-fix-oops-on-tvaudio-when-controlling-bass-treble.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1422_v4l-dvb-cve-2008-5033-fix-oops-on-tvaudio-when-controlling-bass-treble.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1422_v4l-dvb-cve-2008-5033-fix-oops-on-tvaudio-when-controlling-bass-treble.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 01a1a3cc1e3fbe718bd06a2a5d4d1a2d0fb4d7d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@××××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:46:59 -0300
+Subject: V4L/DVB (9624): CVE-2008-5033: fix OOPS on tvaudio when controlling bass/treble
+
+From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@××××××.com>
+
+commit 01a1a3cc1e3fbe718bd06a2a5d4d1a2d0fb4d7d9 upstream.
+
+This bug were supposed to be fixed by 5ba2f67afb02c5302b2898949ed6fc3b3d37dcf1,
+where a call to NULL happens.
+
+Not all tvaudio chips allow controlling bass/treble. So, the driver
+has a table with a flag to indicate if the chip does support it.
+
+Unfortunately, the handling of this logic were broken for a very long
+time (probably since the first module version). Due to that, an OOPS
+were generated for devices that don't support bass/treble.
+
+This were the resulting OOPS message before the patch, with debug messages
+enabled:
+
+tvaudio' 1-005b: VIDIOC_S_CTRL
+BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000
+IP: [<00000000>]
+*pde = 22fda067 *pte = 00000000
+Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
+Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_seq_device
+snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_hwdep snd soundcore tuner_simple tuner_types tea5767 tuner
+tvaudio bttv bridgebnep rfcomm l2cap bluetooth it87 hwmon_vid hwmon fuse sunrpc ipt_REJECT
+nf_conntrack_ipv4 iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack
+ip6table_filter ip6_tables x_tables ipv6 dm_mirrordm_multipath dm_mod configfs videodev v4l1_compat
+ir_common 8139cp compat_ioctl32 v4l2_common 8139too videobuf_dma_sg videobuf_core mii btcx_risc tveeprom
+i915 button snd_page_alloc serio_raw drm pcspkr i2c_algo_bit i2c_i801 i2c_core iTCO_wdt
+iTCO_vendor_support sr_mod cdrom sg ata_generic pata_acpi ata_piix libata sd_mod scsi_mod ext3 jbdmbcache
+uhci_hcd ohci_hcd ehci_hcd [last unloaded: soundcore]
+
+Pid: 15413, comm: qv4l2 Not tainted (2.6.25.14-108.fc9.i686 #1)
+EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0
+EIP is at 0x0
+EAX: 00008000 EBX: ebd21600 ECX: e2fd9ec4 EDX: 00200046
+ESI: f8c0f0c4 EDI: f8c0f0c4 EBP: e2fd9d50 ESP: e2fd9d2c
+ DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
+Process qv4l2 (pid: 15413, ti=e2fd9000 task=ebe44000 task.ti=e2fd9000)
+Stack: f8c0c6ae e2ff2a00 00000d00 e2fd9ec4 ebc4e000 e2fd9d5c f8c0c448 00000000
+       f899c12a e2fd9d5c f899c154 e2fd9d68 e2fd9d80 c0560185 e2fd9d88 f8f3e1d8
+       f8f3e1dc ebc4e034 f8f3e18c e2fd9ec4 00000000 e2fd9d90 f899c286 c008561c
+Call Trace:
+ [<f8c0c6ae>] ? chip_command+0x266/0x4b6 [tvaudio]
+ [<f8c0c448>] ? chip_command+0x0/0x4b6 [tvaudio]
+ [<f899c12a>] ? i2c_cmd+0x0/0x2f [i2c_core]
+ [<f899c154>] ? i2c_cmd+0x2a/0x2f [i2c_core]
+ [<c0560185>] ? device_for_each_child+0x21/0x49
+ [<f899c286>] ? i2c_clients_command+0x1c/0x1e [i2c_core]
+ [<f8f283d8>] ? bttv_call_i2c_clients+0x14/0x16 [bttv]
+ [<f8f23601>] ? bttv_s_ctrl+0x1bc/0x313 [bttv]
+ [<f8f23445>] ? bttv_s_ctrl+0x0/0x313 [bttv]
+ [<f8b6096d>] ? __video_do_ioctl+0x1f84/0x3726 [videodev]
+ [<c05abb4e>] ? sock_aio_write+0x100/0x10d
+ [<c041b23e>] ? kmap_atomic_prot+0x1dd/0x1df
+ [<c043a0c9>] ? enqueue_hrtimer+0xc2/0xcd
+ [<c04f4fa4>] ? copy_from_user+0x39/0x121
+ [<f8b622b9>] ? __video_ioctl2+0x1aa/0x24a [videodev]
+ [<c04054fd>] ? do_notify_resume+0x768/0x795
+ [<c043c0f7>] ? getnstimeofday+0x34/0xd1
+ [<c0437b77>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x33
+ [<f8b62368>] ? video_ioctl2+0xf/0x13 [videodev]
+ [<c048c6f0>] ? vfs_ioctl+0x50/0x69
+ [<c048c942>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x239/0x24c
+ [<c048c995>] ? sys_ioctl+0x40/0x5b
+ [<c0405bf2>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb
+ [<c0620000>] ? cpuid4_cache_sysfs_exit+0x3d/0x69
+ =======================
+Code:  Bad EIP value.
+EIP: [<00000000>] 0x0 SS:ESP 0068:e2fd9d2c
+
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c |   15 +++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c
++++ b/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c
+@@ -1576,13 +1576,13 @@ static int tvaudio_get_ctrl(struct CHIPS
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	case V4L2_CID_AUDIO_BASS:
+-		if (desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE)
++		if (!(desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE))
+ 			break;
+ 		ctrl->value = chip->bass;
+ 		return 0;
+ 	case V4L2_CID_AUDIO_TREBLE:
+-		if (desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE)
+-			return -EINVAL;
++		if (!(desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE))
++			break;
+ 		ctrl->value = chip->treble;
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1642,16 +1642,15 @@ static int tvaudio_set_ctrl(struct CHIPS
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	case V4L2_CID_AUDIO_BASS:
+-		if (desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE)
++		if (!(desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE))
+ 			break;
+ 		chip->bass = ctrl->value;
+ 		chip_write(chip,desc->bassreg,desc->bassfunc(chip->bass));
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	case V4L2_CID_AUDIO_TREBLE:
+-		if (desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE)
+-			return -EINVAL;
+-
++		if (!(desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE))
++			break;
+ 		chip->treble = ctrl->value;
+ 		chip_write(chip,desc->treblereg,desc->treblefunc(chip->treble));
+ 
+@@ -1695,7 +1694,7 @@ static int chip_command(struct i2c_clien
+ 				break;
+ 			case V4L2_CID_AUDIO_BASS:
+ 			case V4L2_CID_AUDIO_TREBLE:
+-				if (desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE)
++				if (!(desc->flags & CHIP_HAS_BASSTREBLE))
+ 					return -EINVAL;
+ 				break;
+ 			default:

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1423_net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1423_net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1423_net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 5f23b734963ec7eaa3ebcd9050da0c9b7d143dd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: dann frazier <dannf@××.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2008 15:32:27 -0800
+Subject: net: Fix soft lockups/OOM issues w/ unix garbage collector (CVE-2008-5300)
+
+From: dann frazier <dannf@××.com>
+
+commit 5f23b734963ec7eaa3ebcd9050da0c9b7d143dd3 upstream.
+
+This is an implementation of David Miller's suggested fix in:
+  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=470201
+
+It has been updated to use wait_event() instead of
+wait_event_interruptible().
+
+Paraphrasing the description from the above report, it makes sendmsg()
+block while UNIX garbage collection is in progress. This avoids a
+situation where child processes continue to queue new FDs over a
+AF_UNIX socket to a parent which is in the exit path and running
+garbage collection on these FDs. This contention can result in soft
+lockups and oom-killing of unrelated processes.
+
+Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dannf@××.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@×××××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+---
+
+--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
++++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ extern void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
+ extern void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
+ extern void unix_gc(void);
++extern void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
+ 
+ #define UNIX_HASH_SIZE	256
+ 
+--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
++++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
+@@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kio
+ 
+ 	if (NULL == siocb->scm)
+ 		siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
++	wait_for_unix_gc();
+ 	err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		return err;
+@@ -1491,6 +1492,7 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct ki
+ 
+ 	if (NULL == siocb->scm)
+ 		siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
++	wait_for_unix_gc();
+ 	err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		return err;
+--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
++++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/mutex.h>
++#include <linux/wait.h>
+ 
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/af_unix.h>
+@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@
+ static LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list);
+ static LIST_HEAD(gc_candidates);
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock);
++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(unix_gc_wait);
+ 
+ unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
+ 
+@@ -266,12 +268,16 @@ static void inc_inflight_move_tail(struc
+ 		list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_candidates);
+ }
+ 
+-/* The external entry point: unix_gc() */
++static bool gc_in_progress = false;
+ 
+-void unix_gc(void)
++void wait_for_unix_gc(void)
+ {
+-	static bool gc_in_progress = false;
++	wait_event(unix_gc_wait, gc_in_progress == false);
++}
+ 
++/* The external entry point: unix_gc() */
++void unix_gc(void)
++{
+ 	struct unix_sock *u;
+ 	struct unix_sock *next;
+ 	struct sk_buff_head hitlist;
+@@ -376,6 +382,7 @@ void unix_gc(void)
+ 	/* All candidates should have been detached by now. */
+ 	BUG_ON(!list_empty(&gc_candidates));
+ 	gc_in_progress = false;
++	wake_up(&unix_gc_wait);
+ 
+  out:
+ 	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1424_atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1424_atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1424_atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 17b24b3c97498935a2ef9777370b1151dfed3f6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chas Williams <chas@××××××××××××.mil>
+Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2008 14:58:13 -0800
+Subject: ATM: CVE-2008-5079: duplicate listen() on socket corrupts the vcc table
+
+From: Chas Williams <chas@××××××××××××.mil>
+
+commit 17b24b3c97498935a2ef9777370b1151dfed3f6f upstream.
+
+As reported by Hugo Dias that it is possible to cause a local denial
+of service attack by calling the svc_listen function twice on the same
+socket and reading /proc/net/atm/*vc
+
+Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <chas@××××××××××××.mil>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@×××××××××.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+
+--- a/net/atm/svc.c
++++ b/net/atm/svc.c
+@@ -293,7 +293,10 @@ static int svc_listen(struct socket *soc
+ 		error = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	vcc_insert_socket(sk);
++	if (test_bit(ATM_VF_LISTEN, &vcc->flags)) {
++		error = -EADDRINUSE;
++		goto out;
++        }
+ 	set_bit(ATM_VF_WAITING, &vcc->flags);
+ 	prepare_to_wait(sk->sk_sleep, &wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
+ 	sigd_enq(vcc,as_listen,NULL,NULL,&vcc->local);
+@@ -307,6 +310,7 @@ static int svc_listen(struct socket *soc
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	set_bit(ATM_VF_LISTEN,&vcc->flags);
++	vcc_insert_socket(sk);
+ 	sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog > 0 ? backlog : ATM_BACKLOG_DEFAULT;
+ 	error = -sk->sk_err;
+ out:

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1425_enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1425_enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1425_enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From f2f1fa78a155524b849edf359e42a3001ea652c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2008 14:49:18 -0800
+Subject: Enforce a minimum SG_IO timeout
+
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+
+commit f2f1fa78a155524b849edf359e42a3001ea652c0 upstream.
+
+There's no point in having too short SG_IO timeouts, since if the
+command does end up timing out, we'll end up through the reset sequence
+that is several seconds long in order to abort the command that timed
+out.
+
+As a result, shorter timeouts than a few seconds simply do not make
+sense, as the recovery would be longer than the timeout itself.
+
+Add a BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT to match the existign BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT.
+
+Suggested-by: Alan Cox <alan@××××××××××××××××.uk>
+Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@××××××.org>
+Acked-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@××××××.com>
+Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+
+--- a/block/bsg.c
++++ b/block/bsg.c
+@@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ static int blk_fill_sgv4_hdr_rq(struct r
+ 		rq->timeout = q->sg_timeout;
+ 	if (!rq->timeout)
+ 		rq->timeout = BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT;
++	if (rq->timeout < BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT)
++		rq->timeout = BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT;
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+--- a/block/scsi_ioctl.c
++++ b/block/scsi_ioctl.c
+@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ static int blk_fill_sghdr_rq(struct requ
+ 		rq->timeout = q->sg_timeout;
+ 	if (!rq->timeout)
+ 		rq->timeout = BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT;
++	if (rq->timeout < BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT)
++		rq->timeout = BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT;
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+--- a/include/linux/blkdev.h
++++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h
+@@ -623,6 +623,7 @@ extern unsigned long blk_max_low_pfn, bl
+  * default timeout for SG_IO if none specified
+  */
+ #define BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT	(60 * HZ)
++#define BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT	(7 * HZ)
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_BOUNCE
+ extern int init_emergency_isa_pool(void);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1503_hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1503_hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1503_hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From 649f1ee6c705aab644035a7998d7b574193a598a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2008 22:04:10 -0700
+Subject: hfsplus: check read_mapping_page() return value
+
+From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+
+While testing more corrupted images with hfsplus, i came across
+one which triggered the following bug:
+
+[15840.675016] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffb
+[15840.675016] IP: [<c0116a4f>] kmap+0x15/0x56
+[15840.675016] *pde = 00008067 *pte = 00000000
+[15840.675016] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
+[15840.675016] Modules linked in:
+[15840.675016]
+[15840.675016] Pid: 11575, comm: ln Not tainted (2.6.27-rc4-00123-gd3ee1b4-dirty #29)
+[15840.675016] EIP: 0060:[<c0116a4f>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0
+[15840.675016] EIP is at kmap+0x15/0x56
+[15840.675016] EAX: 00000246 EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00000000 EDX: cab919c0
+[15840.675016] ESI: 000007dd EDI: cab0bcf4 EBP: cab0bc98 ESP: cab0bc94
+[15840.675016]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
+[15840.675016] Process ln (pid: 11575, ti=cab0b000 task=cab919c0 task.ti=cab0b000)
+[15840.675016] Stack: 00000000 cab0bcdc c0231cfb 00000000 cab0bce0 00000800 ca9290c0 fffffffb
+[15840.675016]        cab145d0 cab919c0 cab15998 22222222 22222222 22222222 00000001 cab15960
+[15840.675016]        000007dd cab0bcf4 cab0bd04 c022cb3a cab0bcf4 cab15a6c ca9290c0 00000000
+[15840.675016] Call Trace:
+[15840.675016]  [<c0231cfb>] ? hfsplus_block_allocate+0x6f/0x2d3
+[15840.675016]  [<c022cb3a>] ? hfsplus_file_extend+0xc4/0x1db
+[15840.675016]  [<c022ce41>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x8c/0x19d
+[15840.675016]  [<c06adde4>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x9d/0xab
+[15840.675016]  [<c019ece6>] ? __block_prepare_write+0x147/0x311
+[15840.675016]  [<c0161934>] ? __grab_cache_page+0x52/0x73
+[15840.675016]  [<c019ef4f>] ? block_write_begin+0x79/0xd5
+[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
+[15840.675016]  [<c019f22a>] ? cont_write_begin+0x27f/0x2af
+[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
+[15840.675016]  [<c0139ebe>] ? tick_program_event+0x28/0x4c
+[15840.675016]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[15840.675016]  [<c022b723>] ? hfsplus_write_begin+0x2d/0x32
+[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
+[15840.675016]  [<c0161988>] ? pagecache_write_begin+0x33/0x107
+[15840.675016]  [<c01879e5>] ? __page_symlink+0x3c/0xae
+[15840.675016]  [<c019ad34>] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x12f/0x137
+[15840.675016]  [<c0187a70>] ? page_symlink+0x19/0x1e
+[15840.675016]  [<c022e6eb>] ? hfsplus_symlink+0x41/0xa6
+[15840.675016]  [<c01886a9>] ? vfs_symlink+0x99/0x101
+[15840.675016]  [<c018a2f6>] ? sys_symlinkat+0x6b/0xad
+[15840.675016]  [<c018a348>] ? sys_symlink+0x10/0x12
+[15840.675016]  [<c01038bd>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x31
+[15840.675016]  =======================
+[15840.675016] Code: 00 00 75 10 83 3d 88 2f ec c0 02 75 07 89 d0 e8 12 56 05 00 5d c3 55 ba 06 00 00 00 89 e5 53 89 c3 b8 3d eb 7e c0 e8 16 74 00 00 <8b> 03 c1 e8 1e 69 c0 d8 02 00 00 05 b8 69 8e c0 2b 80 c4 02 00
+[15840.675016] EIP: [<c0116a4f>] kmap+0x15/0x56 SS:ESP 0068:cab0bc94
+[15840.675016] ---[ end trace 4fea40dad6b70e5f ]---
+
+This happens because the return value of read_mapping_page() is passed on
+to kmap unchecked.  The bug is triggered after the first
+read_mapping_page() in hfsplus_block_allocate(), this patch fixes all
+three usages in this functions but leaves the ones further down in the
+file unchanged.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ fs/hfsplus/bitmap.c |   12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/hfsplus/bitmap.c
++++ b/fs/hfsplus/bitmap.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ int hfsplus_block_allocate(struct super_
+ 	mutex_lock(&HFSPLUS_SB(sb).alloc_file->i_mutex);
+ 	mapping = HFSPLUS_SB(sb).alloc_file->i_mapping;
+ 	page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS, NULL);
++	if (IS_ERR(page)) {
++		start = size;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	pptr = kmap(page);
+ 	curr = pptr + (offset & (PAGE_CACHE_BITS - 1)) / 32;
+ 	i = offset % 32;
+@@ -73,6 +77,10 @@ int hfsplus_block_allocate(struct super_
+ 			break;
+ 		page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS,
+ 					 NULL);
++		if (IS_ERR(page)) {
++			start = size;
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		curr = pptr = kmap(page);
+ 		if ((size ^ offset) / PAGE_CACHE_BITS)
+ 			end = pptr + PAGE_CACHE_BITS / 32;
+@@ -120,6 +128,10 @@ found:
+ 		offset += PAGE_CACHE_BITS;
+ 		page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS,
+ 					 NULL);
++		if (IS_ERR(page)) {
++			start = size;
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		pptr = kmap(page);
+ 		curr = pptr;
+ 		end = pptr + PAGE_CACHE_BITS / 32;

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1504_hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1504_hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1504_hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From efc7ffcb4237f8cb9938909041c4ed38f6e1bf40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2008 22:04:08 -0700
+Subject: hfsplus: fix Buffer overflow with a corrupted image
+
+From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+
+commit efc7ffcb4237f8cb9938909041c4ed38f6e1bf40 upstream
+
+When an hfsplus image gets corrupted it might happen that the catalog
+namelength field gets b0rked.  If we mount such an image the memcpy() in
+hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() writes more than the 255 that fit in the name
+field.  Depending on the size of the overwritten data, we either only get
+memory corruption or also trigger an oops like this:
+
+[  221.628020] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at c82b0000
+[  221.629066] IP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
+[  221.629066] *pde = 0ea29163 *pte = 082b0160
+[  221.629066] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
+[  221.629066] Modules linked in:
+[  221.629066]
+[  221.629066] Pid: 4845, comm: mount Not tainted (2.6.27-rc4-00123-gd3ee1b4-dirty #28)
+[  221.629066] EIP: 0060:[<c022d4b1>] EFLAGS: 00010206 CPU: 0
+[  221.629066] EIP is at hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
+[  221.629066] EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00016210 ECX: 000042c2 EDX: 00000002
+[  221.629066] ESI: c82d70ca EDI: c82b0000 EBP: c82d1bcc ESP: c82d199c
+[  221.629066]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
+[  221.629066] Process mount (pid: 4845, ti=c82d1000 task=c8224060 task.ti=c82d1000)
+[  221.629066] Stack: c080b3c4 c82aa8f8 c82d19c2 00016210 c080b3be c82d1bd4 c82aa8f0 00000300
+[  221.629066]        01000000 750008b1 74006e00 74006900 65006c00 c82d6400 c013bd35 c8224060
+[  221.629066]        00000036 00000046 c82d19f0 00000082 c8224548 c8224060 00000036 c0d653cc
+[  221.629066] Call Trace:
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
+[  221.629066]  [<c01302d2>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x1b/0x27
+[  221.629066]  [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
+[  221.629066]  [<c0109e32>] ? save_stack_address+0x0/0x2c
+[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
+[  221.629066]  [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
+[  221.629066]  [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
+[  221.629066]  [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
+[  221.629066]  [<c013553d>] ? down+0xc/0x2f
+[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
+[  221.629066]  [<c013da5d>] ? mark_held_locks+0x43/0x5a
+[  221.629066]  [<c013dc3a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
+[  221.629066]  [<c06abec8>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x58
+[  221.629066]  [<c013555c>] ? down+0x2b/0x2f
+[  221.629066]  [<c022aa68>] ? hfsplus_iget+0xa0/0x154
+[  221.629066]  [<c022b0b9>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x280/0x447
+[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
+[  221.629066]  [<c041c9e4>] ? string+0x2b/0x74
+[  221.629066]  [<c041cd16>] ? vsnprintf+0x2e9/0x512
+[  221.629066]  [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
+[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
+[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
+[  221.629066]  [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
+[  221.629066]  [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
+[  221.629066]  [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
+[  221.629066]  [<c01354d3>] ? up+0xc/0x2f
+[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
+[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
+[  221.629066]  [<c041cfb7>] ? snprintf+0x1b/0x1d
+[  221.629066]  [<c01ba466>] ? disk_name+0x25/0x67
+[  221.629066]  [<c0183960>] ? get_sb_bdev+0xcd/0x10b
+[  221.629066]  [<c016ad92>] ? kstrdup+0x2a/0x4c
+[  221.629066]  [<c022a7b3>] ? hfsplus_get_sb+0x13/0x15
+[  221.629066]  [<c022ae39>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x0/0x447
+[  221.629066]  [<c0183583>] ? vfs_kern_mount+0x3b/0x76
+[  221.629066]  [<c0183602>] ? do_kern_mount+0x32/0xba
+[  221.629066]  [<c01960d4>] ? do_new_mount+0x46/0x74
+[  221.629066]  [<c0196277>] ? do_mount+0x175/0x193
+[  221.629066]  [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
+[  221.629066]  [<c01663b2>] ? __get_free_pages+0x1e/0x24
+[  221.629066]  [<c06ac07b>] ? lock_kernel+0x19/0x8c
+[  221.629066]  [<c01962e6>] ? sys_mount+0x51/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c01962f9>] ? sys_mount+0x64/0x9b
+[  221.629066]  [<c01038bd>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x31
+[  221.629066]  =======================
+[  221.629066] Code: 89 c2 c1 e2 08 c1 e8 08 09 c2 8b 85 e8 fd ff ff 66 89 50 06 89 c7 53 83 c7 08 56 57 68 c4 b3 80 c0 e8 8c 5c ef ff 89 d9 c1 e9 02 <f3> a5 89 d9 83 e1 03 74 02 f3 a4 83 c3 06 8b 95 e8 fd ff ff 0f
+[  221.629066] EIP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151 SS:ESP 0068:c82d199c
+[  221.629066] ---[ end trace e417a1d67f0d0066 ]---
+
+Since hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() returns void and only has one callsite,
+the check is performed at the callsite.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@×××××××××××.fi>
+Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ fs/hfsplus/catalog.c |    5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c
++++ b/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c
+@@ -168,6 +168,11 @@ int hfsplus_find_cat(struct super_block 
+ 		return -EIO;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (be16_to_cpu(tmp.thread.nodeName.length) > 255) {
++		printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: catalog name length corrupted\n");
++		return -EIO;
++	}
++
+ 	hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni(fd->search_key, be32_to_cpu(tmp.thread.parentID),
+ 				 &tmp.thread.nodeName);
+ 	return hfs_brec_find(fd);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1505_hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1505_hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1505_hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+---
+
+From d38b7aa7fc3371b52d036748028db50b585ade2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2008 22:04:11 -0700
+Subject: hfs: fix namelength memory corruption (CVE-2008-5025)
+
+From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+
+commit d38b7aa7fc3371b52d036748028db50b585ade2e upstream
+
+Fix a stack corruption caused by a corrupted hfs filesystem.  If the
+catalog name length is corrupted the memcpy overwrites the catalog btree
+structure.  Since the field is limited to HFS_NAMELEN bytes in the
+structure and the file format, we throw an error if it is too long.
+
+Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@×××.de>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@××××.de>
+
+---
+ fs/hfs/catalog.c |    4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/hfs/catalog.c
++++ b/fs/hfs/catalog.c
+@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ int hfs_cat_find_brec(struct super_block
+ 
+ 	fd->search_key->cat.ParID = rec.thread.ParID;
+ 	len = fd->search_key->cat.CName.len = rec.thread.CName.len;
++	if (len > HFS_NAMELEN) {
++		printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: bad catalog namelength\n");
++		return -EIO;
++	}
+ 	memcpy(fd->search_key->cat.CName.name, rec.thread.CName.name, len);
+ 	return hfs_brec_find(fd);
+ }

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1506_inotify-fix-watch-removal-or-umount-races.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1506_inotify-fix-watch-removal-or-umount-races.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1506_inotify-fix-watch-removal-or-umount-races.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Modified slightly to eliminate patch fuzz.
+
+---
+
+From: Al Viro <viro@×××××××××××××××.uk>
+Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2008 01:15:43 +0000 (+0000)
+Subject: Fix inotify watch removal/umount races
+X-Git-Tag: v2.6.28-rc5~1
+X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=8f7b0ba1c853919b85b54774775f567f30006107
+
+Fix inotify watch removal/umount races
+
+Inotify watch removals suck violently.
+
+To kick the watch out we need (in this order) inode->inotify_mutex and
+ih->mutex.  That's fine if we have a hold on inode; however, for all
+other cases we need to make damn sure we don't race with umount.  We can
+*NOT* just grab a reference to a watch - inotify_unmount_inodes() will
+happily sail past it and we'll end with reference to inode potentially
+outliving its superblock.
+
+Ideally we just want to grab an active reference to superblock if we
+can; that will make sure we won't go into inotify_umount_inodes() until
+we are done.  Cleanup is just deactivate_super().
+
+However, that leaves a messy case - what if we *are* racing with
+umount() and active references to superblock can't be acquired anymore?
+We can bump ->s_count, grab ->s_umount, which will almost certainly wait
+until the superblock is shut down and the watch in question is pining
+for fjords.  That's fine, but there is a problem - we might have hit the
+window between ->s_active getting to 0 / ->s_count - below S_BIAS (i.e.
+the moment when superblock is past the point of no return and is heading
+for shutdown) and the moment when deactivate_super() acquires
+->s_umount.
+
+We could just do drop_super() yield() and retry, but that's rather
+antisocial and this stuff is luser-triggerable.  OTOH, having grabbed
+->s_umount and having found that we'd got there first (i.e.  that
+->s_root is non-NULL) we know that we won't race with
+inotify_umount_inodes().
+
+So we could grab a reference to watch and do the rest as above, just
+with drop_super() instead of deactivate_super(), right? Wrong.  We had
+to drop ih->mutex before we could grab ->s_umount.  So the watch
+could've been gone already.
+
+That still can be dealt with - we need to save watch->wd, do idr_find()
+and compare its result with our pointer.  If they match, we either have
+the damn thing still alive or we'd lost not one but two races at once,
+the watch had been killed and a new one got created with the same ->wd
+at the same address.  That couldn't have happened in inotify_destroy(),
+but inotify_rm_wd() could run into that.  Still, "new one got created"
+is not a problem - we have every right to kill it or leave it alone,
+whatever's more convenient.
+
+So we can use idr_find(...) == watch && watch->inode->i_sb == sb as
+"grab it and kill it" check.  If it's been our original watch, we are
+fine, if it's a newcomer - nevermind, just pretend that we'd won the
+race and kill the fscker anyway; we are safe since we know that its
+superblock won't be going away.
+
+And yes, this is far beyond mere "not very pretty"; so's the entire
+concept of inotify to start with.
+
+Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@×××××××××××××××.uk>
+Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@×××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@××××××××××××××××.org>
+---
+
+--- a/fs/inotify.c
++++ b/fs/inotify.c
+@@ -106,6 +106,20 @@ void get_inotify_watch(struct inotify_wa
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_inotify_watch);
+ 
++int pin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
++{
++	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
++	spin_lock(&sb_lock);
++	if (sb->s_count >= S_BIAS) {
++		atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
++		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
++		atomic_inc(&watch->count);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /**
+  * put_inotify_watch - decrements the ref count on a given watch.  cleans up
+  * watch references if the count reaches zero.  inotify_watch is freed by
+@@ -124,6 +138,13 @@ void put_inotify_watch(struct inotify_wa
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(put_inotify_watch);
+ 
++void unpin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
++{
++	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
++	put_inotify_watch(watch);
++	deactivate_super(sb);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * inotify_handle_get_wd - returns the next WD for use by the given handle
+  *
+@@ -479,6 +500,112 @@ void inotify_init_watch(struct inotify_w
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inotify_init_watch);
+ 
++/*
++ * Watch removals suck violently.  To kick the watch out we need (in this
++ * order) inode->inotify_mutex and ih->mutex.  That's fine if we have
++ * a hold on inode; however, for all other cases we need to make damn sure
++ * we don't race with umount.  We can *NOT* just grab a reference to a
++ * watch - inotify_unmount_inodes() will happily sail past it and we'll end
++ * with reference to inode potentially outliving its superblock.  Ideally
++ * we just want to grab an active reference to superblock if we can; that
++ * will make sure we won't go into inotify_umount_inodes() until we are
++ * done.  Cleanup is just deactivate_super().  However, that leaves a messy
++ * case - what if we *are* racing with umount() and active references to
++ * superblock can't be acquired anymore?  We can bump ->s_count, grab
++ * ->s_umount, which will almost certainly wait until the superblock is shut
++ * down and the watch in question is pining for fjords.  That's fine, but
++ * there is a problem - we might have hit the window between ->s_active
++ * getting to 0 / ->s_count - below S_BIAS (i.e. the moment when superblock
++ * is past the point of no return and is heading for shutdown) and the
++ * moment when deactivate_super() acquires ->s_umount.  We could just do
++ * drop_super() yield() and retry, but that's rather antisocial and this
++ * stuff is luser-triggerable.  OTOH, having grabbed ->s_umount and having
++ * found that we'd got there first (i.e. that ->s_root is non-NULL) we know
++ * that we won't race with inotify_umount_inodes().  So we could grab a
++ * reference to watch and do the rest as above, just with drop_super() instead
++ * of deactivate_super(), right?  Wrong.  We had to drop ih->mutex before we
++ * could grab ->s_umount.  So the watch could've been gone already.
++ *
++ * That still can be dealt with - we need to save watch->wd, do idr_find()
++ * and compare its result with our pointer.  If they match, we either have
++ * the damn thing still alive or we'd lost not one but two races at once,
++ * the watch had been killed and a new one got created with the same ->wd
++ * at the same address.  That couldn't have happened in inotify_destroy(),
++ * but inotify_rm_wd() could run into that.  Still, "new one got created"
++ * is not a problem - we have every right to kill it or leave it alone,
++ * whatever's more convenient.
++ *
++ * So we can use idr_find(...) == watch && watch->inode->i_sb == sb as
++ * "grab it and kill it" check.  If it's been our original watch, we are
++ * fine, if it's a newcomer - nevermind, just pretend that we'd won the
++ * race and kill the fscker anyway; we are safe since we know that its
++ * superblock won't be going away.
++ *
++ * And yes, this is far beyond mere "not very pretty"; so's the entire
++ * concept of inotify to start with.
++ */
++
++/**
++ * pin_to_kill - pin the watch down for removal
++ * @ih: inotify handle
++ * @watch: watch to kill
++ *
++ * Called with ih->mutex held, drops it.  Possible return values:
++ * 0 - nothing to do, it has died
++ * 1 - remove it, drop the reference and deactivate_super()
++ * 2 - remove it, drop the reference and drop_super(); we tried hard to avoid
++ * that variant, since it involved a lot of PITA, but that's the best that
++ * could've been done.
++ */
++static int pin_to_kill(struct inotify_handle *ih, struct inotify_watch *watch)
++{
++	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
++	s32 wd = watch->wd;
++
++	spin_lock(&sb_lock);
++	if (sb->s_count >= S_BIAS) {
++		atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
++		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
++		get_inotify_watch(watch);
++		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
++		return 1;	/* the best outcome */
++	}
++	sb->s_count++;
++	spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
++	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex); /* can't grab ->s_umount under it */
++	down_read(&sb->s_umount);
++	if (likely(!sb->s_root)) {
++		/* fs is already shut down; the watch is dead */
++		drop_super(sb);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* raced with the final deactivate_super() */
++	mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
++	if (idr_find(&ih->idr, wd) != watch || watch->inode->i_sb != sb) {
++		/* the watch is dead */
++		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
++		drop_super(sb);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* still alive or freed and reused with the same sb and wd; kill */
++	get_inotify_watch(watch);
++	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
++	return 2;
++}
++
++static void unpin_and_kill(struct inotify_watch *watch, int how)
++{
++	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
++	put_inotify_watch(watch);
++	switch (how) {
++	case 1:
++		deactivate_super(sb);
++		break;
++	case 2:
++		drop_super(sb);
++	}
++}
++
+ /**
+  * inotify_destroy - clean up and destroy an inotify instance
+  * @ih: inotify handle
+@@ -490,11 +617,15 @@ void inotify_destroy(struct inotify_hand
+ 	 * pretty.  We cannot do a simple iteration over the list, because we
+ 	 * do not know the inode until we iterate to the watch.  But we need to
+ 	 * hold inode->inotify_mutex before ih->mutex.  The following works.
++	 *
++	 * AV: it had to become even uglier to start working ;-/
+ 	 */
+ 	while (1) {
+ 		struct inotify_watch *watch;
+ 		struct list_head *watches;
++		struct super_block *sb;
+ 		struct inode *inode;
++		int how;
+ 
+ 		mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
+ 		watches = &ih->watches;
+@@ -503,8 +634,10 @@ void inotify_destroy(struct inotify_hand
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		watch = list_first_entry(watches, struct inotify_watch, h_list);
+-		get_inotify_watch(watch);
+-		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
++		sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
++		how = pin_to_kill(ih, watch);
++		if (!how)
++			continue;
+ 
+ 		inode = watch->inode;
+ 		mutex_lock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
+@@ -518,7 +651,7 @@ void inotify_destroy(struct inotify_hand
+ 
+ 		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+ 		mutex_unlock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
+-		put_inotify_watch(watch);
++		unpin_and_kill(watch, how);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* free this handle: the put matching the get in inotify_init() */
+@@ -719,7 +852,9 @@ void inotify_evict_watch(struct inotify_
+ int inotify_rm_wd(struct inotify_handle *ih, u32 wd)
+ {
+ 	struct inotify_watch *watch;
++	struct super_block *sb;
+ 	struct inode *inode;
++	int how;
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
+ 	watch = idr_find(&ih->idr, wd);
+@@ -727,9 +862,12 @@ int inotify_rm_wd(struct inotify_handle 
+ 		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+-	get_inotify_watch(watch);
++	sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
++	how = pin_to_kill(ih, watch);
++	if (!how)
++		return 0;
++
+ 	inode = watch->inode;
+-	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
+ 	mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
+@@ -740,7 +878,7 @@ int inotify_rm_wd(struct inotify_handle 
+ 
+ 	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+ 	mutex_unlock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
+-	put_inotify_watch(watch);
++	unpin_and_kill(watch, how);
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+--- a/include/linux/inotify.h
++++ b/include/linux/inotify.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ extern void inotify_remove_watch_locked(
+ 					struct inotify_watch *);
+ extern void get_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
+ extern void put_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
++extern int pin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
++extern void unpin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
+ 
+ #else
+ 
+@@ -222,6 +224,15 @@ static inline void put_inotify_watch(str
+ {
+ }
+ 
++extern inline int pin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++extern inline void unpin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
++{
++}
++
+ #endif	/* CONFIG_INOTIFY */
+ 
+ #endif	/* __KERNEL __ */
+--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
++++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct audit_chunk {
+ 	struct list_head trees;		/* with root here */
+ 	int dead;
+ 	int count;
++	atomic_long_t refs;
+ 	struct rcu_head head;
+ 	struct node {
+ 		struct list_head list;
+@@ -56,7 +57,8 @@ static LIST_HEAD(prune_list);
+  * tree is refcounted; one reference for "some rules on rules_list refer to
+  * it", one for each chunk with pointer to it.
+  *
+- * chunk is refcounted by embedded inotify_watch.
++ * chunk is refcounted by embedded inotify_watch + .refs (non-zero refcount
++ * of watch contributes 1 to .refs).
+  *
+  * node.index allows to get from node.list to containing chunk.
+  * MSB of that sucker is stolen to mark taggings that we might have to
+@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ static struct audit_chunk *alloc_chunk(i
+ 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->hash);
+ 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->trees);
+ 	chunk->count = count;
++	atomic_long_set(&chunk->refs, 1);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->owners[i].list);
+ 		chunk->owners[i].index = i;
+@@ -129,9 +132,8 @@ static struct audit_chunk *alloc_chunk(i
+ 	return chunk;
+ }
+ 
+-static void __free_chunk(struct rcu_head *rcu)
++static void free_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+ {
+-	struct audit_chunk *chunk = container_of(rcu, struct audit_chunk, head);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < chunk->count; i++) {
+@@ -141,14 +143,16 @@ static void __free_chunk(struct rcu_head
+ 	kfree(chunk);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline void free_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
++void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+ {
+-	call_rcu(&chunk->head, __free_chunk);
++	if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&chunk->refs))
++		free_chunk(chunk);
+ }
+ 
+-void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
++static void __put_chunk(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+ {
+-	put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
++	struct audit_chunk *chunk = container_of(rcu, struct audit_chunk, head);
++	audit_put_chunk(chunk);
+ }
+ 
+ enum {HASH_SIZE = 128};
+@@ -177,7 +181,7 @@ struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(co
+ 	list_for_each_rcu(pos, list) {
+ 		struct audit_chunk *p = container_of(pos, struct audit_chunk, hash);
+ 		if (p->watch.inode == inode) {
+-			get_inotify_watch(&p->watch);
++			atomic_long_inc(&p->refs);
+ 			return p;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+@@ -195,17 +199,49 @@ int audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk 
+ 
+ /* tagging and untagging inodes with trees */
+ 
+-static void untag_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk, struct node *p)
++static struct audit_chunk *find_chunk(struct node *p)
++{
++	int index = p->index & ~(1U<<31);
++	p -= index;
++	return container_of(p, struct audit_chunk, owners[0]);
++}
++
++static void untag_chunk(struct node *p)
+ {
++	struct audit_chunk *chunk = find_chunk(p);
+ 	struct audit_chunk *new;
+ 	struct audit_tree *owner;
+ 	int size = chunk->count - 1;
+ 	int i, j;
+ 
++	if (!pin_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch)) {
++		/*
++		 * Filesystem is shutting down; all watches are getting
++		 * evicted, just take it off the node list for this
++		 * tree and let the eviction logics take care of the
++		 * rest.
++		 */
++		owner = p->owner;
++		if (owner->root == chunk) {
++			list_del_init(&owner->same_root);
++			owner->root = NULL;
++		}
++		list_del_init(&p->list);
++		p->owner = NULL;
++		put_tree(owner);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
++
++	/*
++	 * pin_inotify_watch() succeeded, so the watch won't go away
++	 * from under us.
++	 */
+ 	mutex_lock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
+ 	if (chunk->dead) {
+ 		mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
+-		return;
++		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	owner = p->owner;
+@@ -222,7 +258,7 @@ static void untag_chunk(struct audit_chu
+ 		inotify_evict_watch(&chunk->watch);
+ 		mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
+ 		put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+-		return;
++		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	new = alloc_chunk(size);
+@@ -264,7 +300,7 @@ static void untag_chunk(struct audit_chu
+ 	inotify_evict_watch(&chunk->watch);
+ 	mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
+ 	put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+-	return;
++	goto out;
+ 
+ Fallback:
+ 	// do the best we can
+@@ -278,6 +314,9 @@ Fallback:
+ 	put_tree(owner);
+ 	spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
+ 	mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
++out:
++	unpin_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
++	spin_lock(&hash_lock);
+ }
+ 
+ static int create_chunk(struct inode *inode, struct audit_tree *tree)
+@@ -388,13 +427,6 @@ static int tag_chunk(struct inode *inode
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static struct audit_chunk *find_chunk(struct node *p)
+-{
+-	int index = p->index & ~(1U<<31);
+-	p -= index;
+-	return container_of(p, struct audit_chunk, owners[0]);
+-}
+-
+ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
+ {
+ 	struct audit_krule *rule, *next;
+@@ -432,17 +464,10 @@ static void prune_one(struct audit_tree 
+ 	spin_lock(&hash_lock);
+ 	while (!list_empty(&victim->chunks)) {
+ 		struct node *p;
+-		struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+ 
+ 		p = list_entry(victim->chunks.next, struct node, list);
+-		chunk = find_chunk(p);
+-		get_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+-		spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
+-
+-		untag_chunk(chunk, p);
+ 
+-		put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+-		spin_lock(&hash_lock);
++		untag_chunk(p);
+ 	}
+ 	spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
+ 	put_tree(victim);
+@@ -470,7 +495,6 @@ static void trim_marked(struct audit_tre
+ 
+ 	while (!list_empty(&tree->chunks)) {
+ 		struct node *node;
+-		struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+ 
+ 		node = list_entry(tree->chunks.next, struct node, list);
+ 
+@@ -478,14 +502,7 @@ static void trim_marked(struct audit_tre
+ 		if (!(node->index & (1U<<31)))
+ 			break;
+ 
+-		chunk = find_chunk(node);
+-		get_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+-		spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
+-
+-		untag_chunk(chunk, node);
+-
+-		put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+-		spin_lock(&hash_lock);
++		untag_chunk(node);
+ 	}
+ 	if (!tree->root && !tree->goner) {
+ 		tree->goner = 1;
+@@ -879,7 +896,7 @@ static void handle_event(struct inotify_
+ static void destroy_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
+ {
+ 	struct audit_chunk *chunk = container_of(watch, struct audit_chunk, watch);
+-	free_chunk(chunk);
++	call_rcu(&chunk->head, __put_chunk);
+ }
+ 
+ static const struct inotify_operations rtree_inotify_ops = {
+--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
++++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+@@ -1085,8 +1085,8 @@ static void audit_inotify_unregister(str
+ 	list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, in_list, ilist) {
+ 		list_del(&p->ilist);
+ 		inotify_rm_watch(audit_ih, &p->wdata);
+-		/* the put matching the get in audit_do_del_rule() */
+-		put_inotify_watch(&p->wdata);
++		/* the unpin matching the pin in audit_do_del_rule() */
++		unpin_inotify_watch(&p->wdata);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1380,9 +1380,13 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct 
+ 				/* Put parent on the inotify un-registration
+ 				 * list.  Grab a reference before releasing
+ 				 * audit_filter_mutex, to be released in
+-				 * audit_inotify_unregister(). */
+-				list_add(&parent->ilist, &inotify_list);
+-				get_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata);
++				 * audit_inotify_unregister().
++				 * If filesystem is going away, just leave
++				 * the sucker alone, eviction will take
++				 * care of it.
++				 */
++				if (pin_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata))
++					list_add(&parent->ilist, &inotify_list);
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1507_sctp-avoid_memory_overflow_with_bad_stream_ID.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1507_sctp-avoid_memory_overflow_with_bad_stream_ID.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1507_sctp-avoid_memory_overflow_with_bad_stream_ID.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+Added-By: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Note: Re-diffed to eliminate failed hunks.
+
+---
+
+From: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@××××××××××.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2008 00:58:11 +0000 (-0800)
+Subject: sctp: Avoid memory overflow while FWD-TSN chunk is received with bad stream ID
+X-Git-Tag: v2.6.29-rc1~581^2~75
+X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=9fcb95a105758b81ef0131cd18e2db5149f13e95
+
+sctp: Avoid memory overflow while FWD-TSN chunk is received with bad stream ID
+
+If FWD-TSN chunk is received with bad stream ID, the sctp will not do the
+validity check, this may cause memory overflow when overwrite the TSN of
+the stream ID.
+
+The FORWARD-TSN chunk is like this:
+
+FORWARD-TSN chunk
+  Type                       = 192
+  Flags                      = 0
+  Length                     = 172
+  NewTSN                     = 99
+  Stream                     = 10000
+  StreamSequence             = 0xFFFF
+
+This patch fix this problem by discard the chunk if stream ID is not
+less than MIS.
+
+Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@××××××××××.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@××.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@×××××××××.net>
+---
+
+--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+@@ -3641,6 +3641,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn(c
+ {
+ 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+ 	struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr *fwdtsn_hdr;
++	struct sctp_fwdtsn_skip *skip;
+ 	__u16 len;
+ 	__u32 tsn;
+ 
+@@ -3670,6 +3671,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn(c
+ 	if (sctp_tsnmap_check(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, tsn) < 0)
+ 		goto discard_noforce;
+ 
++	/* Silently discard the chunk if stream-id is not valid */
++	sctp_walk_fwdtsn(skip, chunk) {
++		if (ntohs(skip->stream) >= asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams)
++			goto discard_noforce;
++	}
++
+ 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_FWDTSN, SCTP_U32(tsn));
+ 	if (len > sizeof(struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr))
+ 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PROCESS_FWDTSN,
+@@ -3701,6 +3708,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn_f
+ {
+ 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+ 	struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr *fwdtsn_hdr;
++	struct sctp_fwdtsn_skip *skip;
+ 	__u16 len;
+ 	__u32 tsn;
+ 
+@@ -3730,6 +3738,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn_f
+ 	if (sctp_tsnmap_check(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, tsn) < 0)
+ 		goto gen_shutdown;
+ 
++	/* Silently discard the chunk if stream-id is not valid */
++	sctp_walk_fwdtsn(skip, chunk) {
++		if (ntohs(skip->stream) >= asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams)
++			goto gen_shutdown;
++	}
++
+ 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_FWDTSN, SCTP_U32(tsn));
+ 	if (len > sizeof(struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr))
+ 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PROCESS_FWDTSN,

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1800_sched-disable-hrtick.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1800_sched-disable-hrtick.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/1800_sched-disable-hrtick.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+
+This is a backport to 2.6.25 of commit 612f39d5e7baeb0518cfe50d53e37e14c0ca1475
+from Ingo Molnar, which disables hrtick (high-resolution preemption ticks). For
+further information, please refer to Gentoo Bug #247453.
+
+--- a/kernel/sched.c	2008-04-17 03:49:44.000000000 +0100
++++ b/kernel/sched.c	2008-11-18 20:30:33.000000000 +0000
+@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@
+ 		SCHED_FEAT_NEW_FAIR_SLEEPERS	* 1 |
+ 		SCHED_FEAT_WAKEUP_PREEMPT	* 1 |
+ 		SCHED_FEAT_START_DEBIT		* 1 |
+-		SCHED_FEAT_HRTICK		* 1 |
++		SCHED_FEAT_HRTICK		* 0 |
+ 		SCHED_FEAT_DOUBLE_TICK		* 0;
+ 
+ #define sched_feat(x) (sysctl_sched_features & SCHED_FEAT_##x)

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4420_grsec-2.1.12-2.6.25.16-200808201644.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4420_grsec-2.1.12-2.6.25.16-200808201644.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4420_grsec-2.1.12-2.6.25.16-200808201644.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,35914 @@
+diff -urNp a/Documentation/dontdiff b/Documentation/dontdiff
+--- a/Documentation/dontdiff	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/Documentation/dontdiff	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+ *.bin
+ *.cpio
+ *.css
++*.dbg
+ *.dvi
+ *.eps
+ *.gif
+@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ ChangeSet
+ Image
+ Kerntypes
+ MODS.txt
++Module.markers
+ Module.symvers
+ PENDING
+ SCCS
+@@ -89,6 +91,7 @@ config_data.gz*
+ conmakehash
+ consolemap_deftbl.c*
+ crc32table.h*
++cpustr.h
+ cscope.*
+ defkeymap.c*
+ devlist.h*
+@@ -137,11 +140,13 @@ miboot*
+ mk_elfconfig
+ mkboot
+ mkbugboot
++mkcpustr
+ mkdep
+ mkprep
+ mktables
+ mktree
+ modpost
++modules.order
+ modversions.h*
+ offset.h
+ offsets.h
+@@ -172,20 +177,24 @@ sm_tbl*
+ split-include
+ tags
+ tftpboot.img
++timeconst.h
+ times.h*
+ tkparse
+ trix_boot.h
+ utsrelease.h*
+-vdso.lds
++vdso*.lds
+ version.h*
+ vmlinux
+ vmlinux-*
+ vmlinux.aout
+-vmlinux*.lds*
++vmlinux.bin.all
++vmlinux*.lds
++vmlinux.relocs
+ vmlinux*.scr
+-vsyscall.lds
++vsyscall*.lds
+ wanxlfw.inc
+ uImage
+ unifdef
++utsrelease.h
+ zImage*
+ zconf.hash.c
+diff -urNp a/Makefile b/Makefile
+--- a/Makefile	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/Makefile	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ CONFIG_SHELL := $(shell if [ -x "$$BASH"
+ 
+ HOSTCC       = gcc
+ HOSTCXX      = g++
+-HOSTCFLAGS   = -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer
++HOSTCFLAGS   = -Wall -W -Wno-unused -Wno-sign-compare -Wstrict-prototypes -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer
+ HOSTCXXFLAGS = -O2
+ 
+ # Decide whether to build built-in, modular, or both.
+@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ export mod_strip_cmd
+ 
+ 
+ ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
+-core-y		+= kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
++core-y		+= kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/ grsecurity/
+ 
+ vmlinux-dirs	:= $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \
+ 		     $(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \
+diff -urNp a/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c
+--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs, 
+ 
+ 	/* The small sections were sorted to the end of the segment.
+ 	   The following should definitely cover them.  */
+-	gp = (u64)me->module_core + me->core_size - 0x8000;
++	gp = (u64)me->module_core_rw + me->core_size_rw - 0x8000;
+ 	got = sechdrs[me->arch.gotsecindex].sh_addr;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+diff -urNp a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
+--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1288,6 +1288,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
+ 	   merely specific addresses, but regions of memory -- perhaps
+ 	   this feature should be incorporated into all ports?  */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
+ 		if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
+@@ -1295,8 +1299,8 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Next, try allocating at TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE.  */
+-	addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE),
+-					 len, limit);
++	addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(current->mm->mmap_base), len, limit);
++
+ 	if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/signal.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -266,6 +267,9 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *chi
+ 	size_t copied;
+ 	long ret;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	switch (request) {
+ 	/* When I and D space are separate, these will need to be fixed.  */
+ 	case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT: /* read word at location addr. */
+diff -urNp a/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c b/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -54,6 +55,124 @@ __load_new_mm_context(struct mm_struct *
+ 	__reload_thread(pcb);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	int err;
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int ldah, ldq, jmp;
++
++		err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x277B0000U &&
++		    (ldq & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
++		    jmp == 0x6BFB0000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long r27, addr;
++			unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
++			unsigned long addrl = ldq | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->r27 + ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
++			err = get_user(r27, (unsigned long *)addr);
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			regs->r27 = r27;
++			regs->pc = r27;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int ldah, lda, br;
++
++		err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(lda, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(br, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x277B0000U &&
++		    (lda & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
++		    (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3E00000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL;
++			unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
++			unsigned long addrl = lda | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
++
++			regs->r27 += ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
++			regs->pc += 12 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
++		unsigned int br;
++
++		err = get_user(br, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++
++		if (!err && (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3800000U) {
++			unsigned int br2, ldq, nop, jmp;
++			unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL, resolver;
++
++			addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
++			err = get_user(br2, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(resolver, (unsigned long *)(addr+16));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (br2 == 0xC3600000U &&
++			    ldq == 0xA77B000CU &&
++			    nop == 0x47FF041FU &&
++			    jmp == 0x6B7B0000U)
++			{
++				regs->r28 = regs->pc+4;
++				regs->r27 = addr+16;
++				regs->pc = resolver;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * This routine handles page faults.  It determines the address,
+@@ -131,8 +250,29 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, uns
+  good_area:
+ 	si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
+ 	if (cause < 0) {
+-		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
++		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->pc)
++				goto bad_area;
++
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++			case 2:
++			case 3:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++			}
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->pc, (void *)rdusp());
++			do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++#else
+ 			goto bad_area;
++#endif
++
++		}
+ 	} else if (!cause) {
+ 		/* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
+ 		if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)))
+diff -urNp a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
+--- a/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
+ 	if (len > TASK_SIZE)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		if (do_align)
+ 			addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
+@@ -72,10 +76,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
+ 			return addr;
+ 	}
+ 	if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
+-	        start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++		start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
+ 	} else {
+-	        start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+-	        mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
++		start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
++		mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ full_search:
+@@ -91,8 +95,8 @@ full_search:
+ 			 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
+ 			 * some holes.
+ 			 */
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
+-				start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++			if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
++				start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
+ 				mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+diff -urNp a/arch/avr32/mm/fault.c b/arch/avr32/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/avr32/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/avr32/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -41,6 +41,23 @@ static inline int notify_page_fault(stru
+ 
+ int exception_trace = 1;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
++		unsigned char c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned char *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%02x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address and the
+  * problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate routines.
+@@ -157,6 +174,16 @@ bad_area:
+ 	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 
+ 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++			if (ecr == ECR_PROTECTION_X || ecr == ECR_TLB_MISS_X) {
++				pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->pc, (void *)regs->sp);
++				do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		if (exception_trace && printk_ratelimit())
+ 			printk("%s%s[%d]: segfault at %08lx pc %08lx "
+ 			       "sp %08lx ecr %lu\n",
+diff -urNp a/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c b/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c
+--- a/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_
+ 
+ #define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, have_pt_gnu_stack)	(!(have_pt_gnu_stack))
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(current->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	(current->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	(current->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
++#endif
++
+ /* Ugly but avoids duplication */
+ #include "../../../fs/binfmt_elf.c"
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h b/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h
+--- a/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -303,7 +303,14 @@ struct old_linux32_dirent {
+ #define ELF_DATA	ELFDATA2LSB
+ #define ELF_ARCH	EM_386
+ 
+-#define IA32_STACK_TOP		IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK	(current->mm->delta_stack)
++#else
++#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK	0UL
++#endif
++
++#define IA32_STACK_TOP		(IA32_PAGE_OFFSET - __IA32_DELTA_STACK)
++
+ #define IA32_GATE_OFFSET	IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
+ #define IA32_GATE_END		IA32_PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c
+--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ module_alloc (unsigned long size)
+ void
+ module_free (struct module *mod, void *module_region)
+ {
+-	if (mod->arch.init_unw_table && module_region == mod->module_init) {
++	if (mod->arch.init_unw_table && module_region == mod->module_init_rx) {
+ 		unw_remove_unwind_table(mod->arch.init_unw_table);
+ 		mod->arch.init_unw_table = NULL;
+ 	}
+@@ -499,15 +499,39 @@ module_frob_arch_sections (Elf_Ehdr *ehd
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int
++in_init_rx (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
++{
++	return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rx < mod->init_size_rx;
++}
++
++static inline int
++in_init_rw (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
++{
++	return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rw < mod->init_size_rw;
++}
++
++static inline int
+ in_init (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
+ {
+-	return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_init < mod->init_size;
++	return in_init_rx(mod, addr) || in_init_rw(mod, addr);
++}
++
++static inline int
++in_core_rx (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
++{
++	return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rx < mod->core_size_rx;
++}
++
++static inline int
++in_core_rw (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
++{
++	return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rw < mod->core_size_rw;
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int
+ in_core (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
+ {
+-	return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_core < mod->core_size;
++	return in_core_rx(mod, addr) || in_core_rw(mod, addr);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int
+@@ -691,7 +715,14 @@ do_reloc (struct module *mod, uint8_t r_
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	      case RV_BDREL:
+-		val -= (uint64_t) (in_init(mod, val) ? mod->module_init : mod->module_core);
++		if (in_init_rx(mod, val))
++			val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rx;
++		else if (in_init_rw(mod, val))
++			val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rw;
++		else if (in_core_rx(mod, val))
++			val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rx;
++		else if (in_core_rw(mod, val))
++			val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rw;
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	      case RV_LTV:
+@@ -825,15 +856,15 @@ apply_relocate_add (Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs,
+ 		 *     addresses have been selected...
+ 		 */
+ 		uint64_t gp;
+-		if (mod->core_size > MAX_LTOFF)
++		if (mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw > MAX_LTOFF)
+ 			/*
+ 			 * This takes advantage of fact that SHF_ARCH_SMALL gets allocated
+ 			 * at the end of the module.
+ 			 */
+-			gp = mod->core_size - MAX_LTOFF / 2;
++			gp = mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw - MAX_LTOFF / 2;
+ 		else
+-			gp = mod->core_size / 2;
+-		gp = (uint64_t) mod->module_core + ((gp + 7) & -8);
++			gp = (mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw) / 2;
++		gp = (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rx + ((gp + 7) & -8);
+ 		mod->arch.gp = gp;
+ 		DEBUGP("%s: placing gp at 0x%lx\n", __func__, gp);
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c
+--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -43,6 +43,13 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil
+ 	if (REGION_NUMBER(addr) == RGN_HPAGE)
+ 		addr = 0;
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && addr && filp)
++		addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	if (!addr)
+ 		addr = mm->free_area_cache;
+ 
+@@ -61,9 +68,9 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil
+ 	for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ 		/* At this point:  (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
+ 		if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr || RGN_MAP_LIMIT - len < REGION_OFFSET(addr)) {
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
++			if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
+ 				/* Start a new search --- just in case we missed some holes.  */
+-				addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++				addr = mm->mmap_base;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+diff -urNp a/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c b/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/kprobes.h>
+ #include <linux/kdebug.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+@@ -72,6 +73,23 @@ mapped_kernel_page_is_present (unsigned 
+ 	return pte_present(pte);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ void __kprobes
+ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+@@ -145,9 +163,23 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long addres
+ 	mask = (  (((isr >> IA64_ISR_X_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_EXEC_BIT)
+ 		| (((isr >> IA64_ISR_W_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_WRITE_BIT));
+ 
+-	if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask)
++	if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (mask & VM_EXEC)) {
++			if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->cr_iip)
++				goto bad_area;
++
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->cr_iip, (void *)regs->r12);
++			do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		goto bad_area;
+ 
++	}
++
+   survive:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
+diff -urNp a/arch/ia64/mm/init.c b/arch/ia64/mm/init.c
+--- a/arch/ia64/mm/init.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/ia64/mm/init.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -128,6 +128,19 @@ ia64_init_addr_space (void)
+ 		vma->vm_start = current->thread.rbs_bot & PAGE_MASK;
+ 		vma->vm_end = vma->vm_start + PAGE_SIZE;
+ 		vma->vm_flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS|VM_GROWSUP|VM_ACCOUNT;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++			vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++			if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++				vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
++#endif
++
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
+ 		down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 		if (insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma)) {
+diff -urNp a/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c b/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c
+--- a/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
+ #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
++
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/elfcore.h>
+diff -urNp a/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c b/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c
+--- a/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -52,6 +52,13 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
+ #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
++
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/elfcore.h>
+diff -urNp a/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c
+--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
+ 	do_color_align = 0;
+ 	if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
+ 		do_color_align = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		if (do_color_align)
+ 			addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
+@@ -103,7 +108,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
+ 		    (!vmm || addr + len <= vmm->vm_start))
+ 			return addr;
+ 	}
+-	addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++	addr = current->mm->mmap_base;
+ 	if (do_color_align)
+ 		addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
+ 	else
+diff -urNp a/arch/mips/mm/fault.c b/arch/mips/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/mips/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/mips/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -26,6 +26,23 @@
+ #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+ #include <asm/highmem.h>		/* For VMALLOC_END */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * This routine handles page faults.  It determines the address,
+  * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
+diff -urNp a/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c
+--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -73,16 +73,38 @@
+ 
+ /* three functions to determine where in the module core
+  * or init pieces the location is */
++static inline int in_init_rx(struct module *me, void *loc)
++{
++	return (loc >= me->module_init_rx &&
++		loc < (me->module_init_rx + me->init_size_rx));
++}
++
++static inline int in_init_rw(struct module *me, void *loc)
++{
++	return (loc >= me->module_init_rw &&
++		loc < (me->module_init_rw + me->init_size_rw));
++}
++
+ static inline int in_init(struct module *me, void *loc)
+ {
+-	return (loc >= me->module_init &&
+-		loc <= (me->module_init + me->init_size));
++	return in_init_rx(me, loc) || in_init_rw(me, loc);
++}
++
++static inline int in_core_rx(struct module *me, void *loc)
++{
++	return (loc >= me->module_core_rx &&
++		loc < (me->module_core_rx + me->core_size_rx));
++}
++
++static inline int in_core_rw(struct module *me, void *loc)
++{
++	return (loc >= me->module_core_rw &&
++		loc < (me->module_core_rw + me->core_size_rw));
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int in_core(struct module *me, void *loc)
+ {
+-	return (loc >= me->module_core &&
+-		loc <= (me->module_core + me->core_size));
++	return in_core_rx(me, loc) || in_core_rw(me, loc);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int in_local(struct module *me, void *loc)
+@@ -296,21 +318,21 @@ int module_frob_arch_sections(CONST Elf_
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* align things a bit */
+-	me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 16);
+-	me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size;
+-	me->core_size += gots * sizeof(struct got_entry);
+-
+-	me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 16);
+-	me->arch.fdesc_offset = me->core_size;
+-	me->core_size += fdescs * sizeof(Elf_Fdesc);
+-
+-	me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 16);
+-	me->arch.stub_offset = me->core_size;
+-	me->core_size += stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
+-
+-	me->init_size = ALIGN(me->init_size, 16);
+-	me->arch.init_stub_offset = me->init_size;
+-	me->init_size += init_stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
++	me->core_size_rw = ALIGN(me->core_size_rw, 16);
++	me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size_rw;
++	me->core_size_rw += gots * sizeof(struct got_entry);
++
++	me->core_size_rw = ALIGN(me->core_size_rw, 16);
++	me->arch.fdesc_offset = me->core_size_rw;
++	me->core_size_rw += fdescs * sizeof(Elf_Fdesc);
++
++	me->core_size_rx = ALIGN(me->core_size_rx, 16);
++	me->arch.stub_offset = me->core_size_rx;
++	me->core_size_rx += stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
++
++	me->init_size_rx = ALIGN(me->init_size_rx, 16);
++	me->arch.init_stub_offset = me->init_size_rx;
++	me->init_size_rx += init_stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
+ 
+ 	me->arch.got_max = gots;
+ 	me->arch.fdesc_max = fdescs;
+@@ -330,7 +352,7 @@ static Elf64_Word get_got(struct module 
+ 
+ 	BUG_ON(value == 0);
+ 
+-	got = me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset;
++	got = me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset;
+ 	for (i = 0; got[i].addr; i++)
+ 		if (got[i].addr == value)
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -348,7 +370,7 @@ static Elf64_Word get_got(struct module 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+ static Elf_Addr get_fdesc(struct module *me, unsigned long value)
+ {
+-	Elf_Fdesc *fdesc = me->module_core + me->arch.fdesc_offset;
++	Elf_Fdesc *fdesc = me->module_core_rw + me->arch.fdesc_offset;
+ 
+ 	if (!value) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: zero OPD requested!\n", me->name);
+@@ -366,7 +388,7 @@ static Elf_Addr get_fdesc(struct module 
+ 
+ 	/* Create new one */
+ 	fdesc->addr = value;
+-	fdesc->gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset;
++	fdesc->gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset;
+ 	return (Elf_Addr)fdesc;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
+@@ -386,12 +408,12 @@ static Elf_Addr get_stub(struct module *
+ 	if(init_section) {
+ 		i = me->arch.init_stub_count++;
+ 		BUG_ON(me->arch.init_stub_count > me->arch.init_stub_max);
+-		stub = me->module_init + me->arch.init_stub_offset + 
++		stub = me->module_init_rx + me->arch.init_stub_offset +
+ 			i * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
+ 	} else {
+ 		i = me->arch.stub_count++;
+ 		BUG_ON(me->arch.stub_count > me->arch.stub_max);
+-		stub = me->module_core + me->arch.stub_offset + 
++		stub = me->module_core_rx + me->arch.stub_offset +
+ 			i * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -759,7 +781,7 @@ register_unwind_table(struct module *me,
+ 
+ 	table = (unsigned char *)sechdrs[me->arch.unwind_section].sh_addr;
+ 	end = table + sechdrs[me->arch.unwind_section].sh_size;
+-	gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset;
++	gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset;
+ 
+ 	DEBUGP("register_unwind_table(), sect = %d at 0x%p - 0x%p (gp=0x%lx)\n",
+ 	       me->arch.unwind_section, table, end, gp);
+diff -urNp a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
+--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
+ 	if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ 		return addr;
+ 	if (!addr)
+-		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++		addr = current->mm->mmap_base;
+ 
+ 	if (filp) {
+ 		addr = get_shared_area(filp->f_mapping, addr, len, pgoff);
+diff -urNp a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -732,9 +732,7 @@ void handle_interruption(int code, struc
+ 
+ 			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			vma = find_vma(current->mm,regs->iaoq[0]);
+-			if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)
+-				&& (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+-
++			if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)) {
+ 				fault_address = regs->iaoq[0];
+ 				fault_space = regs->iasq[0];
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c b/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/traps.h>
+@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct exception_data, ex
+ static unsigned long
+ parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsigned int inst)
+ {
+-	if (code == 6 || code == 16)
++	if (code == 6 || code == 7 || code == 16)
+ 	    return VM_EXEC;
+ 
+ 	switch (inst & 0xf0000000) {
+@@ -139,6 +141,116 @@ parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsign
+ 			}
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (instruction_pointer(regs) = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	int err;
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
++		unsigned int bl, depwi;
++
++		err = get_user(bl, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs));
++		err |= get_user(depwi, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (bl == 0xEA9F1FDDU && depwi == 0xD6801C1EU) {
++			unsigned int ldw, bv, ldw2, addr = instruction_pointer(regs)-12;
++
++			err = get_user(ldw, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(bv, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(ldw2, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (ldw == 0x0E801096U &&
++			    bv == 0xEAC0C000U &&
++			    ldw2 == 0x0E881095U)
++			{
++				unsigned int resolver, map;
++
++				err = get_user(resolver, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
++				err |= get_user(map, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
++				if (err)
++					break;
++
++				regs->gr[20] = instruction_pointer(regs)+8;
++				regs->gr[21] = map;
++				regs->gr[22] = resolver;
++				regs->iaoq[0] = resolver | 3UL;
++				regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++	if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++		return 1;
++#endif
++
++	do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int ldi1, ldi2, bel, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(ldi1, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs));
++		err |= get_user(ldi2, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
++		err |= get_user(bel, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((ldi1 == 0x34190000U || ldi1 == 0x34190002U) &&
++		    ldi2 == 0x3414015AU &&
++		    bel == 0xE4008200U &&
++		    nop == 0x08000240U)
++		{
++			regs->gr[25] = (ldi1 & 2) >> 1;
++			regs->gr[20] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
++			regs->gr[31] = regs->iaoq[1] + 16;
++			regs->sr[0] = regs->iasq[1];
++			regs->iaoq[0] = 0x100UL;
++			regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
++			regs->iasq[0] = regs->sr[2];
++			regs->iasq[1] = regs->sr[2];
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long code,
+ 			      unsigned long address)
+ {
+@@ -165,8 +277,33 @@ good_area:
+ 
+ 	acc_type = parisc_acctyp(code,regs->iir);
+ 
+-	if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type)
++	if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (acc_type & VM_EXEC) &&
++		    (address & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
++		{
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++			case 3:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++			case 2:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++			}
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)instruction_pointer(regs), (void *)regs->gr[30]);
++			do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		goto bad_area;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
+diff -urNp a/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_32.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_32.c
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/module_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int module_frob_arch_sections(Elf32_Ehdr
+ 			me->arch.core_plt_section = i;
+ 	}
+ 	if (!me->arch.core_plt_section || !me->arch.init_plt_section) {
+-		printk("Module doesn't contain .plt or .init.plt sections.\n");
++		printk("Module %s doesn't contain .plt or .init.plt sections.\n", me->name);
+ 		return -ENOEXEC;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -216,11 +216,16 @@ static uint32_t do_plt_call(void *locati
+ 
+ 	DEBUGP("Doing plt for call to 0x%x at 0x%x\n", val, (unsigned int)location);
+ 	/* Init, or core PLT? */
+-	if (location >= mod->module_core
+-	    && location < mod->module_core + mod->core_size)
++	if ((location >= mod->module_core_rx && location < mod->module_core_rx + mod->core_size_rx) ||
++	    (location >= mod->module_core_rw && location < mod->module_core_rw + mod->core_size_rw))
+ 		entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.core_plt_section].sh_addr;
+-	else
++	else if ((location >= mod->module_init_rx && location < mod->module_init_rx + mod->init_size_rx) ||
++		 (location >= mod->module_init_rw && location < mod->module_init_rw + mod->init_size_rw))
+ 		entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.init_plt_section].sh_addr;
++	else {
++		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: invalid R_PPC_REL24 entry found\n", mod->name);
++		return ~0UL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* Find this entry, or if that fails, the next avail. entry */
+ 	while (entry->jump[0]) {
+diff -urNp a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ int handle_rt_signal32(unsigned long sig
+ 	/* Save user registers on the stack */
+ 	frame = &rt_sf->uc.uc_mcontext;
+ 	addr = frame;
+-	if (vdso32_rt_sigtramp && current->mm->context.vdso_base) {
++	if (vdso32_rt_sigtramp && current->mm->context.vdso_base != ~0UL) {
+ 		if (save_user_regs(regs, frame, 0))
+ 			goto badframe;
+ 		regs->link = current->mm->context.vdso_base + vdso32_rt_sigtramp;
+diff -urNp a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ int handle_rt_signal64(int signr, struct
+ 	current->thread.fpscr.val = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* Set up to return from userspace. */
+-	if (vdso64_rt_sigtramp && current->mm->context.vdso_base) {
++	if (vdso64_rt_sigtramp && current->mm->context.vdso_base != ~0UL) {
+ 		regs->link = current->mm->context.vdso_base + vdso64_rt_sigtramp;
+ 	} else {
+ 		err |= setup_trampoline(__NR_rt_sigreturn, &frame->tramp[0]);
+diff -urNp a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso.c
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct l
+ 	vdso_base = VDSO32_MBASE;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	current->mm->context.vdso_base = 0;
++	current->mm->context.vdso_base = ~0UL;
+ 
+ 	/* vDSO has a problem and was disabled, just don't "enable" it for the
+ 	 * process
+@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct l
+ 	 */
+ 	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	vdso_base = get_unmapped_area(NULL, vdso_base,
+-				      vdso_pages << PAGE_SHIFT, 0, 0);
++				      vdso_pages << PAGE_SHIFT, 0, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_EXECUTABLE);
+ 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(vdso_base)) {
+ 		rc = vdso_base;
+ 		goto fail_mmapsem;
+diff -urNp a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/kprobes.h>
+ #include <linux/kdebug.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -62,6 +68,366 @@ static inline int notify_page_fault(stru
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page *pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
++{
++	struct page *page;
++	unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++	page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++	if (!page)
++		return NOPAGE_OOM;
++
++	kaddr = kmap(page);
++	memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */
++	__flush_dcache_icache(kaddr);
++	kunmap(page);
++	if (type)
++		*type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
++	return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++	.close = pax_syscall_close,
++	.nopage = pax_syscall_nopage,
++};
++
++static int pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++	int ret;
++
++	vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++	vma->vm_start = addr;
++	vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++	vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
++	vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++
++	ret = insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	++current->mm->total_vm;
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         5 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ *         6 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */
++		unsigned int blrl;
++
++		err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++
++		if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) {
++			unsigned long temp = regs->nip;
++
++			regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL;
++			regs->link = temp + 4UL;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int b;
++
++		err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++
++		if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			return 3;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int li, b;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+16));
++			err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int *)(addr+20));
++			err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int *)(addr+24));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+28));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++			    add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++			    (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++			    (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++#if 0
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr;
++
++		err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8));
++		err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U &&
++		    (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU &&
++		    (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U &&
++		    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int *)(addr+16));
++			err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int *)(addr+20));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+24));
++			err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int *)(addr+28));
++			err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int *)(addr+32));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+36));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++			    (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U &&
++			    rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++			    add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++			    (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++			    (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */
++		unsigned int li, b;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++			    (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				unsigned int r11;
++
++				addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++
++				err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int *)addr);
++				if (err)
++					break;
++
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11;
++				regs->ctr = r11;
++				regs->nip = r11;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++	do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int li, sc;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++			unsigned long call_syscall;
++
++			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++			up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (likely(call_syscall))
++				goto emulate;
++
++			vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++				call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				goto emulate;
++			}
++
++			call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++			if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++			regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_sigreturn;
++			regs->nip = call_syscall;
++			return 5;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int li, sc;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_rt_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++			unsigned int call_syscall;
++
++			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++			up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (likely(call_syscall))
++				goto rt_emulate;
++
++			vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++				call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				goto rt_emulate;
++			}
++
++			call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++			if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++rt_emulate:
++			regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
++			regs->nip = call_syscall;
++			return 6;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using
+  * an update addressing form which will update r1.
+@@ -157,7 +523,7 @@ int __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_re
+ 	 * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (trap == 0x400)
+-		error_code &= 0x48200000;
++		error_code &= 0x58200000;
+ 	else
+ 		is_write = error_code & DSISR_ISSTORE;
+ #else
+@@ -355,6 +721,37 @@ bad_area:
+ bad_area_nosemaphore:
+ 	/* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
+ 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
++			if (is_exec && (error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT)) {
++#else
++			if (is_exec && regs->nip == address) {
++#endif
++				switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++				case 2:
++				case 3:
++				case 4:
++					return 0;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++				case 5:
++				case 6:
++					return 0;
++#endif
++
++				}
++
++				pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->nip, (void *)regs->gpr[PT_R1]);
++				do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, code, address);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
+--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -75,10 +75,22 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
+ 	 */
+ 	if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
+ 		mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++			mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
+ 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
+ 	} else {
+ 		mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++			mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap + mm->delta_stack;
++#endif
++
+ 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
+ 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c b/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/highmem.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -48,6 +53,366 @@ unsigned long pte_misses;	/* updated by 
+ unsigned long pte_errors;	/* updated by do_page_fault() */
+ unsigned int probingmem;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page *pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
++{
++	struct page *page;
++	unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++	page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++	if (!page)
++		return NOPAGE_OOM;
++
++	kaddr = kmap(page);
++	memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */
++	__flush_dcache_icache(kaddr);
++	kunmap(page);
++	if (type)
++		*type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
++	return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++	.close = pax_syscall_close,
++	.nopage = pax_syscall_nopage,
++};
++
++static int pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++	int ret;
++
++	vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++	vma->vm_start = addr;
++	vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++	vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
++	vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++
++	ret = insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	++current->mm->total_vm;
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         5 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ *         6 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	int err;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */
++		unsigned int blrl;
++
++		err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++
++		if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) {
++			unsigned long temp = regs->nip;
++
++			regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL;
++			regs->link = temp + 4UL;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int b;
++
++		err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++
++		if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			return 3;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int li, b;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+16));
++			err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int *)(addr+20));
++			err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int *)(addr+24));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+28));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++			    add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++			    (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++			    (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++#if 0
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr;
++
++		err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8));
++		err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U &&
++		    (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU &&
++		    (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U &&
++		    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++			err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int *)(addr+16));
++			err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int *)(addr+20));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+24));
++			err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int *)(addr+28));
++			err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int *)(addr+32));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+36));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++			    (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U &&
++			    rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++			    add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++			    (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++			    (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++			    (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++				regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */
++		unsigned int li, b;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++			unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr;
++			unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++			addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++			err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++			    (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U &&
++			    mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U &&
++			    bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++			{
++				unsigned int r11;
++
++				addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++				addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++
++				err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int *)addr);
++				if (err)
++					break;
++
++				regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11;
++				regs->ctr = r11;
++				regs->nip = r11;
++				return 4;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++	do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int li, sc;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++			unsigned long call_syscall;
++
++			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++			up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (likely(call_syscall))
++				goto emulate;
++
++			vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++				call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				goto emulate;
++			}
++
++			call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++			if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++			regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_sigreturn;
++			regs->nip = call_syscall;
++			return 5;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++		unsigned int li, sc;
++
++		err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++		err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++		if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_rt_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++			unsigned int call_syscall;
++
++			down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++			up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (likely(call_syscall))
++				goto rt_emulate;
++
++			vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++			if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++				call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				goto rt_emulate;
++			}
++
++			call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++			if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (vma)
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall)) {
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++				return 1;
++			}
++
++			current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++rt_emulate:
++			regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
++			regs->nip = call_syscall;
++			return 6;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using
+  * an update addressing form which will update r1.
+@@ -109,7 +474,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, 
+ 	 * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400)
+-		error_code &= 0x48200000;
++		error_code &= 0x58200000;
+ 	else
+ 		is_write = error_code & 0x02000000;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_4xx || CONFIG_BOOKE */
+@@ -204,15 +569,14 @@ good_area:
+ 		pte_t *ptep;
+ 		pmd_t *pmdp;
+ 
+-#if 0
++#if 1
+ 		/* It would be nice to actually enforce the VM execute
+ 		   permission on CPUs which can do so, but far too
+ 		   much stuff in userspace doesn't get the permissions
+ 		   right, so we let any page be executed for now. */
+ 		if (! (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+ 			goto bad_area;
+-#endif
+-
++#else
+ 		/* Since 4xx/Book-E supports per-page execute permission,
+ 		 * we lazily flush dcache to icache. */
+ 		ptep = NULL;
+@@ -235,6 +599,7 @@ good_area:
+ 			pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
+ 		}
+ #endif
++#endif
+ 	/* a read */
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* protection fault */
+@@ -278,6 +643,33 @@ bad_area:
+ 
+ 	/* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
+ 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++			if ((TRAP(regs) == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) {
++				switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++				case 2:
++				case 3:
++				case 4:
++					return 0;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++				case 5:
++				case 6:
++					return 0;
++#endif
++
++				}
++
++				pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->nip, (void *)regs->gpr[1]);
++				do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, code, address);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/s390/kernel/module.c b/arch/s390/kernel/module.c
+--- a/arch/s390/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/s390/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -166,11 +166,11 @@ module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
+ 
+ 	/* Increase core size by size of got & plt and set start
+ 	   offsets for got and plt. */
+-	me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 4);
+-	me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size;
+-	me->core_size += me->arch.got_size;
+-	me->arch.plt_offset = me->core_size;
+-	me->core_size += me->arch.plt_size;
++	me->core_size_rw = ALIGN(me->core_size_rw, 4);
++	me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size_rw;
++	me->core_size_rw += me->arch.got_size;
++	me->arch.plt_offset = me->core_size_rx;
++	me->core_size_rx += me->arch.plt_size;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
+ 		if (info->got_initialized == 0) {
+ 			Elf_Addr *gotent;
+ 
+-			gotent = me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset +
++			gotent = me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset +
+ 				info->got_offset;
+ 			*gotent = val;
+ 			info->got_initialized = 1;
+@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
+ 		else if (r_type == R_390_GOTENT ||
+ 			 r_type == R_390_GOTPLTENT)
+ 			*(unsigned int *) loc =
+-				(val + (Elf_Addr) me->module_core - loc) >> 1;
++				(val + (Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rw - loc) >> 1;
+ 		else if (r_type == R_390_GOT64 ||
+ 			 r_type == R_390_GOTPLT64)
+ 			*(unsigned long *) loc = val;
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
+ 	case R_390_PLTOFF64:	/* 16 bit offset from GOT to PLT. */
+ 		if (info->plt_initialized == 0) {
+ 			unsigned int *ip;
+-			ip = me->module_core + me->arch.plt_offset +
++			ip = me->module_core_rx + me->arch.plt_offset +
+ 				info->plt_offset;
+ #ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
+ 			ip[0] = 0x0d105810; /* basr 1,0; l 1,6(1); br 1 */
+@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
+ 			val = me->arch.plt_offset - me->arch.got_offset +
+ 				info->plt_offset + rela->r_addend;
+ 		else
+-			val =  (Elf_Addr) me->module_core +
++			val =  (Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rx +
+ 				me->arch.plt_offset + info->plt_offset + 
+ 				rela->r_addend - loc;
+ 		if (r_type == R_390_PLT16DBL)
+@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
+ 	case R_390_GOTOFF32:	/* 32 bit offset to GOT.  */
+ 	case R_390_GOTOFF64:	/* 64 bit offset to GOT. */
+ 		val = val + rela->r_addend -
+-			((Elf_Addr) me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset);
++			((Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset);
+ 		if (r_type == R_390_GOTOFF16)
+ 			*(unsigned short *) loc = val;
+ 		else if (r_type == R_390_GOTOFF32)
+@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
+ 		break;
+ 	case R_390_GOTPC:	/* 32 bit PC relative offset to GOT. */
+ 	case R_390_GOTPCDBL:	/* 32 bit PC rel. off. to GOT shifted by 1. */
+-		val = (Elf_Addr) me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset +
++		val = (Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset +
+ 			rela->r_addend - loc;
+ 		if (r_type == R_390_GOTPC)
+ 			*(unsigned int *) loc = val;
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc/Makefile b/arch/sparc/Makefile
+--- a/arch/sparc/Makefile	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc/Makefile	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ drivers-$(CONFIG_OPROFILE)	+= arch/sparc
+ # Renaming is done to avoid confusing pattern matching rules in 2.5.45 (multy-)
+ INIT_Y		:= $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(init-y))
+ CORE_Y		:= $(core-y)
+-CORE_Y		+= kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
++CORE_Y		+= kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/ grsecurity/
+ CORE_Y		:= $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(CORE_Y))
+ DRIVERS_Y	:= $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(drivers-y))
+ NET_Y		:= $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(net-y))
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c
+--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
+ 	if (ARCH_SUN4C_SUN4 && len > 0x20000000)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	if (!addr)
+-		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++		addr = current->mm->mmap_base;
+ 
+ 	if (flags & MAP_SHARED)
+ 		addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr);
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c b/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/kdebug.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+@@ -216,6 +220,253 @@ static unsigned long compute_si_addr(str
+ 	return safe_compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page *pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
++{
++	struct page *page;
++	unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++	page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++	if (!page)
++		return NOPAGE_OOM;
++
++	kaddr = kmap(page);
++	memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
++	flush_dcache_page(page);
++	kunmap(page);
++	if (type)
++		*type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
++
++	return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++	.close = pax_emuplt_close,
++	.nopage = pax_emuplt_nopage,
++};
++
++static int pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++	int ret;
++
++	vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++	vma->vm_start = addr;
++	vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++	vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
++	vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++
++	ret = insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	++current->mm->total_vm;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	int err;
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
++			regs->pc = addr;
++			regs->npc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	{ /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int ba;
++
++		err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++
++		if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
++			unsigned int addr;
++
++			addr = regs->pc + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
++			regs->pc = addr;
++			regs->npc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	}
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
++		unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addr;
++
++			addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
++			regs->pc = addr;
++			regs->npc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
++		unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int addr, save, call;
++
++			if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
++				addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
++			else
++				addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFF80000U) ^ 0x00040000U) + 0x00040000U) << 2);
++
++			err = get_user(save, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++			    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++			    nop == 0x01000000U)
++			{
++				struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++				unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++
++				down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++				up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
++					goto emulate;
++
++				vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++				down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
++					call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma)
++						kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					goto emulate;
++				}
++
++				call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++				if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma)
++						kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					return 1;
++				}
++
++				if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve)) {
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					return 1;
++				}
++
++				current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++				regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++				regs->pc = call_dl_resolve;
++				regs->npc = addr+4;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
++		unsigned int save, call, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(save, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc-4));
++		err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++		    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned int dl_resolve = regs->pc + ((((call | 0xC0000000U) ^ 0x20000000U) + 0x20000000U) << 2);
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->pc;
++			regs->pc = dl_resolve;
++			regs->npc = dl_resolve+4;
++			return 3;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write,
+ 			       unsigned long address)
+ {
+@@ -280,6 +531,24 @@ good_area:
+ 		if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ 			goto bad_area;
+ 	} else {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && text_fault && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++			case 2:
++			case 3:
++				return;
++#endif
++
++			}
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->pc, (void *)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]);
++			do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
+ 		if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
+ 			goto bad_area;
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc/mm/init.c b/arch/sparc/mm/init.c
+--- a/arch/sparc/mm/init.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc/mm/init.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -311,6 +311,9 @@ extern void device_scan(void);
+ pgprot_t PAGE_SHARED __read_mostly;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(PAGE_SHARED);
+ 
++pgprot_t PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __read_mostly;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC);
++
+ void __init paging_init(void)
+ {
+ 	switch(sparc_cpu_model) {
+@@ -336,17 +339,17 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the protection map with non-constant, MMU dependent values. */
+ 	protection_map[0] = PAGE_NONE;
+-	protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY;
+-	protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY;
+-	protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY;
++	protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
+ 	protection_map[4] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[5] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[6] = PAGE_COPY;
+ 	protection_map[7] = PAGE_COPY;
+ 	protection_map[8] = PAGE_NONE;
+-	protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY;
+-	protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED;
+-	protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED;
++	protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
++	protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
+ 	protection_map[12] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[13] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ 	protection_map[14] = PAGE_SHARED;
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c b/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c
+--- a/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2160,6 +2160,13 @@ void __init ld_mmu_srmmu(void)
+ 	PAGE_SHARED = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED);
+ 	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY));
+ 	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC);
++	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC));
++	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC));
++#endif
++
+ 	BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_kernel, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL));
+ 	page_kernel = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/sparc64/kernel/Makefile
+--- a/arch/sparc64/kernel/Makefile	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc64/kernel/Makefile	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ #
+ 
+ EXTRA_AFLAGS := -ansi
+-EXTRA_CFLAGS := -Werror
++#EXTRA_CFLAGS := -Werror
+ 
+ extra-y		:= head.o init_task.o vmlinux.lds
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c b/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c
+--- a/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
+ 		/* We do not accept a shared mapping if it would violate
+ 		 * cache aliasing constraints.
+ 		 */
+-		if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) &&
++		if ((filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED)) &&
+ 		    ((addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1)))
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+ 		return addr;
+@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
+ 	if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
+ 		do_color_align = 1;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		if (do_color_align)
+ 			addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
+@@ -152,9 +156,9 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
+-	        start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++		start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
+ 	} else {
+-	        start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++		start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
+ 	        mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -174,8 +178,8 @@ full_search:
+ 			vma = find_vma(mm, VA_EXCLUDE_END);
+ 		}
+ 		if (unlikely(task_size < addr)) {
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
+-				start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++			if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
++				start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
+ 				mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+@@ -215,7 +219,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
+ 		/* We do not accept a shared mapping if it would violate
+ 		 * cache aliasing constraints.
+ 		 */
+-		if ((flags & MAP_SHARED) &&
++		if ((filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED)) &&
+ 		    ((addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1)))
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+ 		return addr;
+@@ -378,6 +382,12 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
+ 	    current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY ||
+ 	    sysctl_legacy_va_layout) {
+ 		mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++			mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
+ 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -392,6 +402,12 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
+ 			gap = (task_size / 6 * 5);
+ 
+ 		mm->mmap_base = PAGE_ALIGN(task_size - gap - random_factor);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++			mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap + mm->delta_stack;
++#endif
++
+ 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
+ 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc64/mm/Makefile b/arch/sparc64/mm/Makefile
+--- a/arch/sparc64/mm/Makefile	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc64/mm/Makefile	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ #
+ 
+ EXTRA_AFLAGS := -ansi
+-EXTRA_CFLAGS := -Werror
++#EXTRA_CFLAGS := -Werror
+ 
+ obj-y    := ultra.o tlb.o tsb.o fault.o init.o generic.o
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c b/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
+ #include <linux/kprobes.h>
+ #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+ #include <linux/kdebug.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -262,6 +266,370 @@ cannot_handle:
+ 	unhandled_fault (address, current, regs);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++static void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page *pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
++{
++	struct page *page;
++	unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++	page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++	if (!page)
++		return NOPAGE_OOM;
++
++	kaddr = kmap(page);
++	memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
++	flush_dcache_page(page);
++	kunmap(page);
++	if (type)
++		*type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
++	return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++	.close = pax_emuplt_close,
++	.nopage = pax_emuplt_nopage,
++};
++
++static int pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++	int ret;
++
++	vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++	vma->vm_start = addr;
++	vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++	vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
++	vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++
++	ret = insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	++current->mm->total_vm;
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->tpc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ *         3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++	int err;
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	{ /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++		unsigned int ba;
++
++		err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++
++		if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	}
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
++		unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
++			addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #4 */
++		unsigned int mov1, call, mov2;
++
++		err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (mov1 == 0x8210000FU &&
++		    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++		    mov2 == 0x9E100001U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC];
++			addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #5 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, or1, or2, sllx, jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(or1, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+8));
++		err |= get_user(or2, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+12));
++		err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+16));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+20));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+24));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
++		    (or1 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x82106000U &&
++		    (or2 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
++		    sllx == 0x83287020 &&
++		    jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = ((sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or1 & 0x000003FFU);
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or2 & 0x000003FFU);
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #6 */
++		unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, sllx, or,  jmpl, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+8));
++		err |= get_user(or, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+12));
++		err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+16));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+20));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
++		    sllx == 0x83287020 &&
++		    (or & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
++		    jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or & 0x3FFU);
++			addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #7 */
++		unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    (ba & 0xFFF00000U) == 0x30600000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++
++			addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
++			addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2);
++			regs->tpc = addr;
++			regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
++		unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++		    ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long addr;
++			unsigned int save, call;
++
++			if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
++				addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
++			else
++				addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2);
++
++			err = get_user(save, (unsigned int *)addr);
++			err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++			err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++			if (err)
++				break;
++
++			if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++			    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++			    nop == 0x01000000U)
++			{
++				struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++				unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++
++				down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++				up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
++					goto emulate;
++
++				vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++				down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++				if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
++					call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma)
++						kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					goto emulate;
++				}
++
++				call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++				if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					if (vma)
++						kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					return 1;
++				}
++
++				if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve)) {
++					up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++					kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++					return 1;
++				}
++
++				current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
++				up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++				regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++				regs->tpc = call_dl_resolve;
++				regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++				return 3;
++			}
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
++		unsigned int save, call, nop;
++
++		err = get_user(save, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc-4));
++		err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int *)regs->tpc);
++		err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->tpc+4));
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++		    (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++		    nop == 0x01000000U)
++		{
++			unsigned long dl_resolve = regs->tpc + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
++
++			regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->tpc;
++			regs->tpc = dl_resolve;
++			regs->tnpc = dl_resolve+4;
++			return 3;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	unsigned long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++		unsigned int c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned int *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%08x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+@@ -303,8 +671,10 @@ asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fau
+ 		goto intr_or_no_mm;
+ 
+ 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
+-		if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV))
++		if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
+ 			regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
++			regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
++		}
+ 		address &= 0xffffffff;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -321,6 +691,29 @@ asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fau
+ 	if (!vma)
+ 		goto bad_area;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	/* PaX: detect ITLB misses on non-exec pages */
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && vma->vm_start <= address &&
++	    !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB))
++	{
++		if (address != regs->tpc)
++			goto good_area;
++
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
++		case 2:
++		case 3:
++			return;
++#endif
++
++		}
++		pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->tpc, (void *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS));
++		do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing
+ 	 * load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there
+ 	 * was no match.  So in such a case we (carefully) read the
+diff -urNp a/arch/v850/kernel/module.c b/arch/v850/kernel/module.c
+--- a/arch/v850/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/v850/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ static uint32_t do_plt_call (void *locat
+ 	tramp[1] = ((val >> 16) & 0xffff) + 0x610000; /* ...; jmp r1 */
+ 
+ 	/* Init, or core PLT? */
+-	if (location >= mod->module_core
+-	    && location < mod->module_core + mod->core_size)
++	if (location >= mod->module_core_rx
++	    && location < mod->module_core_rx + mod->core_size_rx)
+ 		entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.core_plt_section].sh_addr;
+ 	else
+ 		entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.init_plt_section].sh_addr;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ config PAGE_OFFSET
+ 	hex
+ 	default 0xB0000000 if VMSPLIT_3G_OPT
+ 	default 0x80000000 if VMSPLIT_2G
+-	default 0x78000000 if VMSPLIT_2G_OPT
++	default 0x70000000 if VMSPLIT_2G_OPT
+ 	default 0x40000000 if VMSPLIT_1G
+ 	default 0xC0000000
+ 	depends on X86_32
+@@ -1113,8 +1113,7 @@ config CRASH_DUMP
+ config PHYSICAL_START
+ 	hex "Physical address where the kernel is loaded" if (EMBEDDED || CRASH_DUMP)
+ 	default "0x1000000" if X86_NUMAQ
+-	default "0x200000" if X86_64
+-	default "0x100000"
++	default "0x200000"
+ 	help
+ 	  This gives the physical address where the kernel is loaded.
+ 
+@@ -1206,9 +1205,9 @@ config HOTPLUG_CPU
+ 	  suspend.
+ 
+ config COMPAT_VDSO
+-	def_bool y
++	def_bool n
+ 	prompt "Compat VDSO support"
+-	depends on X86_32 || IA32_EMULATION
++	depends on (X86_32 || IA32_EMULATION) && !PAX_NOEXEC
+ 	help
+ 	  Map the 32-bit VDSO to the predictable old-style address too.
+ 	---help---
+@@ -1395,7 +1394,7 @@ config PCI
+ choice
+ 	prompt "PCI access mode"
+ 	depends on X86_32 && PCI && !X86_VISWS
+-	default PCI_GOANY
++	default PCI_GODIRECT
+ 	---help---
+ 	  On PCI systems, the BIOS can be used to detect the PCI devices and
+ 	  determine their configuration. However, some old PCI motherboards
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ config X86_PPRO_FENCE
+ 
+ config X86_F00F_BUG
+ 	def_bool y
+-	depends on M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || M386
++	depends on (M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || M386) && !PAX_KERNEXEC
+ 
+ config X86_WP_WORKS_OK
+ 	def_bool y
+@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ config X86_POPAD_OK
+ 
+ config X86_ALIGNMENT_16
+ 	def_bool y
+-	depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK6 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 || MGEODEGX1
++	depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK8 || MK7 || MK6 || MCORE2 || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 || MGEODEGX1
+ 
+ config X86_GOOD_APIC
+ 	def_bool y
+@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ config X86_TSC
+ # generates cmov.
+ config X86_CMOV
+ 	def_bool y
+-	depends on (MK7 || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMM || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || MVIAC3_2 || MVIAC7)
++	depends on (MK8 || MK7 || MCORE2 || MPSC || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMM || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || MVIAC3_2 || MVIAC7)
+ 
+ config X86_MINIMUM_CPU_FAMILY
+ 	int
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS
+ config DEBUG_RODATA
+ 	bool "Write protect kernel read-only data structures"
+ 	default y
+-	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
++	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && BROKEN
+ 	help
+ 	  Mark the kernel read-only data as write-protected in the pagetables,
+ 	  in order to catch accidental (and incorrect) writes to such const
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/bitops.h b/arch/x86/boot/bitops.h
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/bitops.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/bitops.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static inline int variable_test_bit(int 
+ 	u8 v;
+ 	const u32 *p = (const u32 *)addr;
+ 
+-	asm("btl %2,%1; setc %0" : "=qm" (v) : "m" (*p), "Ir" (nr));
++	asm volatile("btl %2,%1; setc %0" : "=qm" (v) : "m" (*p), "Ir" (nr));
+ 	return v;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static inline int variable_test_bit(int 
+ 
+ static inline void set_bit(int nr, void *addr)
+ {
+-	asm("btsl %1,%0" : "+m" (*(u32 *)addr) : "Ir" (nr));
++	asm volatile("btsl %1,%0" : "+m" (*(u32 *)addr) : "Ir" (nr));
+ }
+ 
+ #endif /* BOOT_BITOPS_H */
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/boot.h b/arch/x86/boot/boot.h
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/boot.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/boot.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static inline void io_delay(void)
+ static inline u16 ds(void)
+ {
+ 	u16 seg;
+-	asm("movw %%ds,%0" : "=rm" (seg));
++	asm volatile("movw %%ds,%0" : "=rm" (seg));
+ 	return seg;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static inline void wrgs32(u32 v, addr_t 
+ static inline int memcmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len)
+ {
+ 	u8 diff;
+-	asm("repe; cmpsb; setnz %0"
++	asm volatile("repe; cmpsb; setnz %0"
+ 	    : "=qm" (diff), "+D" (s1), "+S" (s2), "+c" (len));
+ 	return diff;
+ }
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ startup_32:
+ 	addl    $(CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN - 1), %ebx
+ 	andl    $(~(CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN - 1)), %ebx
+ #else
+-	movl $LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, %ebx
++	movl $____LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, %ebx
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Replace the compressed data size with the uncompressed size */
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ startup_32:
+ 	addl    $(CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN - 1), %ebp
+ 	andl    $(~(CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN - 1)), %ebp
+ #else
+-	movl	$LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, %ebp
++	movl	$____LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, %ebp
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -159,16 +159,15 @@ relocated:
+  * and where it was actually loaded.
+  */
+ 	movl %ebp, %ebx
+-	subl $LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, %ebx
++	subl $____LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, %ebx
+ 	jz   2f		/* Nothing to be done if loaded at compiled addr. */
+ /*
+  * Process relocations.
+  */
+ 
+ 1:	subl $4, %edi
+-	movl 0(%edi), %ecx
+-	testl %ecx, %ecx
+-	jz 2f
++	movl (%edi), %ecx
++	jecxz 2f
+ 	addl %ebx, -__PAGE_OFFSET(%ebx, %ecx)
+ 	jmp 1b
+ 2:
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ typedef unsigned char  uch;
+ typedef unsigned short ush;
+ typedef unsigned long  ulg;
+ 
+-#define WSIZE 0x80000000	/* Window size must be at least 32k,
++#define WSIZE 0x80000000
++				/* Window size must be at least 32k,
+ 				 * and a power of two
+ 				 * We don't actually have a window just
+ 				 * a huge output buffer so I report
+@@ -400,7 +401,7 @@ asmlinkage void decompress_kernel(void *
+ 	if (heap > ((-__PAGE_OFFSET-(512<<20)-1) & 0x7fffffff))
+ 		error("Destination address too large");
+ #ifndef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
+-	if ((u32)output != LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR)
++	if ((u32)output != ____LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR)
+ 		error("Wrong destination address");
+ #endif
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/relocs.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/relocs.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/relocs.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/relocs.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -10,9 +10,13 @@
+ #define USE_BSD
+ #include <endian.h>
+ 
++#include "../../../../include/linux/autoconf.h"
++
++#define MAX_PHDRS 100
+ #define MAX_SHDRS 100
+ #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))
+ static Elf32_Ehdr ehdr;
++static Elf32_Phdr phdr[MAX_PHDRS];
+ static Elf32_Shdr shdr[MAX_SHDRS];
+ static Elf32_Sym  *symtab[MAX_SHDRS];
+ static Elf32_Rel  *reltab[MAX_SHDRS];
+@@ -241,6 +245,34 @@ static void read_ehdr(FILE *fp)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++static void read_phdrs(FILE *fp)
++{
++	int i;
++	if (ehdr.e_phnum > MAX_PHDRS) {
++		die("%d program headers supported: %d\n",
++			ehdr.e_phnum, MAX_PHDRS);
++	}
++	if (fseek(fp, ehdr.e_phoff, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
++		die("Seek to %d failed: %s\n",
++			ehdr.e_phoff, strerror(errno));
++	}
++	if (fread(&phdr, sizeof(phdr[0]), ehdr.e_phnum, fp) != ehdr.e_phnum) {
++		die("Cannot read ELF program headers: %s\n",
++			strerror(errno));
++	}
++	for(i = 0; i < ehdr.e_phnum; i++) {
++		phdr[i].p_type      = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_type);
++		phdr[i].p_offset    = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_offset);
++		phdr[i].p_vaddr     = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_vaddr);
++		phdr[i].p_paddr     = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_paddr);
++		phdr[i].p_filesz    = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_filesz);
++		phdr[i].p_memsz     = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_memsz);
++		phdr[i].p_flags     = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_flags);
++		phdr[i].p_align     = elf32_to_cpu(phdr[i].p_align);
++	}
++
++}
++
+ static void read_shdrs(FILE *fp)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+@@ -327,6 +359,8 @@ static void read_symtabs(FILE *fp)
+ static void read_relocs(FILE *fp)
+ {
+ 	int i,j;
++	uint32_t base;
++
+ 	for(i = 0; i < ehdr.e_shnum; i++) {
+ 		if (shdr[i].sh_type != SHT_REL) {
+ 			continue;
+@@ -344,8 +378,17 @@ static void read_relocs(FILE *fp)
+ 			die("Cannot read symbol table: %s\n",
+ 				strerror(errno));
+ 		}
++		base = 0;
++		for (j = 0; j < ehdr.e_phnum; j++) {
++			if (phdr[j].p_type != PT_LOAD )
++				continue;
++			if (shdr[shdr[i].sh_info].sh_offset < phdr[j].p_offset || shdr[shdr[i].sh_info].sh_offset > phdr[j].p_offset + phdr[j].p_filesz)
++				continue;
++			base = CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET + phdr[j].p_paddr - phdr[j].p_vaddr;
++			break;
++		}
+ 		for(j = 0; j < shdr[i].sh_size/sizeof(reltab[0][0]); j++) {
+-			reltab[i][j].r_offset = elf32_to_cpu(reltab[i][j].r_offset);
++			reltab[i][j].r_offset = elf32_to_cpu(reltab[i][j].r_offset) + base;
+ 			reltab[i][j].r_info   = elf32_to_cpu(reltab[i][j].r_info);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+@@ -482,6 +525,23 @@ static void walk_relocs(void (*visit)(El
+ 			if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_ABS) {
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
++			/* Don't relocate actual per-cpu variables, they are absolute indices, not addresses */
++			if (!strcmp(sec_name(sym->st_shndx), ".data.percpu") && strncmp(sym_name(sym_strtab, sym), "__per_cpu_", 10))
++				continue;
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
++			/* Don't relocate actual code, they are relocated implicitly by the base address of KERNEL_CS */
++			if (!strcmp(sec_name(sym->st_shndx), ".init.text"))
++				continue;
++			if (!strcmp(sec_name(sym->st_shndx), ".exit.text"))
++				continue;
++			if (!strcmp(sec_name(sym->st_shndx), ".text.head")) {
++				if (strcmp(sym_name(sym_strtab, sym), "__init_end") &&
++				    strcmp(sym_name(sym_strtab, sym), "KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET"))
++					continue;
++			}
++			if (!strcmp(sec_name(sym->st_shndx), ".text"))
++				continue;
++#endif
+ 			if (r_type == R_386_PC32) {
+ 				/* PC relative relocations don't need to be adjusted */
+ 			}
+@@ -609,6 +669,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			fname, strerror(errno));
+ 	}
+ 	read_ehdr(fp);
++	read_phdrs(fp);
+ 	read_shdrs(fp);
+ 	read_strtabs(fp);
+ 	read_symtabs(fp);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c b/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int has_fpu(void)
+ 	u16 fcw = -1, fsw = -1;
+ 	u32 cr0;
+ 
+-	asm("movl %%cr0,%0" : "=r" (cr0));
++	asm volatile("movl %%cr0,%0" : "=r" (cr0));
+ 	if (cr0 & (X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS)) {
+ 		cr0 &= ~(X86_CR0_EM|X86_CR0_TS);
+ 		asm volatile("movl %0,%%cr0" : : "r" (cr0));
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int has_eflag(u32 mask)
+ {
+ 	u32 f0, f1;
+ 
+-	asm("pushfl ; "
++	asm volatile("pushfl ; "
+ 	    "pushfl ; "
+ 	    "popl %0 ; "
+ 	    "movl %0,%1 ; "
+@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static void get_flags(void)
+ 		set_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, cpu.flags);
+ 
+ 	if (has_eflag(X86_EFLAGS_ID)) {
+-		asm("cpuid"
++		asm volatile("cpuid"
+ 		    : "=a" (max_intel_level),
+ 		      "=b" (cpu_vendor[0]),
+ 		      "=d" (cpu_vendor[1]),
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void get_flags(void)
+ 
+ 		if (max_intel_level >= 0x00000001 &&
+ 		    max_intel_level <= 0x0000ffff) {
+-			asm("cpuid"
++			asm volatile("cpuid"
+ 			    : "=a" (tfms),
+ 			      "=c" (cpu.flags[4]),
+ 			      "=d" (cpu.flags[0])
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void get_flags(void)
+ 				cpu.model += ((tfms >> 16) & 0xf) << 4;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		asm("cpuid"
++		asm volatile("cpuid"
+ 		    : "=a" (max_amd_level)
+ 		    : "a" (0x80000000)
+ 		    : "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static void get_flags(void)
+ 		if (max_amd_level >= 0x80000001 &&
+ 		    max_amd_level <= 0x8000ffff) {
+ 			u32 eax = 0x80000001;
+-			asm("cpuid"
++			asm volatile("cpuid"
+ 			    : "+a" (eax),
+ 			      "=c" (cpu.flags[6]),
+ 			      "=d" (cpu.flags[1])
+@@ -207,9 +207,9 @@ int check_cpu(int *cpu_level_ptr, int *r
+ 		u32 ecx = MSR_K7_HWCR;
+ 		u32 eax, edx;
+ 
+-		asm("rdmsr" : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx) : "c" (ecx));
++		asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx) : "c" (ecx));
+ 		eax &= ~(1 << 15);
+-		asm("wrmsr" : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
++		asm volatile("wrmsr" : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
+ 
+ 		get_flags();	/* Make sure it really did something */
+ 		err = check_flags();
+@@ -222,9 +222,9 @@ int check_cpu(int *cpu_level_ptr, int *r
+ 		u32 ecx = MSR_VIA_FCR;
+ 		u32 eax, edx;
+ 
+-		asm("rdmsr" : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx) : "c" (ecx));
++		asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx) : "c" (ecx));
+ 		eax |= (1<<1)|(1<<7);
+-		asm("wrmsr" : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
++		asm volatile("wrmsr" : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
+ 
+ 		set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CX8, cpu.flags);
+ 		err = check_flags();
+@@ -235,12 +235,12 @@ int check_cpu(int *cpu_level_ptr, int *r
+ 		u32 eax, edx;
+ 		u32 level = 1;
+ 
+-		asm("rdmsr" : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx) : "c" (ecx));
+-		asm("wrmsr" : : "a" (~0), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
+-		asm("cpuid"
++		asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx) : "c" (ecx));
++		asm volatile("wrmsr" : : "a" (~0), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
++		asm volatile("cpuid"
+ 		    : "+a" (level), "=d" (cpu.flags[0])
+ 		    : : "ecx", "ebx");
+-		asm("wrmsr" : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
++		asm volatile("wrmsr" : : "a" (eax), "d" (edx), "c" (ecx));
+ 
+ 		err = check_flags();
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/edd.c b/arch/x86/boot/edd.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/edd.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/edd.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int get_edd_info(u8 devno, struct
+ 	ax = 0x4100;
+ 	bx = EDDMAGIC1;
+ 	dx = devno;
+-	asm("pushfl; stc; int $0x13; setc %%al; popfl"
++	asm volatile("pushfl; stc; int $0x13; setc %%al; popfl"
+ 	    : "+a" (ax), "+b" (bx), "=c" (cx), "+d" (dx)
+ 	    : : "esi", "edi");
+ 
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int get_edd_info(u8 devno, struct
+ 	ei->params.length = sizeof(ei->params);
+ 	ax = 0x4800;
+ 	dx = devno;
+-	asm("pushfl; int $0x13; popfl"
++	asm volatile("pushfl; int $0x13; popfl"
+ 	    : "+a" (ax), "+d" (dx), "=m" (ei->params)
+ 	    : "S" (&ei->params)
+ 	    : "ebx", "ecx", "edi");
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int get_edd_info(u8 devno, struct
+ 	ax = 0x0800;
+ 	dx = devno;
+ 	di = 0;
+-	asm("pushw %%es; "
++	asm volatile("pushw %%es; "
+ 	    "movw %%di,%%es; "
+ 	    "pushfl; stc; int $0x13; setc %%al; popfl; "
+ 	    "popw %%es"
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/main.c b/arch/x86/boot/main.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/main.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/main.c	2008-08-20 18:38:51.000000000 -0700
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void query_ist(void)
+ 	if (cpu.level < 6)
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	asm("int $0x15"
++	asm volatile("int $0x15"
+ 	    : "=a" (boot_params.ist_info.signature),
+ 	      "=b" (boot_params.ist_info.command),
+ 	      "=c" (boot_params.ist_info.event),
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/mca.c b/arch/x86/boot/mca.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/mca.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/mca.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ int query_mca(void)
+ 	u8 err;
+ 	u16 es, bx, len;
+ 
+-	asm("pushw %%es ; "
++	asm volatile("pushw %%es ; "
+ 	    "int $0x15 ; "
+ 	    "setc %0 ; "
+ 	    "movw %%es, %1 ; "
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/memory.c b/arch/x86/boot/memory.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/memory.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/memory.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static int detect_memory_e820(void)
+ 		/* Important: %edx is clobbered by some BIOSes,
+ 		   so it must be either used for the error output
+ 		   or explicitly marked clobbered. */
+-		asm("int $0x15; setc %0"
++		asm volatile("int $0x15; setc %0"
+ 		    : "=d" (err), "+b" (next), "=a" (id), "+c" (size),
+ 		      "=m" (*desc)
+ 		    : "D" (desc), "d" (SMAP), "a" (0xe820));
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int detect_memory_e801(void)
+ 
+ 	bx = cx = dx = 0;
+ 	ax = 0xe801;
+-	asm("stc; int $0x15; setc %0"
++	asm volatile("stc; int $0x15; setc %0"
+ 	    : "=m" (err), "+a" (ax), "+b" (bx), "+c" (cx), "+d" (dx));
+ 
+ 	if (err)
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int detect_memory_88(void)
+ 	u8 err;
+ 
+ 	ax = 0x8800;
+-	asm("stc; int $0x15; setc %0" : "=bcdm" (err), "+a" (ax));
++	asm volatile("stc; int $0x15; setc %0" : "=bcdm" (err), "+a" (ax));
+ 
+ 	boot_params.screen_info.ext_mem_k = ax;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/video-vesa.c b/arch/x86/boot/video-vesa.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/video-vesa.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/video-vesa.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int vesa_probe(void)
+ 
+ 	ax = 0x4f00;
+ 	di = (size_t)&vginfo;
+-	asm(INT10
++	asm volatile(INT10
+ 	    : "+a" (ax), "+D" (di), "=m" (vginfo)
+ 	    : : "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi");
+ 
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int vesa_probe(void)
+ 		ax = 0x4f01;
+ 		cx = mode;
+ 		di = (size_t)&vminfo;
+-		asm(INT10
++		asm volatile(INT10
+ 		    : "+a" (ax), "+c" (cx), "+D" (di), "=m" (vminfo)
+ 		    : : "ebx", "edx", "esi");
+ 
+@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static int vesa_set_mode(struct mode_inf
+ 	ax = 0x4f01;
+ 	cx = vesa_mode;
+ 	di = (size_t)&vminfo;
+-	asm(INT10
++	asm volatile(INT10
+ 	    : "+a" (ax), "+c" (cx), "+D" (di), "=m" (vminfo)
+ 	    : : "ebx", "edx", "esi");
+ 
+@@ -199,19 +199,20 @@ static void vesa_dac_set_8bits(void)
+ /* Save the VESA protected mode info */
+ static void vesa_store_pm_info(void)
+ {
+-	u16 ax, bx, di, es;
++	u16 ax, bx, cx, di, es;
+ 
+ 	ax = 0x4f0a;
+-	bx = di = 0;
+-	asm("pushw %%es; "INT10"; movw %%es,%0; popw %%es"
+-	    : "=d" (es), "+a" (ax), "+b" (bx), "+D" (di)
+-	    : : "ecx", "esi");
++	bx = cx = di = 0;
++	asm volatile("pushw %%es; "INT10"; movw %%es,%0; popw %%es"
++	    : "=d" (es), "+a" (ax), "+b" (bx), "+c" (cx), "+D" (di)
++	    : : "esi");
+ 
+ 	if (ax != 0x004f)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	boot_params.screen_info.vesapm_seg = es;
+ 	boot_params.screen_info.vesapm_off = di;
++	boot_params.screen_info.vesapm_size = cx;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ void vesa_store_edid(void)
+ 	/* Note: The VBE DDC spec is different from the main VESA spec;
+ 	   we genuinely have to assume all registers are destroyed here. */
+ 
+-	asm("pushw %%es; movw %2,%%es; "INT10"; popw %%es"
++	asm volatile("pushw %%es; movw %2,%%es; "INT10"; popw %%es"
+ 	    : "+a" (ax), "+b" (bx)
+ 	    :  "c" (cx), "D" (di)
+ 	    : "esi");
+@@ -281,7 +282,7 @@ void vesa_store_edid(void)
+ 	cx = 0;			/* Controller 0 */
+ 	dx = 0;			/* EDID block number */
+ 	di =(size_t) &boot_params.edid_info; /* (ES:)Pointer to block */
+-	asm(INT10
++	asm volatile(INT10
+ 	    : "+a" (ax), "+b" (bx), "+d" (dx), "=m" (boot_params.edid_info)
+ 	    : "c" (cx), "D" (di)
+ 	    : "esi");
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/video-vga.c b/arch/x86/boot/video-vga.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/video-vga.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/video-vga.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static int vga_probe(void)
+ 	};
+ 	u8 vga_flag;
+ 
+-	asm(INT10
++	asm volatile(INT10
+ 	    : "=b" (boot_params.screen_info.orig_video_ega_bx)
+ 	    : "a" (0x1200), "b" (0x10) /* Check EGA/VGA */
+ 	    : "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi");
+@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static int vga_probe(void)
+ 	/* If we have MDA/CGA/HGC then BL will be unchanged at 0x10 */
+ 	if ((u8)boot_params.screen_info.orig_video_ega_bx != 0x10) {
+ 		/* EGA/VGA */
+-		asm(INT10
++		asm volatile(INT10
+ 		    : "=a" (vga_flag)
+ 		    : "a" (0x1a00)
+ 		    : "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi");
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/video.c b/arch/x86/boot/video.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/video.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/video.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static void store_cursor_position(void)
+ 
+ 	ax = 0x0300;
+ 	bx = 0;
+-	asm(INT10
++	asm volatile(INT10
+ 	    : "=d" (curpos), "+a" (ax), "+b" (bx)
+ 	    : : "ecx", "esi", "edi");
+ 
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static void store_video_mode(void)
+ 	/* N.B.: the saving of the video page here is a bit silly,
+ 	   since we pretty much assume page 0 everywhere. */
+ 	ax = 0x0f00;
+-	asm(INT10
++	asm volatile(INT10
+ 	    : "+a" (ax), "=b" (page)
+ 	    : : "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi");
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/boot/voyager.c b/arch/x86/boot/voyager.c
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/voyager.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/voyager.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int query_voyager(void)
+ 
+ 	data_ptr[0] = 0xff;	/* Flag on config not found(?) */
+ 
+-	asm("pushw %%es ; "
++	asm volatile("pushw %%es ; "
+ 	    "int $0x15 ; "
+ 	    "setc %0 ; "
+ 	    "movw %%es, %1 ; "
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
+--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct 
+ 		__NR_ia32_rt_sigreturn,
+ 		0x80cd,
+ 		0,
++		0
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame));
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata a
+ 		     DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "TravelMate 360"),
+ 		     },
+ 	 },
+-	{}
++	{ NULL, NULL, {{0, NULL}}, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ #endif				/* __i386__ */
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/sleep_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static __initdata struct dmi_system_id a
+ 		     DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "S4030CDT/4.3"),
+ 		     },
+ 	 },
+-	{}
++	{ NULL, NULL, {{0, NULL}}, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ static int __init acpisleep_dmi_init(void)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
+ #include <linux/linkage.h>
+ #include <asm/segment.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
++#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+ 
+ #
+ # wakeup_code runs in real mode, and at unknown address (determined at run-time).
+@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ wakeup_code:
+ 	# restore efer setting
+ 	movl	real_save_efer_edx - wakeup_code, %edx
+ 	movl	real_save_efer_eax - wakeup_code, %eax
+-	mov     $0xc0000080, %ecx
++	mov	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
+ 	wrmsr
+ 4:
+ 	# make sure %cr4 is set correctly (features, etc)
+@@ -196,13 +197,11 @@ wakeup_pmode_return:
+ 	# and restore the stack ... but you need gdt for this to work
+ 	movl	saved_context_esp, %esp
+ 
+-	movl	%cs:saved_magic, %eax
+-	cmpl	$0x12345678, %eax
++	cmpl	$0x12345678, saved_magic
+ 	jne	bogus_magic
+ 
+ 	# jump to place where we left off
+-	movl	saved_eip,%eax
+-	jmp	*%eax
++	jmp	*(saved_eip)
+ 
+ bogus_magic:
+ 	jmp	bogus_magic
+@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ ENTRY(acpi_copy_wakeup_routine)
+ 	# save efer setting
+ 	pushl	%eax
+ 	movl	%eax, %ebx
+-	mov     $0xc0000080, %ecx
++	mov	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
+ 	rdmsr
+ 	movl	%edx, real_save_efer_edx - wakeup_start (%ebx)
+ 	movl	%eax, real_save_efer_eax - wakeup_start (%ebx)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ void apply_paravirt(struct paravirt_patc
+ 
+ 		BUG_ON(p->len > MAX_PATCH_LEN);
+ 		/* prep the buffer with the original instructions */
+-		memcpy(insnbuf, p->instr, p->len);
++		memcpy(insnbuf, ktla_ktva(p->instr), p->len);
+ 		used = pv_init_ops.patch(p->instrtype, p->clobbers, insnbuf,
+ 					 (unsigned long)p->instr, p->len);
+ 
+@@ -485,7 +485,19 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(voi
+  */
+ void __kprobes text_poke(void *addr, unsigned char *opcode, int len)
+ {
+-	memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	memcpy(ktla_ktva(addr), opcode, len);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	sync_core();
+ 	/* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but
+ 	   that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs. */
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(apm_waitq
+ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(apm_suspend_waitqueue);
+ static struct apm_user *user_list;
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(user_list_lock);
+-static const struct desc_struct	bad_bios_desc = { { { 0, 0x00409200 } } };
++static const struct desc_struct	bad_bios_desc = { { { 0, 0x00409300 } } };
+ 
+ static const char driver_version[] = "1.16ac";	/* no spaces */
+ 
+@@ -601,19 +601,42 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call(u32 func, u32 eb
+ 	struct desc_struct	save_desc_40;
+ 	struct desc_struct	*gdt;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long		cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	cpus = apm_save_cpus();
+ 
+ 	cpu = get_cpu();
+ 	gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
+ 	save_desc_40 = gdt[0x40 / 8];
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	gdt[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	apm_irq_save(flags);
+ 	APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS;
+ 	apm_bios_call_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi);
+ 	APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
+ 	apm_irq_restore(flags);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	gdt[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	put_cpu();
+ 	apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
+ 
+@@ -644,19 +667,42 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call_simple(u32 func,
+ 	struct desc_struct	save_desc_40;
+ 	struct desc_struct	*gdt;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long		cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	cpus = apm_save_cpus();
+ 
+ 	cpu = get_cpu();
+ 	gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
+ 	save_desc_40 = gdt[0x40 / 8];
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	gdt[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	apm_irq_save(flags);
+ 	APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS;
+ 	error = apm_bios_call_simple_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax);
+ 	APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
+ 	apm_irq_restore(flags);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	gdt[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	put_cpu();
+ 	apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
+ 	return error;
+@@ -925,7 +971,7 @@ recalc:
+ 
+ static void apm_power_off(void)
+ {
+-	unsigned char po_bios_call[] = {
++	const unsigned char po_bios_call[] = {
+ 		0xb8, 0x00, 0x10,	/* movw  $0x1000,ax  */
+ 		0x8e, 0xd0,		/* movw  ax,ss       */
+ 		0xbc, 0x00, 0xf0,	/* movw  $0xf000,sp  */
+@@ -1881,7 +1927,10 @@ static const struct file_operations apm_
+ static struct miscdevice apm_device = {
+ 	APM_MINOR_DEV,
+ 	"apm_bios",
+-	&apm_bios_fops
++	&apm_bios_fops,
++	{NULL, NULL},
++	NULL,
++	NULL
+ };
+ 
+ 
+@@ -2202,7 +2251,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata a
+ 		{	DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "IBM"), },
+ 	},
+ 
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -2221,6 +2270,10 @@ static int __init apm_init(void)
+ 	struct desc_struct *gdt;
+ 	int err;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	dmi_check_system(apm_dmi_table);
+ 
+ 	if (apm_info.bios.version == 0 || paravirt_enabled()) {
+@@ -2294,9 +2347,18 @@ static int __init apm_init(void)
+ 	 * This is for buggy BIOS's that refer to (real mode) segment 0x40
+ 	 * even though they are called in protected mode.
+ 	 */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	set_base(bad_bios_desc, __va((unsigned long)0x40 << 4));
+ 	_set_limit((char *)&bad_bios_desc, 4095 - (0x40 << 4));
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Set up the long jump entry point to the APM BIOS, which is called
+ 	 * from inline assembly.
+@@ -2315,6 +2377,11 @@ static int __init apm_init(void)
+ 	 * code to that CPU.
+ 	 */
+ 	gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(0);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	set_base(gdt[APM_CS >> 3],
+ 		 __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg << 4));
+ 	set_base(gdt[APM_CS_16 >> 3],
+@@ -2322,6 +2389,10 @@ static int __init apm_init(void)
+ 	set_base(gdt[APM_DS >> 3],
+ 		 __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.dseg << 4));
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	apm_proc = create_proc_entry("apm", 0, NULL);
+ 	if (apm_proc)
+ 		apm_proc->proc_fops = &apm_file_ops;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ void foo(void)
+ 	DEFINE(PTRS_PER_PTE, PTRS_PER_PTE);
+ 	DEFINE(PTRS_PER_PMD, PTRS_PER_PMD);
+ 	DEFINE(PTRS_PER_PGD, PTRS_PER_PGD);
++	DEFINE(PERCPU_MODULE_RESERVE, PERCPU_MODULE_RESERVE);
+ 
+ 	OFFSET(crypto_tfm_ctx_offset, crypto_tfm, __crt_ctx);
+ 
+@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ void foo(void)
+ 	OFFSET(PV_CPU_iret, pv_cpu_ops, iret);
+ 	OFFSET(PV_CPU_irq_enable_syscall_ret, pv_cpu_ops, irq_enable_syscall_ret);
+ 	OFFSET(PV_CPU_read_cr0, pv_cpu_ops, read_cr0);
++	OFFSET(PV_CPU_write_cr0, pv_cpu_ops, write_cr0);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int main(void)
+ 	ENTRY(cr8);
+ 	BLANK();
+ #undef ENTRY
++	DEFINE(TSS_size, sizeof(struct tss_struct));
+ 	DEFINE(TSS_ist, offsetof(struct tss_struct, x86_tss.ist));
+ 	BLANK();
+ 	DEFINE(crypto_tfm_ctx_offset, offsetof(struct crypto_tfm, __crt_ctx));
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/percpu.h>
+-#include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <asm/semaphore.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+ #include <asm/i387.h>
+@@ -21,42 +20,6 @@
+ 
+ #include "cpu.h"
+ 
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct gdt_page, gdt_page) = { .gdt = {
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00cf9a00 } } },
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00cf9200 } } },
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00cffa00 } } },
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00cff200 } } },
+-	/*
+-	 * Segments used for calling PnP BIOS have byte granularity.
+-	 * They code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits,
+-	 * the transfer segment sizes are set at run time.
+-	 */
+-	/* 32-bit code */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00409a00 } } },
+-	/* 16-bit code */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00009a00 } } },
+-	/* 16-bit data */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00009200 } } },
+-	/* 16-bit data */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1] = { { { 0x00000000, 0x00009200 } } },
+-	/* 16-bit data */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2] = { { { 0x00000000, 0x00009200 } } },
+-	/*
+-	 * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
+-	 * are set at run time.  All have 64k limits.
+-	 */
+-	/* 32-bit code */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00409a00 } } },
+-	/* 16-bit code */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00009a00 } } },
+-	/* data */
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2] = { { { 0x0000ffff, 0x00409200 } } },
+-
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = { { { 0x00000000, 0x00c09200 } } },
+-	[GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = { { { 0x00000000, 0x00000000 } } },
+-} };
+-EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(gdt_page);
+-
+ __u32 cleared_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __cpuinitdata;
+ 
+ static int cachesize_override __cpuinitdata = -1;
+@@ -478,6 +441,10 @@ void __cpuinit identify_cpu(struct cpuin
+ 	 * we do "generic changes."
+ 	 */
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF)
++	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEP);
++#endif
++
+ 	/* If the model name is still unset, do table lookup. */
+ 	if ( !c->x86_model_id[0] ) {
+ 		char *p;
+@@ -614,7 +581,7 @@ static __init int setup_disablecpuid(cha
+ }
+ __setup("clearcpuid=", setup_disablecpuid);
+ 
+-cpumask_t cpu_initialized __cpuinitdata = CPU_MASK_NONE;
++cpumask_t cpu_initialized = CPU_MASK_NONE;
+ 
+ /* This is hacky. :)
+  * We're emulating future behavior.
+@@ -650,7 +617,7 @@ void switch_to_new_gdt(void)
+ {
+ 	struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
+ 
+-	gdt_descr.address = (long)get_cpu_gdt_table(smp_processor_id());
++	gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_table(smp_processor_id());
+ 	gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
+ 	load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
+ 	asm("mov %0, %%fs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_PERCPU) : "memory");
+@@ -666,7 +633,7 @@ void __cpuinit cpu_init(void)
+ {
+ 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ 	struct task_struct *curr = current;
+-	struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *t = init_tss + cpu;
+ 	struct thread_struct *thread = &curr->thread;
+ 
+ 	if (cpu_test_and_set(cpu, cpu_initialized)) {
+@@ -721,7 +688,7 @@ void __cpuinit cpu_init(void)
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
+-void __cpuinit cpu_uninit(void)
++void cpu_uninit(void)
+ {
+ 	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ 	cpu_clear(cpu, cpu_initialized);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id sw_any
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "X6DLP"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }
+ };
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static struct cpu_model models[] =
+ 	{ &cpu_ids[CPU_MP4HT_D0], NULL, 0, NULL },
+ 	{ &cpu_ids[CPU_MP4HT_E0], NULL, 0, NULL },
+ 
+-	{ NULL, }
++	{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ #undef _BANIAS
+ #undef BANIAS
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static void __cpuinit trap_init_f00f_bug
+ 	 * Update the IDT descriptor and reload the IDT so that
+ 	 * it uses the read-only mapped virtual address.
+ 	 */
+-	idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_F00F_IDT);
++	idt_descr.address = (struct desc_struct *)fix_to_virt(FIX_F00F_IDT);
+ 	load_idt(&idt_descr);
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ static struct miscdevice mce_log_device 
+ 	MISC_MCELOG_MINOR,
+ 	"mcelog",
+ 	&mce_chrdev_ops,
++	{NULL, NULL}, NULL, NULL
+ };
+ 
+ static unsigned long old_cr4 __initdata;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ static struct fixed_range_block fixed_ra
+ 	{ MTRRfix64K_00000_MSR, 1 }, /* one  64k MTRR  */
+ 	{ MTRRfix16K_80000_MSR, 2 }, /* two  16k MTRRs */
+ 	{ MTRRfix4K_C0000_MSR,  8 }, /* eight 4k MTRRs */
+-	{}
++	{ 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static unsigned long smp_changes_mask;
+-static struct mtrr_state mtrr_state = {};
++static struct mtrr_state mtrr_state;
+ 
+ #undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
+ #define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "mtrr."
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(struct not
+ 	local_irq_disable();
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+-	if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
++	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+ 		crash_fixup_ss_esp(&fixed_regs, regs);
+ 		regs = &fixed_regs;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/doublefault_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/doublefault_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/doublefault_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/doublefault_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
+ 
+ #define DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE (1024)
+ static unsigned long doublefault_stack[DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE];
+-#define STACK_START (unsigned long)(doublefault_stack+DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE)
++#define STACK_START (unsigned long)(doublefault_stack+DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE-2)
+ 
+ #define ptr_ok(x) ((x) > PAGE_OFFSET && (x) < PAGE_OFFSET + MAXMEM)
+ 
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static void doublefault_fn(void)
+ 	unsigned long gdt, tss;
+ 
+ 	store_gdt(&gdt_desc);
+-	gdt = gdt_desc.address;
++	gdt = (unsigned long)gdt_desc.address;
+ 
+ 	printk(KERN_EMERG "PANIC: double fault, gdt at %08lx [%d bytes]\n", gdt, gdt_desc.size);
+ 
+@@ -60,10 +60,10 @@ struct tss_struct doublefault_tss __cach
+ 		/* 0x2 bit is always set */
+ 		.flags		= X86_EFLAGS_SF | 0x2,
+ 		.sp		= STACK_START,
+-		.es		= __USER_DS,
++		.es		= __KERNEL_DS,
+ 		.cs		= __KERNEL_CS,
+ 		.ss		= __KERNEL_DS,
+-		.ds		= __USER_DS,
++		.ds		= __KERNEL_DS,
+ 		.fs		= __KERNEL_PERCPU,
+ 
+ 		.__cr3		= __pa(swapper_pg_dir)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/efi_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/efi_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/efi_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/efi_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -38,70 +38,37 @@
+  */
+ 
+ static unsigned long efi_rt_eflags;
+-static pgd_t efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[2];
++static pgd_t __initdata efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[KERNEL_PGD_PTRS] __attribute__ ((aligned (4096)));
+ 
+-void efi_call_phys_prelog(void)
++void __init efi_call_phys_prelog(void)
+ {
+-	unsigned long cr4;
+-	unsigned long temp;
+ 	struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
+ 
+ 	local_irq_save(efi_rt_eflags);
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * If I don't have PSE, I should just duplicate two entries in page
+-	 * directory. If I have PSE, I just need to duplicate one entry in
+-	 * page directory.
+-	 */
+-	cr4 = read_cr4();
+-
+-	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PSE) {
+-		efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd =
+-		    swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd;
+-		swapper_pg_dir[0].pgd =
+-		    swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET)].pgd;
+-	} else {
+-		efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd =
+-		    swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd;
+-		efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[1].pgd =
+-		    swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0x400000)].pgd;
+-		swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd =
+-		    swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET)].pgd;
+-		temp = PAGE_OFFSET + 0x400000;
+-		swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0x400000)].pgd =
+-		    swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(temp)].pgd;
+-	}
++	clone_pgd_range(efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer, swapper_pg_dir, KERNEL_PGD_PTRS);
++	clone_pgd_range(swapper_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir + USER_PGD_PTRS,
++			min_t(unsigned long, KERNEL_PGD_PTRS, USER_PGD_PTRS));
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * After the lock is released, the original page table is restored.
+ 	 */
+ 	__flush_tlb_all();
+ 
+-	gdt_descr.address = __pa(get_cpu_gdt_table(0));
++	gdt_descr.address = (struct desc_struct *)__pa(get_cpu_gdt_table(0));
+ 	gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
+ 	load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
+ }
+ 
+-void efi_call_phys_epilog(void)
++void __init efi_call_phys_epilog(void)
+ {
+-	unsigned long cr4;
+ 	struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
+ 
+-	gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_table(0);
++	gdt_descr.address = get_cpu_gdt_table(0);
+ 	gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
+ 	load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
+ 
+-	cr4 = read_cr4();
+-
+-	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PSE) {
+-		swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd =
+-		    efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd;
+-	} else {
+-		swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd =
+-		    efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd;
+-		swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0x400000)].pgd =
+-		    efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[1].pgd;
+-	}
++	clone_pgd_range(swapper_pg_dir, efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer, KERNEL_PGD_PTRS);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * After the lock is released, the original page table is restored.
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/efi_stub_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/efi_stub_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/efi_stub_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/efi_stub_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include <linux/linkage.h>
++#include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@
+  * service functions will comply with gcc calling convention, too.
+  */
+ 
+-.text
++__INIT
+ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
+ 	/*
+ 	 * 0. The function can only be called in Linux kernel. So CS has been
+@@ -36,9 +37,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
+ 	 * The mapping of lower virtual memory has been created in prelog and
+ 	 * epilog.
+ 	 */
+-	movl	$1f, %edx
+-	subl	$__PAGE_OFFSET, %edx
+-	jmp	*%edx
++	jmp	1f-__PAGE_OFFSET
+ 1:
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -47,14 +46,8 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
+ 	 * parameter 2, ..., param n. To make things easy, we save the return
+ 	 * address of efi_call_phys in a global variable.
+ 	 */
+-	popl	%edx
+-	movl	%edx, saved_return_addr
+-	/* get the function pointer into ECX*/
+-	popl	%ecx
+-	movl	%ecx, efi_rt_function_ptr
+-	movl	$2f, %edx
+-	subl	$__PAGE_OFFSET, %edx
+-	pushl	%edx
++	popl	(saved_return_addr)
++	popl	(efi_rt_function_ptr)
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * 3. Clear PG bit in %CR0.
+@@ -73,9 +66,8 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
+ 	/*
+ 	 * 5. Call the physical function.
+ 	 */
+-	jmp	*%ecx
++	call	*(efi_rt_function_ptr-__PAGE_OFFSET)
+ 
+-2:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * 6. After EFI runtime service returns, control will return to
+ 	 * following instruction. We'd better readjust stack pointer first.
+@@ -88,34 +80,27 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
+ 	movl	%cr0, %edx
+ 	orl	$0x80000000, %edx
+ 	movl	%edx, %cr0
+-	jmp	1f
+-1:
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * 8. Now restore the virtual mode from flat mode by
+ 	 * adding EIP with PAGE_OFFSET.
+ 	 */
+-	movl	$1f, %edx
+-	jmp	*%edx
++	jmp	1f+__PAGE_OFFSET
+ 1:
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * 9. Balance the stack. And because EAX contain the return value,
+ 	 * we'd better not clobber it.
+ 	 */
+-	leal	efi_rt_function_ptr, %edx
+-	movl	(%edx), %ecx
+-	pushl	%ecx
++	pushl	(efi_rt_function_ptr)
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * 10. Push the saved return address onto the stack and return.
++	 * 10. Return to the saved return address.
+ 	 */
+-	leal	saved_return_addr, %edx
+-	movl	(%edx), %ecx
+-	pushl	%ecx
+-	ret
++	jmpl	*(saved_return_addr)
+ .previous
+ 
+-.data
++__INITDATA
+ saved_return_addr:
+ 	.long 0
+ efi_rt_function_ptr:
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ VM_MASK		= 0x00020000
+ #define resume_userspace_sig	resume_userspace
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define SAVE_ALL \
++#define __SAVE_ALL(_DS) \
+ 	cld; \
+ 	pushl %fs; \
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4;\
+@@ -129,12 +129,26 @@ VM_MASK		= 0x00020000
+ 	pushl %ebx; \
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4;\
+ 	CFI_REL_OFFSET ebx, 0;\
+-	movl $(__USER_DS), %edx; \
++	movl $(_DS), %edx; \
+ 	movl %edx, %ds; \
+ 	movl %edx, %es; \
+ 	movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %edx; \
+ 	movl %edx, %fs
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#define SAVE_ALL \
++	__SAVE_ALL(__KERNEL_DS); \
++	GET_CR0_INTO_EDX; \
++	movl %edx, %esi; \
++	orl $X86_CR0_WP, %edx; \
++	xorl %edx, %esi; \
++	SET_CR0_FROM_EDX
++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF)
++#define SAVE_ALL __SAVE_ALL(__KERNEL_DS)
++#else
++#define SAVE_ALL __SAVE_ALL(__USER_DS)
++#endif
++
+ #define RESTORE_INT_REGS \
+ 	popl %ebx;	\
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4;\
+@@ -225,6 +239,11 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
+ 	popfl
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	xorl %esi, %esi
++#endif
++
+ 	jmp syscall_exit
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+ END(ret_from_fork)
+@@ -248,7 +267,17 @@ check_userspace:
+ 	movb PT_CS(%esp), %al
+ 	andl $(VM_MASK | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %eax
+ 	cmpl $USER_RPL, %eax
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	jae resume_userspace
++
++	GET_CR0_INTO_EDX
++	xorl %esi, %edx
++	SET_CR0_FROM_EDX
++	jmp resume_kernel
++#else
+ 	jb resume_kernel		# not returning to v8086 or userspace
++#endif
+ 
+ ENTRY(resume_userspace)
+ 	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
+@@ -308,10 +337,9 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
+ 	/*CFI_REL_OFFSET cs, 0*/
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Push current_thread_info()->sysenter_return to the stack.
+-	 * A tiny bit of offset fixup is necessary - 4*4 means the 4 words
+-	 * pushed above; +8 corresponds to copy_thread's esp0 setting.
+ 	 */
+-	pushl (TI_sysenter_return-THREAD_SIZE+8+4*4)(%esp)
++	GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
++	pushl TI_sysenter_return(%ebp)
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
+ 	CFI_REL_OFFSET eip, 0
+ 
+@@ -319,9 +347,17 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
+  * Load the potential sixth argument from user stack.
+  * Careful about security.
+  */
++	movl 12(%esp),%ebp
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
++	mov 16(%esp),%ds
++1:	movl %ds:(%ebp),%ebp
++#else
+ 	cmpl $__PAGE_OFFSET-3,%ebp
+ 	jae syscall_fault
+ 1:	movl (%ebp),%ebp
++#endif
++
+ .section __ex_table,"a"
+ 	.align 4
+ 	.long 1b,syscall_fault
+@@ -345,20 +381,37 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
+ 	movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
+ 	testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx
+ 	jne syscall_exit_work
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++	pushl %eax
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	call pax_randomize_kstack
++	popl %eax
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++#endif
++
+ /* if something modifies registers it must also disable sysexit */
+ 	movl PT_EIP(%esp), %edx
+ 	movl PT_OLDESP(%esp), %ecx
+ 	xorl %ebp,%ebp
+ 	TRACE_IRQS_ON
+ 1:	mov  PT_FS(%esp), %fs
++2:	mov  PT_DS(%esp), %ds
++3:	mov  PT_ES(%esp), %es
+ 	ENABLE_INTERRUPTS_SYSCALL_RET
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+ .pushsection .fixup,"ax"
+-2:	movl $0,PT_FS(%esp)
++4:	movl $0,PT_FS(%esp)
++	jmp 1b
++5:	movl $0,PT_DS(%esp)
++	jmp 1b
++6:	movl $0,PT_ES(%esp)
+ 	jmp 1b
+ .section __ex_table,"a"
+ 	.align 4
+-	.long 1b,2b
++	.long 1b,4b
++	.long 2b,5b
++	.long 3b,6b
+ .popsection
+ ENDPROC(ia32_sysenter_target)
+ 
+@@ -392,6 +445,10 @@ no_singlestep:
+ 	testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx	# current->work
+ 	jne syscall_exit_work
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++	call pax_randomize_kstack
++#endif
++
+ restore_all:
+ 	movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %eax	# mix EFLAGS, SS and CS
+ 	# Warning: PT_OLDSS(%esp) contains the wrong/random values if we
+@@ -485,25 +542,19 @@ work_resched:
+ 
+ work_notifysig:				# deal with pending signals and
+ 					# notify-resume requests
++	movl %esp, %eax
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VM86
+ 	testl $VM_MASK, PT_EFLAGS(%esp)
+-	movl %esp, %eax
+-	jne work_notifysig_v86		# returning to kernel-space or
++	jz 1f				# returning to kernel-space or
+ 					# vm86-space
+-	xorl %edx, %edx
+-	call do_notify_resume
+-	jmp resume_userspace_sig
+ 
+-	ALIGN
+-work_notifysig_v86:
+ 	pushl %ecx			# save ti_flags for do_notify_resume
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
+ 	call save_v86_state		# %eax contains pt_regs pointer
+ 	popl %ecx
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	movl %eax, %esp
+-#else
+-	movl %esp, %eax
++1:
+ #endif
+ 	xorl %edx, %edx
+ 	call do_notify_resume
+@@ -557,17 +608,24 @@ syscall_badsys:
+ END(syscall_badsys)
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+ 
+-#define FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK \
+-	/* since we are on a wrong stack, we cant make it a C code :( */ \
+-	PER_CPU(gdt_page, %ebx); \
+-	GET_DESC_BASE(GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS, %ebx, %eax, %ax, %al, %ah); \
+-	addl %esp, %eax; \
+-	pushl $__KERNEL_DS; \
+-	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4; \
+-	pushl %eax; \
+-	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4; \
+-	lss (%esp), %esp; \
++.macro FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK
++	/* since we are on a wrong stack, we cant make it a C code :( */
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++	movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_number), %ebx;
++	shll $PAGE_SHIFT_asm, %ebx;
++	addl $cpu_gdt_table, %ebx;
++#else
++	movl $cpu_gdt_table, %ebx;
++#endif
++	GET_DESC_BASE(GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS, %ebx, %eax, %ax, %al, %ah);
++	addl %esp, %eax;
++	pushl $__KERNEL_DS;
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4;
++	pushl %eax;
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4;
++	lss (%esp), %esp;
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -8;
++.endm
+ #define UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK \
+ 	movl %ss, %eax; \
+ 	/* see if on espfix stack */ \
+@@ -584,7 +642,7 @@ END(syscall_badsys)
+  * Build the entry stubs and pointer table with
+  * some assembler magic.
+  */
+-.section .rodata,"a"
++.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(interrupt)
+ .text
+ 
+@@ -684,12 +742,21 @@ error_code:
+ 	popl %ecx
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	/*CFI_REGISTER es, ecx*/
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	GET_CR0_INTO_EDX
++	movl %edx, %esi
++	orl $X86_CR0_WP, %edx
++	xorl %edx, %esi
++	SET_CR0_FROM_EDX
++#endif
++
+ 	movl PT_FS(%esp), %edi		# get the function address
+ 	movl PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp), %edx	# get the error code
+ 	movl $-1, PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp)	# no syscall to restart
+ 	mov  %ecx, PT_FS(%esp)
+ 	/*CFI_REL_OFFSET fs, ES*/
+-	movl $(__USER_DS), %ecx
++	movl $(__KERNEL_DS), %ecx
+ 	movl %ecx, %ds
+ 	movl %ecx, %es
+ 	movl %esp,%eax			# pt_regs pointer
+@@ -823,6 +890,13 @@ nmi_stack_correct:
+ 	xorl %edx,%edx		# zero error code
+ 	movl %esp,%eax		# pt_regs pointer
+ 	call do_nmi
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	GET_CR0_INTO_EDX
++	xorl %esi, %edx
++	SET_CR0_FROM_EDX
++#endif
++
+ 	jmp restore_nocheck_notrace
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+ 
+@@ -863,6 +937,13 @@ nmi_espfix_stack:
+ 	FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK		# %eax == %esp
+ 	xorl %edx,%edx			# zero error code
+ 	call do_nmi
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	GET_CR0_INTO_EDX
++	xorl %esi, %edx
++	SET_CR0_FROM_EDX
++#endif
++
+ 	RESTORE_REGS
+ 	lss 12+4(%esp), %esp		# back to espfix stack
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -24
+@@ -1107,7 +1188,6 @@ ENDPROC(xen_failsafe_callback)
+ 
+ #endif	/* CONFIG_XEN */
+ 
+-.section .rodata,"a"
+ #include "syscall_table_32.S"
+ 
+ syscall_table_size=(.-sys_call_table)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -769,17 +769,18 @@ END(spurious_interrupt)
+ 	xorl  %ebx,%ebx
+ 1:
+ 	.if \ist
+-	movq	%gs:pda_data_offset, %rbp
++	imul	$TSS_size, %gs:pda_cpunumber, %ebp
++	lea	init_tss(%rbp), %rbp
+ 	.endif
+ 	movq %rsp,%rdi
+ 	movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp),%rsi
+ 	movq $-1,ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
+ 	.if \ist
+-	subq	$EXCEPTION_STKSZ, per_cpu__init_tss + TSS_ist + (\ist - 1) * 8(%rbp)
++	subq	$EXCEPTION_STKSZ, TSS_ist + (\ist - 1) * 8(%rbp)
+ 	.endif
+ 	call \sym
+ 	.if \ist
+-	addq	$EXCEPTION_STKSZ, per_cpu__init_tss + TSS_ist + (\ist - 1) * 8(%rbp)
++	addq	$EXCEPTION_STKSZ, TSS_ist + (\ist - 1) * 8(%rbp)
+ 	.endif
+ 	DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
+ 	.if \irqtrace
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * r
+ 	/* Make NULL pointers segfault */
+ 	zap_identity_mappings();
+ 
++	for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++)
++		cpu_pda(i) = &boot_cpu_pda[i];
++
++	pda_init(0);
++
+ 	/* Cleanup the over mapped high alias */
+ 	cleanup_highmap();
+ 
+@@ -102,10 +107,6 @@ void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * r
+ 
+ 	early_printk("Kernel alive\n");
+ 
+- 	for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++)
+- 		cpu_pda(i) = &boot_cpu_pda[i];
+-
+-	pda_init(0);
+ 	copy_bootdata(__va(real_mode_data));
+ 
+ 	reserve_early(__pa_symbol(&_text), __pa_symbol(&_end), "TEXT DATA BSS");
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+ #include <asm/setup.h>
+ #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
++#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+ 
+ /* Physical address */
+ #define pa(X) ((X) - __PAGE_OFFSET)
+@@ -65,17 +66,22 @@ LOW_PAGES = 1<<(32-PAGE_SHIFT_asm)
+ LOW_PAGES = LOW_PAGES + 0x1000000
+ #endif
+ 
+-#if PTRS_PER_PMD > 1
+-PAGE_TABLE_SIZE = (LOW_PAGES / PTRS_PER_PMD) + PTRS_PER_PGD
+-#else
+-PAGE_TABLE_SIZE = (LOW_PAGES / PTRS_PER_PGD)
+-#endif
++PAGE_TABLE_SIZE = (LOW_PAGES / PTRS_PER_PTE)
+ BOOTBITMAP_SIZE = LOW_PAGES / 8
+ ALLOCATOR_SLOP = 4
+ 
+ INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END = BOOTBITMAP_SIZE + (PAGE_TABLE_SIZE + ALLOCATOR_SLOP)*PAGE_SIZE_asm
+ 
+ /*
++ * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
++ */
++ENTRY(stext)
++ENTRY(_stext)
++
++.section .text.startup,"ax",@progbits
++	ljmp $(__BOOT_CS),$phys_startup_32
++
++/*
+  * 32-bit kernel entrypoint; only used by the boot CPU.  On entry,
+  * %esi points to the real-mode code as a 32-bit pointer.
+  * CS and DS must be 4 GB flat segments, but we don't depend on
+@@ -83,6 +89,12 @@ INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END = BOOTBITMAP_SIZE + 
+  * can.
+  */
+ .section .text.head,"ax",@progbits
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++/* PaX: fill first page in .text with int3 to catch NULL derefs in kernel mode */
++.fill 4096,1,0xcc
++#endif
++
+ ENTRY(startup_32)
+ 	/* test KEEP_SEGMENTS flag to see if the bootloader is asking
+ 		us to not reload segments */
+@@ -100,6 +112,43 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
+ 	movl %eax,%gs
+ 2:
+ 
++	movl $__per_cpu_start,%eax
++	movw %ax,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_PERCPU + 2)
++	rorl $16,%eax
++	movb %al,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_PERCPU + 4)
++	movb %ah,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_PERCPU + 7)
++	movl $__per_cpu_end + PERCPU_MODULE_RESERVE - 1,%eax
++	subl $__per_cpu_start,%eax
++	movw %ax,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_PERCPU + 0)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
++	/* check for VMware */
++	movl $0x564d5868,%eax
++	xorl %ebx,%ebx
++	movl $0xa,%ecx
++	movl $0x5658,%edx
++	in (%dx),%eax
++	cmpl $0x564d5868,%ebx
++	jz 1f
++
++	movl $((((__PAGE_OFFSET-1) & 0xf0000000) >> 12) | 0x00c09700),%eax
++	movl %eax,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS * 8 + 4)
++1:
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	movl $KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET,%eax
++	movw %ax,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 2)
++	rorl $16,%eax
++	movb %al,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 4)
++	movb %ah,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 7)
++
++	movb %al,(boot_gdt - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 4)
++	movb %ah,(boot_gdt - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 7)
++	rorl $16,%eax
++	movw %ax,(boot_gdt - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 2)
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Clear BSS first so that there are no surprises...
+  */
+@@ -143,9 +192,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
+ 	cmpl $num_subarch_entries, %eax
+ 	jae bad_subarch
+ 
+-	movl pa(subarch_entries)(,%eax,4), %eax
+-	subl $__PAGE_OFFSET, %eax
+-	jmp *%eax
++	jmp *pa(subarch_entries)(,%eax,4)
+ 
+ bad_subarch:
+ WEAK(lguest_entry)
+@@ -157,9 +204,9 @@ WEAK(xen_entry)
+ 	__INITDATA
+ 
+ subarch_entries:
+-	.long default_entry		/* normal x86/PC */
+-	.long lguest_entry		/* lguest hypervisor */
+-	.long xen_entry			/* Xen hypervisor */
++	.long pa(default_entry)		/* normal x86/PC */
++	.long pa(lguest_entry)		/* lguest hypervisor */
++	.long pa(xen_entry)		/* Xen hypervisor */
+ num_subarch_entries = (. - subarch_entries) / 4
+ .previous
+ #endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
+@@ -173,7 +220,7 @@ num_subarch_entries = (. - subarch_entri
+  *
+  * Note that the stack is not yet set up!
+  */
+-#define PTE_ATTR	0x007		/* PRESENT+RW+USER */
++#define PTE_ATTR	0x067		/* PRESENT+RW+USER+DIRTY+ACCESSED */
+ #define PDE_ATTR	0x067		/* PRESENT+RW+USER+DIRTY+ACCESSED */
+ #define PGD_ATTR	0x001		/* PRESENT (no other attributes) */
+ 
+@@ -222,8 +269,7 @@ default_entry:
+ 	movl %edi,pa(init_pg_tables_end)
+ 
+ 	/* Do early initialization of the fixmap area */
+-	movl $pa(swapper_pg_fixmap)+PDE_ATTR,%eax
+-	movl %eax,pa(swapper_pg_pmd+0x1000*KPMDS-8)
++	movl $pa(swapper_pg_fixmap)+PDE_ATTR,pa(swapper_pg_pmd+0x1000*KPMDS-8)
+ #else	/* Not PAE */
+ 
+ page_pde_offset = (__PAGE_OFFSET >> 20);
+@@ -252,8 +298,7 @@ page_pde_offset = (__PAGE_OFFSET >> 20);
+ 	movl %edi,pa(init_pg_tables_end)
+ 
+ 	/* Do early initialization of the fixmap area */
+-	movl $pa(swapper_pg_fixmap)+PDE_ATTR,%eax
+-	movl %eax,pa(swapper_pg_dir+0xffc)
++	movl $pa(swapper_pg_fixmap)+PDE_ATTR,pa(swapper_pg_dir+0xffc)
+ #endif
+ 	jmp 3f
+ /*
+@@ -317,13 +362,16 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
+ 	jnc 6f
+ 
+ 	/* Setup EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */
+-	movl $0xc0000080, %ecx
++	movl $MSR_EFER, %ecx
+ 	rdmsr
+ 
+ 	btsl $11, %eax
+ 	/* Make changes effective */
+ 	wrmsr
+ 
++	btsl $63-32,pa(__supported_pte_mask+4)
++	movl $1,pa(nx_enabled)
++
+ 6:
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -349,9 +397,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ 	cmpb $0, ready
+-	jz  1f				/* Initial CPU cleans BSS */
+-	jmp checkCPUtype
+-1:
++	jnz checkCPUtype		/* Initial CPU cleans BSS */
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -428,12 +474,12 @@ is386:	movl $2,%ecx		# set MP
+ 	ljmp $(__KERNEL_CS),$1f
+ 1:	movl $(__KERNEL_DS),%eax	# reload all the segment registers
+ 	movl %eax,%ss			# after changing gdt.
+-	movl %eax,%fs			# gets reset once there's real percpu
+-
+-	movl $(__USER_DS),%eax		# DS/ES contains default USER segment
+ 	movl %eax,%ds
+ 	movl %eax,%es
+ 
++	movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %eax
++	movl %eax,%fs			# set this cpu's percpu
++
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax			# Clear GS and LDT
+ 	movl %eax,%gs
+ 	lldt %ax
+@@ -444,11 +490,7 @@ is386:	movl $2,%ecx		# set MP
+ 	movb ready, %cl
+ 	movb $1, ready
+ 	cmpb $0,%cl		# the first CPU calls start_kernel
+-	je   1f
+-	movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %eax
+-	movl %eax,%fs		# set this cpu's percpu
+-	jmp initialize_secondary # all other CPUs call initialize_secondary
+-1:
++	jne initialize_secondary # all other CPUs call initialize_secondary
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+ 	jmp start_kernel
+ 
+@@ -534,15 +576,15 @@ early_page_fault:
+ 	jmp early_fault
+ 
+ early_fault:
+-	cld
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
++	cmpl $2,%ss:early_recursion_flag
++	je hlt_loop
++	incl %ss:early_recursion_flag
++	cld
+ 	pusha
+ 	movl $(__KERNEL_DS),%eax
+ 	movl %eax,%ds
+ 	movl %eax,%es
+-	cmpl $2,early_recursion_flag
+-	je hlt_loop
+-	incl early_recursion_flag
+ 	movl %cr2,%eax
+ 	pushl %eax
+ 	pushl %edx		/* trapno */
+@@ -552,8 +594,8 @@ early_fault:
+ #else
+ 	call printk
+ #endif
+-#endif
+ 	call dump_stack
++#endif
+ hlt_loop:
+ 	hlt
+ 	jmp hlt_loop
+@@ -561,8 +603,11 @@ hlt_loop:
+ /* This is the default interrupt "handler" :-) */
+ 	ALIGN
+ ignore_int:
+-	cld
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
++	cmpl $2,%ss:early_recursion_flag
++	je hlt_loop
++	incl %ss:early_recursion_flag
++	cld
+ 	pushl %eax
+ 	pushl %ecx
+ 	pushl %edx
+@@ -571,9 +616,6 @@ ignore_int:
+ 	movl $(__KERNEL_DS),%eax
+ 	movl %eax,%ds
+ 	movl %eax,%es
+-	cmpl $2,early_recursion_flag
+-	je hlt_loop
+-	incl early_recursion_flag
+ 	pushl 16(%esp)
+ 	pushl 24(%esp)
+ 	pushl 32(%esp)
+@@ -593,36 +635,41 @@ ignore_int:
+ #endif
+ 	iret
+ 
+-.section .text
+-/*
+- * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
+- */
+-ENTRY(stext)
+-ENTRY(_stext)
+-
+ /*
+  * BSS section
+  */
+-.section ".bss.page_aligned","wa"
+-	.align PAGE_SIZE_asm
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++.section .swapper_pg_pmd,"a",@progbits
+ swapper_pg_pmd:
+ 	.fill 1024*KPMDS,4,0
+ #else
++.section .swapper_pg_dir,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir)
+ 	.fill 1024,4,0
+ #endif
+ swapper_pg_fixmap:
+ 	.fill 1024,4,0
++
++.section .empty_zero_page,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(empty_zero_page)
+ 	.fill 4096,1,0
++
++/*
++ * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
++ * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
++ * for this.
++ */
++.section .idt,"a",@progbits
++ENTRY(idt_table)
++	.fill 256,8,0
++
+ /*
+  * This starts the data section.
+  */
++.data
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
+-.section ".data.page_aligned","wa"
+-	/* Page-aligned for the benefit of paravirt? */
+-	.align PAGE_SIZE_asm
++.section .swapper_pg_dir,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir)
+ 	.long	pa(swapper_pg_pmd+PGD_ATTR),0		/* low identity map */
+ # if KPMDS == 3
+@@ -645,11 +692,12 @@ ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir)
+ 
+ .data
+ ENTRY(stack_start)
+-	.long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE
++	.long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE-8
+ 	.long __BOOT_DS
+ 
+ ready:	.byte 0
+ 
++.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
+ early_recursion_flag:
+ 	.long 0
+ 
+@@ -695,7 +743,7 @@ idt_descr:
+ 	.word 0				# 32 bit align gdt_desc.address
+ ENTRY(early_gdt_descr)
+ 	.word GDT_ENTRIES*8-1
+-	.long per_cpu__gdt_page		/* Overwritten for secondary CPUs */
++	.long cpu_gdt_table		/* Overwritten for secondary CPUs */
+ 
+ /*
+  * The boot_gdt must mirror the equivalent in setup.S and is
+@@ -704,5 +752,61 @@ ENTRY(early_gdt_descr)
+ 	.align L1_CACHE_BYTES
+ ENTRY(boot_gdt)
+ 	.fill GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS,8,0
+-	.quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
+-	.quad 0x00cf92000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cf93000000ffff	/* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++
++	.align PAGE_SIZE_asm
++ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table)
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* NULL descriptor */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x0b reserved */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x13 reserved */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x1b reserved */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x20 unused */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x28 unused */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x33 TLS entry 1 */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x3b TLS entry 2 */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x43 TLS entry 3 */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x4b reserved */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x53 reserved */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x5b reserved */
++
++	.quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff	/* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cf93000000ffff	/* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cffb000000ffff	/* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++	.quad 0x00cff3000000ffff	/* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x80 TSS descriptor */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0x88 LDT descriptor */
++
++	/*
++	 * Segments used for calling PnP BIOS have byte granularity.
++	 * The code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits,
++	 * the transfer segment sizes are set at run time.
++	 */
++	.quad 0x00409b000000ffff	/* 0x90 32-bit code */
++	.quad 0x00009b000000ffff	/* 0x98 16-bit code */
++	.quad 0x000093000000ffff	/* 0xa0 16-bit data */
++	.quad 0x0000930000000000	/* 0xa8 16-bit data */
++	.quad 0x0000930000000000	/* 0xb0 16-bit data */
++
++	/*
++	 * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
++	 * are set at run time.  All have 64k limits.
++	 */
++	.quad 0x00409b000000ffff	/* 0xb8 APM CS    code */
++	.quad 0x00009b000000ffff	/* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
++	.quad 0x004093000000ffff	/* 0xc8 APM DS    data */
++
++	.quad 0x00c0930000000000	/* 0xd0 - ESPFIX SS */
++	.quad 0x0040930000000000	/* 0xd8 - PERCPU */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0xe0 - PCIBIOS_CS */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0xe8 - PCIBIOS_DS */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0xf0 - unused */
++	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* 0xf8 - GDT entry 31: double-fault TSS */
++
++	/* Be sure this is zeroed to avoid false validations in Xen */
++	.fill PAGE_SIZE_asm - GDT_ENTRIES,1,0
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++	.fill (NR_CPUS-1) * (PAGE_SIZE_asm),1,0 /* other CPU's GDT */
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -185,6 +185,10 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
+ 	btl	$20,%edi		/* No Execute supported? */
+ 	jnc     1f
+ 	btsl	$_EFER_NX, %eax
++	movq	$(init_level4_pgt), %rdi
++	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rdi
++	btsq	$_PAGE_BIT_NX, 8*258(%rdi)
++	btsq	$_PAGE_BIT_NX, 8*388(%rdi)
+ 1:	wrmsr				/* Make changes effective */
+ 
+ 	/* Setup cr0 */
+@@ -254,6 +258,9 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
+ 	pushq	%rax		# target address in negative space
+ 	lretq
+ 
++bad_address:
++	jmp bad_address
++
+ 	/* SMP bootup changes these two */
+ 	__REFDATA
+ 	.align	8
+@@ -264,9 +271,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
+ 	ENTRY(init_rsp)
+ 	.quad  init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE-8
+ 
+-bad_address:
+-	jmp bad_address
+-
++	__INIT
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK
+ .macro early_idt_tramp first, last
+ 	.ifgt \last-\first
+@@ -319,15 +324,18 @@ ENTRY(early_idt_handler)
+ 	jmp 1b
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK
++	__INITDATA
+ early_recursion_flag:
+ 	.long 0
+ 
++	.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
+ early_idt_msg:
+ 	.asciz "PANIC: early exception %02lx rip %lx:%lx error %lx cr2 %lx\n"
+ early_idt_ripmsg:
+ 	.asciz "RIP %s\n"
+ #endif /* CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK */
+ 
++	.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
+ .balign PAGE_SIZE
+ 
+ #define NEXT_PAGE(name) \
+@@ -352,7 +360,9 @@ NEXT_PAGE(init_level4_pgt)
+ 	.quad	level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
+ 	.fill	257,8,0
+ 	.quad	level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
+-	.fill	252,8,0
++	.fill	129,8,0
++	.quad	level3_vmalloc_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
++	.fill	122,8,0
+ 	/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024))/(2^39) = 511 */
+ 	.quad	level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE
+ 
+@@ -360,6 +370,9 @@ NEXT_PAGE(level3_ident_pgt)
+ 	.quad	level2_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
+ 	.fill	511,8,0
+ 
++NEXT_PAGE(level3_vmalloc_pgt)
++	.fill	512,8,0
++
+ NEXT_PAGE(level3_kernel_pgt)
+ 	.fill	510,8,0
+ 	/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024)-((2^39)*511))/(2^30) = 510 */
+@@ -401,19 +414,12 @@ NEXT_PAGE(level2_spare_pgt)
+ #undef PMDS
+ #undef NEXT_PAGE
+ 
+-	.data
+ 	.align 16
+ 	.globl cpu_gdt_descr
+ cpu_gdt_descr:
+-	.word	gdt_end-cpu_gdt_table-1
++	.word	GDT_SIZE-1
+ gdt:
+ 	.quad	cpu_gdt_table
+-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+-	.rept	NR_CPUS-1
+-	.word	0
+-	.quad	0
+-	.endr
+-#endif
+ 
+ ENTRY(phys_base)
+ 	/* This must match the first entry in level2_kernel_pgt */
+@@ -423,8 +429,7 @@ ENTRY(phys_base)
+  * IRET will check the segment types  kkeil 2000/10/28
+  * Also sysret mandates a special GDT layout 
+  */
+-		 		
+-	.section .data.page_aligned, "aw"
++
+ 	.align PAGE_SIZE
+ 
+ /* The TLS descriptors are currently at a different place compared to i386.
+@@ -443,15 +448,15 @@ ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table)
+ 	.quad	0,0			/* LDT */
+ 	.quad   0,0,0			/* three TLS descriptors */ 
+ 	.quad	0x0000f40000000000	/* node/CPU stored in limit */
+-gdt_end:	
+ 	/* asm/segment.h:GDT_ENTRIES must match this */	
+ 	/* This should be a multiple of the cache line size */
+-	/* GDTs of other CPUs are now dynamically allocated */
+ 
+ 	/* zero the remaining page */
+ 	.fill PAGE_SIZE / 8 - GDT_ENTRIES,8,0
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++	.fill (NR_CPUS-1) * (PAGE_SIZE),1,0 /* other CPU's GDT */
++#endif
+ 
+-	.section .bss, "aw", @nobits
+ 	.align L1_CACHE_BYTES
+ ENTRY(idt_table)
+ 	.skip 256 * 16
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void hpet_reserve_platform_timers
+ 	hd.hd_irq[1] = HPET_LEGACY_RTC;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 2; i < nrtimers; timer++, i++)
+-		hd.hd_irq[i] = (timer->hpet_config & Tn_INT_ROUTE_CNF_MASK) >>
++		hd.hd_irq[i] = (readl(&timer->hpet_config) & Tn_INT_ROUTE_CNF_MASK) >>
+ 			Tn_INT_ROUTE_CNF_SHIFT;
+ 
+ 	hpet_alloc(&hd);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -4,12 +4,16 @@
+ #include <asm/desc.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ 
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_gdt_table);
++
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__down_failed);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__down_failed_interruptible);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__down_failed_trylock);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__up_wakeup);
+ /* Networking helper routines. */
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_partial_copy_generic);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_partial_copy_generic_to_user);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_partial_copy_generic_from_user);
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_1);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_2);
+@@ -24,3 +28,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strstr);
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_partial);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET);
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/init_task.c b/arch/x86/kernel/init_task.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/init_task.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/init_task.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_task);
+  * section. Since TSS's are completely CPU-local, we want them
+  * on exact cacheline boundaries, to eliminate cacheline ping-pong.
+  */
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, init_tss) = INIT_TSS;
+-
++struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS] ____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp = { [0 ... NR_CPUS-1] = INIT_TSS };
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_tss);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */
+ static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, unsigned int base,
+@@ -40,6 +41,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long
+ 
+ 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++	if (turn_on) {
++		gr_handle_ioperm();
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+@@ -66,7 +73,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long
+ 	 * because the ->io_bitmap_max value must match the bitmap
+ 	 * contents:
+ 	 */
+-	tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
++	tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
+ 
+ 	set_bitmap(t->io_bitmap_ptr, from, num, !turn_on);
+ 
+@@ -121,8 +128,13 @@ static int do_iopl(unsigned int level, s
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
+ 	if (level > old) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++		gr_handle_iopl();
++		return -EPERM;
++#else
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ unsigned int do_IRQ(struct pt_regs *regs
+ 		int arg1, arg2, bx;
+ 
+ 		/* build the stack frame on the IRQ stack */
+-		isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx));
++		isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx) - 8);
+ 		irqctx->tinfo.task = curctx->tinfo.task;
+ 		irqctx->tinfo.previous_esp = current_stack_pointer;
+ 
+@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_softirq(void)
+ 		irqctx->tinfo.previous_esp = current_stack_pointer;
+ 
+ 		/* build the stack frame on the softirq stack */
+-		isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx));
++		isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx) - 8);
+ 
+ 		asm volatile(
+ 			"       xchgl   %%ebx,%%esp     \n"
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -166,9 +166,24 @@ static void __kprobes set_jmp_op(void *f
+ 		char op;
+ 		s32 raddr;
+ 	} __attribute__((packed)) * jop;
+-	jop = (struct __arch_jmp_op *)from;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
++	jop = (struct __arch_jmp_op *)(ktla_ktva(from));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	jop->raddr = (s32)((long)(to) - ((long)(from) + 5));
+ 	jop->op = RELATIVEJUMP_INSTRUCTION;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -342,16 +357,29 @@ static void __kprobes fix_riprel(struct 
+ 
+ static void __kprobes arch_copy_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
+ {
+-	memcpy(p->ainsn.insn, p->addr, MAX_INSN_SIZE * sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	memcpy(p->ainsn.insn, ktla_ktva(p->addr), MAX_INSN_SIZE * sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
+ 
+ 	fix_riprel(p);
+ 
+-	if (can_boost(p->addr))
++	if (can_boost(ktla_ktva(p->addr)))
+ 		p->ainsn.boostable = 0;
+ 	else
+ 		p->ainsn.boostable = -1;
+ 
+-	p->opcode = *p->addr;
++	p->opcode = *(ktla_ktva(p->addr));
+ }
+ 
+ int __kprobes arch_prepare_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
+@@ -428,7 +456,7 @@ static void __kprobes prepare_singlestep
+ 	if (p->opcode == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
+ 		regs->ip = (unsigned long)p->addr;
+ 	else
+-		regs->ip = (unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn;
++		regs->ip = ktva_ktla((unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Called with kretprobe_lock held */
+@@ -450,7 +478,7 @@ static void __kprobes setup_singlestep(s
+ 	if (p->ainsn.boostable == 1 && !p->post_handler) {
+ 		/* Boost up -- we can execute copied instructions directly */
+ 		reset_current_kprobe();
+-		regs->ip = (unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn;
++		regs->ip = ktva_ktla((unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn);
+ 		preempt_enable_no_resched();
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+@@ -772,7 +800,7 @@ static void __kprobes resume_execution(s
+ 		struct pt_regs *regs, struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long *tos = stack_addr(regs);
+-	unsigned long copy_ip = (unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn;
++	unsigned long copy_ip = ktva_ktla((unsigned long)p->ainsn.insn);
+ 	unsigned long orig_ip = (unsigned long)p->addr;
+ 	kprobe_opcode_t *insn = p->ainsn.insn;
+ 
+@@ -956,7 +984,7 @@ int __kprobes kprobe_exceptions_notify(s
+ 	struct die_args *args = data;
+ 	int ret = NOTIFY_DONE;
+ 
+-	if (args->regs && user_mode_vm(args->regs))
++	if (args->regs && user_mode(args->regs))
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+ 	switch (val) {
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int alloc_ldt(mm_context_t *pc, i
+ 		cpumask_t mask;
+ 
+ 		preempt_disable();
+-		load_LDT(pc);
++		load_LDT_nolock(pc);
+ 		mask = cpumask_of_cpu(smp_processor_id());
+ 		if (!cpus_equal(current->mm->cpu_vm_mask, mask))
+ 			smp_call_function(flush_ldt, NULL, 1, 1);
+@@ -110,6 +110,24 @@ int init_new_context(struct task_struct 
+ 		retval = copy_ldt(&mm->context, &old_mm->context);
+ 		mutex_unlock(&old_mm->context.lock);
+ 	}
++
++	if (tsk == current) {
++		mm->context.vdso = ~0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		mm->context.user_cs_base = 0UL;
++		mm->context.user_cs_limit = ~0UL;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++		cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++#endif
++
++#endif
++#endif
++
++	}
++
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -223,6 +241,13 @@ static int write_ldt(void __user *ptr, u
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (ldt_info.contents & MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_CODE)) {
++		error = -EINVAL;
++		goto out_unlock;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	fill_ldt(&ldt, &ldt_info);
+ 	if (oldmode)
+ 		ldt.avl = 0;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static u32 kexec_pmd1[1024] PAGE_ALIGNED
+ static u32 kexec_pte0[1024] PAGE_ALIGNED;
+ static u32 kexec_pte1[1024] PAGE_ALIGNED;
+ 
+-static void set_idt(void *newidt, __u16 limit)
++static void set_idt(struct desc_struct *newidt, __u16 limit)
+ {
+ 	struct desc_ptr curidt;
+ 
+@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static void set_idt(void *newidt, __u16 
+ };
+ 
+ 
+-static void set_gdt(void *newgdt, __u16 limit)
++static void set_gdt(struct desc_struct *newgdt, __u16 limit)
+ {
+ 	struct desc_ptr curgdt;
+ 
+@@ -111,10 +111,10 @@ NORET_TYPE void machine_kexec(struct kim
+ 	local_irq_disable();
+ 
+ 	control_page = page_address(image->control_code_page);
+-	memcpy(control_page, relocate_kernel, PAGE_SIZE);
++	memcpy(control_page, ktla_ktva(relocate_kernel), PAGE_SIZE);
+ 
+ 	page_list[PA_CONTROL_PAGE] = __pa(control_page);
+-	page_list[VA_CONTROL_PAGE] = (unsigned long)relocate_kernel;
++	page_list[VA_CONTROL_PAGE] = ktla_ktva((unsigned long)relocate_kernel);
+ 	page_list[PA_PGD] = __pa(kexec_pgd);
+ 	page_list[VA_PGD] = (unsigned long)kexec_pgd;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/module_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/bug.h>
+ 
++#include <asm/desc.h>
++
+ #if 0
+ #define DEBUGP printk
+ #else
+@@ -33,9 +35,31 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
+ {
+ 	if (size == 0)
+ 		return NULL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	return vmalloc(size);
++#else
+ 	return vmalloc_exec(size);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++void *module_alloc_exec(unsigned long size)
++{
++	struct vm_struct *area;
++
++	if (size == 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	area = __get_vm_area(size, VM_ALLOC, (unsigned long)&MODULES_VADDR, (unsigned long)&MODULES_END);
++	if (area)
++		return area->addr;
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_alloc_exec);
++#endif
+ 
+ /* Free memory returned from module_alloc */
+ void module_free(struct module *mod, void *module_region)
+@@ -45,6 +69,45 @@ void module_free(struct module *mod, voi
+            table entries. */
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++void module_free_exec(struct module *mod, void *module_region)
++{
++	struct vm_struct **p, *tmp;
++
++	if (!module_region)
++		return;
++
++	if ((PAGE_SIZE-1) & (unsigned long)module_region) {
++		printk(KERN_ERR "Trying to module_free_exec() bad address (%p)\n", module_region);
++		WARN_ON(1);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	write_lock(&vmlist_lock);
++	for (p = &vmlist; (tmp = *p) != NULL; p = &tmp->next)
++		 if (tmp->addr == module_region)
++			break;
++
++	if (tmp) {
++		unsigned long cr0;
++
++		pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++		memset(tmp->addr, 0xCC, tmp->size);
++		pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++
++		*p = tmp->next;
++		kfree(tmp);
++	}
++	write_unlock(&vmlist_lock);
++
++	if (!tmp) {
++		printk(KERN_ERR "Trying to module_free_exec() nonexistent vm area (%p)\n",
++				module_region);
++		WARN_ON(1);
++	}
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* We don't need anything special. */
+ int module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
+ 			      Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
+@@ -63,14 +126,20 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf32_Shdr *sechdrs,
+ 	unsigned int i;
+ 	Elf32_Rel *rel = (void *)sechdrs[relsec].sh_addr;
+ 	Elf32_Sym *sym;
+-	uint32_t *location;
++	uint32_t *plocation, location;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	DEBUGP("Applying relocate section %u to %u\n", relsec,
+ 	       sechdrs[relsec].sh_info);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < sechdrs[relsec].sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) {
+ 		/* This is where to make the change */
+-		location = (void *)sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_addr
+-			+ rel[i].r_offset;
++		plocation = (void *)sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_addr + rel[i].r_offset;
++		location = (uint32_t)plocation;
++		if (sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)
++			plocation = ktla_ktva((void *)plocation);
+ 		/* This is the symbol it is referring to.  Note that all
+ 		   undefined symbols have been resolved.  */
+ 		sym = (Elf32_Sym *)sechdrs[symindex].sh_addr
+@@ -78,12 +147,32 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf32_Shdr *sechdrs,
+ 
+ 		switch (ELF32_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info)) {
+ 		case R_386_32:
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			/* We add the value into the location given */
+-			*location += sym->st_value;
++			*plocation += sym->st_value;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			break;
+ 		case R_386_PC32:
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			/* Add the value, subtract its postition */
+-			*location += sym->st_value - (uint32_t)location;
++			*plocation += sym->st_value - location;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			printk(KERN_ERR "module %s: Unknown relocation: %u\n",
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/module_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void module_free(struct module *mod, voi
+            table entries. */
+ }
+ 
+-void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
++static void *__module_alloc(unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot)
+ {
+ 	struct vm_struct *area;
+ 
+@@ -53,8 +53,31 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
+ 	if (!area)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+-	return __vmalloc_area(area, GFP_KERNEL, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
++	return __vmalloc_area(area, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, prot);
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
++{
++	return __module_alloc(size, PAGE_KERNEL);
++}
++
++void module_free_exec(struct module *mod, void *module_region)
++{
++	module_free(mod, module_region);
++}
++
++void *module_alloc_exec(unsigned long size)
++{
++	return __module_alloc(size, PAGE_KERNEL_RX);
+ }
++#else
++void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
++{
++	return __module_alloc(size, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
++}
++#endif
++
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* We don't need anything special. */
+@@ -76,7 +99,11 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechd
+ 	Elf64_Rela *rel = (void *)sechdrs[relsec].sh_addr;
+ 	Elf64_Sym *sym;
+ 	void *loc;
+-	u64 val; 
++	u64 val;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	DEBUGP("Applying relocate section %u to %u\n", relsec,
+ 	       sechdrs[relsec].sh_info);
+@@ -100,21 +127,61 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechd
+ 		case R_X86_64_NONE:
+ 			break;
+ 		case R_X86_64_64:
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			*(u64 *)loc = val;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			break;
+ 		case R_X86_64_32:
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			*(u32 *)loc = val;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			if (val != *(u32 *)loc)
+ 				goto overflow;
+ 			break;
+ 		case R_X86_64_32S:
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			*(s32 *)loc = val;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			if ((s64)val != *(s32 *)loc)
+ 				goto overflow;
+ 			break;
+ 		case R_X86_64_PC32: 
+ 			val -= (u64)loc;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			*(u32 *)loc = val;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ #if 0
+ 			if ((s64)val != *(s32 *)loc)
+ 				goto overflow; 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ void _paravirt_nop(void)
+ {
+ }
+ 
+-static void __init default_banner(void)
++static void default_banner(void)
+ {
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "Booting paravirtualized kernel on %s\n",
+ 	       pv_info.name);
+@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ unsigned paravirt_patch_insns(void *insn
+ 	if (insn_len > len || start == NULL)
+ 		insn_len = len;
+ 	else
+-		memcpy(insnbuf, start, insn_len);
++		memcpy(insnbuf, ktla_ktva(start), insn_len);
+ 
+ 	return insn_len;
+ }
+@@ -277,21 +277,21 @@ enum paravirt_lazy_mode paravirt_get_laz
+ 	return __get_cpu_var(paravirt_lazy_mode);
+ }
+ 
+-struct pv_info pv_info = {
++struct pv_info pv_info __read_only = {
+ 	.name = "bare hardware",
+ 	.paravirt_enabled = 0,
+ 	.kernel_rpl = 0,
+ 	.shared_kernel_pmd = 1,	/* Only used when CONFIG_X86_PAE is set */
+ };
+ 
+-struct pv_init_ops pv_init_ops = {
++struct pv_init_ops pv_init_ops __read_only = {
+ 	.patch = native_patch,
+ 	.banner = default_banner,
+ 	.arch_setup = paravirt_nop,
+ 	.memory_setup = machine_specific_memory_setup,
+ };
+ 
+-struct pv_time_ops pv_time_ops = {
++struct pv_time_ops pv_time_ops __read_only = {
+ 	.time_init = hpet_time_init,
+ 	.get_wallclock = native_get_wallclock,
+ 	.set_wallclock = native_set_wallclock,
+@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ struct pv_time_ops pv_time_ops = {
+ 	.get_cpu_khz = native_calculate_cpu_khz,
+ };
+ 
+-struct pv_irq_ops pv_irq_ops = {
++struct pv_irq_ops pv_irq_ops __read_only = {
+ 	.init_IRQ = native_init_IRQ,
+ 	.save_fl = native_save_fl,
+ 	.restore_fl = native_restore_fl,
+@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ struct pv_irq_ops pv_irq_ops = {
+ 	.halt = native_halt,
+ };
+ 
+-struct pv_cpu_ops pv_cpu_ops = {
++struct pv_cpu_ops pv_cpu_ops __read_only = {
+ 	.cpuid = native_cpuid,
+ 	.get_debugreg = native_get_debugreg,
+ 	.set_debugreg = native_set_debugreg,
+@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ struct pv_cpu_ops pv_cpu_ops = {
+ 	},
+ };
+ 
+-struct pv_apic_ops pv_apic_ops = {
++struct pv_apic_ops pv_apic_ops __read_only = {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
+ 	.apic_write = native_apic_write,
+ 	.apic_write_atomic = native_apic_write_atomic,
+@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ struct pv_apic_ops pv_apic_ops = {
+ #endif
+ };
+ 
+-struct pv_mmu_ops pv_mmu_ops = {
++struct pv_mmu_ops pv_mmu_ops __read_only = {
+ #ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+ 	.pagetable_setup_start = native_pagetable_setup_start,
+ 	.pagetable_setup_done = native_pagetable_setup_done,
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -66,8 +66,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(boot_option_idle_override)
+ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, current_task) = &init_task;
+ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(current_task);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, cpu_number);
+ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_number);
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Return saved PC of a blocked thread.
+@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_number);
+ unsigned long thread_saved_pc(struct task_struct *tsk)
+ {
+ 	return ((unsigned long *)tsk->thread.sp)[3];
++//XXX	return tsk->thread.eip;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ void __show_registers(struct pt_regs *re
+ 	unsigned long sp;
+ 	unsigned short ss, gs;
+ 
+-	if (user_mode_vm(regs)) {
++	if (user_mode(regs)) {
+ 		sp = regs->sp;
+ 		ss = regs->ss & 0xffff;
+ 		savesegment(gs, gs);
+@@ -411,8 +414,8 @@ int kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), voi
+ 	regs.bx = (unsigned long) fn;
+ 	regs.dx = (unsigned long) arg;
+ 
+-	regs.ds = __USER_DS;
+-	regs.es = __USER_DS;
++	regs.ds = __KERNEL_DS;
++	regs.es = __KERNEL_DS;
+ 	regs.fs = __KERNEL_PERCPU;
+ 	regs.orig_ax = -1;
+ 	regs.ip = (unsigned long) kernel_thread_helper;
+@@ -434,7 +437,7 @@ void exit_thread(void)
+ 		struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ 		struct thread_struct *t = &tsk->thread;
+ 		int cpu = get_cpu();
+-		struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++		struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
+ 
+ 		kfree(t->io_bitmap_ptr);
+ 		t->io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
+@@ -455,6 +458,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
+ {
+ 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ 
++	__asm__("mov %0,%%gs\n" : : "r" (0) : "memory");
+ 	tsk->thread.debugreg0 = 0;
+ 	tsk->thread.debugreg1 = 0;
+ 	tsk->thread.debugreg2 = 0;
+@@ -493,7 +497,7 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long cl
+ 	struct task_struct *tsk;
+ 	int err;
+ 
+-	childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
++	childregs = task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE - sizeof(struct pt_regs) - 8;
+ 	*childregs = *regs;
+ 	childregs->ax = 0;
+ 	childregs->sp = sp;
+@@ -522,6 +526,7 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long cl
+ 	 * Set a new TLS for the child thread?
+ 	 */
+ 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
++//XXX needs set_fs()?
+ 		err = do_set_thread_area(p, -1,
+ 			(struct user_desc __user *)childregs->si, 0);
+ 
+@@ -668,7 +673,7 @@ struct task_struct * __switch_to(struct 
+ 	struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread,
+ 				 *next = &next_p->thread;
+ 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+-	struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
+ 
+ 	/* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */
+ 
+@@ -696,6 +701,11 @@ struct task_struct * __switch_to(struct 
+ 	 */
+ 	savesegment(gs, prev->gs);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
++	if (!segment_eq(task_thread_info(prev_p)->addr_limit, task_thread_info(next_p)->addr_limit))
++		__set_fs(task_thread_info(next_p)->addr_limit, cpu);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Load the per-thread Thread-Local Storage descriptor.
+ 	 */
+@@ -834,15 +844,27 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_stru
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++asmlinkage void pax_randomize_kstack(void)
+ {
+-	if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
+-		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
+-	return sp & ~0xf;
+-}
++	struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
++	unsigned long time;
+ 
+-unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+-{
+-	unsigned long range_end = mm->brk + 0x02000000;
+-	return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
++	if (!randomize_va_space)
++		return;
++
++	rdtscl(time);
++
++	/* P4 seems to return a 0 LSB, ignore it */
++#ifdef CONFIG_MPENTIUM4
++	time &= 0x1EUL;
++	time <<= 2;
++#else
++	time &= 0xFUL;
++	time <<= 3;
++#endif
++
++	thread->sp0 ^= time;
++	load_sp0(init_tss + smp_processor_id(), thread);
+ }
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ static inline void play_dead(void)
+ void cpu_idle(void)
+ {
+ 	current_thread_info()->status |= TS_POLLING;
++	current->stack_canary = pax_get_random_long();
++	write_pda(stack_canary, current->stack_canary);
+ 	/* endless idle loop with no priority at all */
+ 	while (1) {
+ 		tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick();
+@@ -397,7 +399,7 @@ void exit_thread(void)
+ 	struct thread_struct *t = &me->thread;
+ 
+ 	if (me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr) {
+-		struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
++		struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
+ 
+ 		kfree(t->io_bitmap_ptr);
+ 		t->io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
+@@ -621,7 +623,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, 
+ 	struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread,
+ 				 *next = &next_p->thread;
+ 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+-	struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
+ 
+ 	/* we're going to use this soon, after a few expensive things */
+ 	if (next_p->fpu_counter>5)
+@@ -696,7 +698,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, 
+ 	write_pda(kernelstack,
+ 	(unsigned long)task_stack_page(next_p) + THREAD_SIZE - PDA_STACKOFFSET);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+-	write_pda(stack_canary, next_p->stack_canary);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at
+ 	 * offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement
+@@ -910,16 +911,3 @@ long sys_arch_prctl(int code, unsigned l
+ {
+ 	return do_arch_prctl(current, code, addr);
+ }
+-
+-unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
+-{
+-	if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
+-		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
+-	return sp & ~0xf;
+-}
+-
+-unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
+-{
+-	unsigned long range_end = mm->brk + 0x02000000;
+-	return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
+-}
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1457,7 +1457,7 @@ void send_sigtrap(struct task_struct *ts
+ 	info.si_code = TRAP_BRKPT;
+ 
+ 	/* User-mode ip? */
+-	info.si_addr = user_mode_vm(regs) ? (void __user *) regs->ip : NULL;
++	info.si_addr = user_mode(regs) ? (void __user *) regs->ip : NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Send us the fake SIGTRAP */
+ 	force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &info, tsk);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ void (*pm_power_off)(void);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(pm_power_off);
+ 
+ static long no_idt[3];
+-static int reboot_mode;
++static unsigned short reboot_mode;
+ enum reboot_type reboot_type = BOOT_KBD;
+ int reboot_force;
+ 
+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata r
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "HP Compaq"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {{0, NULL}}, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ static int __init reboot_init(void)
+@@ -202,15 +202,15 @@ core_initcall(reboot_init);
+    controller to pulse the CPU reset line, which is more thorough, but
+    doesn't work with at least one type of 486 motherboard.  It is easy
+    to stop this code working; hence the copious comments. */
+-static unsigned long long
+-real_mode_gdt_entries [3] =
++static struct desc_struct
++real_mode_gdt_entries [3] __read_only =
+ {
+-	0x0000000000000000ULL,	/* Null descriptor */
+-	0x00009a000000ffffULL,	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
+-	0x000092000100ffffULL	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
++	{{{0x00000000, 0x00000000}}},	/* Null descriptor */
++	{{{0x0000ffff, 0x00009b00}}},	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
++	{{{0x0100ffff, 0x00009300}}}	/* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
+ };
+ 
+-static struct desc_ptr
++static const struct desc_ptr
+ real_mode_gdt = { sizeof (real_mode_gdt_entries) - 1, (long)real_mode_gdt_entries },
+ real_mode_idt = { 0x3ff, 0 };
+ 
+@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ real_mode_idt = { 0x3ff, 0 };
+ 
+    More could be done here to set up the registers as if a CPU reset had
+    occurred; hopefully real BIOSs don't assume much. */
+-static unsigned char real_mode_switch [] =
++static const unsigned char real_mode_switch [] =
+ {
+ 	0x66, 0x0f, 0x20, 0xc0,			/*    movl  %cr0,%eax        */
+ 	0x66, 0x83, 0xe0, 0x11,			/*    andl  $0x00000011,%eax */
+@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static unsigned char real_mode_switch []
+ 	0x24, 0x10,				/* f: andb  $0x10,al         */
+ 	0x66, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xc0			/*    movl  %eax,%cr0        */
+ };
+-static unsigned char jump_to_bios [] =
++static const unsigned char jump_to_bios [] =
+ {
+ 	0xea, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff		/*    ljmp  $0xffff,$0x0000  */
+ };
+@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static unsigned char jump_to_bios [] =
+  * specified by the code and length parameters.
+  * We assume that length will aways be less that 100!
+  */
+-void machine_real_restart(unsigned char *code, int length)
++void machine_real_restart(const unsigned char *code, unsigned int length)
+ {
+ 	local_irq_disable();
+ 
+@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ void machine_real_restart(unsigned char 
+ 	/* Remap the kernel at virtual address zero, as well as offset zero
+ 	   from the kernel segment.  This assumes the kernel segment starts at
+ 	   virtual address PAGE_OFFSET. */
+-	memcpy(swapper_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir + USER_PGD_PTRS,
+-		sizeof(swapper_pg_dir [0]) * KERNEL_PGD_PTRS);
++	clone_pgd_range(swapper_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir + USER_PGD_PTRS,
++			min_t(unsigned long, KERNEL_PGD_PTRS, USER_PGD_PTRS));
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Use `swapper_pg_dir' as our page directory.
+@@ -289,16 +289,15 @@ void machine_real_restart(unsigned char 
+ 	   boot)".  This seems like a fairly standard thing that gets set by
+ 	   REBOOT.COM programs, and the previous reset routine did this
+ 	   too. */
+-	*((unsigned short *)0x472) = reboot_mode;
++	*(unsigned short *)(__va(0x472)) = reboot_mode;
+ 
+ 	/* For the switch to real mode, copy some code to low memory.  It has
+ 	   to be in the first 64k because it is running in 16-bit mode, and it
+ 	   has to have the same physical and virtual address, because it turns
+ 	   off paging.  Copy it near the end of the first page, out of the way
+ 	   of BIOS variables. */
+-	memcpy((void *)(0x1000 - sizeof(real_mode_switch) - 100),
+-		real_mode_switch, sizeof (real_mode_switch));
+-	memcpy((void *)(0x1000 - 100), code, length);
++	memcpy(__va(0x1000 - sizeof (real_mode_switch) - 100), real_mode_switch, sizeof (real_mode_switch));
++	memcpy(__va(0x1000 - 100), code, length);
+ 
+ 	/* Set up the IDT for real mode. */
+ 	load_idt(&real_mode_idt);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/setup64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -36,15 +36,13 @@ struct x8664_pda *_cpu_pda[NR_CPUS] __re
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_cpu_pda);
+ struct x8664_pda boot_cpu_pda[NR_CPUS] __cacheline_aligned;
+ 
+-struct desc_ptr idt_descr = { 256 * 16 - 1, (unsigned long) idt_table };
++struct desc_ptr idt_descr __read_only = { 256 * 16 - 1, (unsigned long) idt_table };
+ 
+ char boot_cpu_stack[IRQSTACKSIZE] __attribute__((section(".bss.page_aligned")));
+ 
+ unsigned long __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0UL;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
+ 
+-static int do_not_nx __cpuinitdata = 0;
+-
+ /* noexec=on|off
+ Control non executable mappings for 64bit processes.
+ 
+@@ -57,16 +55,14 @@ static int __init nonx_setup(char *str)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	if (!strncmp(str, "on", 2)) {
+                 __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_NX; 
+- 		do_not_nx = 0; 
+ 	} else if (!strncmp(str, "off", 3)) {
+-		do_not_nx = 1;
+ 		__supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+         }
+ 	return 0;
+ } 
+ early_param("noexec", nonx_setup);
+ 
+-int force_personality32 = 0; 
++int force_personality32;
+ 
+ /* noexec32=on|off
+ Control non executable heap for 32bit processes.
+@@ -226,7 +222,7 @@ void __cpuinit check_efer(void)
+ 	unsigned long efer;
+ 
+ 	rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer); 
+-        if (!(efer & EFER_NX) || do_not_nx) { 
++        if (!(efer & EFER_NX)) {
+                 __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX; 
+         }       
+ }
+@@ -249,12 +245,13 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct orig_ist, orig_ist
+ void __cpuinit cpu_init (void)
+ {
+ 	int cpu = stack_smp_processor_id();
+-	struct tss_struct *t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *t = init_tss + cpu;
+ 	struct orig_ist *orig_ist = &per_cpu(orig_ist, cpu);
+ 	unsigned long v; 
+ 	char *estacks = NULL; 
+ 	struct task_struct *me;
+ 	int i;
++	struct desc_ptr cpu_gdt_descr = { .size = GDT_SIZE - 1, .address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)};
+ 
+ 	/* CPU 0 is initialised in head64.c */
+ 	if (cpu != 0) {
+@@ -272,14 +269,12 @@ void __cpuinit cpu_init (void)
+ 	clear_in_cr4(X86_CR4_VME|X86_CR4_PVI|X86_CR4_TSD|X86_CR4_DE);
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT,
+-	 * and set up the GDT descriptor:
++	 * Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT:
+ 	 */
+ 	if (cpu)
+-		memcpy(get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu), cpu_gdt_table, GDT_SIZE);
++		memcpy(get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu), get_cpu_gdt_table(0), GDT_SIZE);
+ 
+-	cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].size = GDT_SIZE;
+-	load_gdt((const struct desc_ptr *)&cpu_gdt_descr[cpu]);
++	load_gdt(&cpu_gdt_descr);
+ 	load_idt((const struct desc_ptr *)&idt_descr);
+ 
+ 	memset(me->thread.tls_array, 0, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/setup_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+ #include <setup_arch.h>
+ #include <bios_ebda.h>
+ #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
++#include <asm/boot.h>
+ 
+ /* This value is set up by the early boot code to point to the value
+    immediately after the boot time page tables.  It contains a *physical*
+@@ -613,8 +614,8 @@ void __init setup_bootmem_allocator(void
+ 	 * the (very unlikely) case of us accidentally initializing the
+ 	 * bootmem allocator with an invalid RAM area.
+ 	 */
+-	reserve_bootmem(__pa_symbol(_text), (PFN_PHYS(min_low_pfn) +
+-			 bootmap_size + PAGE_SIZE-1) - __pa_symbol(_text),
++	reserve_bootmem(LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, (PFN_PHYS(min_low_pfn) +
++			 bootmap_size + PAGE_SIZE-1) - LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR,
+ 			 BOOTMEM_DEFAULT);
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -743,14 +744,14 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 
+ 	if (!boot_params.hdr.root_flags)
+ 		root_mountflags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
+-	init_mm.start_code = (unsigned long) _text;
+-	init_mm.end_code = (unsigned long) _etext;
++	init_mm.start_code = ktla_ktva((unsigned long) _text);
++	init_mm.end_code = ktla_ktva((unsigned long) _etext);
+ 	init_mm.end_data = (unsigned long) _edata;
+ 	init_mm.brk = init_pg_tables_end + PAGE_OFFSET;
+ 
+-	code_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_text);
+-	code_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_etext)-1;
+-	data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_etext);
++	code_resource.start = virt_to_phys(ktla_ktva(_text));
++	code_resource.end = virt_to_phys(ktla_ktva(_etext))-1;
++	data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_data);
+ 	data_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_edata)-1;
+ 	bss_resource.start = virt_to_phys(&__bss_start);
+ 	bss_resource.end = virt_to_phys(&__bss_stop)-1;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -366,9 +366,9 @@ static int setup_frame(int sig, struct k
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (current->binfmt->hasvdso)
+-		restorer = VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso, sigreturn);
++		restorer = (void __user *)VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso, sigreturn);
+ 	else
+-		restorer = &frame->retcode;
++		restorer = (void __user *)&frame->retcode;
+ 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
+ 		restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
+ 
+@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int sig, struc
+ 		goto give_sigsegv;
+ 
+ 	/* Set up to return from userspace.  */
+-	restorer = VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso, rt_sigreturn);
++	restorer = (void __user *)VDSO32_SYMBOL(current->mm->context.vdso, rt_sigreturn);
+ 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
+ 		restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
+ 	err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode);
+@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static void do_signal(struct pt_regs *re
+  	 * before reaching here, so testing against kernel
+  	 * CS suffices.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!user_mode(regs))
++	if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -252,8 +252,8 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int sig, struc
+ 	err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, regs, set->sig[0], me);
+ 	err |= __put_user(fp, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext.fpstate);
+ 	if (sizeof(*set) == 16) { 
+-		__put_user(set->sig[0], &frame->uc.uc_sigmask.sig[0]);
+-		__put_user(set->sig[1], &frame->uc.uc_sigmask.sig[1]); 
++		err |= __put_user(set->sig[0], &frame->uc.uc_sigmask.sig[0]);
++		err |= __put_user(set->sig[1], &frame->uc.uc_sigmask.sig[1]);
+ 	} else
+ 		err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/smp_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smp_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smp_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smp_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
+  *	about nothing of note with C stepping upwards.
+  */
+ 
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate) ____cacheline_aligned = { &init_mm, 0, };
++DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate) ____cacheline_aligned = { &init_mm, 0, {0} };
+ 
+ /*
+  * the following functions deal with sending IPIs between CPUs.
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -768,6 +768,10 @@ static int __cpuinit do_boot_cpu(int api
+ 	unsigned long start_eip;
+ 	unsigned short nmi_high = 0, nmi_low = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Save current MTRR state in case it was changed since early boot
+ 	 * (e.g. by the ACPI SMI) to initialize new CPUs with MTRRs in sync:
+@@ -784,8 +788,17 @@ static int __cpuinit do_boot_cpu(int api
+ 
+ 	init_gdt(cpu);
+  	per_cpu(current_task, cpu) = idle;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	early_gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	idle->thread.ip = (unsigned long) start_secondary;
+ 	/* start_eip had better be page-aligned! */
+ 	start_eip = setup_trampoline();
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -559,13 +559,6 @@ static int __cpuinit do_boot_cpu(int cpu
+ 	};
+ 	INIT_WORK(&c_idle.work, do_fork_idle);
+ 
+-	/* allocate memory for gdts of secondary cpus. Hotplug is considered */
+-	if (!cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].address &&
+-		!(cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].address = get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL))) {
+-		printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to allocate GDT for CPU %d\n", cpu);
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-
+ 	/* Allocate node local memory for AP pdas */
+ 	if (cpu_pda(cpu) == &boot_cpu_pda[cpu]) {
+ 		struct x8664_pda *newpda, *pda;
+@@ -624,7 +617,7 @@ do_rest:
+ 	start_rip = setup_trampoline();
+ 
+ 	init_rsp = c_idle.idle->thread.sp;
+-	load_sp0(&per_cpu(init_tss, cpu), &c_idle.idle->thread);
++	load_sp0(init_tss + cpu, &c_idle.idle->thread);
+ 	initial_code = start_secondary;
+ 	clear_tsk_thread_flag(c_idle.idle, TIF_FORK);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/smpcommon_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpcommon_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpcommon_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpcommon_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
+  */
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <asm/smp.h>
++#include <asm/sections.h>
+ 
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, this_cpu_off);
++DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, this_cpu_off) = (unsigned long)__per_cpu_start;
+ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(this_cpu_off);
+ 
+ /* Initialize the CPU's GDT.  This is either the boot CPU doing itself
+@@ -12,15 +13,32 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(this_cpu_off);
+    secondary which will soon come up. */
+ __cpuinit void init_gdt(int cpu)
+ {
+-	struct desc_struct *gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
++	struct desc_struct d, *gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
++	unsigned long base, limit;
+ 
+-	pack_descriptor(&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU],
+-			__per_cpu_offset[cpu], 0xFFFFF,
+-			0x2 | DESCTYPE_S, 0x8);
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
+ 
+-	gdt[GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU].s = 1;
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
+ 
+-	per_cpu(this_cpu_off, cpu) = __per_cpu_offset[cpu];
++	if (cpu)
++		memcpy(gdt, get_cpu_gdt_table(0), GDT_SIZE);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	base = __per_cpu_offset[cpu] + (unsigned long)__per_cpu_start;
++	limit = PERCPU_ENOUGH_ROOM - 1;
++	if (limit < 64*1024)
++		pack_descriptor(&d, base, limit, 0x80 | DESCTYPE_S | 0x3, 0x4);
++	else
++		pack_descriptor(&d, base, limit >> PAGE_SHIFT, 0x80 | DESCTYPE_S | 0x3, 0xC);
++
++	write_gdt_entry(gdt, GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++
++	per_cpu(this_cpu_off, cpu) = base;
+ 	per_cpu(cpu_number, cpu) = cpu;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/step.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/step.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -23,22 +23,20 @@ unsigned long convert_ip_to_linear(struc
+ 	 * and APM bios ones we just ignore here.
+ 	 */
+ 	if ((seg & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
+-		u32 *desc;
++		struct desc_struct *desc;
+ 		unsigned long base;
+ 
+-		seg &= ~7UL;
++		seg >>= 3;
+ 
+ 		mutex_lock(&child->mm->context.lock);
+-		if (unlikely((seg >> 3) >= child->mm->context.size))
+-			addr = -1L; /* bogus selector, access would fault */
++		if (unlikely(seg >= child->mm->context.size))
++			addr = -EINVAL;
+ 		else {
+-			desc = child->mm->context.ldt + seg;
+-			base = ((desc[0] >> 16) |
+-				((desc[1] & 0xff) << 16) |
+-				(desc[1] & 0xff000000));
++			desc = &child->mm->context.ldt[seg];
++			base = (desc->a >> 16) | ((desc->b & 0xff) << 16) | (desc->b & 0xff000000);
+ 
+ 			/* 16-bit code segment? */
+-			if (!((desc[1] >> 22) & 1))
++			if (!((desc->b >> 22) & 1))
+ 				addr &= 0xffff;
+ 			addr += base;
+ 		}
+@@ -54,6 +52,9 @@ static int is_setting_trap_flag(struct t
+ 	unsigned char opcode[15];
+ 	unsigned long addr = convert_ip_to_linear(child, regs);
+ 
++	if (addr == -EINVAL)
++		return 0;
++
+ 	copied = access_process_vm(child, addr, opcode, sizeof(opcode), 0);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < copied; i++) {
+ 		switch (opcode[i]) {
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_i386_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_i386_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_i386_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_i386_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -39,6 +39,21 @@ asmlinkage int sys_pipe(unsigned long __
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++int i386_mmap_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
++	if (len > pax_task_size || addr > pax_task_size - len)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ asmlinkage long sys_mmap2(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
+ 			  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+ 			  unsigned long fd, unsigned long pgoff)
+@@ -98,6 +113,205 @@ out:
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
++unsigned long
++arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
++		unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++	unsigned long start_addr, pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
++	if (len > pax_task_size)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
++	if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
++		return addr;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
++	if (addr) {
++		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
++		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
++		if (pax_task_size - len >= addr &&
++		    (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
++			return addr;
++	}
++	if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
++		start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++	} else {
++		start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
++		mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
++	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!nx_enabled && (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr >= mm->mmap_base) {
++		start_addr = 0x00110000UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++			start_addr += mm->delta_mmap & 0x03FFF000UL;
++#endif
++
++		if (mm->start_brk <= start_addr && start_addr < mm->mmap_base)
++			start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
++		else
++			addr = start_addr;
++	}
++#endif
++
++full_search:
++	for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
++		/* At this point:  (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
++		if (pax_task_size - len < addr) {
++			/*
++			 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
++			 * some holes.
++			 */
++			if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
++				start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
++				mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
++				goto full_search;
++			}
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++		if (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start) {
++			/*
++			 * Remember the place where we stopped the search:
++			 */
++			mm->free_area_cache = addr + len;
++			return addr;
++		}
++		if (addr + mm->cached_hole_size < vma->vm_start)
++			mm->cached_hole_size = vma->vm_start - addr;
++		addr = vma->vm_end;
++		if (mm->start_brk <= addr && addr < mm->mmap_base) {
++			start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
++			mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
++			goto full_search;
++		}
++	}
++}
++
++unsigned long
++arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
++			  const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
++			  const unsigned long flags)
++{
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++	unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0, pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
++	/* requested length too big for entire address space */
++	if (len > pax_task_size)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
++	if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
++		return addr;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!nx_enabled && (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE))
++		goto bottomup;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
++	/* requesting a specific address */
++	if (addr) {
++		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
++		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
++		if (pax_task_size - len >= addr &&
++				(!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
++			return addr;
++	}
++
++	/* check if free_area_cache is useful for us */
++	if (len <= mm->cached_hole_size) {
++		mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
++		mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
++	}
++
++	/* either no address requested or can't fit in requested address hole */
++	addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++
++	/* make sure it can fit in the remaining address space */
++	if (addr > len) {
++		vma = find_vma(mm, addr-len);
++		if (!vma || addr <= vma->vm_start)
++			/* remember the address as a hint for next time */
++			return (mm->free_area_cache = addr-len);
++	}
++
++	if (mm->mmap_base < len)
++		goto bottomup;
++
++	addr = mm->mmap_base-len;
++
++	do {
++		/*
++		 * Lookup failure means no vma is above this address,
++		 * else if new region fits below vma->vm_start,
++		 * return with success:
++		 */
++		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
++		if (!vma || addr+len <= vma->vm_start)
++			/* remember the address as a hint for next time */
++			return (mm->free_area_cache = addr);
++
++		/* remember the largest hole we saw so far */
++		if (addr + mm->cached_hole_size < vma->vm_start)
++			mm->cached_hole_size = vma->vm_start - addr;
++
++		/* try just below the current vma->vm_start */
++		addr = vma->vm_start-len;
++	} while (len < vma->vm_start);
++
++bottomup:
++	/*
++	 * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
++	 * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
++	 * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
++	 * allocations.
++	 */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		mm->mmap_base = SEGMEXEC_TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++	else
++#endif
++
++	mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
++	mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
++	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
++	addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
++	/*
++	 * Restore the topdown base:
++	 */
++	mm->mmap_base = base;
++	mm->free_area_cache = base;
++	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
++
++	return addr;
++}
+ 
+ struct sel_arg_struct {
+ 	unsigned long n;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ out:
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
+-static void find_start_end(unsigned long flags, unsigned long *begin,
+-			   unsigned long *end)
++static void find_start_end(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
++			   unsigned long *begin, unsigned long *end)
+ {
+ 	if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) && (flags & MAP_32BIT)) {
+ 		unsigned long new_begin;
+@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long
+ 				*begin = new_begin;
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+-		*begin = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++		*begin = mm->mmap_base;
+ 		*end = TASK_SIZE; 
+ 	}
+ } 
+@@ -99,11 +99,15 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
+ 	if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
+-	find_start_end(flags, &begin, &end); 
++	find_start_end(mm, flags, &begin, &end);
+ 
+ 	if (len > end)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
+ 		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+@@ -158,7 +162,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
+ {
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+-	unsigned long addr = addr0;
++	unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0;
+ 
+ 	/* requested length too big for entire address space */
+ 	if (len > TASK_SIZE)
+@@ -171,6 +175,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
+ 	if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) && (flags & MAP_32BIT))
+ 		goto bottomup;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
++#endif
++
+ 	/* requesting a specific address */
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
+@@ -228,13 +236,21 @@ bottomup:
+ 	 * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
+ 	 * allocations.
+ 	 */
++	mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
++	mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
+ 	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
+-	mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 	addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Restore the topdown base:
+ 	 */
+-	mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
++	mm->mmap_base = base;
++	mm->free_area_cache = base;
+ 	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
+ 
+ 	return addr;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
++.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
+ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
+ 	.long sys_restart_syscall	/* 0 - old "setup()" system call, used for restarting */
+ 	.long sys_exit
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/time_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/time_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/time_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/time_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -52,20 +52,30 @@ unsigned long profile_pc(struct pt_regs 
+ 	if (!v8086_mode(regs) && SEGMENT_IS_KERNEL_CODE(regs->cs) &&
+ 	    in_lock_functions(pc)) {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
+-		return *(unsigned long *)(regs->bp + 4);
++		return ktla_ktva(*(unsigned long *)(regs->bp + 4));
+ #else
+ 		unsigned long *sp = (unsigned long *)&regs->sp;
+ 
+ 		/* Return address is either directly at stack pointer
+ 		   or above a saved flags. Eflags has bits 22-31 zero,
+ 		   kernel addresses don't. */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		return ktla_ktva(sp[0]);
++#else
+ 		if (sp[0] >> 22)
+ 			return sp[0];
+ 		if (sp[1] >> 22)
+ 			return sp[1];
+ #endif
++
++#endif
+ 	}
+ #endif
++
++	if (!v8086_mode(regs) && SEGMENT_IS_KERNEL_CODE(regs->cs))
++		pc = ktla_ktva(pc);
++
+ 	return pc;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(profile_pc);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ int do_set_thread_area(struct task_struc
+ 	if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (info.contents & MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_CODE))
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	set_tls_desc(p, idx, &info, 1);
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/traps_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <linux/nmi.h>
+ #include <linux/bug.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EISA
+ #include <linux/ioport.h>
+@@ -71,14 +72,6 @@ asmlinkage int system_call(void);
+ /* Do we ignore FPU interrupts ? */
+ char ignore_fpu_irq = 0;
+ 
+-/*
+- * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
+- * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
+- * for this.
+- */
+-gate_desc idt_table[256]
+-	__attribute__((__section__(".data.idt"))) = { { { { 0, 0 } } }, };
+-
+ asmlinkage void divide_error(void);
+ asmlinkage void debug(void);
+ asmlinkage void nmi(void);
+@@ -330,22 +323,23 @@ void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs
+ 	 * When in-kernel, we also print out the stack and code at the
+ 	 * time of the fault..
+ 	 */
+-	if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
++	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+ 		u8 *ip;
+ 		unsigned int code_prologue = code_bytes * 43 / 64;
+ 		unsigned int code_len = code_bytes;
+ 		unsigned char c;
++		unsigned long cs_base = get_desc_base(&get_cpu_gdt_table(smp_processor_id())[(0xffff & regs->cs) >> 3]);
+ 
+ 		printk("\n" KERN_EMERG "Stack: ");
+ 		show_stack_log_lvl(NULL, regs, &regs->sp, 0, KERN_EMERG);
+ 
+ 		printk(KERN_EMERG "Code: ");
+ 
+-		ip = (u8 *)regs->ip - code_prologue;
++		ip = (u8 *)regs->ip - code_prologue + cs_base;
+ 		if (ip < (u8 *)PAGE_OFFSET ||
+ 			probe_kernel_address(ip, c)) {
+ 			/* try starting at EIP */
+-			ip = (u8 *)regs->ip;
++			ip = (u8 *)regs->ip + cs_base;
+ 			code_len = code_len - code_prologue + 1;
+ 		}
+ 		for (i = 0; i < code_len; i++, ip++) {
+@@ -354,7 +348,7 @@ void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs
+ 				printk(" Bad EIP value.");
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+-			if (ip == (u8 *)regs->ip)
++			if (ip == (u8 *)regs->ip + cs_base)
+ 				printk("<%02x> ", c);
+ 			else
+ 				printk("%02x ", c);
+@@ -367,6 +361,7 @@ int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long ip)
+ {
+ 	unsigned short ud2;
+ 
++	ip = ktla_ktva(ip);
+ 	if (ip < PAGE_OFFSET)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if (probe_kernel_address((unsigned short *)ip, ud2))
+@@ -476,7 +471,7 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_reg
+ 
+ static inline void die_if_kernel(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
+ {
+-	if (!user_mode_vm(regs))
++	if (!user_mode(regs))
+ 		die(str, regs, err);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -492,7 +487,7 @@ static void __kprobes do_trap(int trapnr
+ 		goto trap_signal;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!user_mode(regs))
++	if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
+ 		goto kernel_trap;
+ 
+ 	trap_signal: {
+@@ -598,7 +593,7 @@ void __kprobes do_general_protection(str
+ 					      long error_code)
+ {
+ 	int cpu = get_cpu();
+-	struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *tss = &init_tss[cpu];
+ 	struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -631,9 +626,25 @@ void __kprobes do_general_protection(str
+ 	if (regs->flags & VM_MASK)
+ 		goto gp_in_vm86;
+ 
+-	if (!user_mode(regs))
++	if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
+ 		goto gp_in_kernel;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!nx_enabled && current->mm && (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
++		struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++		unsigned long limit;
++
++		down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
++		if (limit < TASK_SIZE) {
++			track_exec_limit(mm, limit, TASK_SIZE, VM_EXEC);
++			up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
++			return;
++		}
++		up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	current->thread.error_code = error_code;
+ 	current->thread.trap_no = 13;
+ 	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(current, SIGSEGV) &&
+@@ -661,6 +672,13 @@ gp_in_kernel:
+ 		if (notify_die(DIE_GPF, "general protection fault", regs,
+ 				error_code, 13, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+ 			return;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		if ((regs->cs & 0xFFFF) == __KERNEL_CS)
++			die("PAX: suspicious general protection fault", regs, error_code);
++		else
++#endif
++
+ 		die("general protection fault", regs, error_code);
+ 	}
+ }
+@@ -750,7 +768,7 @@ void __kprobes die_nmi(struct pt_regs *r
+ 	/* If we are in kernel we are probably nested up pretty bad
+ 	 * and might aswell get out now while we still can.
+ 	*/
+-	if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
++	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+ 		current->thread.trap_no = 2;
+ 		crash_kexec(regs);
+ 	}
+@@ -907,7 +925,7 @@ void __kprobes do_debug(struct pt_regs *
+ 		 * check for kernel mode by just checking the CPL
+ 		 * of CS.
+ 		 */
+-		if (!user_mode(regs))
++		if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
+ 			goto clear_TF_reenable;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1085,18 +1103,14 @@ void do_spurious_interrupt_bug(struct pt
+ unsigned long patch_espfix_desc(unsigned long uesp,
+ 					  unsigned long kesp)
+ {
+-	struct desc_struct *gdt = __get_cpu_var(gdt_page).gdt;
+ 	unsigned long base = (kesp - uesp) & -THREAD_SIZE;
+ 	unsigned long new_kesp = kesp - base;
+ 	unsigned long lim_pages = (new_kesp | (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+-	__u64 desc = *(__u64 *)&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS];
++	struct desc_struct ss;
++
+ 	/* Set up base for espfix segment */
+- 	desc &= 0x00f0ff0000000000ULL;
+- 	desc |=	((((__u64)base) << 16) & 0x000000ffffff0000ULL) |
+-		((((__u64)base) << 32) & 0xff00000000000000ULL) |
+-		((((__u64)lim_pages) << 32) & 0x000f000000000000ULL) |
+-		(lim_pages & 0xffff);
+-	*(__u64 *)&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = desc;
++	pack_descriptor(&ss, base, lim_pages, 0x93, 0xC);
++	write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_table(smp_processor_id()), GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS, &ss, DESCTYPE_S);
+ 	return new_kesp;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata b
+ 		     DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "2635FA0"),
+ 		     },
+ 	 },
+-	 {}
++	{ NULL, NULL, {{0, NULL}}, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ struct pt_regs * save_v86_state(struct k
+ 		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
++	tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
+ 	current->thread.sp0 = current->thread.saved_sp0;
+ 	current->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
+ 	load_sp0(tss, &current->thread);
+@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm
+ 	tsk->thread.saved_fs = info->regs32->fs;
+ 	savesegment(gs, tsk->thread.saved_gs);
+ 
+-	tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
++	tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
+ 	tsk->thread.sp0 = (unsigned long) &info->VM86_TSS_ESP0;
+ 	if (cpu_has_sep)
+ 		tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = 0;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmi_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -101,18 +101,43 @@ static unsigned patch_internal(int call,
+ {
+ 	u64 reloc;
+ 	struct vmi_relocation_info *const rel = (struct vmi_relocation_info *)&reloc;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	reloc = call_vrom_long_func(vmi_rom, get_reloc,	call);
+ 	switch(rel->type) {
+ 		case VMI_RELOCATION_CALL_REL:
+ 			BUG_ON(len < 5);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			*(char *)insnbuf = MNEM_CALL;
+ 			patch_offset(insnbuf, ip, (unsigned long)rel->eip);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			return 5;
+ 
+ 		case VMI_RELOCATION_JUMP_REL:
+ 			BUG_ON(len < 5);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			*(char *)insnbuf = MNEM_JMP;
+ 			patch_offset(insnbuf, ip, (unsigned long)rel->eip);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			return 5;
+ 
+ 		case VMI_RELOCATION_NOP:
+@@ -515,14 +540,14 @@ static void vmi_set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud
+ 
+ static void vmi_pte_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+ {
+-	const pte_t pte = { .pte = 0 };
++	const pte_t pte = __pte(0ULL);
+ 	vmi_check_page_type(__pa(ptep) >> PAGE_SHIFT, VMI_PAGE_PTE);
+ 	vmi_ops.set_pte(pte, ptep, vmi_flags_addr(mm, addr, VMI_PAGE_PT, 0));
+ }
+ 
+ static void vmi_pmd_clear(pmd_t *pmd)
+ {
+-	const pte_t pte = { .pte = 0 };
++	const pte_t pte = __pte(0ULL);
+ 	vmi_check_page_type(__pa(pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT, VMI_PAGE_PMD);
+ 	vmi_ops.set_pte(pte, (pte_t *)pmd, VMI_PAGE_PD);
+ }
+@@ -551,8 +576,8 @@ vmi_startup_ipi_hook(int phys_apicid, un
+ 	ap.ss = __KERNEL_DS;
+ 	ap.esp = (unsigned long) start_esp;
+ 
+-	ap.ds = __USER_DS;
+-	ap.es = __USER_DS;
++	ap.ds = __KERNEL_DS;
++	ap.es = __KERNEL_DS;
+ 	ap.fs = __KERNEL_PERCPU;
+ 	ap.gs = 0;
+ 
+@@ -747,12 +772,20 @@ static inline int __init activate_vmi(vo
+ 	u64 reloc;
+ 	const struct vmi_relocation_info *rel = (struct vmi_relocation_info *)&reloc;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (call_vrom_func(vmi_rom, vmi_init) != 0) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "VMI ROM failed to initialize!");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	savesegment(cs, kernel_cs);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	pv_info.paravirt_enabled = 1;
+ 	pv_info.kernel_rpl = kernel_cs & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+ 	pv_info.name = "vmi";
+@@ -943,6 +976,10 @@ static inline int __init activate_vmi(vo
+ 
+ 	para_fill(pv_irq_ops.safe_halt, Halt);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Alternative instruction rewriting doesn't happen soon enough
+ 	 * to convert VMI_IRET to a call instead of a jump; so we have
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_32.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_32.lds.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_32.lds.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_32.lds.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,20 @@
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/cache.h>
+ #include <asm/boot.h>
++#include <asm/segment.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++#define PMD_SHIFT 21
++#else
++#define PMD_SHIFT 22
++#endif
++#define PMD_SIZE (1 << PMD_SHIFT)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET	(__PAGE_OFFSET + (((____LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR + 2*(PMD_SIZE - 1)) - 1) & ~(PMD_SIZE - 1)))
++#else
++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET	0
++#endif
+ 
+ OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386")
+ OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
+@@ -22,90 +36,23 @@ ENTRY(phys_startup_32)
+ jiffies = jiffies_64;
+ 
+ PHDRS {
+-	text PT_LOAD FLAGS(5);	/* R_E */
+-	data PT_LOAD FLAGS(7);	/* RWE */
+-	note PT_NOTE FLAGS(0);	/* ___ */
++	initdata PT_LOAD FLAGS(6);	/* RW_ */
++	percpu   PT_LOAD FLAGS(6);	/* RW_ */
++	inittext PT_LOAD FLAGS(5);	/* R_E */
++	text     PT_LOAD FLAGS(5);	/* R_E */
++	rodata   PT_LOAD FLAGS(4);	/* R__ */
++	data     PT_LOAD FLAGS(6);	/* RW_ */
++	note     PT_NOTE FLAGS(0);	/* ___ */
+ }
+ SECTIONS
+ {
+-  . = LOAD_OFFSET + LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR;
+-  phys_startup_32 = startup_32 - LOAD_OFFSET;
+-
+-  .text.head : AT(ADDR(.text.head) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-  	_text = .;			/* Text and read-only data */
+-	*(.text.head)
+-  } :text = 0x9090
+-
+-  /* read-only */
+-  .text : AT(ADDR(.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); /* not really needed, already page aligned */
+-	*(.text.page_aligned)
+-	TEXT_TEXT
+-	SCHED_TEXT
+-	LOCK_TEXT
+-	KPROBES_TEXT
+-	*(.fixup)
+-	*(.gnu.warning)
+-  	_etext = .;			/* End of text section */
+-  } :text = 0x9090
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(16);		/* Exception table */
+-  __ex_table : AT(ADDR(__ex_table) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-  	__start___ex_table = .;
+-	 *(__ex_table)
+-  	__stop___ex_table = .;
+-  }
+-
+-  NOTES :text :note
+-
+-  BUG_TABLE :text
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(4);
+-  .tracedata : AT(ADDR(.tracedata) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-  	__tracedata_start = .;
+-	*(.tracedata)
+-  	__tracedata_end = .;
+-  }
++  . = LOAD_OFFSET + ____LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR;
+ 
+-  RODATA
+-
+-  /* writeable */
+-  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  .data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {	/* Data */
+-	DATA_DATA
+-	CONSTRUCTORS
+-	} :data
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  .data_nosave : AT(ADDR(.data_nosave) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-  	__nosave_begin = .;
+-	*(.data.nosave)
+-  	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  	__nosave_end = .;
+-  }
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  .data.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	*(.data.page_aligned)
+-	*(.data.idt)
+-  }
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(32);
+-  .data.cacheline_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.cacheline_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	*(.data.cacheline_aligned)
+-  }
+-
+-  /* rarely changed data like cpu maps */
+-  . = ALIGN(32);
+-  .data.read_mostly : AT(ADDR(.data.read_mostly) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	*(.data.read_mostly)
+-	_edata = .;		/* End of data section */
+-  }
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE);	/* init_task */
+-  .data.init_task : AT(ADDR(.data.init_task) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	*(.data.init_task)
+-  }
++  .text.startup : AT(ADDR(.text.startup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	__LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR = . - LOAD_OFFSET;
++	phys_startup_32 = startup_32 - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++	*(.text.startup)
++  } :initdata
+ 
+   /* might get freed after init */
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+@@ -123,14 +70,8 @@ SECTIONS
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+ 
+   /* will be freed after init */
+-  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);		/* Init code and data */
+-  .init.text : AT(ADDR(.init.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-  	__init_begin = .;
+-	_sinittext = .;
+-	INIT_TEXT
+-	_einittext = .;
+-  }
+   .init.data : AT(ADDR(.init.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	__init_begin = .;
+ 	INIT_DATA
+   }
+   . = ALIGN(16);
+@@ -165,11 +106,6 @@ SECTIONS
+ 	*(.parainstructions)
+   	__parainstructions_end = .;
+   }
+-  /* .exit.text is discard at runtime, not link time, to deal with references
+-     from .altinstructions and .eh_frame */
+-  .exit.text : AT(ADDR(.exit.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	EXIT_TEXT
+-  }
+   .exit.data : AT(ADDR(.exit.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ 	EXIT_DATA
+   }
+@@ -182,17 +118,144 @@ SECTIONS
+   }
+ #endif
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  .data.percpu  : AT(ADDR(.data.percpu) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	__per_cpu_start = .;
++  per_cpu_start = .;
++  .data.percpu (0) : AT(ADDR(.data.percpu) - LOAD_OFFSET + per_cpu_start) {
++	__per_cpu_start = . + per_cpu_start;
++	LONG(0)
+ 	*(.data.percpu)
+ 	*(.data.percpu.shared_aligned)
+-	__per_cpu_end = .;
+-  }
++	__per_cpu_end = . + per_cpu_start;
++  } :percpu
++  . += per_cpu_start;
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+   /* freed after init ends here */
+ 
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);		/* Init code and data */
++  .init.text (. - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : AT(ADDR(.init.text) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++	_sinittext = .;
++	INIT_TEXT
++	_einittext = .;
++  } :inittext
++
++  /* .exit.text is discard at runtime, not link time, to deal with references
++     from .altinstructions and .eh_frame */
++  .exit.text : AT(ADDR(.exit.text) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++	EXIT_TEXT
++  }
++
++  .filler : AT(ADDR(.filler) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++	BYTE(0)
++	. = ALIGN(2*PMD_SIZE) - 1;
++  }
++
++  /* freed after init ends here */
++
++  .text.head : AT(ADDR(.text.head) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++	__init_end = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++	KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++	_text = .;			/* Text and read-only data */
++	*(.text.head)
++  } :text = 0x9090
++
++  /* read-only */
++  .text : AT(ADDR(.text) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); /* not really needed, already page aligned */
++	*(.text.page_aligned)
++	TEXT_TEXT
++	SCHED_TEXT
++	LOCK_TEXT
++	KPROBES_TEXT
++	*(.fixup)
++	*(.gnu.warning)
++  	_etext = .;			/* End of text section */
++  } :text = 0x9090
++
++  . += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++  . = ALIGN(4096);		/* Exception table */
++  __ex_table : AT(ADDR(__ex_table) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++  	__start___ex_table = .;
++	 *(__ex_table)
++  	__stop___ex_table = .;
++  } :rodata
++
++  NOTES :rodata :note
++
++  BUG_TABLE :rodata
++
++  . = ALIGN(4);
++  .tracedata : AT(ADDR(.tracedata) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++  	__tracedata_start = .;
++	*(.tracedata)
++  	__tracedata_end = .;
++  }
++
++  RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
++
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  .rodata.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.rodata.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	*(.idt)
++	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++	*(.empty_zero_page)
++	*(.swapper_pg_pmd)
++	*(.swapper_pg_dir)
++	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  .module.text : AT(ADDR(.module.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	MODULES_VADDR = .;
++	BYTE(0)
++	. += (6 * 1024 * 1024);
++	. = ALIGN( PMD_SIZE) - 1;
++	MODULES_END = .;
++  }
++#else
++  . = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE) - 1;
++#endif
++
++#endif
++
++  /* writeable */
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  .data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {	/* Data */
++	_data = .;
++	DATA_DATA
++	CONSTRUCTORS
++	} :data
++
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  .data_nosave : AT(ADDR(.data_nosave) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++  	__nosave_begin = .;
++	*(.data.nosave)
++  	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  	__nosave_end = .;
++  }
++
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  .data.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	*(.data.page_aligned)
++  }
++
++  . = ALIGN(32);
++  .data.cacheline_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.cacheline_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	*(.data.cacheline_aligned)
++  }
++
++  /* rarely changed data like cpu maps */
++  . = ALIGN(32);
++  .data.read_mostly : AT(ADDR(.data.read_mostly) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	*(.data.read_mostly)
++	_edata = .;		/* End of data section */
++  }
++
++  . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE);	/* init_task */
++  .data.init_task : AT(ADDR(.data.init_task) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	*(.data.init_task)
++  }
++
+   .bss : AT(ADDR(.bss) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	__init_end = .;
+ 	__bss_start = .;		/* BSS */
+ 	*(.bss.page_aligned)
+ 	*(.bss)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_64.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_64.lds.S
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_64.lds.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux_64.lds.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ jiffies_64 = jiffies;
+ _proxy_pda = 1;
+ PHDRS {
+ 	text PT_LOAD FLAGS(5);	/* R_E */
+-	data PT_LOAD FLAGS(7);	/* RWE */
+-	user PT_LOAD FLAGS(7);	/* RWE */
++	data PT_LOAD FLAGS(6);	/* RW_ */
++	user PT_LOAD FLAGS(7);	/* RWX */
+ 	data.init PT_LOAD FLAGS(7);	/* RWE */
+ 	note PT_NOTE FLAGS(4);	/* R__ */
+ }
+@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ SECTIONS
+ 
+   BUG_TABLE :text
+ 
+-  RODATA
++  RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
+ 
+   . = ALIGN(4);
+   .tracedata : AT(ADDR(.tracedata) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+@@ -60,15 +60,18 @@ SECTIONS
+   	__tracedata_end = .;
+   }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++  . = ALIGN(2*1024*1024);	/* Align data segment to PMD size boundary */
++#else
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);		/* Align data segment to page size boundary */
++#endif
+ 				/* Data */
++  _data = .;
+   .data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ 	DATA_DATA
+ 	CONSTRUCTORS
+ 	} :data
+ 
+-  _edata = .;			/* End of data section */
+-
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+   . = ALIGN(CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_BYTES);
+   .data.cacheline_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.cacheline_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+@@ -79,9 +82,27 @@ SECTIONS
+   	*(.data.read_mostly)
+   }
+ 
++  . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE);	/* init_task */
++  .data.init_task : AT(ADDR(.data.init_task) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	*(.data.init_task)
++  }
++
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  .data.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
++	*(.data.page_aligned)
++  }
++
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  __nosave_begin = .;
++  .data_nosave : AT(ADDR(.data_nosave) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.data.nosave) }
++  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
++  __nosave_end = .;
++
++  _edata = .;			/* End of data section */
++
+ #define VSYSCALL_ADDR (-10*1024*1024)
+-#define VSYSCALL_PHYS_ADDR ((LOADADDR(.data.read_mostly) + SIZEOF(.data.read_mostly) + 4095) & ~(4095))
+-#define VSYSCALL_VIRT_ADDR ((ADDR(.data.read_mostly) + SIZEOF(.data.read_mostly) + 4095) & ~(4095))
++#define VSYSCALL_PHYS_ADDR ((LOADADDR(.data_nosave) + SIZEOF(.data_nosave) + 4095) & ~(4095))
++#define VSYSCALL_VIRT_ADDR ((ADDR(.data_nosave) + SIZEOF(.data_nosave) + 4095) & ~(4095))
+ 
+ #define VLOAD_OFFSET (VSYSCALL_ADDR - VSYSCALL_PHYS_ADDR)
+ #define VLOAD(x) (ADDR(x) - VLOAD_OFFSET)
+@@ -129,23 +150,13 @@ SECTIONS
+ #undef VVIRT_OFFSET
+ #undef VVIRT
+ 
+-  . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE);	/* init_task */
+-  .data.init_task : AT(ADDR(.data.init_task) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	*(.data.init_task)
+-  }:data.init
+-
+-  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  .data.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+-	*(.data.page_aligned)
+-  }
+-
+   /* might get freed after init */
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+   __smp_alt_begin = .;
+   __smp_locks = .;
+   .smp_locks : AT(ADDR(.smp_locks) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ 	*(.smp_locks)
+-  }
++  } :data.init
+   __smp_locks_end = .;
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+   __smp_alt_end = .;
+@@ -222,12 +233,6 @@ SECTIONS
+   . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+   __init_end = .;
+ 
+-  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  __nosave_begin = .;
+-  .data_nosave : AT(ADDR(.data_nosave) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.data.nosave) }
+-  . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+-  __nosave_end = .;
+-
+   __bss_start = .;		/* BSS */
+   .bss : AT(ADDR(.bss) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ 	*(.bss.page_aligned)
+@@ -235,6 +240,7 @@ SECTIONS
+ 	}
+   __bss_stop = .;
+ 
++  . = ALIGN(2*1024*1024);
+   _end = . ;
+ 
+   /* Sections to be discarded */
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -235,13 +235,13 @@ static ctl_table kernel_table2[] = {
+ 	  .data = &vsyscall_gtod_data.sysctl_enabled, .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ 	  .mode = 0644,
+ 	  .proc_handler = vsyscall_sysctl_change },
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static ctl_table kernel_root_table2[] = {
+ 	{ .ctl_name = CTL_KERN, .procname = "kernel", .mode = 0555,
+ 	  .child = kernel_table2 },
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -251,6 +251,11 @@ static void __cpuinit vsyscall_set_cpu(i
+ {
+ 	unsigned long *d;
+ 	unsigned long node = 0;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ 	node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+ #endif
+@@ -261,10 +266,20 @@ static void __cpuinit vsyscall_set_cpu(i
+ 	   in user space in vgetcpu.
+ 	   12 bits for the CPU and 8 bits for the node. */
+ 	d = (unsigned long *)(get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu) + GDT_ENTRY_PER_CPU);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	*d = 0x0f40000000000ULL;
+ 	*d |= cpu;
+ 	*d |= (node & 0xf) << 12;
+ 	*d |= (node >> 4) << 48;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ static void __cpuinit cpu_vsyscall_init(void *arg)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -54,8 +54,3 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_level4_pgt);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(load_gs_index);
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_proxy_pda);
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
+-/* Virtualized guests may want to use it */
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_gdt_descr);
+-#endif
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1329,7 +1329,19 @@ static void reload_tss(struct kvm_vcpu *
+ 	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ 
+ 	struct svm_cpu_data *svm_data = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	svm_data->tss_desc->type = 9; /* available 32/64-bit TSS */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	load_TR_desc();
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -355,9 +355,23 @@ static void reload_tss(void)
+ 	struct descriptor_table gdt;
+ 	struct segment_descriptor *descs;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	get_gdt(&gdt);
+ 	descs = (void *)gdt.base;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	descs[GDT_ENTRY_TSS].type = 9; /* available TSS */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	load_TR_desc();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2464,7 +2478,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
+ 	vcpu->arch.interrupt_window_open =
+ 		(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & 3) == 0;
+ 
+-	asm("mov %0, %%ds; mov %0, %%es" : : "r"(__USER_DS));
++	asm("mov %0, %%ds; mov %0, %%es" : : "r"(__KERNEL_DS));
+ 	vmx->launched = 1;
+ 
+ 	intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -52,33 +52,33 @@ static int kvm_dev_ioctl_get_supported_c
+ struct kvm_x86_ops *kvm_x86_ops;
+ 
+ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_entries[] = {
+-	{ "pf_fixed", VCPU_STAT(pf_fixed) },
+-	{ "pf_guest", VCPU_STAT(pf_guest) },
+-	{ "tlb_flush", VCPU_STAT(tlb_flush) },
+-	{ "invlpg", VCPU_STAT(invlpg) },
+-	{ "exits", VCPU_STAT(exits) },
+-	{ "io_exits", VCPU_STAT(io_exits) },
+-	{ "mmio_exits", VCPU_STAT(mmio_exits) },
+-	{ "signal_exits", VCPU_STAT(signal_exits) },
+-	{ "irq_window", VCPU_STAT(irq_window_exits) },
+-	{ "halt_exits", VCPU_STAT(halt_exits) },
+-	{ "halt_wakeup", VCPU_STAT(halt_wakeup) },
+-	{ "request_irq", VCPU_STAT(request_irq_exits) },
+-	{ "irq_exits", VCPU_STAT(irq_exits) },
+-	{ "host_state_reload", VCPU_STAT(host_state_reload) },
+-	{ "efer_reload", VCPU_STAT(efer_reload) },
+-	{ "fpu_reload", VCPU_STAT(fpu_reload) },
+-	{ "insn_emulation", VCPU_STAT(insn_emulation) },
+-	{ "insn_emulation_fail", VCPU_STAT(insn_emulation_fail) },
+-	{ "mmu_shadow_zapped", VM_STAT(mmu_shadow_zapped) },
+-	{ "mmu_pte_write", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_write) },
+-	{ "mmu_pte_updated", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_updated) },
+-	{ "mmu_pde_zapped", VM_STAT(mmu_pde_zapped) },
+-	{ "mmu_flooded", VM_STAT(mmu_flooded) },
+-	{ "mmu_recycled", VM_STAT(mmu_recycled) },
+-	{ "mmu_cache_miss", VM_STAT(mmu_cache_miss) },
+-	{ "remote_tlb_flush", VM_STAT(remote_tlb_flush) },
+-	{ NULL }
++	{ "pf_fixed", VCPU_STAT(pf_fixed), NULL },
++	{ "pf_guest", VCPU_STAT(pf_guest), NULL },
++	{ "tlb_flush", VCPU_STAT(tlb_flush), NULL },
++	{ "invlpg", VCPU_STAT(invlpg), NULL },
++	{ "exits", VCPU_STAT(exits), NULL },
++	{ "io_exits", VCPU_STAT(io_exits), NULL },
++	{ "mmio_exits", VCPU_STAT(mmio_exits), NULL },
++	{ "signal_exits", VCPU_STAT(signal_exits), NULL },
++	{ "irq_window", VCPU_STAT(irq_window_exits), NULL },
++	{ "halt_exits", VCPU_STAT(halt_exits), NULL },
++	{ "halt_wakeup", VCPU_STAT(halt_wakeup), NULL },
++	{ "request_irq", VCPU_STAT(request_irq_exits), NULL },
++	{ "irq_exits", VCPU_STAT(irq_exits), NULL },
++	{ "host_state_reload", VCPU_STAT(host_state_reload), NULL },
++	{ "efer_reload", VCPU_STAT(efer_reload), NULL },
++	{ "fpu_reload", VCPU_STAT(fpu_reload), NULL },
++	{ "insn_emulation", VCPU_STAT(insn_emulation), NULL },
++	{ "insn_emulation_fail", VCPU_STAT(insn_emulation_fail), NULL },
++	{ "mmu_shadow_zapped", VM_STAT(mmu_shadow_zapped), NULL },
++	{ "mmu_pte_write", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_write), NULL },
++	{ "mmu_pte_updated", VM_STAT(mmu_pte_updated), NULL },
++	{ "mmu_pde_zapped", VM_STAT(mmu_pde_zapped), NULL },
++	{ "mmu_flooded", VM_STAT(mmu_flooded), NULL },
++	{ "mmu_recycled", VM_STAT(mmu_recycled), NULL },
++	{ "mmu_cache_miss", VM_STAT(mmu_cache_miss), NULL },
++	{ "remote_tlb_flush", VM_STAT(remote_tlb_flush), NULL },
++	{ NULL, 0, KVM_STAT_VM, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(stru
+ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ 				    struct kvm_interrupt *irq)
+ {
+-	if (irq->irq < 0 || irq->irq >= 256)
++	if (irq->irq >= 256)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	if (irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
+ 		return -ENXIO;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
+ #include <linux/linkage.h>
+ #include <asm/dwarf2.h>
+ #include <asm/errno.h>
+-				
++#include <asm/segment.h>
++
+ /*
+  * computes a partial checksum, e.g. for TCP/UDP fragments
+  */
+@@ -304,9 +305,22 @@ unsigned int csum_partial_copy_generic (
+ 
+ #define ARGBASE 16		
+ #define FP		12
+-		
+-ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
++
++ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic_to_user)
+ 	CFI_STARTPROC
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %es
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++	jmp csum_partial_copy_generic
++
++ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic_from_user)
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %ds
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++
++ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
+ 	subl  $4,%esp	
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
+ 	pushl %edi
+@@ -331,7 +345,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
+ 	jmp 4f
+ SRC(1:	movw (%esi), %bx	)
+ 	addl $2, %esi
+-DST(	movw %bx, (%edi)	)
++DST(	movw %bx, %es:(%edi)	)
+ 	addl $2, %edi
+ 	addw %bx, %ax	
+ 	adcl $0, %eax
+@@ -343,30 +357,30 @@ DST(	movw %bx, (%edi)	)
+ SRC(1:	movl (%esi), %ebx	)
+ SRC(	movl 4(%esi), %edx	)
+ 	adcl %ebx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %ebx, (%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %ebx, %es:(%edi)	)
+ 	adcl %edx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %edx, 4(%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %edx, %es:4(%edi)	)
+ 
+ SRC(	movl 8(%esi), %ebx	)
+ SRC(	movl 12(%esi), %edx	)
+ 	adcl %ebx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %ebx, 8(%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %ebx, %es:8(%edi)	)
+ 	adcl %edx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %edx, 12(%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %edx, %es:12(%edi)	)
+ 
+ SRC(	movl 16(%esi), %ebx 	)
+ SRC(	movl 20(%esi), %edx	)
+ 	adcl %ebx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %ebx, 16(%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %ebx, %es:16(%edi)	)
+ 	adcl %edx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %edx, 20(%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %edx, %es:20(%edi)	)
+ 
+ SRC(	movl 24(%esi), %ebx	)
+ SRC(	movl 28(%esi), %edx	)
+ 	adcl %ebx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %ebx, 24(%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %ebx, %es:24(%edi)	)
+ 	adcl %edx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %edx, 28(%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %edx, %es:28(%edi)	)
+ 
+ 	lea 32(%esi), %esi
+ 	lea 32(%edi), %edi
+@@ -380,7 +394,7 @@ DST(	movl %edx, 28(%edi)	)
+ 	shrl $2, %edx			# This clears CF
+ SRC(3:	movl (%esi), %ebx	)
+ 	adcl %ebx, %eax
+-DST(	movl %ebx, (%edi)	)
++DST(	movl %ebx, %es:(%edi)	)
+ 	lea 4(%esi), %esi
+ 	lea 4(%edi), %edi
+ 	dec %edx
+@@ -392,12 +406,12 @@ DST(	movl %ebx, (%edi)	)
+ 	jb 5f
+ SRC(	movw (%esi), %cx	)
+ 	leal 2(%esi), %esi
+-DST(	movw %cx, (%edi)	)
++DST(	movw %cx, %es:(%edi)	)
+ 	leal 2(%edi), %edi
+ 	je 6f
+ 	shll $16,%ecx
+ SRC(5:	movb (%esi), %cl	)
+-DST(	movb %cl, (%edi)	)
++DST(	movb %cl, %es:(%edi)	)
+ 6:	addl %ecx, %eax
+ 	adcl $0, %eax
+ 7:
+@@ -408,7 +422,7 @@ DST(	movb %cl, (%edi)	)
+ 
+ 6001:
+ 	movl ARGBASE+20(%esp), %ebx	# src_err_ptr
+-	movl $-EFAULT, (%ebx)
++	movl $-EFAULT, %ss:(%ebx)
+ 
+ 	# zero the complete destination - computing the rest
+ 	# is too much work 
+@@ -421,11 +435,19 @@ DST(	movb %cl, (%edi)	)
+ 
+ 6002:
+ 	movl ARGBASE+24(%esp), %ebx	# dst_err_ptr
+-	movl $-EFAULT,(%ebx)
++	movl $-EFAULT,%ss:(%ebx)
+ 	jmp 5000b
+ 
+ .previous
+ 
++	pushl %ss
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %ds
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++	pushl %ss
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %es
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	popl %ebx
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	CFI_RESTORE ebx
+@@ -439,26 +461,41 @@ DST(	movb %cl, (%edi)	)
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	ret	
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+-ENDPROC(csum_partial_copy_generic)
++ENDPROC(csum_partial_copy_generic_to_user)
+ 
+ #else
+ 
+ /* Version for PentiumII/PPro */
+ 
+ #define ROUND1(x) \
++	nop; nop; nop;				\
+ 	SRC(movl x(%esi), %ebx	)	;	\
+ 	addl %ebx, %eax			;	\
+-	DST(movl %ebx, x(%edi)	)	; 
++	DST(movl %ebx, %es:x(%edi))	;
+ 
+ #define ROUND(x) \
++	nop; nop; nop;				\
+ 	SRC(movl x(%esi), %ebx	)	;	\
+ 	adcl %ebx, %eax			;	\
+-	DST(movl %ebx, x(%edi)	)	;
++	DST(movl %ebx, %es:x(%edi))	;
+ 
+ #define ARGBASE 12
+-		
+-ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
++
++ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic_to_user)
+ 	CFI_STARTPROC
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %es
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++	jmp csum_partial_copy_generic
++
++ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic_from_user)
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %ds
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++
++ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
+ 	pushl %ebx
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
+ 	CFI_REL_OFFSET ebx, 0
+@@ -482,7 +519,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
+ 	subl %ebx, %edi  
+ 	lea  -1(%esi),%edx
+ 	andl $-32,%edx
+-	lea 3f(%ebx,%ebx), %ebx
++	lea 3f(%ebx,%ebx,2), %ebx
+ 	testl %esi, %esi 
+ 	jmp *%ebx
+ 1:	addl $64,%esi
+@@ -503,19 +540,19 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
+ 	jb 5f
+ SRC(	movw (%esi), %dx         )
+ 	leal 2(%esi), %esi
+-DST(	movw %dx, (%edi)         )
++DST(	movw %dx, %es:(%edi)     )
+ 	leal 2(%edi), %edi
+ 	je 6f
+ 	shll $16,%edx
+ 5:
+ SRC(	movb (%esi), %dl         )
+-DST(	movb %dl, (%edi)         )
++DST(	movb %dl, %es:(%edi)     )
+ 6:	addl %edx, %eax
+ 	adcl $0, %eax
+ 7:
+ .section .fixup, "ax"
+ 6001:	movl	ARGBASE+20(%esp), %ebx	# src_err_ptr	
+-	movl $-EFAULT, (%ebx)
++	movl $-EFAULT, %ss:(%ebx)
+ 	# zero the complete destination (computing the rest is too much work)
+ 	movl ARGBASE+8(%esp),%edi	# dst
+ 	movl ARGBASE+12(%esp),%ecx	# len
+@@ -523,10 +560,18 @@ DST(	movb %dl, (%edi)         )
+ 	rep; stosb
+ 	jmp 7b
+ 6002:	movl ARGBASE+24(%esp), %ebx	# dst_err_ptr
+-	movl $-EFAULT, (%ebx)
++	movl $-EFAULT, %ss:(%ebx)
+ 	jmp  7b			
+ .previous				
+ 
++	pushl %ss
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %ds
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
++	pushl %ss
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %es
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	popl %esi
+ 	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	CFI_RESTORE esi
+@@ -538,7 +583,7 @@ DST(	movb %dl, (%edi)         )
+ 	CFI_RESTORE ebx
+ 	ret
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+-ENDPROC(csum_partial_copy_generic)
++ENDPROC(csum_partial_copy_generic_to_user)
+ 				
+ #undef ROUND
+ #undef ROUND1		
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ ENDPROC(clear_page)
+ 
+ #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+ 
+-	.section .altinstr_replacement,"ax"
++	.section .altinstr_replacement,"a"
+ 1:	.byte 0xeb					/* jmp <disp8> */
+ 	.byte (clear_page_c - clear_page) - (2f - 1b)	/* offset */
+ 2:
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ ENDPROC(copy_page)
+ 
+ #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+ 
+-	.section .altinstr_replacement,"ax"
++	.section .altinstr_replacement,"a"
+ 1:	.byte 0xeb					/* jmp <disp8> */
+ 	.byte (copy_page_c - copy_page) - (2f - 1b)	/* offset */
+ 2:
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
+ 	.byte 0xe9	/* 32bit jump */
+ 	.long \orig-1f	/* by default jump to orig */
+ 1:
+-	.section .altinstr_replacement,"ax"
++	.section .altinstr_replacement,"a"
+ 2:	.byte 0xe9	             /* near jump with 32bit immediate */
+ 	.long \alt-1b /* offset */   /* or alternatively to alt */
+ 	.previous
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ ENDPROC(copy_from_user)
+ 	/* must zero dest */
+ bad_from_user:
+ 	CFI_STARTPROC
++	testl %edx,%edx
++	js bad_to_user
+ 	movl %edx,%ecx
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	rep
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/getuser_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
+ #include <linux/linkage.h>
+ #include <asm/dwarf2.h>
+ #include <asm/thread_info.h>
+-
++#include <asm/segment.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * __get_user_X
+@@ -31,7 +31,11 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1)
+ 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%edx)
+ 	cmpl TI_addr_limit(%edx),%eax
+ 	jae bad_get_user
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	popl %ds
+ 1:	movzbl (%eax),%edx
++	pushl %ss
++	pop %ds
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	ret
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+@@ -44,7 +48,11 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_2)
+ 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%edx)
+ 	cmpl TI_addr_limit(%edx),%eax
+ 	jae bad_get_user
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	popl %ds
+ 2:	movzwl -1(%eax),%edx
++	pushl %ss
++	pop %ds
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	ret
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+@@ -57,7 +65,11 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4)
+ 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%edx)
+ 	cmpl TI_addr_limit(%edx),%eax
+ 	jae bad_get_user
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	popl %ds
+ 3:	movl -3(%eax),%edx
++	pushl %ss
++	pop %ds
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	ret
+ 	CFI_ENDPROC
+@@ -65,6 +77,8 @@ ENDPROC(__get_user_4)
+ 
+ bad_get_user:
+ 	CFI_STARTPROC
++	pushl %ss
++	pop %ds
+ 	xorl %edx,%edx
+ 	movl $-14,%eax
+ 	ret
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ ENDPROC(__memcpy)
+ 	/* Some CPUs run faster using the string copy instructions.
+ 	   It is also a lot simpler. Use this when possible */
+ 
+-	.section .altinstr_replacement,"ax"
++	.section .altinstr_replacement,"a"
+ 1:	.byte 0xeb				/* jmp <disp8> */
+ 	.byte (memcpy_c - memcpy) - (2f - 1b)	/* offset */
+ 2:
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ ENDPROC(__memset)
+ 
+ #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+ 
+-	.section .altinstr_replacement,"ax"
++	.section .altinstr_replacement,"a"
+ 1:	.byte 0xeb				/* jmp <disp8> */
+ 	.byte (memset_c - memset) - (2f - 1b)	/* offset */
+ 2:
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/mmx_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ void *_mmx_memcpy(void *to, const void *
+ {
+ 	void *p;
+ 	int i;
++	unsigned long cr0;
+ 
+ 	if (unlikely(in_interrupt()))
+ 		return __memcpy(to, from, len);
+@@ -41,46 +42,74 @@ void *_mmx_memcpy(void *to, const void *
+ 	kernel_fpu_begin();
+ 
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__ (
+-		"1: prefetch (%0)\n"		/* This set is 28 bytes */
+-		"   prefetch 64(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 128(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 192(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 256(%0)\n"
++		"1: prefetch (%1)\n"		/* This set is 28 bytes */
++		"   prefetch 64(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 128(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 192(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 256(%1)\n"
+ 		"2:  \n"
+ 		".section .fixup, \"ax\"\n"
+-		"3: movw $0x1AEB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 26 bytes */
++		"3:  \n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %%cr0, %0\n"
++		"   movl %0, %%eax\n"
++		"   andl $0xFFFEFFFF, %%eax\n"
++		"   movl %%eax, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
++		"   movw $0x1AEB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 26 bytes */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %0, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
+ 		"   jmp 2b\n"
+ 		".previous\n"
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)
+-		: : "r" (from) );
++		: "=&r" (cr0) : "r" (from) : "ax");
+ 		
+ 	
+ 	for(; i>5; i--)
+ 	{
+ 		__asm__ __volatile__ (
+-		"1:  prefetch 320(%0)\n"
+-		"2:  movq (%0), %%mm0\n"
+-		"  movq 8(%0), %%mm1\n"
+-		"  movq 16(%0), %%mm2\n"
+-		"  movq 24(%0), %%mm3\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm0, (%1)\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm1, 8(%1)\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm2, 16(%1)\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm3, 24(%1)\n"
+-		"  movq 32(%0), %%mm0\n"
+-		"  movq 40(%0), %%mm1\n"
+-		"  movq 48(%0), %%mm2\n"
+-		"  movq 56(%0), %%mm3\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm0, 32(%1)\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm1, 40(%1)\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm2, 48(%1)\n"
+-		"  movq %%mm3, 56(%1)\n"
++		"1:  prefetch 320(%1)\n"
++		"2:  movq (%1), %%mm0\n"
++		"  movq 8(%1), %%mm1\n"
++		"  movq 16(%1), %%mm2\n"
++		"  movq 24(%1), %%mm3\n"
++		"  movq %%mm0, (%2)\n"
++		"  movq %%mm1, 8(%2)\n"
++		"  movq %%mm2, 16(%2)\n"
++		"  movq %%mm3, 24(%2)\n"
++		"  movq 32(%1), %%mm0\n"
++		"  movq 40(%1), %%mm1\n"
++		"  movq 48(%1), %%mm2\n"
++		"  movq 56(%1), %%mm3\n"
++		"  movq %%mm0, 32(%2)\n"
++		"  movq %%mm1, 40(%2)\n"
++		"  movq %%mm2, 48(%2)\n"
++		"  movq %%mm3, 56(%2)\n"
+ 		".section .fixup, \"ax\"\n"
+-		"3: movw $0x05EB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 5 bytes */
++		"3:\n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %%cr0, %0\n"
++		"   movl %0, %%eax\n"
++		"   andl $0xFFFEFFFF, %%eax\n"
++		"   movl %%eax, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
++		"   movw $0x05EB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 5 bytes */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %0, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
+ 		"   jmp 2b\n"
+ 		".previous\n"
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)
+-		: : "r" (from), "r" (to) : "memory");
++		: "=&r" (cr0) : "r" (from), "r" (to) : "memory", "ax");
+ 		from+=64;
+ 		to+=64;
+ 	}
+@@ -159,6 +188,7 @@ static void fast_clear_page(void *page)
+ static void fast_copy_page(void *to, void *from)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	unsigned long cr0;
+ 
+ 	kernel_fpu_begin();
+ 
+@@ -166,45 +196,73 @@ static void fast_copy_page(void *to, voi
+ 	 * but that is for later. -AV
+ 	 */
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__ (
+-		"1: prefetch (%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 64(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 128(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 192(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 256(%0)\n"
++		"1: prefetch (%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 64(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 128(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 192(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 256(%1)\n"
+ 		"2:  \n"
+ 		".section .fixup, \"ax\"\n"
+-		"3: movw $0x1AEB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 26 bytes */
++		"3:  \n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %%cr0, %0\n"
++		"   movl %0, %%eax\n"
++		"   andl $0xFFFEFFFF, %%eax\n"
++		"   movl %%eax, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
++		"   movw $0x1AEB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 26 bytes */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %0, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
+ 		"   jmp 2b\n"
+ 		".previous\n"
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)
+-		: : "r" (from) );
++		: "=&r" (cr0) : "r" (from) : "ax");
+ 
+ 	for(i=0; i<(4096-320)/64; i++)
+ 	{
+ 		__asm__ __volatile__ (
+-		"1: prefetch 320(%0)\n"
+-		"2: movq (%0), %%mm0\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm0, (%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 8(%0), %%mm1\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm1, 8(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 16(%0), %%mm2\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm2, 16(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 24(%0), %%mm3\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm3, 24(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 32(%0), %%mm4\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm4, 32(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 40(%0), %%mm5\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm5, 40(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 48(%0), %%mm6\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm6, 48(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 56(%0), %%mm7\n"
+-		"   movntq %%mm7, 56(%1)\n"
++		"1: prefetch 320(%1)\n"
++		"2: movq (%1), %%mm0\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm0, (%2)\n"
++		"   movq 8(%1), %%mm1\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm1, 8(%2)\n"
++		"   movq 16(%1), %%mm2\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm2, 16(%2)\n"
++		"   movq 24(%1), %%mm3\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm3, 24(%2)\n"
++		"   movq 32(%1), %%mm4\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm4, 32(%2)\n"
++		"   movq 40(%1), %%mm5\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm5, 40(%2)\n"
++		"   movq 48(%1), %%mm6\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm6, 48(%2)\n"
++		"   movq 56(%1), %%mm7\n"
++		"   movntq %%mm7, 56(%2)\n"
+ 		".section .fixup, \"ax\"\n"
+-		"3: movw $0x05EB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 5 bytes */
++		"3:\n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %%cr0, %0\n"
++		"   movl %0, %%eax\n"
++		"   andl $0xFFFEFFFF, %%eax\n"
++		"   movl %%eax, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
++		"   movw $0x05EB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 5 bytes */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %0, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
+ 		"   jmp 2b\n"
+ 		".previous\n"
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)
+-		: : "r" (from), "r" (to) : "memory");
++		: "=&r" (cr0) : "r" (from), "r" (to) : "memory", "ax");
+ 		from+=64;
+ 		to+=64;
+ 	}
+@@ -285,50 +343,78 @@ static void fast_clear_page(void *page)
+ static void fast_copy_page(void *to, void *from)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+-	
+-	
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
+ 	kernel_fpu_begin();
+ 
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__ (
+-		"1: prefetch (%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 64(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 128(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 192(%0)\n"
+-		"   prefetch 256(%0)\n"
++		"1: prefetch (%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 64(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 128(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 192(%1)\n"
++		"   prefetch 256(%1)\n"
+ 		"2:  \n"
+ 		".section .fixup, \"ax\"\n"
+-		"3: movw $0x1AEB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 26 bytes */
++		"3:  \n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %%cr0, %0\n"
++		"   movl %0, %%eax\n"
++		"   andl $0xFFFEFFFF, %%eax\n"
++		"   movl %%eax, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
++		"   movw $0x1AEB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 26 bytes */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %0, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
+ 		"   jmp 2b\n"
+ 		".previous\n"
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)
+-		: : "r" (from) );
++		: "=&r" (cr0) : "r" (from) : "ax");
+ 
+ 	for(i=0; i<4096/64; i++)
+ 	{
+ 		__asm__ __volatile__ (
+-		"1: prefetch 320(%0)\n"
+-		"2: movq (%0), %%mm0\n"
+-		"   movq 8(%0), %%mm1\n"
+-		"   movq 16(%0), %%mm2\n"
+-		"   movq 24(%0), %%mm3\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm0, (%1)\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm1, 8(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm2, 16(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm3, 24(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq 32(%0), %%mm0\n"
+-		"   movq 40(%0), %%mm1\n"
+-		"   movq 48(%0), %%mm2\n"
+-		"   movq 56(%0), %%mm3\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm0, 32(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm1, 40(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm2, 48(%1)\n"
+-		"   movq %%mm3, 56(%1)\n"
++		"1: prefetch 320(%1)\n"
++		"2: movq (%1), %%mm0\n"
++		"   movq 8(%1), %%mm1\n"
++		"   movq 16(%1), %%mm2\n"
++		"   movq 24(%1), %%mm3\n"
++		"   movq %%mm0, (%2)\n"
++		"   movq %%mm1, 8(%2)\n"
++		"   movq %%mm2, 16(%2)\n"
++		"   movq %%mm3, 24(%2)\n"
++		"   movq 32(%1), %%mm0\n"
++		"   movq 40(%1), %%mm1\n"
++		"   movq 48(%1), %%mm2\n"
++		"   movq 56(%1), %%mm3\n"
++		"   movq %%mm0, 32(%2)\n"
++		"   movq %%mm1, 40(%2)\n"
++		"   movq %%mm2, 48(%2)\n"
++		"   movq %%mm3, 56(%2)\n"
+ 		".section .fixup, \"ax\"\n"
+-		"3: movw $0x05EB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 5 bytes */
++		"3:\n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %%cr0, %0\n"
++		"   movl %0, %%eax\n"
++		"   andl $0xFFFEFFFF, %%eax\n"
++		"   movl %%eax, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
++		"   movw $0x05EB, 1b\n"	/* jmp on 5 bytes */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		"   movl %0, %%cr0\n"
++#endif
++
+ 		"   jmp 2b\n"
+ 		".previous\n"
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)
+-		: : "r" (from), "r" (to) : "memory");
++		: "=&r" (cr0) : "r" (from), "r" (to) : "memory", "ax");
+ 		from+=64;
+ 		to+=64;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/putuser_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/putuser_32.S
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/putuser_32.S	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/putuser_32.S	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
+ #include <linux/linkage.h>
+ #include <asm/dwarf2.h>
+ #include <asm/thread_info.h>
+-
++#include <asm/segment.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * __put_user_X
+@@ -41,7 +41,11 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_1)
+ 	ENTER
+ 	cmpl TI_addr_limit(%ebx),%ecx
+ 	jae bad_put_user
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	popl %ds
+ 1:	movb %al,(%ecx)
++	pushl %ss
++	popl %ds
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	EXIT
+ ENDPROC(__put_user_1)
+@@ -52,7 +56,11 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_2)
+ 	subl $1,%ebx
+ 	cmpl %ebx,%ecx
+ 	jae bad_put_user
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	popl %ds
+ 2:	movw %ax,(%ecx)
++	pushl %ss
++	popl %ds
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	EXIT
+ ENDPROC(__put_user_2)
+@@ -63,7 +71,11 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_4)
+ 	subl $3,%ebx
+ 	cmpl %ebx,%ecx
+ 	jae bad_put_user
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	popl %ds
+ 3:	movl %eax,(%ecx)
++	pushl %ss
++	popl %ds
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	EXIT
+ ENDPROC(__put_user_4)
+@@ -74,8 +86,12 @@ ENTRY(__put_user_8)
+ 	subl $7,%ebx
+ 	cmpl %ebx,%ecx
+ 	jae bad_put_user
++	pushl $(__USER_DS)
++	popl %ds
+ 4:	movl %eax,(%ecx)
+ 5:	movl %edx,4(%ecx)
++	pushl %ss
++	popl %ds
+ 	xorl %eax,%eax
+ 	EXIT
+ ENDPROC(__put_user_8)
+@@ -85,6 +101,10 @@ bad_put_user:
+ 	CFI_DEF_CFA esp, 2*4
+ 	CFI_OFFSET eip, -1*4
+ 	CFI_OFFSET ebx, -2*4
++	pushl %ss
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET 4
++	popl %ds
++	CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -4
+ 	movl $-14,%eax
+ 	EXIT
+ END(bad_put_user)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -29,31 +29,38 @@ static inline int __movsl_is_ok(unsigned
+  * Copy a null terminated string from userspace.
+  */
+ 
+-#define __do_strncpy_from_user(dst,src,count,res)			   \
+-do {									   \
+-	int __d0, __d1, __d2;						   \
+-	might_sleep();							   \
+-	__asm__ __volatile__(						   \
+-		"	testl %1,%1\n"					   \
+-		"	jz 2f\n"					   \
+-		"0:	lodsb\n"					   \
+-		"	stosb\n"					   \
+-		"	testb %%al,%%al\n"				   \
+-		"	jz 1f\n"					   \
+-		"	decl %1\n"					   \
+-		"	jnz 0b\n"					   \
+-		"1:	subl %1,%0\n"					   \
+-		"2:\n"							   \
+-		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				   \
+-		"3:	movl %5,%0\n"					   \
+-		"	jmp 2b\n"					   \
+-		".previous\n"						   \
+-		_ASM_EXTABLE(0b,3b)					   \
+-		: "=d"(res), "=c"(count), "=&a" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1),	   \
+-		  "=&D" (__d2)						   \
+-		: "i"(-EFAULT), "0"(count), "1"(count), "3"(src), "4"(dst) \
+-		: "memory");						   \
+-} while (0)
++static long __do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
++{
++	int __d0, __d1, __d2;
++	long res = -EFAULT;
++
++	might_sleep();
++	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		"	movw %w10,%%ds\n"
++		"	testl %1,%1\n"
++		"	jz 2f\n"
++		"0:	lodsb\n"
++		"	stosb\n"
++		"	testb %%al,%%al\n"
++		"	jz 1f\n"
++		"	decl %1\n"
++		"	jnz 0b\n"
++		"1:	subl %1,%0\n"
++		"2:\n"
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"
++		"	popl %%ds\n"
++		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
++		"3:	movl %5,%0\n"
++		"	jmp 2b\n"
++		".previous\n"
++		_ASM_EXTABLE(0b,3b)
++		: "=d"(res), "=c"(count), "=&a" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1),
++		  "=&D" (__d2)
++		: "i"(-EFAULT), "0"(count), "1"(count), "3"(src), "4"(dst),
++		  "r"(__USER_DS)
++		: "memory");
++	return res;
++}
+ 
+ /**
+  * __strncpy_from_user: - Copy a NUL terminated string from userspace, with less checking.
+@@ -78,9 +85,7 @@ do {									   \
+ long
+ __strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
+ {
+-	long res;
+-	__do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, res);
+-	return res;
++	return __do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__strncpy_from_user);
+ 
+@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char 
+ {
+ 	long res = -EFAULT;
+ 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, src, 1))
+-		__do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, res);
++		res = __do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count);
+ 	return res;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncpy_from_user);
+@@ -116,24 +121,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncpy_from_user);
+  * Zero Userspace
+  */
+ 
+-#define __do_clear_user(addr,size)					\
+-do {									\
+-	int __d0;							\
+-	might_sleep();							\
+-  	__asm__ __volatile__(						\
+-		"0:	rep; stosl\n"					\
+-		"	movl %2,%0\n"					\
+-		"1:	rep; stosb\n"					\
+-		"2:\n"							\
+-		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				\
+-		"3:	lea 0(%2,%0,4),%0\n"				\
+-		"	jmp 2b\n"					\
+-		".previous\n"						\
+-		_ASM_EXTABLE(0b,3b)					\
+-		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,2b)					\
+-		: "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0)				\
+-		: "r"(size & 3), "0"(size / 4), "1"(addr), "a"(0));	\
+-} while (0)
++static unsigned long __do_clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
++{
++	int __d0;
++
++	might_sleep();
++	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		"	movw %w6,%%es\n"
++		"0:	rep; stosl\n"
++		"	movl %2,%0\n"
++		"1:	rep; stosb\n"
++		"2:\n"
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"
++		"	popl %%es\n"
++		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
++		"3:	lea 0(%2,%0,4),%0\n"
++		"	jmp 2b\n"
++		".previous\n"
++		_ASM_EXTABLE(0b,3b)
++		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,2b)
++		: "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0)
++		: "r"(size & 3), "0"(size / 4), "1"(addr), "a"(0),
++		  "r"(__USER_DS));
++	return size;
++}
+ 
+ /**
+  * clear_user: - Zero a block of memory in user space.
+@@ -150,7 +161,7 @@ clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned lon
+ {
+ 	might_sleep();
+ 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+-		__do_clear_user(to, n);
++		n = __do_clear_user(to, n);
+ 	return n;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_user);
+@@ -169,8 +180,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_user);
+ unsigned long
+ __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
+ {
+-	__do_clear_user(to, n);
+-	return n;
++	return __do_clear_user(to, n);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
+ 
+@@ -193,14 +203,17 @@ long strnlen_user(const char __user *s, 
+ 	might_sleep();
+ 
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		"	movw %w8,%%es\n"
+ 		"	testl %0, %0\n"
+ 		"	jz 3f\n"
+-		"	andl %0,%%ecx\n"
++		"	movl %0,%%ecx\n"
+ 		"0:	repne; scasb\n"
+ 		"	setne %%al\n"
+ 		"	subl %%ecx,%0\n"
+ 		"	addl %0,%%eax\n"
+ 		"1:\n"
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"
++		"	popl %%es\n"
+ 		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ 		"2:	xorl %%eax,%%eax\n"
+ 		"	jmp 1b\n"
+@@ -212,7 +225,7 @@ long strnlen_user(const char __user *s, 
+ 		"	.long 0b,2b\n"
+ 		".previous"
+ 		:"=r" (n), "=D" (s), "=a" (res), "=c" (tmp)
+-		:"0" (n), "1" (s), "2" (0), "3" (mask)
++		:"0" (n), "1" (s), "2" (0), "3" (mask), "r" (__USER_DS)
+ 		:"cc");
+ 	return res & mask;
+ }
+@@ -220,10 +233,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strnlen_user);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
+ static unsigned long
+-__copy_user_intel(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long size)
++__generic_copy_to_user_intel(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long size)
+ {
+ 	int d0, d1;
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		       "       movw %w6, %%es\n"
+ 		       "       .align 2,0x90\n"
+ 		       "1:     movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "       cmpl $67, %0\n"
+@@ -232,36 +246,36 @@ __copy_user_intel(void __user *to, const
+ 		       "       .align 2,0x90\n"
+ 		       "3:     movl 0(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "4:     movl 4(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "5:     movl %%eax, 0(%3)\n"
+-		       "6:     movl %%edx, 4(%3)\n"
++		       "5:     movl %%eax, %%es:0(%3)\n"
++		       "6:     movl %%edx, %%es:4(%3)\n"
+ 		       "7:     movl 8(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "8:     movl 12(%4),%%edx\n"
+-		       "9:     movl %%eax, 8(%3)\n"
+-		       "10:    movl %%edx, 12(%3)\n"
++		       "9:     movl %%eax, %%es:8(%3)\n"
++		       "10:    movl %%edx, %%es:12(%3)\n"
+ 		       "11:    movl 16(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "12:    movl 20(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "13:    movl %%eax, 16(%3)\n"
+-		       "14:    movl %%edx, 20(%3)\n"
++		       "13:    movl %%eax, %%es:16(%3)\n"
++		       "14:    movl %%edx, %%es:20(%3)\n"
+ 		       "15:    movl 24(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "16:    movl 28(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "17:    movl %%eax, 24(%3)\n"
+-		       "18:    movl %%edx, 28(%3)\n"
++		       "17:    movl %%eax, %%es:24(%3)\n"
++		       "18:    movl %%edx, %%es:28(%3)\n"
+ 		       "19:    movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "20:    movl 36(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "21:    movl %%eax, 32(%3)\n"
+-		       "22:    movl %%edx, 36(%3)\n"
++		       "21:    movl %%eax, %%es:32(%3)\n"
++		       "22:    movl %%edx, %%es:36(%3)\n"
+ 		       "23:    movl 40(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "24:    movl 44(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "25:    movl %%eax, 40(%3)\n"
+-		       "26:    movl %%edx, 44(%3)\n"
++		       "25:    movl %%eax, %%es:40(%3)\n"
++		       "26:    movl %%edx, %%es:44(%3)\n"
+ 		       "27:    movl 48(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "28:    movl 52(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "29:    movl %%eax, 48(%3)\n"
+-		       "30:    movl %%edx, 52(%3)\n"
++		       "29:    movl %%eax, %%es:48(%3)\n"
++		       "30:    movl %%edx, %%es:52(%3)\n"
+ 		       "31:    movl 56(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "32:    movl 60(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "33:    movl %%eax, 56(%3)\n"
+-		       "34:    movl %%edx, 60(%3)\n"
++		       "33:    movl %%eax, %%es:56(%3)\n"
++		       "34:    movl %%edx, %%es:60(%3)\n"
+ 		       "       addl $-64, %0\n"
+ 		       "       addl $64, %4\n"
+ 		       "       addl $64, %3\n"
+@@ -275,6 +289,8 @@ __copy_user_intel(void __user *to, const
+ 		       "36:    movl %%eax, %0\n"
+ 		       "37:    rep; movsb\n"
+ 		       "100:\n"
++		       "       pushl %%ss\n"
++		       "       popl %%es\n"
+ 		       ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ 		       "101:   lea 0(%%eax,%0,4),%0\n"
+ 		       "       jmp 100b\n"
+@@ -321,7 +337,117 @@ __copy_user_intel(void __user *to, const
+ 		       "       .long 99b,101b\n"
+ 		       ".previous"
+ 		       : "=&c"(size), "=&D" (d0), "=&S" (d1)
+-		       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size)
++		       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size), "r"(__USER_DS)
++		       : "eax", "edx", "memory");
++	return size;
++}
++
++static unsigned long
++__generic_copy_from_user_intel(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long size)
++{
++	int d0, d1;
++	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		       "       movw %w6, %%ds\n"
++		       "       .align 2,0x90\n"
++		       "1:     movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "       cmpl $67, %0\n"
++		       "       jbe 3f\n"
++		       "2:     movl 64(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "       .align 2,0x90\n"
++		       "3:     movl 0(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "4:     movl 4(%4), %%edx\n"
++		       "5:     movl %%eax, %%es:0(%3)\n"
++		       "6:     movl %%edx, %%es:4(%3)\n"
++		       "7:     movl 8(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "8:     movl 12(%4),%%edx\n"
++		       "9:     movl %%eax, %%es:8(%3)\n"
++		       "10:    movl %%edx, %%es:12(%3)\n"
++		       "11:    movl 16(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "12:    movl 20(%4), %%edx\n"
++		       "13:    movl %%eax, %%es:16(%3)\n"
++		       "14:    movl %%edx, %%es:20(%3)\n"
++		       "15:    movl 24(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "16:    movl 28(%4), %%edx\n"
++		       "17:    movl %%eax, %%es:24(%3)\n"
++		       "18:    movl %%edx, %%es:28(%3)\n"
++		       "19:    movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "20:    movl 36(%4), %%edx\n"
++		       "21:    movl %%eax, %%es:32(%3)\n"
++		       "22:    movl %%edx, %%es:36(%3)\n"
++		       "23:    movl 40(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "24:    movl 44(%4), %%edx\n"
++		       "25:    movl %%eax, %%es:40(%3)\n"
++		       "26:    movl %%edx, %%es:44(%3)\n"
++		       "27:    movl 48(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "28:    movl 52(%4), %%edx\n"
++		       "29:    movl %%eax, %%es:48(%3)\n"
++		       "30:    movl %%edx, %%es:52(%3)\n"
++		       "31:    movl 56(%4), %%eax\n"
++		       "32:    movl 60(%4), %%edx\n"
++		       "33:    movl %%eax, %%es:56(%3)\n"
++		       "34:    movl %%edx, %%es:60(%3)\n"
++		       "       addl $-64, %0\n"
++		       "       addl $64, %4\n"
++		       "       addl $64, %3\n"
++		       "       cmpl $63, %0\n"
++		       "       ja  1b\n"
++		       "35:    movl  %0, %%eax\n"
++		       "       shrl  $2, %0\n"
++		       "       andl  $3, %%eax\n"
++		       "       cld\n"
++		       "99:    rep; movsl\n"
++		       "36:    movl %%eax, %0\n"
++		       "37:    rep; movsb\n"
++		       "100:\n"
++		       "       pushl %%ss\n"
++		       "       popl %%ds\n"
++		       ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
++		       "101:   lea 0(%%eax,%0,4),%0\n"
++		       "       jmp 100b\n"
++		       ".previous\n"
++		       ".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
++		       "       .align 4\n"
++		       "       .long 1b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 2b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 3b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 4b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 5b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 6b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 7b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 8b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 9b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 10b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 11b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 12b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 13b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 14b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 15b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 16b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 17b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 18b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 19b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 20b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 21b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 22b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 23b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 24b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 25b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 26b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 27b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 28b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 29b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 30b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 31b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 32b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 33b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 34b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 35b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 36b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 37b,100b\n"
++		       "       .long 99b,101b\n"
++		       ".previous"
++		       : "=&c"(size), "=&D" (d0), "=&S" (d1)
++		       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size), "r"(__USER_DS)
+ 		       : "eax", "edx", "memory");
+ 	return size;
+ }
+@@ -331,6 +457,7 @@ __copy_user_zeroing_intel(void *to, cons
+ {
+ 	int d0, d1;
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		       "        movw %w6, %%ds\n"
+ 		       "        .align 2,0x90\n"
+ 		       "0:      movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "        cmpl $67, %0\n"      
+@@ -339,36 +466,36 @@ __copy_user_zeroing_intel(void *to, cons
+ 		       "        .align 2,0x90\n"     
+ 		       "2:      movl 0(%4), %%eax\n" 
+ 		       "21:     movl 4(%4), %%edx\n" 
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 0(%3)\n" 
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 4(%3)\n" 
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:0(%3)\n" 
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:4(%3)\n" 
+ 		       "3:      movl 8(%4), %%eax\n" 
+ 		       "31:     movl 12(%4),%%edx\n" 
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 8(%3)\n" 
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 12(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:8(%3)\n" 
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:12(%3)\n"
+ 		       "4:      movl 16(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "41:     movl 20(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 16(%3)\n"
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 20(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:16(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:20(%3)\n"
+ 		       "10:     movl 24(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "51:     movl 28(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 24(%3)\n"
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 28(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:24(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:28(%3)\n"
+ 		       "11:     movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "61:     movl 36(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 32(%3)\n"
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 36(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:32(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:36(%3)\n"
+ 		       "12:     movl 40(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "71:     movl 44(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 40(%3)\n"
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 44(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:40(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:44(%3)\n"
+ 		       "13:     movl 48(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "81:     movl 52(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 48(%3)\n"
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 52(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:48(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:52(%3)\n"
+ 		       "14:     movl 56(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 		       "91:     movl 60(%4), %%edx\n"
+-		       "        movl %%eax, 56(%3)\n"
+-		       "        movl %%edx, 60(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%eax, %%es:56(%3)\n"
++		       "        movl %%edx, %%es:60(%3)\n"
+ 		       "        addl $-64, %0\n"     
+ 		       "        addl $64, %4\n"      
+ 		       "        addl $64, %3\n"      
+@@ -382,6 +509,8 @@ __copy_user_zeroing_intel(void *to, cons
+ 		       "        movl %%eax,%0\n"
+ 		       "7:      rep; movsb\n"	
+ 		       "8:\n"			
++		       "        pushl %%ss\n"
++		       "        popl %%ds\n"
+ 		       ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ 		       "9:      lea 0(%%eax,%0,4),%0\n"	
+ 		       "16:     pushl %0\n"	
+@@ -416,7 +545,7 @@ __copy_user_zeroing_intel(void *to, cons
+ 		       "        .long 7b,16b\n" 
+ 		       ".previous"		
+ 		       : "=&c"(size), "=&D" (d0), "=&S" (d1)
+-		       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size)
++		       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size), "r"(__USER_DS)
+ 		       : "eax", "edx", "memory");
+ 	return size;
+ }
+@@ -432,6 +561,7 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_zeroing
+         int d0, d1;
+ 
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(
++	       "        movw %w6, %%ds\n"
+ 	       "        .align 2,0x90\n"
+ 	       "0:      movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "        cmpl $67, %0\n"
+@@ -440,36 +570,36 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_zeroing
+ 	       "        .align 2,0x90\n"
+ 	       "2:      movl 0(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "21:     movl 4(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 0(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 4(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:0(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:4(%3)\n"
+ 	       "3:      movl 8(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "31:     movl 12(%4),%%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 8(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 12(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:8(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:12(%3)\n"
+ 	       "4:      movl 16(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "41:     movl 20(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 16(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 20(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:16(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:20(%3)\n"
+ 	       "10:     movl 24(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "51:     movl 28(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 24(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 28(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:24(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:28(%3)\n"
+ 	       "11:     movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "61:     movl 36(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 32(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 36(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:32(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:36(%3)\n"
+ 	       "12:     movl 40(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "71:     movl 44(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 40(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 44(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:40(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:44(%3)\n"
+ 	       "13:     movl 48(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "81:     movl 52(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 48(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 52(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:48(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:52(%3)\n"
+ 	       "14:     movl 56(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "91:     movl 60(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 56(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 60(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:56(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:60(%3)\n"
+ 	       "        addl $-64, %0\n"
+ 	       "        addl $64, %4\n"
+ 	       "        addl $64, %3\n"
+@@ -484,6 +614,8 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_zeroing
+ 	       "        movl %%eax,%0\n"
+ 	       "7:      rep; movsb\n"
+ 	       "8:\n"
++	       "        pushl %%ss\n"
++	       "        popl %%ds\n"
+ 	       ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ 	       "9:      lea 0(%%eax,%0,4),%0\n"
+ 	       "16:     pushl %0\n"
+@@ -518,7 +650,7 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_zeroing
+ 	       "        .long 7b,16b\n"
+ 	       ".previous"
+ 	       : "=&c"(size), "=&D" (d0), "=&S" (d1)
+-	       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size)
++	       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size), "r"(__USER_DS)
+ 	       : "eax", "edx", "memory");
+ 	return size;
+ }
+@@ -529,6 +661,7 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_intel_n
+         int d0, d1;
+ 
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(
++	       "        movw %w6, %%ds\n"
+ 	       "        .align 2,0x90\n"
+ 	       "0:      movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "        cmpl $67, %0\n"
+@@ -537,36 +670,36 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_intel_n
+ 	       "        .align 2,0x90\n"
+ 	       "2:      movl 0(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "21:     movl 4(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 0(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 4(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:0(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:4(%3)\n"
+ 	       "3:      movl 8(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "31:     movl 12(%4),%%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 8(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 12(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:8(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:12(%3)\n"
+ 	       "4:      movl 16(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "41:     movl 20(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 16(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 20(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:16(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:20(%3)\n"
+ 	       "10:     movl 24(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "51:     movl 28(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 24(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 28(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:24(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:28(%3)\n"
+ 	       "11:     movl 32(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "61:     movl 36(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 32(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 36(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:32(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:36(%3)\n"
+ 	       "12:     movl 40(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "71:     movl 44(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 40(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 44(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:40(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:44(%3)\n"
+ 	       "13:     movl 48(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "81:     movl 52(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 48(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 52(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:48(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:52(%3)\n"
+ 	       "14:     movl 56(%4), %%eax\n"
+ 	       "91:     movl 60(%4), %%edx\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%eax, 56(%3)\n"
+-	       "        movnti %%edx, 60(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%eax, %%es:56(%3)\n"
++	       "        movnti %%edx, %%es:60(%3)\n"
+ 	       "        addl $-64, %0\n"
+ 	       "        addl $64, %4\n"
+ 	       "        addl $64, %3\n"
+@@ -581,6 +714,8 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_intel_n
+ 	       "        movl %%eax,%0\n"
+ 	       "7:      rep; movsb\n"
+ 	       "8:\n"
++	       "        pushl %%ss\n"
++	       "        popl %%ds\n"
+ 	       ".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
+ 	       "9:      lea 0(%%eax,%0,4),%0\n"
+ 	       "16:     jmp 8b\n"
+@@ -609,7 +744,7 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_intel_n
+ 	       "        .long 7b,16b\n"
+ 	       ".previous"
+ 	       : "=&c"(size), "=&D" (d0), "=&S" (d1)
+-	       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size)
++	       :  "1"(to), "2"(from), "0"(size), "r"(__USER_DS)
+ 	       : "eax", "edx", "memory");
+ 	return size;
+ }
+@@ -622,90 +757,146 @@ static unsigned long __copy_user_intel_n
+  */
+ unsigned long __copy_user_zeroing_intel(void *to, const void __user *from,
+ 					unsigned long size);
+-unsigned long __copy_user_intel(void __user *to, const void *from,
++unsigned long __generic_copy_to_user_intel(void __user *to, const void *from,
++					unsigned long size);
++unsigned long __generic_copy_from_user_intel(void *to, const void __user *from,
+ 					unsigned long size);
+ unsigned long __copy_user_zeroing_intel_nocache(void *to,
+ 				const void __user *from, unsigned long size);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY */
+ 
+ /* Generic arbitrary sized copy.  */
+-#define __copy_user(to,from,size)					\
+-do {									\
+-	int __d0, __d1, __d2;						\
+-	__asm__ __volatile__(						\
+-		"	cmp  $7,%0\n"					\
+-		"	jbe  1f\n"					\
+-		"	movl %1,%0\n"					\
+-		"	negl %0\n"					\
+-		"	andl $7,%0\n"					\
+-		"	subl %0,%3\n"					\
+-		"4:	rep; movsb\n"					\
+-		"	movl %3,%0\n"					\
+-		"	shrl $2,%0\n"					\
+-		"	andl $3,%3\n"					\
+-		"	.align 2,0x90\n"				\
+-		"0:	rep; movsl\n"					\
+-		"	movl %3,%0\n"					\
+-		"1:	rep; movsb\n"					\
+-		"2:\n"							\
+-		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				\
+-		"5:	addl %3,%0\n"					\
+-		"	jmp 2b\n"					\
+-		"3:	lea 0(%3,%0,4),%0\n"				\
+-		"	jmp 2b\n"					\
+-		".previous\n"						\
+-		".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"				\
+-		"	.align 4\n"					\
+-		"	.long 4b,5b\n"					\
+-		"	.long 0b,3b\n"					\
+-		"	.long 1b,2b\n"					\
+-		".previous"						\
+-		: "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1), "=r"(__d2)	\
+-		: "3"(size), "0"(size), "1"(to), "2"(from)		\
+-		: "memory");						\
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define __copy_user_zeroing(to,from,size)				\
+-do {									\
+-	int __d0, __d1, __d2;						\
+-	__asm__ __volatile__(						\
+-		"	cmp  $7,%0\n"					\
+-		"	jbe  1f\n"					\
+-		"	movl %1,%0\n"					\
+-		"	negl %0\n"					\
+-		"	andl $7,%0\n"					\
+-		"	subl %0,%3\n"					\
+-		"4:	rep; movsb\n"					\
+-		"	movl %3,%0\n"					\
+-		"	shrl $2,%0\n"					\
+-		"	andl $3,%3\n"					\
+-		"	.align 2,0x90\n"				\
+-		"0:	rep; movsl\n"					\
+-		"	movl %3,%0\n"					\
+-		"1:	rep; movsb\n"					\
+-		"2:\n"							\
+-		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				\
+-		"5:	addl %3,%0\n"					\
+-		"	jmp 6f\n"					\
+-		"3:	lea 0(%3,%0,4),%0\n"				\
+-		"6:	pushl %0\n"					\
+-		"	pushl %%eax\n"					\
+-		"	xorl %%eax,%%eax\n"				\
+-		"	rep; stosb\n"					\
+-		"	popl %%eax\n"					\
+-		"	popl %0\n"					\
+-		"	jmp 2b\n"					\
+-		".previous\n"						\
+-		".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"				\
+-		"	.align 4\n"					\
+-		"	.long 4b,5b\n"					\
+-		"	.long 0b,3b\n"					\
+-		"	.long 1b,6b\n"					\
+-		".previous"						\
+-		: "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1), "=r"(__d2)	\
+-		: "3"(size), "0"(size), "1"(to), "2"(from)		\
+-		: "memory");						\
+-} while (0)
++static unsigned long
++__generic_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long size)
++{
++	int __d0, __d1, __d2;
++
++	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		"	movw %w8,%%es\n"
++		"	cmp  $7,%0\n"
++		"	jbe  1f\n"
++		"	movl %1,%0\n"
++		"	negl %0\n"
++		"	andl $7,%0\n"
++		"	subl %0,%3\n"
++		"4:	rep; movsb\n"
++		"	movl %3,%0\n"
++		"	shrl $2,%0\n"
++		"	andl $3,%3\n"
++		"	.align 2,0x90\n"
++		"0:	rep; movsl\n"
++		"	movl %3,%0\n"
++		"1:	rep; movsb\n"
++		"2:\n"
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"
++		"	popl %%es\n"
++		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
++		"5:	addl %3,%0\n"
++		"	jmp 2b\n"
++		"3:	lea 0(%3,%0,4),%0\n"
++		"	jmp 2b\n"
++		".previous\n"
++		".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
++		"	.align 4\n"
++		"	.long 4b,5b\n"
++		"	.long 0b,3b\n"
++		"	.long 1b,2b\n"
++		".previous"
++		: "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1), "=r"(__d2)
++		: "3"(size), "0"(size), "1"(to), "2"(from), "r"(__USER_DS)
++		: "memory");
++	return size;
++}
++
++static unsigned long
++__generic_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long size)
++{
++	int __d0, __d1, __d2;
++
++	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		"	movw %w8,%%ds\n"
++		"	cmp  $7,%0\n"
++		"	jbe  1f\n"
++		"	movl %1,%0\n"
++		"	negl %0\n"
++		"	andl $7,%0\n"
++		"	subl %0,%3\n"
++		"4:	rep; movsb\n"
++		"	movl %3,%0\n"
++		"	shrl $2,%0\n"
++		"	andl $3,%3\n"
++		"	.align 2,0x90\n"
++		"0:	rep; movsl\n"
++		"	movl %3,%0\n"
++		"1:	rep; movsb\n"
++		"2:\n"
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"
++		"	popl %%ds\n"
++		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
++		"5:	addl %3,%0\n"
++		"	jmp 2b\n"
++		"3:	lea 0(%3,%0,4),%0\n"
++		"	jmp 2b\n"
++		".previous\n"
++		".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
++		"	.align 4\n"
++		"	.long 4b,5b\n"
++		"	.long 0b,3b\n"
++		"	.long 1b,2b\n"
++		".previous"
++		: "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1), "=r"(__d2)
++		: "3"(size), "0"(size), "1"(to), "2"(from), "r"(__USER_DS)
++		: "memory");
++	return size;
++}
++
++static unsigned long
++__copy_user_zeroing(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long size)
++{
++	int __d0, __d1, __d2;
++
++	__asm__ __volatile__(
++		"	movw %w8,%%ds\n"
++		"	cmp  $7,%0\n"
++		"	jbe  1f\n"
++		"	movl %1,%0\n"
++		"	negl %0\n"
++		"	andl $7,%0\n"
++		"	subl %0,%3\n"
++		"4:	rep; movsb\n"
++		"	movl %3,%0\n"
++		"	shrl $2,%0\n"
++		"	andl $3,%3\n"
++		"	.align 2,0x90\n"
++		"0:	rep; movsl\n"
++		"	movl %3,%0\n"
++		"1:	rep; movsb\n"
++		"2:\n"
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"
++		"	popl %%ds\n"
++		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
++		"5:	addl %3,%0\n"
++		"	jmp 6f\n"
++		"3:	lea 0(%3,%0,4),%0\n"
++		"6:	pushl %0\n"
++		"	pushl %%eax\n"
++		"	xorl %%eax,%%eax\n"
++		"	rep; stosb\n"
++		"	popl %%eax\n"
++		"	popl %0\n"
++		"	jmp 2b\n"
++		".previous\n"
++		".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
++		"	.align 4\n"
++		"	.long 4b,5b\n"
++		"	.long 0b,3b\n"
++		"	.long 1b,6b\n"
++		".previous"
++		: "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1), "=r"(__d2)
++		: "3"(size), "0"(size), "1"(to), "2"(from), "r"(__USER_DS)
++		: "memory");
++	return size;
++}
+ 
+ unsigned long __copy_to_user_ll(void __user *to, const void *from,
+ 				unsigned long n)
+@@ -768,9 +959,9 @@ survive:
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 	if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n))
+-		__copy_user(to, from, n);
++		n = __generic_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ 	else
+-		n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n);
++		n = __generic_copy_to_user_intel(to, from, n);
+ 	return n;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_to_user_ll);
+@@ -779,7 +970,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll(void *
+ 					unsigned long n)
+ {
+ 	if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n))
+-		__copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n);
++		n = __copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n);
+ 	else
+ 		n = __copy_user_zeroing_intel(to, from, n);
+ 	return n;
+@@ -790,9 +981,9 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nozero
+ 					 unsigned long n)
+ {
+ 	if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n))
+-		__copy_user(to, from, n);
++		n = __generic_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ 	else
+-		n = __copy_user_intel((void __user *)to,
++		n = __generic_copy_from_user_intel((void __user *)to,
+ 				      (const void *)from, n);
+ 	return n;
+ }
+@@ -803,11 +994,11 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocach
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
+ 	if ( n > 64 && cpu_has_xmm2)
+-                n = __copy_user_zeroing_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
++		n = __copy_user_zeroing_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
+ 	else
+-		__copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n);
++		n = __copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n);
+ #else
+-        __copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n);
++	n = __copy_user_zeroing(to, from, n);
+ #endif
+ 	return n;
+ }
+@@ -818,11 +1009,11 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocach
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
+ 	if ( n > 64 && cpu_has_xmm2)
+-                n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
++		n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
+ 	else
+-		__copy_user(to, from, n);
++		n = __generic_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ #else
+-        __copy_user(to, from, n);
++	n = __generic_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ #endif
+ 	return n;
+ }
+@@ -871,8 +1062,35 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __us
+ {
+ 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
+ 		n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+-	else
++	else if ((long)n > 0)
+ 		memset(to, 0, n);
+ 	return n;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_from_user);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
++void __set_fs(mm_segment_t x, int cpu)
++{
++	unsigned long limit = x.seg;
++	struct desc_struct d;
++
++	current_thread_info()->addr_limit = x;
++	if (likely(limit))
++		limit = (limit - 1UL) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++	pack_descriptor(&d, 0UL, limit, 0xF3, 0xC);
++	write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++}
++
++void set_fs(mm_segment_t x)
++{
++	__set_fs(x, get_cpu());
++	put_cpu_no_resched();
++}
++#else
++void set_fs(mm_segment_t x)
++{
++	current_thread_info()->addr_limit = x;
++}
++#endif
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_fs);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_basic.c b/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_basic.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_basic.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_basic.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int __init voyager_memory_detect(int reg
+ 	__u8 cmos[4];
+ 	ClickMap_t *map;
+ 	unsigned long map_addr;
+-	unsigned long old;
++	pte_t old;
+ 
+ 	if (region >= CLICK_ENTRIES) {
+ 		printk("Voyager: Illegal ClickMap region %d\n", region);
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int __init voyager_memory_detect(int reg
+ 
+ 	/* steal page 0 for this */
+ 	old = pg0[0];
+-	pg0[0] = ((map_addr & PAGE_MASK) | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT);
++	pg0[0] = __pte((map_addr & PAGE_MASK) | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT);
+ 	local_flush_tlb();
+ 	/* now clear everything out but page 0 */
+ 	map = (ClickMap_t *) (map_addr & (~PAGE_MASK));
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c b/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ static void __init do_boot_cpu(__u8 cpu)
+ 	__u32 *hijack_vector;
+ 	__u32 start_phys_address = setup_trampoline();
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* There's a clever trick to this: The linux trampoline is
+ 	 * compiled to begin at absolute location zero, so make the
+ 	 * address zero but have the data segment selector compensate
+@@ -559,7 +563,17 @@ static void __init do_boot_cpu(__u8 cpu)
+ 
+ 	init_gdt(cpu);
+ 	per_cpu(current_task, cpu) = idle;
+-	early_gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	early_gdt_descr.address = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	irq_ctx_init(cpu);
+ 
+ 	/* Note: Don't modify initial ss override */
+@@ -1242,7 +1256,7 @@ void smp_local_timer_interrupt(void)
+ 			    per_cpu(prof_counter, cpu);
+ 		}
+ 
+-		update_process_times(user_mode_vm(get_irq_regs()));
++		update_process_times(user_mode(get_irq_regs()));
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (((1 << cpu) & voyager_extended_vic_processors) == 0)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1,14 +1,62 @@
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/spinlock.h>
++#include <linux/sort.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
++/*
++ * The exception table needs to be sorted so that the binary
++ * search that we use to find entries in it works properly.
++ * This is used both for the kernel exception table and for
++ * the exception tables of modules that get loaded.
++ */
++static int cmp_ex(const void *a, const void *b)
++{
++	const struct exception_table_entry *x = a, *y = b;
++
++	/* avoid overflow */
++	if (x->insn > y->insn)
++		return 1;
++	if (x->insn < y->insn)
++		return -1;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static void swap_ex(void *a, void *b, int size)
++{
++	struct exception_table_entry t, *x = a, *y = b;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
++	t = *x;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	*x = *y;
++	*y = t;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++}
++
++void sort_extable(struct exception_table_entry *start,
++		  struct exception_table_entry *finish)
++{
++	sort(start, finish - start, sizeof(struct exception_table_entry),
++	     cmp_ex, swap_ex);
++}
+ 
+ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+ 	const struct exception_table_entry *fixup;
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PNPBIOS
+-	if (unlikely(SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(regs->cs))) {
++	if (unlikely(!(regs->flags & VM_MASK) && SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(regs->cs))) {
+ 		extern u32 pnp_bios_fault_eip, pnp_bios_fault_esp;
+ 		extern u32 pnp_bios_is_utter_crap;
+ 		pnp_bios_is_utter_crap = 1;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
+ #include <linux/kprobes.h>
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <linux/kdebug.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/desc.h>
+@@ -34,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+ #include <asm/proto.h>
+ #include <asm-generic/sections.h>
++#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * Page fault error code bits
+@@ -55,11 +59,7 @@ static inline int notify_page_fault(stru
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* kprobe_running() needs smp_processor_id() */
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+-	if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
+-#else
+ 	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+-#endif
+ 		preempt_disable();
+ 		if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, 14))
+ 			ret = 1;
+@@ -257,6 +257,30 @@ bad:
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++static inline pmd_t * pax_get_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
++{
++	pgd_t *pgd;
++	pud_t *pud;
++	pmd_t *pmd;
++
++	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
++	if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
++		return NULL;
++	pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
++	if (!pud_present(*pud))
++		return NULL;
++	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
++	if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
++		return NULL;
++	return pmd;
++}
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ static inline pmd_t *vmalloc_sync_one(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
+ {
+@@ -343,7 +367,7 @@ static int is_errata93(struct pt_regs *r
+ static int is_errata100(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+-	if ((regs->cs == __USER32_CS || (regs->cs & (1<<2))) &&
++	if ((regs->cs == __USER32_CS || (regs->cs & SEGMENT_LDT)) &&
+ 	    (address >> 32))
+ 		return 1;
+ #endif
+@@ -380,17 +404,32 @@ static void show_fault_oops(struct pt_re
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
+-	if (error_code & PF_INSTR) {
++	if (nx_enabled && (error_code & PF_INSTR)) {
+ 		unsigned int level;
+ 		pte_t *pte = lookup_address(address, &level);
+ 
+ 		if (pte && pte_present(*pte) && !pte_exec(*pte))
+ 			printk(KERN_CRIT "kernel tried to execute "
+ 				"NX-protected page - exploit attempt? "
+-				"(uid: %d)\n", current->uid);
++				"(uid: %d, task: %s, pid: %d)\n",
++				current->uid, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
++	if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < (unsigned long)MODULES_END)
++#else
++	if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < init_mm.end_code)
++#endif
++		if (current->signal->curr_ip)
++			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
++				 NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip), current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current->uid, current->euid);
++		else
++			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
++				 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current->uid, current->euid);
++#endif
++
+ 	printk(KERN_ALERT "BUG: unable to handle kernel ");
+ 	if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
+ 		printk(KERN_CONT "NULL pointer dereference");
+@@ -578,13 +617,22 @@ void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_r
+ 	struct task_struct *tsk;
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+-	unsigned long address;
+ 	int write, si_code;
+ 	int fault;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+ #endif
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++	pte_t *pte;
++	pmd_t *pmd;
++	spinlock_t *ptl;
++	unsigned char pte_mask;
++#endif
++
++	/* get the address */
++	const unsigned long address = read_cr2();
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We can fault from pretty much anywhere, with unknown IRQ state.
+ 	 */
+@@ -594,9 +642,6 @@ void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_r
+ 	mm = tsk->mm;
+ 	prefetchw(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 
+-	/* get the address */
+-	address = read_cr2();
+-
+ 	si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
+ 
+ 	if (notify_page_fault(regs))
+@@ -647,7 +692,7 @@ void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_r
+ 	 * atomic region then we must not take the fault.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (in_atomic() || !mm)
+-		goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
++		goto bad_area_nopax;
+ #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+ 	if (likely(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
+ 		local_irq_enable();
+@@ -660,13 +705,13 @@ void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_r
+ 	 * atomic region then we must not take the fault.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (unlikely(in_atomic() || !mm))
+-		goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
++		goto bad_area_nopax;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * User-mode registers count as a user access even for any
+ 	 * potential system fault or CPU buglet.
+ 	 */
+-	if (user_mode_vm(regs))
++	if (user_mode(regs))
+ 		error_code |= PF_USER;
+ again:
+ #endif
+@@ -688,10 +733,104 @@ again:
+ 	if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
+ 		if ((error_code & PF_USER) == 0 &&
+ 		    !search_exception_tables(regs->ip))
+-			goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
++			goto bad_area_nopax;
+ 		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	}
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++	if (nx_enabled || (error_code & 5) != 5 || (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) ||
++	    !(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
++		goto not_pax_fault;
++
++	/* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */
++
++	/* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */
++	if (unlikely(!(error_code & 2) && (regs->ip == address))) {
++		/* instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++		switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++		case 2:
++			return;
++		}
++#endif
++
++		pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp);
++		do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++	}
++
++	pmd = pax_get_pmd(mm, address);
++	if (unlikely(!pmd))
++		goto not_pax_fault;
++
++	pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
++	if (unlikely(!(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_user(*pte))) {
++		pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
++		goto not_pax_fault;
++	}
++
++	if (unlikely((error_code & 2) && !pte_write(*pte))) {
++		/* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */
++		pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
++		goto not_pax_fault;
++	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++	if (likely(address > get_limit(regs->cs) && cpu_isset(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask)))
++#else
++	if (likely(address > get_limit(regs->cs)))
++#endif
++	{
++		set_pte(pte, pte_mkread(*pte));
++		__flush_tlb_one(address);
++		pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	pte_mask = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER | ((error_code & 2) << (_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY-1));
++
++	/*
++	 * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry
++	 */
++	__asm__ __volatile__ (
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
++		"movw %w4,%%es\n"
++#endif
++		"orb %2,(%1)\n"
++#if defined(CONFIG_M586) || defined(CONFIG_M586TSC)
++/*
++ * PaX: let this uncommented 'invlpg' remind us on the behaviour of Intel's
++ * (and AMD's) TLBs. namely, they do not cache PTEs that would raise *any*
++ * page fault when examined during a TLB load attempt. this is true not only
++ * for PTEs holding a non-present entry but also present entries that will
++ * raise a page fault (such as those set up by PaX, or the copy-on-write
++ * mechanism). in effect it means that we do *not* need to flush the TLBs
++ * for our target pages since their PTEs are simply not in the TLBs at all.
++
++ * the best thing in omitting it is that we gain around 15-20% speed in the
++ * fast path of the page fault handler and can get rid of tracing since we
++ * can no longer flush unintended entries.
++ */
++		"invlpg (%0)\n"
++#endif
++		"testb $0,%%es:(%0)\n"
++		"xorb %3,(%1)\n"
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
++		"pushl %%ss\n"
++		"popl %%es\n"
++#endif
++		:
++		: "r" (address), "r" (pte), "q" (pte_mask), "i" (_PAGE_USER), "r" (__USER_DS)
++		: "memory", "cc");
++	pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
++	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++	return;
++
++not_pax_fault:
++#endif
++
+ 	vma = find_vma(mm, address);
+ 	if (!vma)
+ 		goto bad_area;
+@@ -709,6 +848,12 @@ again:
+ 		if (address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)
+ 			goto bad_area;
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && vma->vm_end - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1 < address - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1)
++		goto bad_area;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (expand_stack(vma, address))
+ 		goto bad_area;
+ /*
+@@ -718,6 +863,8 @@ again:
+ good_area:
+ 	si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
+ 	write = 0;
++	if (nx_enabled && (error_code & PF_INSTR) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
++		goto bad_area;
+ 	switch (error_code & (PF_PROT|PF_WRITE)) {
+ 	default:	/* 3: write, present */
+ 		/* fall through */
+@@ -775,6 +922,49 @@ bad_area:
+ 	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 
+ bad_area_nosemaphore:
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (mm && (error_code & 4) && !(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
++		/*
++		 * It's possible to have interrupts off here.
++		 */
++		local_irq_enable();
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++		if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) &&
++		    ((nx_enabled && ((error_code & PF_INSTR) || !(error_code & (PF_PROT | PF_WRITE))) && (regs->ip == address)))) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++			switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++			case 2:
++				return;
++			}
++#endif
++
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp);
++			do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !(error_code & (PF_PROT | PF_WRITE)) && (regs->ip + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE == address)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++			switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++			case 2:
++				return;
++			}
++#endif
++
++			pax_report_fault(regs, (void *)regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp);
++			do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
++		}
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
++bad_area_nopax:
+ 	/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
+ 	if (error_code & PF_USER) {
+ 		/*
+@@ -857,7 +1047,7 @@ no_context:
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ 	die("Oops", regs, error_code);
+ 	bust_spinlocks(0);
+-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
++	do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
+ #else
+ 	if (__die("Oops", regs, error_code))
+ 		regs = NULL;
+@@ -871,17 +1061,17 @@ no_context:
+  * us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
+  */
+ out_of_memory:
+-	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	if (is_global_init(tsk)) {
+ 		yield();
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+-		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 		goto survive;
+ #else
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 		goto again;
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ 
++	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	printk("VM: killing process %s\n", tsk->comm);
+ 	if (error_code & PF_USER)
+ 		do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
+@@ -982,3 +1172,174 @@ void vmalloc_sync_all(void)
+ 				(__START_KERNEL & PGDIR_MASK)));
+ #endif
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++	int err;
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */
++		unsigned char mov1, mov2;
++		unsigned short jmp;
++		unsigned int addr1, addr2;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
++		if ((regs->ip + 11) >> 32)
++			break;
++#endif
++
++		err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned char __user *)regs->ip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned int __user *)(regs->ip + 1));
++		err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned char __user *)(regs->ip + 5));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned int __user *)(regs->ip + 6));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned short __user *)(regs->ip + 10));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (mov1 == 0xB9 && mov2 == 0xB8 && jmp == 0xE0FF) {
++			regs->cx = addr1;
++			regs->ax = addr2;
++			regs->ip = addr2;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */
++		unsigned char mov, jmp;
++		unsigned int addr1, addr2;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
++		if ((regs->ip + 9) >> 32)
++			break;
++#endif
++
++		err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char __user *)regs->ip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned int __user *)(regs->ip + 1));
++		err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char __user *)(regs->ip + 5));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned int __user *)(regs->ip + 6));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (mov == 0xB9 && jmp == 0xE9) {
++			regs->cx = addr1;
++			regs->ip = (unsigned int)(regs->ip + addr2 + 10);
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	return 1; /* PaX in action */
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault_64(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++	int err;
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */
++		unsigned short mov1, mov2, jmp1;
++		unsigned char jmp2;
++		unsigned int addr1;
++		unsigned long addr2;
++
++		err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned short __user *)regs->ip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned int __user *)(regs->ip + 2));
++		err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned short __user *)(regs->ip + 6));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long __user *)(regs->ip + 8));
++		err |= get_user(jmp1, (unsigned short __user *)(regs->ip + 16));
++		err |= get_user(jmp2, (unsigned char __user *)(regs->ip + 18));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (mov1 == 0xBB41 && mov2 == 0xBA49 && jmp1 == 0xFF49 && jmp2 == 0xE3) {
++			regs->r11 = addr1;
++			regs->r10 = addr2;
++			regs->ip = addr1;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */
++		unsigned short mov1, mov2, jmp1;
++		unsigned char jmp2;
++		unsigned long addr1, addr2;
++
++		err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned short __user *)regs->ip);
++		err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long __user *)(regs->ip + 2));
++		err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned short __user *)(regs->ip + 10));
++		err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long __user *)(regs->ip + 12));
++		err |= get_user(jmp1, (unsigned short __user *)(regs->ip + 20));
++		err |= get_user(jmp2, (unsigned char __user *)(regs->ip + 22));
++
++		if (err)
++			break;
++
++		if (mov1 == 0xBB49 && mov2 == 0xBA49 && jmp1 == 0xFF49 && jmp2 == 0xE3) {
++			regs->r11 = addr1;
++			regs->r10 = addr2;
++			regs->ip = addr1;
++			return 2;
++		}
++	} while (0);
++
++	return 1; /* PaX in action */
++}
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->ip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ *         2 when gcc trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++	if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++		return 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++	return pax_handle_fetch_fault_32(regs);
++#else
++	if (regs->cs == __USER32_CS || (regs->cs & SEGMENT_LDT))
++		return pax_handle_fetch_fault_32(regs);
++	else
++		return pax_handle_fetch_fault_64(regs);
++#endif
++}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	long i;
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
++		unsigned char c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned char __user *)pc+i))
++			printk(KERN_CONT "?? ");
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%02x ", c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at SP-%lu: ", (unsigned long)sizeof(long));
++	for (i = -1; i < 80 / sizeof(long); i++) {
++		unsigned long c;
++		if (get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)sp+i))
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????? ");
++#else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "???????????????? ");
++#endif
++		else
++			printk(KERN_CONT "%0*lx ", 2 * (int)sizeof(long), c);
++	}
++	printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/highmem_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/highmem_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/highmem_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/highmem_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ void *kmap_atomic_prot(struct page *page
+ 	enum fixed_addresses idx;
+ 	unsigned long vaddr;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* even !CONFIG_PREEMPT needs this, for in_atomic in do_page_fault */
+ 	pagefault_disable();
+ 
+@@ -85,7 +89,17 @@ void *kmap_atomic_prot(struct page *page
+ 	idx = type + KM_TYPE_NR*smp_processor_id();
+ 	vaddr = __fix_to_virt(FIX_KMAP_BEGIN + idx);
+ 	BUG_ON(!pte_none(*(kmap_pte-idx)));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	set_pte(kmap_pte-idx, mk_pte(page, prot));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode();
+ 
+ 	return (void *)vaddr;
+@@ -101,15 +115,29 @@ void kunmap_atomic(void *kvaddr, enum km
+ 	unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long) kvaddr & PAGE_MASK;
+ 	enum fixed_addresses idx = type + KM_TYPE_NR*smp_processor_id();
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Force other mappings to Oops if they'll try to access this pte
+ 	 * without first remap it.  Keeping stale mappings around is a bad idea
+ 	 * also, in case the page changes cacheability attributes or becomes
+ 	 * a protected page in a hypervisor.
+ 	 */
+-	if (vaddr == __fix_to_virt(FIX_KMAP_BEGIN+idx))
++	if (vaddr == __fix_to_virt(FIX_KMAP_BEGIN+idx)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 		kpte_clear_flush(kmap_pte-idx, vaddr);
+-	else {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	} else {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_HIGHMEM
+ 		BUG_ON(vaddr < PAGE_OFFSET);
+ 		BUG_ON(vaddr >= (unsigned long)high_memory);
+@@ -128,11 +156,25 @@ void *kmap_atomic_pfn(unsigned long pfn,
+ 	enum fixed_addresses idx;
+ 	unsigned long vaddr;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	pagefault_disable();
+ 
+ 	idx = type + KM_TYPE_NR*smp_processor_id();
+ 	vaddr = __fix_to_virt(FIX_KMAP_BEGIN + idx);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	set_pte(kmap_pte-idx, pfn_pte(pfn, kmap_prot));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode();
+ 
+ 	return (void*) vaddr;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -230,13 +230,18 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmappe
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+-	unsigned long start_addr;
++	unsigned long start_addr, pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
+-	        start_addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++		start_addr = mm->free_area_cache;
+ 	} else {
+-	        start_addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+-	        mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
++		start_addr = mm->mmap_base;
++		mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ full_search:
+@@ -244,13 +249,13 @@ full_search:
+ 
+ 	for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ 		/* At this point:  (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
+-		if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr) {
++		if (pax_task_size - len < addr) {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
+ 			 * some holes.
+ 			 */
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
+-				start_addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++			if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
++				start_addr = mm->mmap_base;
+ 				mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+@@ -272,9 +277,8 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmappe
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev_vma;
+-	unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0;
++	unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr;
+ 	unsigned long largest_hole = mm->cached_hole_size;
+-	int first_time = 1;
+ 
+ 	/* don't allow allocations above current base */
+ 	if (mm->free_area_cache > base)
+@@ -284,7 +288,7 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmappe
+ 	        largest_hole = 0;
+ 		mm->free_area_cache  = base;
+ 	}
+-try_again:
++
+ 	/* make sure it can fit in the remaining address space */
+ 	if (mm->free_area_cache < len)
+ 		goto fail;
+@@ -326,22 +330,26 @@ try_again:
+ 
+ fail:
+ 	/*
+-	 * if hint left us with no space for the requested
+-	 * mapping then try again:
+-	 */
+-	if (first_time) {
+-		mm->free_area_cache = base;
+-		largest_hole = 0;
+-		first_time = 0;
+-		goto try_again;
+-	}
+-	/*
+ 	 * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
+ 	 * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
+ 	 * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
+ 	 * allocations.
+ 	 */
+-	mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		mm->mmap_base = SEGMEXEC_TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++	else
++#endif
++
++	mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
++	mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
+ 	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
+ 	addr = hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_bottomup(file, addr0,
+ 			len, pgoff, flags);
+@@ -349,6 +357,7 @@ fail:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Restore the topdown base:
+ 	 */
++	mm->mmap_base = base;
+ 	mm->free_area_cache = base;
+ 	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
+ 
+@@ -361,10 +370,17 @@ hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *f
+ {
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++	unsigned long pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	if (len & ~HPAGE_MASK)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	if (len > TASK_SIZE)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
++	if (len > pax_task_size)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+ 	if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
+@@ -376,7 +392,7 @@ hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *f
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = ALIGN(addr, HPAGE_SIZE);
+ 		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+-		if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
++		if (pax_task_size - len >= addr &&
+ 		    (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
+ 			return addr;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ #include <asm/paravirt.h>
+ #include <asm/setup.h>
+ #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
++#include <asm/desc.h>
+ 
+ unsigned int __VMALLOC_RESERVE = 128 << 20;
+ 
+@@ -57,32 +58,6 @@ unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn
+ static noinline int do_test_wp_bit(void);
+ 
+ /*
+- * Creates a middle page table and puts a pointer to it in the
+- * given global directory entry. This only returns the gd entry
+- * in non-PAE compilation mode, since the middle layer is folded.
+- */
+-static pmd_t * __init one_md_table_init(pgd_t *pgd)
+-{
+-	pud_t *pud;
+-	pmd_t *pmd_table;
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
+-	if (!(pgd_val(*pgd) & _PAGE_PRESENT)) {
+-		pmd_table = (pmd_t *) alloc_bootmem_low_pages(PAGE_SIZE);
+-
+-		paravirt_alloc_pd(&init_mm, __pa(pmd_table) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+-		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pmd_table) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
+-		pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
+-		BUG_ON(pmd_table != pmd_offset(pud, 0));
+-	}
+-#endif
+-	pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
+-	pmd_table = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
+-
+-	return pmd_table;
+-}
+-
+-/*
+  * Create a page table and place a pointer to it in a middle page
+  * directory entry:
+  */
+@@ -100,7 +75,11 @@ static pte_t * __init one_page_table_ini
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		paravirt_alloc_pt(&init_mm, __pa(page_table) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(page_table) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
++#else
+ 		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(page_table) | _PAGE_TABLE));
++#endif
+ 		BUG_ON(page_table != pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0));
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -122,6 +101,7 @@ page_table_range_init(unsigned long star
+ 	int pgd_idx, pmd_idx;
+ 	unsigned long vaddr;
+ 	pgd_t *pgd;
++	pud_t *pud;
+ 	pmd_t *pmd;
+ 
+ 	vaddr = start;
+@@ -130,8 +110,13 @@ page_table_range_init(unsigned long star
+ 	pgd = pgd_base + pgd_idx;
+ 
+ 	for ( ; (pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD) && (vaddr != end); pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
+-		pmd = one_md_table_init(pgd);
+-		pmd = pmd + pmd_index(vaddr);
++		pud = pud_offset(pgd, vaddr);
++		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++		paravirt_alloc_pd(&init_mm, __pa(pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++#endif
++
+ 		for (; (pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD) && (vaddr != end);
+ 							pmd++, pmd_idx++) {
+ 			one_page_table_init(pmd);
+@@ -142,11 +127,23 @@ page_table_range_init(unsigned long star
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int is_kernel_text(unsigned long addr)
++static inline int is_kernel_text(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+ {
+-	if (addr >= PAGE_OFFSET && addr <= (unsigned long)__init_end)
+-		return 1;
+-	return 0;
++	unsigned long etext;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	etext = ktva_ktla((unsigned long)&MODULES_END);
++#else
++	etext = (unsigned long)&_etext;
++#endif
++
++	if ((start > ktla_ktva(etext) ||
++	     end <= ktla_ktva((unsigned long)_stext)) &&
++	    (start > ktla_ktva((unsigned long)_einittext) ||
++	     end <= ktla_ktva((unsigned long)_sinittext)) &&
++	    (start > (unsigned long)__va(0xfffff) || end <= (unsigned long)__va(0xc0000)))
++		return 0;
++	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -156,9 +153,10 @@ static inline int is_kernel_text(unsigne
+  */
+ static void __init kernel_physical_mapping_init(pgd_t *pgd_base)
+ {
+-	int pgd_idx, pmd_idx, pte_ofs;
++	unsigned int pgd_idx, pmd_idx, pte_ofs;
+ 	unsigned long pfn;
+ 	pgd_t *pgd;
++	pud_t *pud;
+ 	pmd_t *pmd;
+ 	pte_t *pte;
+ 
+@@ -166,29 +164,27 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi
+ 	pgd = pgd_base + pgd_idx;
+ 	pfn = 0;
+ 
+-	for (; pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD; pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
+-		pmd = one_md_table_init(pgd);
+-		if (pfn >= max_low_pfn)
+-			continue;
++	for (; pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD && pfn < max_low_pfn; pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
++		pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
++		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++		paravirt_alloc_pd(&init_mm, __pa(pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++#endif
+ 
+ 		for (pmd_idx = 0;
+ 		     pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD && pfn < max_low_pfn;
+ 		     pmd++, pmd_idx++) {
+-			unsigned int addr = pfn * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_OFFSET;
++			unsigned long address = pfn * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_OFFSET;
+ 
+ 			/*
+ 			 * Map with big pages if possible, otherwise
+ 			 * create normal page tables:
+ 			 */
+-			if (cpu_has_pse) {
+-				unsigned int addr2;
++			if (cpu_has_pse && address >= (unsigned long)__va(0x100000)) {
+ 				pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE;
+ 
+-				addr2 = (pfn + PTRS_PER_PTE-1) * PAGE_SIZE +
+-					PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE-1;
+-
+-				if (is_kernel_text(addr) ||
+-				    is_kernel_text(addr2))
++				if (is_kernel_text(address, address + PMD_SIZE))
+ 					prot = PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC;
+ 
+ 				set_pmd(pmd, pfn_pmd(pfn, prot));
+@@ -200,10 +196,10 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi
+ 
+ 			for (pte_ofs = 0;
+ 			     pte_ofs < PTRS_PER_PTE && pfn < max_low_pfn;
+-			     pte++, pfn++, pte_ofs++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
++			     pte++, pfn++, pte_ofs++, address += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ 				pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
+ 
+-				if (is_kernel_text(addr))
++				if (is_kernel_text(address, address + PAGE_SIZE))
+ 					prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
+ 
+ 				set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
+@@ -323,10 +319,10 @@ static void __init set_highmem_pages_ini
+ # define set_highmem_pages_init(bad_ppro)	do { } while (0)
+ #endif /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */
+ 
+-pteval_t __PAGE_KERNEL = _PAGE_KERNEL;
++pteval_t __PAGE_KERNEL __read_only = _PAGE_KERNEL;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__PAGE_KERNEL);
+ 
+-pteval_t __PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC = _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
++pteval_t __PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC __read_only = _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
+ 
+ void __init native_pagetable_setup_start(pgd_t *base)
+ {
+@@ -348,7 +344,7 @@ void __init native_pagetable_setup_start
+ 
+ 		pud = pud_offset(pgd, va);
+ 		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, va);
+-		if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
++		if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_huge(*pmd))
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, va);
+@@ -424,12 +420,12 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void)
+  * ACPI suspend needs this for resume, because things like the intel-agp
+  * driver might have split up a kernel 4MB mapping.
+  */
+-char swsusp_pg_dir[PAGE_SIZE]
++pgd_t swsusp_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD]
+ 	__attribute__ ((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
+ 
+ static inline void save_pg_dir(void)
+ {
+-	memcpy(swsusp_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, PAGE_SIZE);
++	clone_pgd_range(swsusp_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, PTRS_PER_PGD);
+ }
+ #else /* !CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP */
+ static inline void save_pg_dir(void)
+@@ -461,13 +457,11 @@ void zap_low_mappings(void)
+ 
+ int nx_enabled;
+ 
+-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~_PAGE_NX;
++pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_only = ~_PAGE_NX;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
+ 
+-static int disable_nx __initdata;
+-
+ /*
+  * noexec = on|off
+  *
+@@ -476,40 +470,33 @@ static int disable_nx __initdata;
+  * on      Enable
+  * off     Disable
+  */
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
+ static int __init noexec_setup(char *str)
+ {
+ 	if (!str || !strcmp(str, "on")) {
+-		if (cpu_has_nx) {
+-			__supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_NX;
+-			disable_nx = 0;
+-		}
++		if (cpu_has_nx)
++			nx_enabled = 1;
+ 	} else {
+-		if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+-			disable_nx = 1;
+-			__supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+-		} else {
++		if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
++			nx_enabled = 0;
++		else
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+-		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ early_param("noexec", noexec_setup);
++#endif
+ 
+ static void __init set_nx(void)
+ {
+-	unsigned int v[4], l, h;
+-
+-	if (cpu_has_pae && (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) > 0x80000001)) {
+-		cpuid(0x80000001, &v[0], &v[1], &v[2], &v[3]);
++	if (!nx_enabled && cpu_has_nx) {
++		unsigned l, h;
+ 
+-		if ((v[3] & (1 << 20)) && !disable_nx) {
+-			rdmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
+-			l |= EFER_NX;
+-			wrmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
+-			nx_enabled = 1;
+-			__supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_NX;
+-		}
++		__supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX;
++		rdmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
++		l &= ~EFER_NX;
++		wrmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
+ 	}
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -601,7 +588,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
+ 	set_highmem_pages_init(bad_ppro);
+ 
+ 	codesize =  (unsigned long) &_etext - (unsigned long) &_text;
+-	datasize =  (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_etext;
++	datasize =  (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_data;
+ 	initsize =  (unsigned long) &__init_end - (unsigned long) &__init_begin;
+ 
+ 	kclist_add(&kcore_mem, __va(0), max_low_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+@@ -648,10 +635,10 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
+ 		((unsigned long)&__init_end -
+ 		 (unsigned long)&__init_begin) >> 10,
+ 
+-		(unsigned long)&_etext, (unsigned long)&_edata,
+-		((unsigned long)&_edata - (unsigned long)&_etext) >> 10,
++		(unsigned long)&_data, (unsigned long)&_edata,
++		((unsigned long)&_edata - (unsigned long)&_data) >> 10,
+ 
+-		(unsigned long)&_text, (unsigned long)&_etext,
++		ktla_ktva((unsigned long)&_text), ktla_ktva((unsigned long)&_etext),
+ 		((unsigned long)&_etext - (unsigned long)&_text) >> 10);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
+@@ -794,6 +781,46 @@ void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigne
+ 
+ void free_initmem(void)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	/* PaX: limit KERNEL_CS to actual size */
++	unsigned long addr, limit;
++	struct desc_struct d;
++	int cpu;
++	pgd_t *pgd;
++	pud_t *pud;
++	pmd_t *pmd;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
++	limit = ktva_ktla((unsigned long)&MODULES_END);
++#else
++	limit = (unsigned long)&_etext;
++#endif
++	limit = (limit - 1UL) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++
++	for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++) {
++		pack_descriptor(&d, get_desc_base(&get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS]), limit, 0x9B, 0xC);
++		write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++	}
++
++	/* PaX: make KERNEL_CS read-only */
++	for (addr = ktla_ktva((unsigned long)&_text); addr < (unsigned long)&_data; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
++		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
++		pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
++		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
++		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
++	}
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++	for (addr = (unsigned long)&__init_begin; addr < (unsigned long)&__init_end; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
++		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
++		pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
++		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
++		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) | (_PAGE_NX & __supported_pte_mask)));
++	}
++#endif
++	flush_tlb_all();
++#endif
++
+ 	free_init_pages("unused kernel memory",
+ 			(unsigned long)(&__init_begin),
+ 			(unsigned long)(&__init_end));
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ set_pte_phys(unsigned long vaddr, unsign
+ 	pmd_t *pmd;
+ 	pte_t *pte, new_pte;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	pr_debug("set_pte_phys %lx to %lx\n", vaddr, phys);
+ 
+ 	pgd = pgd_offset_k(vaddr);
+@@ -140,7 +144,7 @@ set_pte_phys(unsigned long vaddr, unsign
+ 	pud = pud_offset(pgd, vaddr);
+ 	if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+ 		pmd = (pmd_t *) spp_getpage();
+-		set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER));
++		set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _PAGE_TABLE));
+ 		if (pmd != pmd_offset(pud, 0)) {
+ 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAGETABLE BUG #01! %p <-> %p\n",
+ 				pmd, pmd_offset(pud, 0));
+@@ -150,7 +154,7 @@ set_pte_phys(unsigned long vaddr, unsign
+ 	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
+ 	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+ 		pte = (pte_t *) spp_getpage();
+-		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER));
++		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _PAGE_TABLE));
+ 		if (pte != pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0)) {
+ 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAGETABLE BUG #02!\n");
+ 			return;
+@@ -162,8 +166,17 @@ set_pte_phys(unsigned long vaddr, unsign
+ 	if (!pte_none(*pte) &&
+ 	    pte_val(*pte) != (pte_val(new_pte) & __supported_pte_mask))
+ 		pte_ERROR(*pte);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	set_pte(pte, new_pte);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * It's enough to flush this one mapping.
+ 	 * (PGE mappings get flushed as well)
+@@ -585,6 +598,39 @@ void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigne
+ 
+ void free_initmem(void)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long addr, end;
++	pgd_t *pgd;
++	pud_t *pud;
++	pmd_t *pmd;
++
++	/* PaX: make kernel code/rodata read-only, rest non-executable */
++	for (addr = __START_KERNEL_map; addr < __START_KERNEL_map + KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
++		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
++		pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
++		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
++		if ((unsigned long)_text <= addr && addr < (unsigned long)_data)
++			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
++		else
++			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) | (_PAGE_NX & __supported_pte_mask)));
++	}
++
++	addr = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(__START_KERNEL_map));
++	end = addr + KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE;
++	for (; addr < end; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
++		pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
++		pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
++		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
++		if ((unsigned long)__va(__pa(_text)) <= addr && addr < (unsigned long)__va(__pa(_data)))
++			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
++		else
++			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) | (_PAGE_NX & __supported_pte_mask)));
++	}
++
++	flush_tlb_all();
++#endif
++
+ 	free_init_pages("unused kernel memory",
+ 			(unsigned long)(&__init_begin),
+ 			(unsigned long)(&__init_end));
+@@ -753,7 +799,7 @@ int in_gate_area_no_task(unsigned long a
+ 
+ const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+ {
+-	if (vma->vm_mm && vma->vm_start == (long)vma->vm_mm->context.vdso)
++	if (vma->vm_mm && vma->vm_start == vma->vm_mm->context.vdso)
+ 		return "[vdso]";
+ 	if (vma == &gate_vma)
+ 		return "[vsyscall]";
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap(resource_
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
++	prot = canon_pgprot(prot);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Mappings have to be page-aligned
+ 	 */
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
+  * Leave an at least ~128 MB hole.
+  */
+ #define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024)
+-#define MAX_GAP (TASK_SIZE/6*5)
++#define MAX_GAP (pax_task_size/6*5)
+ 
+ /*
+  * True on X86_32 or when emulating IA32 on X86_64
+@@ -81,27 +81,40 @@ static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
+ 	return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ }
+ 
+-static unsigned long mmap_base(void)
++static unsigned long mmap_base(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long gap = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur;
++	unsigned long pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (gap < MIN_GAP)
+ 		gap = MIN_GAP;
+ 	else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
+ 		gap = MAX_GAP;
+ 
+-	return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - mmap_rnd());
++	return PAGE_ALIGN(pax_task_size - gap - mmap_rnd());
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+  * Bottom-up (legacy) layout on X86_32 did not support randomization, X86_64
+  * does, but not when emulating X86_32
+  */
+-static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(void)
++static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+-	if (mmap_is_ia32())
++	if (mmap_is_ia32()) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++			return SEGMEXEC_TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++		else
++#endif
++
+ 		return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+-	else
++	} else
+ 		return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mmap_rnd();
+ }
+ 
+@@ -112,11 +125,23 @@ static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(vo
+ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+ 	if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
+-		mm->mmap_base = mmap_legacy_base();
++		mm->mmap_base = mmap_legacy_base(mm);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++			mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
+ 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
+ 	} else {
+-		mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
++		mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(mm);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++			mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap + mm->delta_stack;
++#endif
++
+ 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
+ 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/numa_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/numa_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ #include <asm/k8.h>
+ 
+ #ifndef Dprintk
+-#define Dprintk(x...)
++#define Dprintk(x...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct pglist_data *node_data[MAX_NUMNODES] __read_mostly;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ #include <asm/proto.h>
++#include <asm/desc.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * The current flushing context - we pass it instead of 5 arguments:
+@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protection
+ 	 * Does not cover __inittext since that is gone later on. On
+ 	 * 64bit we do not enforce !NX on the low mapping
+ 	 */
+-	if (within(address, (unsigned long)_text, (unsigned long)_etext))
++	if (within(address, ktla_ktva((unsigned long)_text), ktla_ktva((unsigned long)_etext)))
+ 		pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_NX;
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -229,8 +230,20 @@ pte_t *lookup_address(unsigned long addr
+  */
+ static void __set_pmd_pte(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long address, pte_t pte)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	/* change init_mm */
+ 	set_pte_atomic(kpte, pte);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ 	if (!SHARED_KERNEL_PMD) {
+ 		struct page *page;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ static void set_pte_pfn(unsigned long va
+ 	pmd_t *pmd;
+ 	pte_t *pte;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	pgd = swapper_pg_dir + pgd_index(vaddr);
+ 	if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+ 		BUG();
+@@ -99,11 +103,20 @@ static void set_pte_pfn(unsigned long va
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	if (pgprot_val(flags))
+ 		set_pte_present(&init_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, flags));
+ 	else
+ 		pte_clear(&init_mm, vaddr, pte);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * It's enough to flush this one mapping.
+ 	 * (PGE mappings get flushed as well)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c
+--- a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static void backtrace_address(void *data
+ 	unsigned int *depth = data;
+ 
+ 	if ((*depth)--)
+-		oprofile_add_trace(addr);
++		oprofile_add_trace(ktla_ktva(addr));
+ }
+ 
+ static struct stacktrace_ops backtrace_ops = {
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ x86_backtrace(struct pt_regs * const reg
+ 	struct frame_head *head = (struct frame_head *)frame_pointer(regs);
+ 	unsigned long stack = kernel_trap_sp(regs);
+ 
+-	if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
++	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+ 		if (depth)
+ 			dump_trace(NULL, regs, (unsigned long *)stack, 0,
+ 				   &backtrace_ops, &depth);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/oprofile/op_model_p4.c b/arch/x86/oprofile/op_model_p4.c
+--- a/arch/x86/oprofile/op_model_p4.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/oprofile/op_model_p4.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static inline void setup_num_counters(vo
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-static int inline addr_increment(void)
++static inline int addr_increment(void)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ 	return smp_num_siblings == 2 ? 2 : 1;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
+--- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __devinitdat
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ProLiant DL585 G2"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ void __init dmi_check_pciprobe(void)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/pci/early.c b/arch/x86/pci/early.c
+--- a/arch/x86/pci/early.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/pci/early.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
+ /* Direct PCI access. This is used for PCI accesses in early boot before
+    the PCI subsystem works. */
+ 
+-#define PDprintk(x...)
++#define PDprintk(x...) do {} while (0)
+ 
+ u32 read_pci_config(u8 bus, u8 slot, u8 func, u8 offset)
+ {
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
+--- a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __devinitdat
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "MS-6702E"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __devinitdat
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "PSA40U"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static void __devinit pci_pre_fixup_toshiba_ohci1394(struct pci_dev *dev)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/pci/irq.c b/arch/x86/pci/irq.c
+--- a/arch/x86/pci/irq.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/pci/irq.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static __init int intel_router_probe(str
+ 	static struct pci_device_id __initdata pirq_440gx[] = {
+ 		{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82443GX_0) },
+ 		{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82443GX_2) },
+-		{ },
++		{ PCI_DEVICE(0, 0) }
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* 440GX has a proprietary PIRQ router -- don't use it */
+@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata p
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "TravelMate 360"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static int __init pcibios_irq_init(void)
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/pci/pcbios.c b/arch/x86/pci/pcbios.c
+--- a/arch/x86/pci/pcbios.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/pci/pcbios.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -57,50 +57,120 @@ union bios32 {
+ static struct {
+ 	unsigned long address;
+ 	unsigned short segment;
+-} bios32_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS };
++} bios32_indirect __read_only = { 0, __PCIBIOS_CS };
+ 
+ /*
+  * Returns the entry point for the given service, NULL on error
+  */
+ 
+-static unsigned long bios32_service(unsigned long service)
++static unsigned long __devinit bios32_service(unsigned long service)
+ {
+ 	unsigned char return_code;	/* %al */
+ 	unsigned long address;		/* %ebx */
+ 	unsigned long length;		/* %ecx */
+ 	unsigned long entry;		/* %edx */
+ 	unsigned long flags;
++	struct desc_struct d, *gdt;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	local_irq_save(flags);
+-	__asm__("lcall *(%%edi); cld"
++
++	gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(smp_processor_id());
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	pack_descriptor(&d, 0UL, 0xFFFFFUL, 0x9B, 0xC);
++	write_gdt_entry(gdt, GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_CS, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++	pack_descriptor(&d, 0UL, 0xFFFFFUL, 0x93, 0xC);
++	write_gdt_entry(gdt, GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_DS, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	__asm__("movw %w7, %%ds; lcall *(%%edi); push %%ss; pop %%ds; cld"
+ 		: "=a" (return_code),
+ 		  "=b" (address),
+ 		  "=c" (length),
+ 		  "=d" (entry)
+ 		: "0" (service),
+ 		  "1" (0),
+-		  "D" (&bios32_indirect));
++		  "D" (&bios32_indirect),
++		  "r"(__PCIBIOS_DS)
++		: "memory");
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	gdt[GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_CS].a = 0;
++	gdt[GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_CS].b = 0;
++	gdt[GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_DS].a = 0;
++	gdt[GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_DS].b = 0;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	local_irq_restore(flags);
+ 
+ 	switch (return_code) {
+-		case 0:
+-			return address + entry;
+-		case 0x80:	/* Not present */
+-			printk(KERN_WARNING "bios32_service(0x%lx): not present\n", service);
+-			return 0;
+-		default: /* Shouldn't happen */
+-			printk(KERN_WARNING "bios32_service(0x%lx): returned 0x%x -- BIOS bug!\n",
+-				service, return_code);
++	case 0: {
++		int cpu;
++		unsigned char flags;
++
++		printk(KERN_INFO "bios32_service: base:%08lx length:%08lx entry:%08lx\n", address, length, entry);
++		if (address >= 0xFFFF0 || length > 0x100000 - address || length <= entry) {
++			printk(KERN_WARNING "bios32_service: not valid\n");
+ 			return 0;
++		}
++		address = address + PAGE_OFFSET;
++		length += 16UL; /* some BIOSs underreport this... */
++		flags = 4;
++		if (length >= 64*1024*1024) {
++			length >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
++			flags |= 8;
++		}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++		for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++) {
++			gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
++			pack_descriptor(&d, address, length, 0x9b, flags);
++			write_gdt_entry(gdt, GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_CS, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++			pack_descriptor(&d, address, length, 0x93, flags);
++			write_gdt_entry(gdt, GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_DS, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++		}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++		return entry;
++	}
++	case 0x80:	/* Not present */
++		printk(KERN_WARNING "bios32_service(0x%lx): not present\n", service);
++		return 0;
++	default: /* Shouldn't happen */
++		printk(KERN_WARNING "bios32_service(0x%lx): returned 0x%x -- BIOS bug!\n",
++			service, return_code);
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+ static struct {
+ 	unsigned long address;
+ 	unsigned short segment;
+-} pci_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS };
++} pci_indirect __read_only = { 0, __PCIBIOS_CS };
+ 
+-static int pci_bios_present;
++static int pci_bios_present __read_only;
+ 
+ static int __devinit check_pcibios(void)
+ {
+@@ -109,11 +179,13 @@ static int __devinit check_pcibios(void)
+ 	unsigned long flags, pcibios_entry;
+ 
+ 	if ((pcibios_entry = bios32_service(PCI_SERVICE))) {
+-		pci_indirect.address = pcibios_entry + PAGE_OFFSET;
++		pci_indirect.address = pcibios_entry;
+ 
+ 		local_irq_save(flags);
+-		__asm__(
+-			"lcall *(%%edi); cld\n\t"
++		__asm__("movw %w6, %%ds\n\t"
++			"lcall *%%ss:(%%edi); cld\n\t"
++			"push %%ss\n\t"
++			"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 			"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 			"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 			"1:"
+@@ -122,7 +194,8 @@ static int __devinit check_pcibios(void)
+ 			  "=b" (ebx),
+ 			  "=c" (ecx)
+ 			: "1" (PCIBIOS_PCI_BIOS_PRESENT),
+-			  "D" (&pci_indirect)
++			  "D" (&pci_indirect),
++			  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS)
+ 			: "memory");
+ 		local_irq_restore(flags);
+ 
+@@ -158,7 +231,10 @@ static int __devinit pci_bios_find_devic
+ 	unsigned short bx;
+ 	unsigned short ret;
+ 
+-	__asm__("lcall *(%%edi); cld\n\t"
++	__asm__("movw %w7, %%ds\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:(%%edi); cld\n\t"
++		"push %%ss\n\t"
++		"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 		"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 		"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 		"1:"
+@@ -168,7 +244,8 @@ static int __devinit pci_bios_find_devic
+ 		  "c" (device_id),
+ 		  "d" (vendor),
+ 		  "S" ((int) index),
+-		  "D" (&pci_indirect));
++		  "D" (&pci_indirect),
++		  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 	*bus = (bx >> 8) & 0xff;
+ 	*device_fn = bx & 0xff;
+ 	return (int) (ret & 0xff00) >> 8;
+@@ -188,7 +265,10 @@ static int pci_bios_read(unsigned int se
+ 
+ 	switch (len) {
+ 	case 1:
+-		__asm__("lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		__asm__("movw %w6, %%ds\n\t"
++			"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++			"push %%ss\n\t"
++			"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 			"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 			"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 			"1:"
+@@ -197,7 +277,8 @@ static int pci_bios_read(unsigned int se
+ 			: "1" (PCIBIOS_READ_CONFIG_BYTE),
+ 			  "b" (bx),
+ 			  "D" ((long)reg),
+-			  "S" (&pci_indirect));
++			  "S" (&pci_indirect),
++			  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Zero-extend the result beyond 8 bits, do not trust the
+ 		 * BIOS having done it:
+@@ -205,7 +286,10 @@ static int pci_bios_read(unsigned int se
+ 		*value &= 0xff;
+ 		break;
+ 	case 2:
+-		__asm__("lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		__asm__("movw %w6, %%ds\n\t"
++			"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++			"push %%ss\n\t"
++			"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 			"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 			"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 			"1:"
+@@ -214,7 +298,8 @@ static int pci_bios_read(unsigned int se
+ 			: "1" (PCIBIOS_READ_CONFIG_WORD),
+ 			  "b" (bx),
+ 			  "D" ((long)reg),
+-			  "S" (&pci_indirect));
++			  "S" (&pci_indirect),
++			  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Zero-extend the result beyond 16 bits, do not trust the
+ 		 * BIOS having done it:
+@@ -222,7 +307,10 @@ static int pci_bios_read(unsigned int se
+ 		*value &= 0xffff;
+ 		break;
+ 	case 4:
+-		__asm__("lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		__asm__("movw %w6, %%ds\n\t"
++			"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++			"push %%ss\n\t"
++			"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 			"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 			"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 			"1:"
+@@ -231,7 +319,8 @@ static int pci_bios_read(unsigned int se
+ 			: "1" (PCIBIOS_READ_CONFIG_DWORD),
+ 			  "b" (bx),
+ 			  "D" ((long)reg),
+-			  "S" (&pci_indirect));
++			  "S" (&pci_indirect),
++			  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -254,7 +343,10 @@ static int pci_bios_write(unsigned int s
+ 
+ 	switch (len) {
+ 	case 1:
+-		__asm__("lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		__asm__("movw %w6, %%ds\n\t"
++			"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++			"push %%ss\n\t"
++			"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 			"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 			"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 			"1:"
+@@ -263,10 +355,14 @@ static int pci_bios_write(unsigned int s
+ 			  "c" (value),
+ 			  "b" (bx),
+ 			  "D" ((long)reg),
+-			  "S" (&pci_indirect));
++			  "S" (&pci_indirect),
++			  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 		break;
+ 	case 2:
+-		__asm__("lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		__asm__("movw %w6, %%ds\n\t"
++			"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++			"push %%ss\n\t"
++			"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 			"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 			"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 			"1:"
+@@ -275,10 +371,14 @@ static int pci_bios_write(unsigned int s
+ 			  "c" (value),
+ 			  "b" (bx),
+ 			  "D" ((long)reg),
+-			  "S" (&pci_indirect));
++			  "S" (&pci_indirect),
++			  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 		break;
+ 	case 4:
+-		__asm__("lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		__asm__("movw %w6, %%ds\n\t"
++			"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++			"push %%ss\n\t"
++			"pop %%ds\n\t"
+ 			"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 			"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 			"1:"
+@@ -287,7 +387,8 @@ static int pci_bios_write(unsigned int s
+ 			  "c" (value),
+ 			  "b" (bx),
+ 			  "D" ((long)reg),
+-			  "S" (&pci_indirect));
++			  "S" (&pci_indirect),
++			  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -440,10 +541,13 @@ struct irq_routing_table * pcibios_get_i
+ 
+ 	DBG("PCI: Fetching IRQ routing table... ");
+ 	__asm__("push %%es\n\t"
++		"movw %w8, %%ds\n\t"
+ 		"push %%ds\n\t"
+ 		"pop  %%es\n\t"
+-		"lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
+ 		"pop %%es\n\t"
++		"push %%ss\n\t"
++		"pop %%ds\n"
+ 		"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 		"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 		"1:"
+@@ -454,7 +558,8 @@ struct irq_routing_table * pcibios_get_i
+ 		  "1" (0),
+ 		  "D" ((long) &opt),
+ 		  "S" (&pci_indirect),
+-		  "m" (opt)
++		  "m" (opt),
++		  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS)
+ 		: "memory");
+ 	DBG("OK  ret=%d, size=%d, map=%x\n", ret, opt.size, map);
+ 	if (ret & 0xff00)
+@@ -478,7 +583,10 @@ int pcibios_set_irq_routing(struct pci_d
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	__asm__("lcall *(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++	__asm__("movw %w5, %%ds\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:(%%esi); cld\n\t"
++		"push %%ss\n\t"
++		"pop %%ds\n"
+ 		"jc 1f\n\t"
+ 		"xor %%ah, %%ah\n"
+ 		"1:"
+@@ -486,7 +594,8 @@ int pcibios_set_irq_routing(struct pci_d
+ 		: "0" (PCIBIOS_SET_PCI_HW_INT),
+ 		  "b" ((dev->bus->number << 8) | dev->devfn),
+ 		  "c" ((irq << 8) | (pin + 10)),
+-		  "S" (&pci_indirect));
++		  "S" (&pci_indirect),
++		  "r" (__PCIBIOS_DS));
+ 	return !(ret & 0xff00);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(pcibios_set_irq_routing);
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/power/cpu_32.c b/arch/x86/power/cpu_32.c
+--- a/arch/x86/power/cpu_32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/power/cpu_32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void do_fpu_end(void)
+ static void fix_processor_context(void)
+ {
+ 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+-	struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *t = init_tss + cpu;
+ 
+ 	set_tss_desc(cpu,t);	/* This just modifies memory; should not be necessary. But... This is necessary, because 386 hardware has concept of busy TSS or some similar stupidity. */
+ 
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/power/cpu_64.c b/arch/x86/power/cpu_64.c
+--- a/arch/x86/power/cpu_64.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/power/cpu_64.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -136,7 +136,11 @@ void restore_processor_state(void)
+ static void fix_processor_context(void)
+ {
+ 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+-	struct tss_struct *t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *t = init_tss + cpu;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * This just modifies memory; should not be necessary. But... This
+@@ -145,8 +149,16 @@ static void fix_processor_context(void)
+ 	 */
+ 	set_tss_desc(cpu, t);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_TSS].type = 9;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	syscall_init();                         /* This sets MSR_*STAR and related */
+ 	load_TR_desc();				/* This does ltr */
+ 	load_LDT(&current->active_mm->context);	/* This does lldt */
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c b/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
+--- a/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static inline void map_compat_vdso(int m
+ void enable_sep_cpu(void)
+ {
+ 	int cpu = get_cpu();
+-	struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
++	struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
+ 
+ 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP)) {
+ 		put_cpu();
+@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static int __init gate_vma_init(void)
+ 	gate_vma.vm_start = FIXADDR_USER_START;
+ 	gate_vma.vm_end = FIXADDR_USER_END;
+ 	gate_vma.vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_MAYREAD | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC;
+-	gate_vma.vm_page_prot = __P101;
++	gate_vma.vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(gate_vma.vm_flags);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Make sure the vDSO gets into every core dump.
+ 	 * Dumping its contents makes post-mortem fully interpretable later
+@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct l
+ 	if (compat)
+ 		addr = VDSO_HIGH_BASE;
+ 	else {
+-		addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0);
++		addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, 0, MAP_EXECUTABLE);
+ 		if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
+ 			ret = addr;
+ 			goto up_fail;
+@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct l
+ 			goto up_fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	current->mm->context.vdso = (void *)addr;
++	current->mm->context.vdso = addr;
+ 	current_thread_info()->sysenter_return =
+ 		VDSO32_SYMBOL(addr, SYSENTER_RETURN);
+ 
+@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static ctl_table abi_table2[] = {
+ 		.mode		= 0644,
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static ctl_table abi_root_table2[] = {
+@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static ctl_table abi_root_table2[] = {
+ 		.mode = 0555,
+ 		.child = abi_table2
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static __init int ia32_binfmt_init(void)
+@@ -414,8 +414,14 @@ __initcall(ia32_binfmt_init);
+ 
+ const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+ {
+-	if (vma->vm_mm && vma->vm_start == (long)vma->vm_mm->context.vdso)
++	if (vma->vm_mm && vma->vm_start == vma->vm_mm->context.vdso)
+ 		return "[vdso]";
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (vma->vm_mm && vma->vm_mirror && vma->vm_mirror->vm_start == vma->vm_mm->context.vdso)
++		return "[vdso]";
++#endif
++
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -424,7 +430,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(stru
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
+ 
+ 	/* Check to see if this task was created in compat vdso mode */
+-	if (mm && mm->context.vdso == (void *)VDSO_HIGH_BASE)
++	if (mm && mm->context.vdso == VDSO_HIGH_BASE)
+ 		return &gate_vma;
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
+--- a/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct l
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto up_fail;
+ 
+-	current->mm->context.vdso = (void *)addr;
++	current->mm->context.vdso = addr;
+ up_fail:
+ 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	return ret;
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static void xen_set_ldt(const void *addr
+ static void xen_load_gdt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long *frames;
+-	unsigned long va = dtr->address;
++	unsigned long va = (unsigned long)dtr->address;
+ 	unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1;
+ 	unsigned pages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ 	int f;
+@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static void xen_load_gdt(const struct de
+ 	mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*frames) * pages);
+ 	frames = mcs.args;
+ 
+-	for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) {
++	for (f = 0; va < (unsigned long)dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) {
+ 		frames[f] = virt_to_mfn(va);
+ 		make_lowmem_page_readonly((void *)va);
+ 	}
+@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static void xen_write_idt_entry(gate_des
+ 
+ 	preempt_disable();
+ 
+-	start = __get_cpu_var(idt_desc).address;
++	start = (unsigned long)__get_cpu_var(idt_desc).address;
+ 	end = start + __get_cpu_var(idt_desc).size + 1;
+ 
+ 	xen_mc_flush();
+diff -urNp a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
+--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void __init xen_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(voi
+ 
+ 	/* We've switched to the "real" per-cpu gdt, so make sure the
+ 	   old memory can be recycled */
+-	make_lowmem_page_readwrite(&per_cpu__gdt_page);
++	make_lowmem_page_readwrite(get_cpu_gdt_table(smp_processor_id()));
+ 
+ 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ 		cpus_clear(per_cpu(cpu_sibling_map, cpu));
+@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static __cpuinit int
+ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
+ {
+ 	struct vcpu_guest_context *ctxt;
+-	struct gdt_page *gdt = &per_cpu(gdt_page, cpu);
++	struct desc_struct *gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
+ 
+ 	if (cpu_test_and_set(cpu, cpu_initialized_map))
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -218,8 +218,8 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu,
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+ 	ctxt->flags = VGCF_IN_KERNEL;
+-	ctxt->user_regs.ds = __USER_DS;
+-	ctxt->user_regs.es = __USER_DS;
++	ctxt->user_regs.ds = __KERNEL_DS;
++	ctxt->user_regs.es = __KERNEL_DS;
+ 	ctxt->user_regs.fs = __KERNEL_PERCPU;
+ 	ctxt->user_regs.gs = 0;
+ 	ctxt->user_regs.ss = __KERNEL_DS;
+@@ -232,11 +232,11 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu,
+ 
+ 	ctxt->ldt_ents = 0;
+ 
+-	BUG_ON((unsigned long)gdt->gdt & ~PAGE_MASK);
+-	make_lowmem_page_readonly(gdt->gdt);
++	BUG_ON((unsigned long)gdt & ~PAGE_MASK);
++	make_lowmem_page_readonly(gdt);
+ 
+-	ctxt->gdt_frames[0] = virt_to_mfn(gdt->gdt);
+-	ctxt->gdt_ents      = ARRAY_SIZE(gdt->gdt);
++	ctxt->gdt_frames[0] = virt_to_mfn(gdt);
++	ctxt->gdt_ents      = GDT_ENTRIES;
+ 
+ 	ctxt->user_regs.cs = __KERNEL_CS;
+ 	ctxt->user_regs.esp = idle->thread.sp0 - sizeof(struct pt_regs);
+diff -urNp a/crypto/async_tx/async_tx.c b/crypto/async_tx/async_tx.c
+--- a/crypto/async_tx/async_tx.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/crypto/async_tx/async_tx.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -341,8 +341,8 @@ async_tx_init(void)
+ err:
+ 	printk(KERN_ERR "async_tx: initialization failure\n");
+ 
+-	while (--cap >= 0)
+-		free_percpu(channel_table[cap]);
++	while (cap)
++		free_percpu(channel_table[--cap]);
+ 
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+diff -urNp a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
+--- a/crypto/lrw.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/crypto/lrw.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int setkey(struct crypto_tfm *par
+ 	struct priv *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(parent);
+ 	struct crypto_cipher *child = ctx->child;
+ 	int err, i;
+-	be128 tmp = { 0 };
++	be128 tmp = { 0, 0 };
+ 	int bsize = crypto_cipher_blocksize(child);
+ 
+ 	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c b/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c
+--- a/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/acpi/blacklist.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static struct acpi_blacklist_item acpi_b
+ 	{"IBM   ", "TP600E  ", 0x00000105, ACPI_SIG_DSDT, less_than_or_equal,
+ 	 "Incorrect _ADR", 1},
+ 
+-	{""}
++	{"", "", 0, 0, 0, all_versions, 0}
+ };
+ 
+ #if	CONFIG_ACPI_BLACKLIST_YEAR
+diff -urNp a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -489,6 +489,8 @@ acpi_os_read_memory(acpi_physical_addres
+ 	void __iomem *virt_addr;
+ 
+ 	virt_addr = ioremap(phys_addr, width);
++	if (!virt_addr)
++		return AE_NO_MEMORY;
+ 	if (!value)
+ 		value = &dummy;
+ 
+@@ -517,6 +519,8 @@ acpi_os_write_memory(acpi_physical_addre
+ 	void __iomem *virt_addr;
+ 
+ 	virt_addr = ioremap(phys_addr, width);
++	if (!virt_addr)
++		return AE_NO_MEMORY;
+ 
+ 	switch (width) {
+ 	case 8:
+diff -urNp a/drivers/acpi/processor_core.c b/drivers/acpi/processor_core.c
+--- a/drivers/acpi/processor_core.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_core.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ static int __cpuinit acpi_processor_star
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	BUG_ON((pr->id >= nr_cpu_ids) || (pr->id < 0));
++	BUG_ON(pr->id >= nr_cpu_ids);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Buggy BIOS check
+diff -urNp a/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c b/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
+--- a/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __cpuinitdat
+ 	  DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VENDOR,"Phoenix Technologies LTD"),
+ 	  DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION,"SHE845M0.86C.0013.D.0302131307")},
+ 	 (void *)2},
+-	{},
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL},
+ };
+ 
+ static inline u32 ticks_elapsed(u32 t1, u32 t2)
+diff -urNp a/drivers/acpi/sleep/main.c b/drivers/acpi/sleep/main.c
+--- a/drivers/acpi/sleep/main.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/acpi/sleep/main.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata a
+ 	 .ident = "Toshiba Satellite 4030cdt",
+ 	 .matches = {DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "S4030CDT/4.3"),},
+ 	 },
+-	{},
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL},
+ };
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SUSPEND */
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/acpi/tables/tbfadt.c b/drivers/acpi/tables/tbfadt.c
+--- a/drivers/acpi/tables/tbfadt.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/acpi/tables/tbfadt.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
+ ACPI_MODULE_NAME("tbfadt")
+ 
+ /* Local prototypes */
+-static void inline
++static inline void
+ acpi_tb_init_generic_address(struct acpi_generic_address *generic_address,
+ 			     u8 bit_width, u64 address);
+ 
+@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct acpi_fadt_info fadt_info_t
+  *
+  ******************************************************************************/
+ 
+-static void inline
++static inline void
+ acpi_tb_init_generic_address(struct acpi_generic_address *generic_address,
+ 			     u8 bit_width, u64 address)
+ {
+diff -urNp a/drivers/acpi/tables/tbxface.c b/drivers/acpi/tables/tbxface.c
+--- a/drivers/acpi/tables/tbxface.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/acpi/tables/tbxface.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static acpi_status acpi_tb_load_namespac
+ 		acpi_tb_print_table_header(0, table);
+ 
+ 		if (no_auto_ssdt == 0) {
+-			printk(KERN_WARNING "ACPI: DSDT override uses original SSDTs unless \"acpi_no_auto_ssdt\"");
++			printk(KERN_WARNING "ACPI: DSDT override uses original SSDTs unless \"acpi_no_auto_ssdt\"\n");
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ata/ahci.c b/drivers/ata/ahci.c
+--- a/drivers/ata/ahci.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ata/ahci.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_p
+ 	{ PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,
+ 	  PCI_CLASS_STORAGE_SATA_AHCI, 0xffffff, board_ahci },
+ 
+-	{ }	/* terminate list */
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }	/* terminate list */
+ };
+ 
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ata/ata_piix.c b/drivers/ata/ata_piix.c
+--- a/drivers/ata/ata_piix.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ata/ata_piix.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id piix_p
+ 	/* SATA Controller IDE (ICH10) */
+ 	{ 0x8086, 0x3a26, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, ich8_2port_sata },
+ 
+-	{ }	/* terminate list */
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }	/* terminate list */
+ };
+ 
+ static struct pci_driver piix_pci_driver = {
+@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ static const struct ich_laptop ich_lapto
+ 	{ 0x27DF, 0x103C, 0x30A1 },	/* ICH7 on HP Compaq nc2400 */
+ 	{ 0x24CA, 0x1025, 0x0061 },	/* ICH4 on ACER Aspire 2023WLMi */
+ 	/* end marker */
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int piix_broken_suspend(void)
+ 			},
+ 		},
+ 
+-		{ }	/* terminate list */
++		{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }	/* terminate list */
+ 	};
+ 	static const char *oemstrs[] = {
+ 		"Tecra M3,",
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static const struct ata_xfer_ent {
+ 	{ ATA_SHIFT_PIO, ATA_NR_PIO_MODES, XFER_PIO_0 },
+ 	{ ATA_SHIFT_MWDMA, ATA_NR_MWDMA_MODES, XFER_MW_DMA_0 },
+ 	{ ATA_SHIFT_UDMA, ATA_NR_UDMA_MODES, XFER_UDMA_0 },
+-	{ -1, },
++	{ -1, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -3043,7 +3043,7 @@ static const struct ata_timing ata_timin
+ 	{ XFER_UDMA_5,     0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,  20 },
+ 	{ XFER_UDMA_6,     0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,  15 },
+ 
+-	{ 0xFF }
++	{ 0xFF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ #define ENOUGH(v, unit)		(((v)-1)/(unit)+1)
+@@ -4465,7 +4465,7 @@ static const struct ata_blacklist_entry 
+ 	{ "TSSTcorp CDDVDW SH-S202N", "SB01",	  ATA_HORKAGE_IVB, },
+ 
+ 	/* End Marker */
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static int strn_pattern_cmp(const char *patt, const char *name, int wildchar)
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c b/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c
+--- a/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static int agpioc_reserve_wrap(struct ag
+ 	if (copy_from_user(&reserve, arg, sizeof(struct agp_region)))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
+-	if ((unsigned) reserve.seg_count >= ~0U/sizeof(struct agp_segment))
++	if ((unsigned) reserve.seg_count >= ~0U/sizeof(struct agp_segment_priv))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
+ 	client = agp_find_client_by_pid(reserve.pid);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c b/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c
+--- a/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/agp/intel-agp.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id agp_intel_pc
+ 	ID(PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_Q35_HB),
+ 	ID(PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_Q33_HB),
+ 	ID(PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IGD_HB),
+-	{ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, agp_intel_pci_table);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/drm/drm_pciids.h b/drivers/char/drm/drm_pciids.h
+--- a/drivers/char/drm/drm_pciids.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/drm/drm_pciids.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@
+ 	{0x8086, 0x7123, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0}, \
+ 	{0x8086, 0x7125, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0}, \
+ 	{0x8086, 0x1132, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0}, \
+-	{0, 0, 0}
++	{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ 
+ #define i830_PCI_IDS \
+ 	{0x8086, 0x3577, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0}, \
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/hpet.c b/drivers/char/hpet.c
+--- a/drivers/char/hpet.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/hpet.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ static struct acpi_driver hpet_acpi_driv
+ 		},
+ };
+ 
+-static struct miscdevice hpet_misc = { HPET_MINOR, "hpet", &hpet_fops };
++static struct miscdevice hpet_misc = { HPET_MINOR, "hpet", &hpet_fops, {NULL, NULL}, NULL, NULL };
+ 
+ static int __init hpet_init(void)
+ {
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/keyboard.c b/drivers/char/keyboard.c
+--- a/drivers/char/keyboard.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/keyboard.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -630,6 +630,16 @@ static void k_spec(struct vc_data *vc, u
+ 	     kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) &&
+ 	     value != KVAL(K_SAK))
+ 		return;		/* SAK is allowed even in raw mode */
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP)
++	{
++		void *func = fn_handler[value];
++		if (func == fn_show_state || func == fn_show_ptregs ||
++		    func == fn_show_mem)
++			return;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	fn_handler[value](vc);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1384,7 +1394,7 @@ static const struct input_device_id kbd_
+                 .evbit = { BIT_MASK(EV_SND) },
+         },
+ 
+-	{ },    /* Terminating entry */
++	{ 0 },    /* Terminating entry */
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(input, kbd_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
+--- a/drivers/char/mem.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/mem.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/splice.h>
+ #include <linux/pfn.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -34,6 +35,10 @@
+ # include <linux/efi.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern struct file_operations grsec_fops;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Architectures vary in how they handle caching for addresses
+  * outside of main memory.
+@@ -180,6 +185,11 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file * f
+ 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	gr_handle_mem_write();
++	return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	written = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED
+@@ -281,6 +291,11 @@ static int mmap_mem(struct file * file, 
+ 	if (!private_mapping_ok(vma))
+ 		return -ENOSYS;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, vma))
++		return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_page_prot = phys_mem_access_prot(file, vma->vm_pgoff,
+ 						 size,
+ 						 vma->vm_page_prot);
+@@ -512,6 +527,11 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file * 
+ 	ssize_t written;
+ 	char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	gr_handle_kmem_write();
++	return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
+ 
+ 		wrote = count;
+@@ -714,6 +734,16 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *
+ 
+ static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	gr_handle_open_port();
++	return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
++	return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
++}
++
++static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
++{
+ 	return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -721,7 +751,6 @@ static int open_port(struct inode * inod
+ #define full_lseek      null_lseek
+ #define write_zero	write_null
+ #define read_full       read_zero
+-#define open_mem	open_port
+ #define open_kmem	open_mem
+ #define open_oldmem	open_mem
+ 
+@@ -854,6 +883,11 @@ static int memory_open(struct inode * in
+ 			filp->f_op = &oldmem_fops;
+ 			break;
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		case 13:
++			filp->f_op = &grsec_fops;
++			break;
++#endif
+ 		default:
+ 			return -ENXIO;
+ 	}
+@@ -886,6 +920,9 @@ static const struct {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
+ 	{12,"oldmem",    S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP, &oldmem_fops},
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	{13,"grsec",	S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO,	    &grsec_fops},
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ static struct class *mem_class;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/nvram.c b/drivers/char/nvram.c
+--- a/drivers/char/nvram.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/nvram.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -430,7 +430,10 @@ static const struct file_operations nvra
+ static struct miscdevice nvram_dev = {
+ 	NVRAM_MINOR,
+ 	"nvram",
+-	&nvram_fops
++	&nvram_fops,
++	{NULL, NULL},
++	NULL,
++	NULL
+ };
+ 
+ static int __init
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -248,8 +248,13 @@
+ /*
+  * Configuration information
+  */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS 512
++#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS 128
++#else
+ #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS 128
+ #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS 32
++#endif
+ #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -286,10 +291,17 @@ static struct poolinfo {
+ 	int poolwords;
+ 	int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+ } poolinfo_table[] = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	/* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 +x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
++	{ 512,	411,	308,	208,	104,	1 },
++	/* x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 + x^25 + x + 1 -- 105 */
++	{ 128,	103,	76,	51,	25,	1 },
++#else
+ 	/* x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 -- 105 */
+ 	{ 128,	103,	76,	51,	25,	1 },
+ 	/* x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 -- 15 */
+ 	{ 32,	26,	20,	14,	7,	1 },
++#endif
+ #if 0
+ 	/* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1  -- 115 */
+ 	{ 2048,	1638,	1231,	819,	411,	1 },
+@@ -1171,7 +1183,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);
+ #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+ 
+ static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
+-static int max_read_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
++static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+ static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+ static char sysctl_bootid[16];
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, con
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+ 
+-	if (in_size > TPM_BUFSIZE)
++	if (in_size > (unsigned int)TPM_BUFSIZE)
+ 		in_size = TPM_BUFSIZE;
+ 
+ 	if (copy_from_user
+diff -urNp a/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c b/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c
+--- a/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ do_kdsk_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbentry __
+ 	case KDSKBENT:
+ 		if (!perm)
+ 			return -EPERM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++			return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 		if (!i && v == K_NOSUCHMAP) {
+ 			/* deallocate map */
+ 			key_map = key_maps[s];
+@@ -236,6 +242,13 @@ do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbsentry 
+ 			goto reterr;
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) {
++			ret = -EPERM;
++			goto reterr;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		q = func_table[i];
+ 		first_free = funcbufptr + (funcbufsize - funcbufleft);
+ 		for (j = i+1; j < MAX_NR_FUNC && !func_table[j]; j++) 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/edac/edac_core.h b/drivers/edac/edac_core.h
+--- a/drivers/edac/edac_core.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/edac/edac_core.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -86,11 +86,11 @@ extern int edac_debug_level;
+ 
+ #else				/* !CONFIG_EDAC_DEBUG */
+ 
+-#define debugf0( ... )
+-#define debugf1( ... )
+-#define debugf2( ... )
+-#define debugf3( ... )
+-#define debugf4( ... )
++#define debugf0( ... ) do {} while (0)
++#define debugf1( ... ) do {} while (0)
++#define debugf2( ... ) do {} while (0)
++#define debugf3( ... ) do {} while (0)
++#define debugf4( ... ) do {} while (0)
+ 
+ #endif				/* !CONFIG_EDAC_DEBUG */
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c b/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c
+--- a/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/firmware/dmi_scan.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -379,11 +379,6 @@ void __init dmi_scan_machine(void)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	else {
+-		/*
+-		 * no iounmap() for that ioremap(); it would be a no-op, but
+-		 * it's so early in setup that sucker gets confused into doing
+-		 * what it shouldn't if we actually call it.
+-		 */
+ 		p = dmi_ioremap(0xF0000, 0x10000);
+ 		if (p == NULL)
+ 			goto out;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/hwmon/fscpos.c b/drivers/hwmon/fscpos.c
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/fscpos.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/fscpos.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -230,7 +230,6 @@ static ssize_t set_pwm(struct i2c_client
+ 	unsigned long v = simple_strtoul(buf, NULL, 10);
+ 
+ 	/* Range: 0..255 */
+-	if (v < 0) v = 0;
+ 	if (v > 255) v = 255;
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&data->update_lock);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c b/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(name, S_IRUGO, show_n
+ 
+ static struct pci_device_id k8temp_ids[] = {
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_K8_NB_MISC) },
+-	{ 0 },
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, k8temp_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/hwmon/sis5595.c b/drivers/hwmon/sis5595.c
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/sis5595.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/sis5595.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static struct sis5595_data *sis5595_upda
+ 
+ static struct pci_device_id sis5595_pci_ids[] = {
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SI, PCI_DEVICE_ID_SI_503) },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, sis5595_pci_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/hwmon/via686a.c b/drivers/hwmon/via686a.c
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/via686a.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/via686a.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static struct via686a_data *via686a_upda
+ 
+ static struct pci_device_id via686a_pci_ids[] = {
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_VIA, PCI_DEVICE_ID_VIA_82C686_4) },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, via686a_pci_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/hwmon/vt8231.c b/drivers/hwmon/vt8231.c
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/vt8231.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/vt8231.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static struct platform_driver vt8231_dri
+ 
+ static struct pci_device_id vt8231_pci_ids[] = {
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_VIA, PCI_DEVICE_ID_VIA_8231_4) },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, vt8231_pci_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c b/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c
+--- a/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -290,8 +290,8 @@ static int w83791d_attach_adapter(struct
+ static int w83791d_detect(struct i2c_adapter *adapter, int address, int kind);
+ static int w83791d_detach_client(struct i2c_client *client);
+ 
+-static int w83791d_read(struct i2c_client *client, u8 register);
+-static int w83791d_write(struct i2c_client *client, u8 register, u8 value);
++static int w83791d_read(struct i2c_client *client, u8 reg);
++static int w83791d_write(struct i2c_client *client, u8 reg, u8 value);
+ static struct w83791d_data *w83791d_update_device(struct device *dev);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+diff -urNp a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c
+--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id i801_ids[] =
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_TOLAPAI_1) },
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_ICH10_4) },
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_ICH10_5) },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (pci, i801_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i810.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i810.c
+--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i810.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i810.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id i810_ids[] _
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82810E_IG) },
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82815_CGC) },
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82845G_IG) },
+-	{ 0, },
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (pci, i810_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c
+--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-piix4.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __devinitdat
+ 		.ident = "IBM",
+ 		.matches = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "IBM"), },
+ 	},
+-	{ },
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL },
+ };
+ 
+ static int __devinit piix4_setup(struct pci_dev *PIIX4_dev,
+@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id piix4_ids[] 
+ 		     PCI_DEVICE_ID_SERVERWORKS_CSB6) },
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SERVERWORKS,
+ 		     PCI_DEVICE_ID_SERVERWORKS_HT1000SB) },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (pci, piix4_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c
+--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis630.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static struct i2c_adapter sis630_adapter
+ static struct pci_device_id sis630_ids[] __devinitdata = {
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SI, PCI_DEVICE_ID_SI_503) },
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SI, PCI_DEVICE_ID_SI_LPC) },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (pci, sis630_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis96x.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis96x.c
+--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis96x.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-sis96x.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static struct i2c_adapter sis96x_adapter
+ 
+ static struct pci_device_id sis96x_ids[] = {
+ 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SI, PCI_DEVICE_ID_SI_SMBUS) },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (pci, sis96x_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ide/ide-cd.c b/drivers/ide/ide-cd.c
+--- a/drivers/ide/ide-cd.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ide/ide-cd.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -182,8 +182,6 @@ void cdrom_analyze_sense_data(ide_drive_
+ 			sector &= ~(bio_sectors -1);
+ 			valid = (sector - failed_command->sector) << 9;
+ 
+-			if (valid < 0)
+-				valid = 0;
+ 			if (sector < get_capacity(info->disk) &&
+ 				drive->probed_capacity - sector < 4 * 75) {
+ 				set_capacity(info->disk, sector);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ieee1394/dv1394.c b/drivers/ieee1394/dv1394.c
+--- a/drivers/ieee1394/dv1394.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ieee1394/dv1394.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ static void frame_prepare(struct video_c
+ 	based upon DIF section and sequence
+ */
+ 
+-static void inline
++static inline void
+ frame_put_packet (struct frame *f, struct packet *p)
+ {
+ 	int section_type = p->data[0] >> 5;           /* section type is in bits 5 - 7 */
+@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static int do_dv1394_init(struct video_c
+ 		/* default SYT offset is 3 cycles */
+ 		init->syt_offset = 3;
+ 
+-	if ( (init->channel > 63) || (init->channel < 0) )
++	if (init->channel > 63)
+ 		init->channel = 63;
+ 
+ 	chan_mask = (u64)1 << init->channel;
+@@ -2173,7 +2173,7 @@ static struct ieee1394_device_id dv1394_
+ 		.specifier_id	= AVC_UNIT_SPEC_ID_ENTRY & 0xffffff,
+ 		.version	= AVC_SW_VERSION_ENTRY & 0xffffff
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ieee1394, dv1394_id_table);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ieee1394/eth1394.c b/drivers/ieee1394/eth1394.c
+--- a/drivers/ieee1394/eth1394.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ieee1394/eth1394.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static struct ieee1394_device_id eth1394
+ 		.specifier_id =	ETHER1394_GASP_SPECIFIER_ID,
+ 		.version = ETHER1394_GASP_VERSION,
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ieee1394, eth1394_id_table);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ieee1394/hosts.c b/drivers/ieee1394/hosts.c
+--- a/drivers/ieee1394/hosts.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ieee1394/hosts.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static int dummy_isoctl(struct hpsb_iso 
+ }
+ 
+ static struct hpsb_host_driver dummy_driver = {
++	.name =		   "dummy",
+ 	.transmit_packet = dummy_transmit_packet,
+ 	.devctl =	   dummy_devctl,
+ 	.isoctl =	   dummy_isoctl
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c b/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c
+--- a/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -147,9 +147,9 @@ printk(level "%s: " fmt "\n" , OHCI1394_
+ printk(level "%s: fw-host%d: " fmt "\n" , OHCI1394_DRIVER_NAME, ohci->host->id , ## args)
+ 
+ /* Module Parameters */
+-static int phys_dma = 1;
++static int phys_dma;
+ module_param(phys_dma, int, 0444);
+-MODULE_PARM_DESC(phys_dma, "Enable physical dma (default = 1).");
++MODULE_PARM_DESC(phys_dma, "Enable physical dma (default = 0).");
+ 
+ static void dma_trm_tasklet(unsigned long data);
+ static void dma_trm_reset(struct dma_trm_ctx *d);
+@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id ohci1394_pci
+ 		.subvendor =	PCI_ANY_ID,
+ 		.subdevice =	PCI_ANY_ID,
+ 	},
+-	{ 0, },
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, ohci1394_pci_tbl);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ieee1394/raw1394.c b/drivers/ieee1394/raw1394.c
+--- a/drivers/ieee1394/raw1394.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ieee1394/raw1394.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2952,7 +2952,7 @@ static struct ieee1394_device_id raw1394
+ 	 .match_flags = IEEE1394_MATCH_SPECIFIER_ID | IEEE1394_MATCH_VERSION,
+ 	 .specifier_id = CAMERA_UNIT_SPEC_ID_ENTRY & 0xffffff,
+ 	 .version = (CAMERA_SW_VERSION_ENTRY + 2) & 0xffffff},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ieee1394, raw1394_id_table);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ieee1394/sbp2.c b/drivers/ieee1394/sbp2.c
+--- a/drivers/ieee1394/sbp2.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ieee1394/sbp2.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static struct ieee1394_device_id sbp2_id
+ 	 .match_flags	= IEEE1394_MATCH_SPECIFIER_ID | IEEE1394_MATCH_VERSION,
+ 	 .specifier_id	= SBP2_UNIT_SPEC_ID_ENTRY & 0xffffff,
+ 	 .version	= SBP2_SW_VERSION_ENTRY & 0xffffff},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ieee1394, sbp2_id_table);
+ 
+@@ -2108,7 +2108,7 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("IEEE-1394 SBP-2 prot
+ MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(SBP2_DEVICE_NAME);
+ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+ 
+-static int sbp2_module_init(void)
++static int __init sbp2_module_init(void)
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c b/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c
+--- a/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static long video1394_ioctl(struct file 
+ 		if (unlikely(d == NULL))
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+ 
+-		if (unlikely((v.buffer<0) || (v.buffer>=d->num_desc - 1))) {
++		if (unlikely(v.buffer>=d->num_desc - 1)) {
+ 			PRINT(KERN_ERR, ohci->host->id,
+ 			      "Buffer %d out of range",v.buffer);
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ static long video1394_ioctl(struct file 
+ 		if (unlikely(d == NULL))
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+ 
+-		if (unlikely((v.buffer<0) || (v.buffer>d->num_desc - 1))) {
++		if (unlikely(v.buffer>d->num_desc - 1)) {
+ 			PRINT(KERN_ERR, ohci->host->id,
+ 			      "Buffer %d out of range",v.buffer);
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static long video1394_ioctl(struct file 
+ 		d = find_ctx(&ctx->context_list, OHCI_ISO_TRANSMIT, v.channel);
+ 		if (d == NULL) return -EFAULT;
+ 
+-		if ((v.buffer<0) || (v.buffer>=d->num_desc - 1)) {
++		if (v.buffer>=d->num_desc - 1) {
+ 			PRINT(KERN_ERR, ohci->host->id,
+ 			      "Buffer %d out of range",v.buffer);
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ static long video1394_ioctl(struct file 
+ 		d = find_ctx(&ctx->context_list, OHCI_ISO_TRANSMIT, v.channel);
+ 		if (d == NULL) return -EFAULT;
+ 
+-		if ((v.buffer<0) || (v.buffer>=d->num_desc-1)) {
++		if (v.buffer>=d->num_desc-1) {
+ 			PRINT(KERN_ERR, ohci->host->id,
+ 			      "Buffer %d out of range",v.buffer);
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ static struct ieee1394_device_id video13
+                 .specifier_id   = CAMERA_UNIT_SPEC_ID_ENTRY & 0xffffff,
+                 .version        = (CAMERA_SW_VERSION_ENTRY + 2) & 0xffffff
+         },
+-	{ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ieee1394, video1394_id_table);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c b/drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c
+--- a/drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ static struct serio_device_id atkbd_seri
+ 		.id	= SERIO_ANY,
+ 		.extra	= SERIO_ANY,
+ 	},
+-	{ 0 }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(serio, atkbd_serio_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/input/mouse/lifebook.c b/drivers/input/mouse/lifebook.c
+--- a/drivers/input/mouse/lifebook.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/input/mouse/lifebook.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id lifebo
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "LifeBook B142"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ static psmouse_ret_t lifebook_process_byte(struct psmouse *psmouse)
+diff -urNp a/drivers/input/mouse/psmouse-base.c b/drivers/input/mouse/psmouse-base.c
+--- a/drivers/input/mouse/psmouse-base.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/input/mouse/psmouse-base.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ static struct serio_device_id psmouse_se
+ 		.id	= SERIO_ANY,
+ 		.extra	= SERIO_ANY,
+ 	},
+-	{ 0 }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(serio, psmouse_serio_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c
+--- a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void synaptics_process_packet(str
+ 				break;
+ 			case 2:
+ 				if (SYN_MODEL_PEN(priv->model_id))
+-					;   /* Nothing, treat a pen as a single finger */
++					break;   /* Nothing, treat a pen as a single finger */
+ 				break;
+ 			case 4 ... 15:
+ 				if (SYN_CAP_PALMDETECT(priv->capabilities))
+@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id toshib
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "PORTEGE M300"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }
+ };
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/input/mousedev.c b/drivers/input/mousedev.c
+--- a/drivers/input/mousedev.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/input/mousedev.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ static struct input_handler mousedev_han
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_INPUT_MOUSEDEV_PSAUX
+ static struct miscdevice psaux_mouse = {
+-	PSMOUSE_MINOR, "psaux", &mousedev_fops
++	PSMOUSE_MINOR, "psaux", &mousedev_fops, {NULL, NULL}, NULL, NULL
+ };
+ static int psaux_registered;
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h b/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h
+--- a/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata i
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "VS2005R2"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static struct dmi_system_id __initdata i
+ 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Aspire 1360"),
+ 		},
+ 	},
+-	{ }
++	{ NULL, NULL, {DMI_MATCH(DMI_NONE, NULL)}, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PNP
+diff -urNp a/drivers/input/serio/serio_raw.c b/drivers/input/serio/serio_raw.c
+--- a/drivers/input/serio/serio_raw.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/input/serio/serio_raw.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static struct serio_device_id serio_raw_
+ 		.id	= SERIO_ANY,
+ 		.extra	= SERIO_ANY,
+ 	},
+-	{ 0 }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(serio, serio_raw_serio_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/md/bitmap.c b/drivers/md/bitmap.c
+--- a/drivers/md/bitmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/md/bitmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
+ #  if DEBUG > 0
+ #    define PRINTK(x...) printk(KERN_DEBUG x)
+ #  else
+-#    define PRINTK(x...)
++#    define PRINTK(x...) do {} while (0)
+ #  endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2000.c b/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2000.c
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2000.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2000.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ static int doc_write(struct mtd_info *mt
+ 
+ 		/* The ECC will not be calculated correctly if less than 512 is written */
+ /* DBB-
+-		if (len != 0x200 && eccbuf)
++		if (len != 0x200)
+ 			printk(KERN_WARNING
+ 			       "ECC needs a full sector write (adr: %lx size %lx)\n",
+ 			       (long) to, (long) len);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c b/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -398,6 +398,8 @@ static int doc_read (struct mtd_info *mt
+ 	/* Don't allow read past end of device */
+ 	if (from >= this->totlen)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++	if (!len)
++		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	/* Don't allow a single read to cross a 512-byte block boundary */
+ 	if (from + len > ((from | 0x1ff) + 1))
+diff -urNp a/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c b/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int parse_cmdline(char *devname, 
+ 	}
+ 	T("slram: devname=%s, devstart=0x%lx, devlength=0x%lx\n",
+ 			devname, devstart, devlength);
+-	if ((devstart < 0) || (devlength < 0) || (devlength % SLRAM_BLK_SZ != 0)) {
++	if (devlength % SLRAM_BLK_SZ != 0) {
+ 		E("slram: Illegal start / length parameter.\n");
+ 		return(-EINVAL);
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c b/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c
+--- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static int __init bytes_str_to_int(const
+ 	unsigned long result;
+ 
+ 	result = simple_strtoul(str, &endp, 0);
+-	if (str == endp || result < 0) {
++	if (str == endp) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "UBI error: incorrect bytes count: \"%s\"\n",
+ 		       str);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/net/eepro100.c b/drivers/net/eepro100.c
+--- a/drivers/net/eepro100.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/net/eepro100.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int rxdmacount /* = 0 */;
+ # define rx_align(skb)		skb_reserve((skb), 2)
+ # define RxFD_ALIGNMENT		__attribute__ ((aligned (2), packed))
+ #else
+-# define rx_align(skb)
++# define rx_align(skb) do {} while (0)
+ # define RxFD_ALIGNMENT
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -2334,33 +2334,33 @@ static void __devexit eepro100_remove_on
+ }
+ 
+ static struct pci_device_id eepro100_pci_tbl[] = {
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1229, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1209, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1029, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1030, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1031, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1032, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1033, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1034, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1035, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1036, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1037, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1038, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1039, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103A, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103B, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103C, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103D, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103E, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1050, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1059, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1227, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2449, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2459, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x245D, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x5200, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x5201, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, },
+-	{ 0,}
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1229, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1209, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1029, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1030, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1031, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1032, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1033, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1034, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1035, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1036, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1037, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1038, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1039, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103A, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103B, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103C, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103D, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x103E, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1050, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1059, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x1227, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2449, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2459, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x245D, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x5200, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x5201, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0 },
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, eepro100_pci_tbl);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c b/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c
+--- a/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/net/irda/vlsi_ir.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -906,13 +906,12 @@ static int vlsi_hard_start_xmit(struct s
+ 			/* no race - tx-ring already empty */
+ 			vlsi_set_baud(idev, iobase);
+ 			netif_wake_queue(ndev);
+-		}
+-		else
+-			;
++		} else {
+ 			/* keep the speed change pending like it would
+ 			 * for any len>0 packet. tx completion interrupt
+ 			 * will apply it when the tx ring becomes empty.
+ 			 */
++		}
+ 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&idev->lock, flags);
+ 		dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
+ 		return 0;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/net/pcnet32.c b/drivers/net/pcnet32.c
+--- a/drivers/net/pcnet32.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/net/pcnet32.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int cards_found;
+ /*
+  * VLB I/O addresses
+  */
+-static unsigned int pcnet32_portlist[] __initdata =
++static unsigned int pcnet32_portlist[] __devinitdata =
+     { 0x300, 0x320, 0x340, 0x360, 0 };
+ 
+ static int pcnet32_debug = 0;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/net/tg3.h b/drivers/net/tg3.h
+--- a/drivers/net/tg3.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/net/tg3.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@
+ #define  CHIPREV_ID_5750_A0		 0x4000
+ #define  CHIPREV_ID_5750_A1		 0x4001
+ #define  CHIPREV_ID_5750_A3		 0x4003
++#define  CHIPREV_ID_5750_C1		 0x4201
+ #define  CHIPREV_ID_5750_C2		 0x4202
+ #define  CHIPREV_ID_5752_A0_HW		 0x5000
+ #define  CHIPREV_ID_5752_A0		 0x6000
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pci/hotplug/cpqphp_nvram.c b/drivers/pci/hotplug/cpqphp_nvram.c
+--- a/drivers/pci/hotplug/cpqphp_nvram.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pci/hotplug/cpqphp_nvram.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -425,9 +425,13 @@ static u32 store_HRT (void __iomem *rom_
+ 
+ void compaq_nvram_init (void __iomem *rom_start)
+ {
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
+ 	if (rom_start) {
+ 		compaq_int15_entry_point = (rom_start + ROM_INT15_PHY_ADDR - ROM_PHY_ADDR);
+ 	}
++#endif
++
+ 	dbg("int15 entry  = %p\n", compaq_int15_entry_point);
+ 
+ 	/* initialize our int15 lock */
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c
+--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static struct pcie_port_service_id aer_i
+ 	.port_type 	= PCIE_RC_PORT,
+ 	.service_type 	= PCIE_PORT_SERVICE_AER,
+ 	},
+-	{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct pci_error_handlers aer_error_handlers = {
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c
+--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer/aerdrv_core.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void aer_isr_one_error(struct pci
+ 		struct aer_err_source *e_src)
+ {
+ 	struct device *s_device;
+-	struct aer_err_info e_info = {0, 0, 0,};
++	struct aer_err_info e_info = {0, 0, 0, {0, 0, 0, 0}};
+ 	int i;
+ 	u16 id;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv_pci.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv_pci.c
+--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv_pci.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv_pci.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static void pcie_portdrv_err_resume(stru
+ static const struct pci_device_id port_pci_ids[] = { {
+ 	/* handle any PCI-Express port */
+ 	PCI_DEVICE_CLASS(((PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI << 8) | 0x00), ~0),
+-	}, { /* end: all zeroes */ }
++	}, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, port_pci_ids);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
+--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -472,7 +472,15 @@ static int __init pci_proc_init(void)
+ {
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 	struct pci_dev *dev = NULL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, proc_bus);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, proc_bus);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir("pci", proc_bus);
++#endif
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("devices", 0, proc_bus_pci_dir);
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_bus_pci_dev_operations;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pcmcia/ti113x.h b/drivers/pcmcia/ti113x.h
+--- a/drivers/pcmcia/ti113x.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pcmcia/ti113x.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id ene_tune_tbl
+ 	DEVID(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MOTOROLA, 0x3410, 0xECC0, PCI_ANY_ID,
+ 		ENE_TEST_C9_TLTENABLE | ENE_TEST_C9_PFENABLE, ENE_TEST_C9_TLTENABLE),
+ 
+-	{}
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static void ene_tune_bridge(struct pcmcia_socket *sock, struct pci_bus *bus)
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pcmcia/yenta_socket.c b/drivers/pcmcia/yenta_socket.c
+--- a/drivers/pcmcia/yenta_socket.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pcmcia/yenta_socket.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1358,7 +1358,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id yenta_table 
+ 
+ 	/* match any cardbus bridge */
+ 	CB_ID(PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, DEFAULT),
+-	{ /* all zeroes */ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, yenta_table);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c b/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c
+--- a/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ set_base(gdt[(selname) >> 3], (u32)(addr
+ set_limit(gdt[(selname) >> 3], size); \
+ } while(0)
+ 
+-static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc;
++static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc __read_only;
+ 
+ /*
+  * At some point we want to use this stack frame pointer to unwind
+@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
+ 	struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
+ 	int cpu;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * PnP BIOSes are generally not terribly re-entrant.
+ 	 * Also, don't rely on them to save everything correctly.
+@@ -97,8 +101,17 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
+ 
+ 	cpu = get_cpu();
+ 	save_desc_40 = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[0x40 / 8];
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	/* On some boxes IRQ's during PnP BIOS calls are deadly.  */
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
+ 
+@@ -135,7 +148,16 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
+ 			     :"memory");
+ 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	put_cpu();
+ 
+ 	/* If we get here and this is set then the PnP BIOS faulted on us. */
+@@ -469,16 +491,24 @@ int pnp_bios_read_escd(char *data, u32 n
+ 	return status;
+ }
+ 
+-void pnpbios_calls_init(union pnp_bios_install_struct *header)
++void __init pnpbios_calls_init(union pnp_bios_install_struct *header)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	spin_lock_init(&pnp_bios_lock);
+ 	pnp_bios_callpoint.offset = header->fields.pm16offset;
+ 	pnp_bios_callpoint.segment = PNP_CS16;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	bad_bios_desc.a = 0;
+-	bad_bios_desc.b = 0x00409200;
++	bad_bios_desc.b = 0x00409300;
+ 
+ 	set_base(bad_bios_desc, __va((unsigned long)0x40 << 4));
+ 	_set_limit((char *)&bad_bios_desc, 4095 - (0x40 << 4));
+@@ -492,4 +522,9 @@ void pnpbios_calls_init(union pnp_bios_i
+ 		set_base(gdt[GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS],
+ 			 __va(header->fields.pm16dseg));
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pnp/quirks.c b/drivers/pnp/quirks.c
+--- a/drivers/pnp/quirks.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pnp/quirks.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static struct pnp_fixup pnp_fixups[] = {
+ 	{"CTL0045", quirk_sb16audio_resources},
+ 	{"PNP0c01", quirk_system_pci_resources},
+ 	{"PNP0c02", quirk_system_pci_resources},
+-	{""}
++	{"", NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ void pnp_fixup_device(struct pnp_dev *dev)
+diff -urNp a/drivers/pnp/resource.c b/drivers/pnp/resource.c
+--- a/drivers/pnp/resource.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/pnp/resource.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ int pnp_check_irq(struct pnp_dev *dev, i
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+ 	/* check if the resource is valid */
+-	if (*irq < 0 || *irq > 15)
++	if (*irq > 15)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	/* check if the resource is reserved */
+@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ int pnp_check_dma(struct pnp_dev *dev, i
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+ 	/* check if the resource is valid */
+-	if (*dma < 0 || *dma == 4 || *dma > 7)
++	if (*dma == 4 || *dma > 7)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	/* check if the resource is reserved */
+diff -urNp a/drivers/scsi/scsi_logging.h b/drivers/scsi/scsi_logging.h
+--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_logging.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_logging.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ do {								\
+ 		} while (0);					\
+ } while (0)
+ #else
+-#define SCSI_CHECK_LOGGING(SHIFT, BITS, LEVEL, CMD)
++#define SCSI_CHECK_LOGGING(SHIFT, BITS, LEVEL, CMD) do {} while (0)
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SCSI_LOGGING */
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/drivers/serial/8250_pci.c b/drivers/serial/8250_pci.c
+--- a/drivers/serial/8250_pci.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/serial/8250_pci.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2837,7 +2837,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id serial_pci_t
+ 		PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID,
+ 		PCI_CLASS_COMMUNICATION_MULTISERIAL << 8,
+ 		0xffff00, pbn_default },
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct pci_driver serial_pci_driver = {
+diff -urNp a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
+--- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id acm_ids[] = 
+ 		USB_CDC_ACM_PROTO_AT_CDMA) },
+ 
+ 	/* NOTE:  COMM/ACM/0xff is likely MSFT RNDIS ... NOT a modem!! */
+-	{ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (usb, acm_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/usb/class/usblp.c b/drivers/usb/class/usblp.c
+--- a/drivers/usb/class/usblp.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/usb/class/usblp.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static const struct quirk_printer_struct
+ 	{ 0x0409, 0xf1be, USBLP_QUIRK_BIDIR }, /* NEC Picty800 (HP OEM) */
+ 	{ 0x0482, 0x0010, USBLP_QUIRK_BIDIR }, /* Kyocera Mita FS 820, by zut <kernel@×××.de> */
+ 	{ 0x04b8, 0x0202, USBLP_QUIRK_BAD_CLASS }, /* Seiko Epson Receipt Printer M129C */
+-	{ 0, 0 }
++	{ 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static int usblp_wwait(struct usblp *usblp, int nonblock);
+@@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id usblp_ids []
+ 	{ USB_INTERFACE_INFO(7, 1, 2) },
+ 	{ USB_INTERFACE_INFO(7, 1, 3) },
+ 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x04b8, 0x0202) },	/* Seiko Epson Receipt Printer M129C */
+-	{ }						/* Terminating entry */
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }		/* Terminating entry */
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (usb, usblp_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2909,7 +2909,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id hub_id_table
+       .bDeviceClass = USB_CLASS_HUB},
+     { .match_flags = USB_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_INT_CLASS,
+       .bInterfaceClass = USB_CLASS_HUB},
+-    { }						/* Terminating entry */
++    { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }						/* Terminating entry */
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (usb, hub_id_table);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c
+--- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id pci_id
+ 	PCI_DEVICE_CLASS(PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB_EHCI, ~0),
+ 	.driver_data =	(unsigned long) &ehci_pci_hc_driver,
+ 	},
+-	{ /* end: all zeroes */ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, pci_ids);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/usb/host/uhci-hcd.c b/drivers/usb/host/uhci-hcd.c
+--- a/drivers/usb/host/uhci-hcd.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/usb/host/uhci-hcd.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id uhci_p
+ 	/* handle any USB UHCI controller */
+ 	PCI_DEVICE_CLASS(PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB_UHCI, ~0),
+ 	.driver_data =	(unsigned long) &uhci_driver,
+-	}, { /* end: all zeroes */ }
++	}, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, uhci_pci_ids);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/usb/storage/debug.h b/drivers/usb/storage/debug.h
+--- a/drivers/usb/storage/debug.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/usb/storage/debug.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -56,9 +56,9 @@ void usb_stor_show_sense( unsigned char 
+ #define US_DEBUGPX(x...) printk( x )
+ #define US_DEBUG(x) x 
+ #else
+-#define US_DEBUGP(x...)
+-#define US_DEBUGPX(x...)
+-#define US_DEBUG(x)
++#define US_DEBUGP(x...) do {} while (0)
++#define US_DEBUGPX(x...) do {} while (0)
++#define US_DEBUG(x) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c b/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c
+--- a/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id storage_usb_
+ #undef UNUSUAL_DEV
+ #undef USUAL_DEV
+ 	/* Terminating entry */
+-	{ }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (usb, storage_usb_ids);
+@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static struct us_unusual_dev us_unusual_
+ #	undef USUAL_DEV
+ 
+ 	/* Terminating entry */
+-	{ NULL }
++	{ NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/fbcmap.c b/drivers/video/fbcmap.c
+--- a/drivers/video/fbcmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/fbcmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -250,8 +250,7 @@ int fb_set_user_cmap(struct fb_cmap_user
+ 	int rc, size = cmap->len * sizeof(u16);
+ 	struct fb_cmap umap;
+ 
+-	if (cmap->start < 0 || (!info->fbops->fb_setcolreg &&
+-			        !info->fbops->fb_setcmap))
++	if (!info->fbops->fb_setcolreg && !info->fbops->fb_setcmap)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	memset(&umap, 0, sizeof(struct fb_cmap));
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbmem.c
+--- a/drivers/video/fbmem.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/fbmem.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static void fb_do_show_logo(struct fb_in
+ 			image->dx += image->width + 8;
+ 		}
+ 	} else if (rotate == FB_ROTATE_UD) {
+-		for (x = 0; x < num && image->dx >= 0; x++) {
++		for (x = 0; x < num && (__s32)image->dx >= 0; x++) {
+ 			info->fbops->fb_imageblit(info, image);
+ 			image->dx -= image->width + 8;
+ 		}
+@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static void fb_do_show_logo(struct fb_in
+ 			image->dy += image->height + 8;
+ 		}
+ 	} else if (rotate == FB_ROTATE_CCW) {
+-		for (x = 0; x < num && image->dy >= 0; x++) {
++		for (x = 0; x < num && (__s32)image->dy >= 0; x++) {
+ 			info->fbops->fb_imageblit(info, image);
+ 			image->dy -= image->height + 8;
+ 		}
+@@ -1057,9 +1057,9 @@ fb_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct fil
+ 	case FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP:
+ 		if (copy_from_user(&con2fb, argp, sizeof(con2fb)))
+ 			return - EFAULT;
+-		if (con2fb.console < 0 || con2fb.console > MAX_NR_CONSOLES)
++		if (con2fb.console > MAX_NR_CONSOLES)
+ 		    return -EINVAL;
+-		if (con2fb.framebuffer < 0 || con2fb.framebuffer >= FB_MAX)
++		if (con2fb.framebuffer >= FB_MAX)
+ 		    return -EINVAL;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
+ 		if (!registered_fb[con2fb.framebuffer])
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/fbmon.c b/drivers/video/fbmon.c
+--- a/drivers/video/fbmon.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/fbmon.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
+ #ifdef DEBUG
+ #define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) printk(fmt,## args)
+ #else
+-#define DPRINTK(fmt, args...)
++#define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define FBMON_FIX_HEADER  1
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/i810/i810_accel.c b/drivers/video/i810/i810_accel.c
+--- a/drivers/video/i810/i810_accel.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/i810/i810_accel.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static inline int wait_for_space(struct 
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	printk("ringbuffer lockup!!!\n");
++	printk("head:%u tail:%u iring.size:%u space:%u\n", head, tail, par->iring.size, space);
+ 	i810_report_error(mmio); 
+ 	par->dev_flags |= LOCKUP;
+ 	info->pixmap.scan_align = 1;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/i810/i810_main.c b/drivers/video/i810/i810_main.c
+--- a/drivers/video/i810/i810_main.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/i810/i810_main.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id i810fb_pci_t
+ 	  PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 4 },
+ 	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82815_CGC,
+ 	  PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 5 },
+-	{ 0 },
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ };
+ 
+ static struct pci_driver i810fb_driver = {
+@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ static int i810fb_cursor(struct fb_info 
+ 		int size = ((cursor->image.width + 7) >> 3) *
+ 			cursor->image.height;
+ 		int i;
+-		u8 *data = kmalloc(64 * 8, GFP_ATOMIC);
++		u8 *data = kmalloc(64 * 8, GFP_KERNEL);
+ 
+ 		if (data == NULL)
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/modedb.c b/drivers/video/modedb.c
+--- a/drivers/video/modedb.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/modedb.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -38,232 +38,232 @@ static const struct fb_videomode modedb[
+     {
+ 	/* 640x400 @ 70 Hz, 31.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 70, 640, 400, 39721, 40, 24, 39, 9, 96, 2,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 640x480 @ 60 Hz, 31.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 640, 480, 39721, 40, 24, 32, 11, 96, 2,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 800x600 @ 56 Hz, 35.15 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 56, 800, 600, 27777, 128, 24, 22, 1, 72, 2,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1024x768 @ 87 Hz interlaced, 35.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 87, 1024, 768, 22271, 56, 24, 33, 8, 160, 8,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_INTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_INTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 640x400 @ 85 Hz, 37.86 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 85, 640, 400, 31746, 96, 32, 41, 1, 64, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 640x480 @ 72 Hz, 36.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 72, 640, 480, 31746, 144, 40, 30, 8, 40, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 640x480 @ 75 Hz, 37.50 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 75, 640, 480, 31746, 120, 16, 16, 1, 64, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 800x600 @ 60 Hz, 37.8 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 800, 600, 25000, 88, 40, 23, 1, 128, 4,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 640x480 @ 85 Hz, 43.27 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 85, 640, 480, 27777, 80, 56, 25, 1, 56, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1152x864 @ 89 Hz interlaced, 44 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 89, 1152, 864, 15384, 96, 16, 110, 1, 216, 10,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_INTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_INTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 800x600 @ 72 Hz, 48.0 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 72, 800, 600, 20000, 64, 56, 23, 37, 120, 6,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1024x768 @ 60 Hz, 48.4 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1024, 768, 15384, 168, 8, 29, 3, 144, 6,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 640x480 @ 100 Hz, 53.01 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 100, 640, 480, 21834, 96, 32, 36, 8, 96, 6,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1152x864 @ 60 Hz, 53.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1152, 864, 11123, 208, 64, 16, 4, 256, 8,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 800x600 @ 85 Hz, 55.84 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 85, 800, 600, 16460, 160, 64, 36, 16, 64, 5,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1024x768 @ 70 Hz, 56.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 70, 1024, 768, 13333, 144, 24, 29, 3, 136, 6,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1280x1024 @ 87 Hz interlaced, 51 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 87, 1280, 1024, 12500, 56, 16, 128, 1, 216, 12,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_INTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_INTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 800x600 @ 100 Hz, 64.02 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 100, 800, 600, 14357, 160, 64, 30, 4, 64, 6,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1024x768 @ 76 Hz, 62.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 76, 1024, 768, 11764, 208, 8, 36, 16, 120, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1152x864 @ 70 Hz, 62.4 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 70, 1152, 864, 10869, 106, 56, 20, 1, 160, 10,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1280x1024 @ 61 Hz, 64.2 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 61, 1280, 1024, 9090, 200, 48, 26, 1, 184, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1400x1050 @ 60Hz, 63.9 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1400, 1050, 9259, 136, 40, 13, 1, 112, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED   	
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1400x1050 @ 75,107 Hz, 82,392 kHz +hsync +vsync*/
+ 	NULL, 75, 1400, 1050, 7190, 120, 56, 23, 10, 112, 13,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1400x1050 @ 60 Hz, ? kHz +hsync +vsync*/
+         NULL, 60, 1400, 1050, 9259, 128, 40, 12, 0, 112, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1024x768 @ 85 Hz, 70.24 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 85, 1024, 768, 10111, 192, 32, 34, 14, 160, 6,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1152x864 @ 78 Hz, 70.8 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 78, 1152, 864, 9090, 228, 88, 32, 0, 84, 12,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1280x1024 @ 70 Hz, 74.59 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 70, 1280, 1024, 7905, 224, 32, 28, 8, 160, 8,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1600x1200 @ 60Hz, 75.00 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1600, 1200, 6172, 304, 64, 46, 1, 192, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1152x864 @ 84 Hz, 76.0 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 84, 1152, 864, 7407, 184, 312, 32, 0, 128, 12,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1280x1024 @ 74 Hz, 78.85 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 74, 1280, 1024, 7407, 256, 32, 34, 3, 144, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1024x768 @ 100Hz, 80.21 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 100, 1024, 768, 8658, 192, 32, 21, 3, 192, 10,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1280x1024 @ 76 Hz, 81.13 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 76, 1280, 1024, 7407, 248, 32, 34, 3, 104, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1600x1200 @ 70 Hz, 87.50 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 70, 1600, 1200, 5291, 304, 64, 46, 1, 192, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1152x864 @ 100 Hz, 89.62 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 100, 1152, 864, 7264, 224, 32, 17, 2, 128, 19,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1280x1024 @ 85 Hz, 91.15 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 85, 1280, 1024, 6349, 224, 64, 44, 1, 160, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1600x1200 @ 75 Hz, 93.75 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 75, 1600, 1200, 4938, 304, 64, 46, 1, 192, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1680x1050 @ 60 Hz, 65.191 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1680, 1050, 6848, 280, 104, 30, 3, 176, 6,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1600x1200 @ 85 Hz, 105.77 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 85, 1600, 1200, 4545, 272, 16, 37, 4, 192, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1280x1024 @ 100 Hz, 107.16 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 100, 1280, 1024, 5502, 256, 32, 26, 7, 128, 15,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1800x1440 @ 64Hz, 96.15 kHz hsync  */
+ 	NULL, 64, 1800, 1440, 4347, 304, 96, 46, 1, 192, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1800x1440 @ 70Hz, 104.52 kHz hsync  */
+ 	NULL, 70, 1800, 1440, 4000, 304, 96, 46, 1, 192, 3,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 512x384 @ 78 Hz, 31.50 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 78, 512, 384, 49603, 48, 16, 16, 1, 64, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 512x384 @ 85 Hz, 34.38 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 85, 512, 384, 45454, 48, 16, 16, 1, 64, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 320x200 @ 70 Hz, 31.5 kHz hsync, 8:5 aspect ratio */
+ 	NULL, 70, 320, 200, 79440, 16, 16, 20, 4, 48, 1,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 320x240 @ 60 Hz, 31.5 kHz hsync, 4:3 aspect ratio */
+ 	NULL, 60, 320, 240, 79440, 16, 16, 16, 5, 48, 1,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 320x240 @ 72 Hz, 36.5 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 72, 320, 240, 63492, 16, 16, 16, 4, 48, 2,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 400x300 @ 56 Hz, 35.2 kHz hsync, 4:3 aspect ratio */
+ 	NULL, 56, 400, 300, 55555, 64, 16, 10, 1, 32, 1,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 400x300 @ 60 Hz, 37.8 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 400, 300, 50000, 48, 16, 11, 1, 64, 2,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 400x300 @ 72 Hz, 48.0 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 72, 400, 300, 40000, 32, 24, 11, 19, 64, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 480x300 @ 56 Hz, 35.2 kHz hsync, 8:5 aspect ratio */
+ 	NULL, 56, 480, 300, 46176, 80, 16, 10, 1, 40, 1,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 480x300 @ 60 Hz, 37.8 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 480, 300, 41858, 56, 16, 11, 1, 80, 2,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 480x300 @ 63 Hz, 39.6 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 63, 480, 300, 40000, 56, 16, 11, 1, 80, 2,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 480x300 @ 72 Hz, 48.0 kHz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 72, 480, 300, 33386, 40, 24, 11, 19, 80, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE
++	0, FB_VMODE_DOUBLE, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1920x1200 @ 60 Hz, 74.5 Khz hsync */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1920, 1200, 5177, 128, 336, 1, 38, 208, 3,
+ 	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT,
+-	FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1152x768, 60 Hz, PowerBook G4 Titanium I and II */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1152, 768, 14047, 158, 26, 29, 3, 136, 6,
+-	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT|FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     }, {
+ 	/* 1366x768, 60 Hz, 47.403 kHz hsync, WXGA 16:9 aspect ratio */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1366, 768, 13806, 120, 10, 14, 3, 32, 5,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+    }, {
+ 	/* 1280x800, 60 Hz, 47.403 kHz hsync, WXGA 16:10 aspect ratio */
+ 	NULL, 60, 1280, 800, 12048, 200, 64, 24, 1, 136, 3,
+-	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED
++	0, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, FB_MODE_IS_UNKNOWN
+     },
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/uvesafb.c b/drivers/video/uvesafb.c
+--- a/drivers/video/uvesafb.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/uvesafb.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
+ #include <linux/fb.h>
+ #include <linux/io.h>
+ #include <linux/mutex.h>
++#include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+ #include <video/edid.h>
+ #include <video/uvesafb.h>
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static int uvesafb_helper_start(void)
+ 		NULL,
+ 	};
+ 
+-	return call_usermodehelper(v86d_path, argv, envp, 1);
++	return call_usermodehelper(v86d_path, argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -560,18 +561,46 @@ static int __devinit uvesafb_vbe_getpmi(
+ {
+ 	int i, err;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	u8 *pmi_code;
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	uvesafb_reset(task);
+ 	task->t.regs.eax = 0x4f0a;
+ 	task->t.regs.ebx = 0x0;
+ 	err = uvesafb_exec(task);
+ 
+-	if ((task->t.regs.eax & 0xffff) != 0x4f || task->t.regs.es < 0xc000) {
+-		par->pmi_setpal = par->ypan = 0;
+-	} else {
++	par->pmi_setpal = par->ypan = 0;
++	if ((task->t.regs.eax & 0xffff) != 0x4f || task->t.regs.es < 0xc000)
++		return 0;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	pmi_code = module_alloc_exec((u16)task->t.regs.ecx);
++	if (pmi_code) {
++#elif !defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	if (1) {
++#endif
++
+ 		par->pmi_base = (u16 *)phys_to_virt(((u32)task->t.regs.es << 4)
+ 						+ task->t.regs.edi);
+-		par->pmi_start = (u8 *)par->pmi_base + par->pmi_base[1];
+-		par->pmi_pal = (u8 *)par->pmi_base + par->pmi_base[2];
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++		pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++		memcpy(pmi_code, par->pmi_base, (u16)task->t.regs.ecx);
++		pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#else
++		pmi_code = par->pmi_base;
++#endif
++
++		par->pmi_start = pmi_code + par->pmi_base[1];
++		par->pmi_pal = pmi_code + par->pmi_base[2];
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++		par->pmi_start = ktva_ktla(par->pmi_start);
++		par->pmi_pal = ktva_ktla(par->pmi_pal);
++#endif
++
+ 		printk(KERN_INFO "uvesafb: protected mode interface info at "
+ 				 "%04x:%04x\n",
+ 				 (u16)task->t.regs.es, (u16)task->t.regs.edi);
+diff -urNp a/drivers/video/vesafb.c b/drivers/video/vesafb.c
+--- a/drivers/video/vesafb.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/drivers/video/vesafb.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+@@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ static int   vram_remap __initdata;		/* 
+ static int   vram_total __initdata;		/* Set total amount of memory */
+ static int   pmi_setpal __read_mostly = 1;	/* pmi for palette changes ??? */
+ static int   ypan       __read_mostly;		/* 0..nothing, 1..ypan, 2..ywrap */
+-static void  (*pmi_start)(void) __read_mostly;
+-static void  (*pmi_pal)  (void) __read_mostly;
++static void  (*pmi_start)(void) __read_only;
++static void  (*pmi_pal)  (void) __read_only;
+ static int   depth      __read_mostly;
+ static int   vga_compat __read_mostly;
+ /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+@@ -224,6 +225,7 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct pl
+ 	unsigned int size_vmode;
+ 	unsigned int size_remap;
+ 	unsigned int size_total;
++	void *pmi_code = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (screen_info.orig_video_isVGA != VIDEO_TYPE_VLFB)
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+@@ -266,10 +268,6 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct pl
+ 		size_remap = size_total;
+ 	vesafb_fix.smem_len = size_remap;
+ 
+-#ifndef __i386__
+-	screen_info.vesapm_seg = 0;
+-#endif
+-
+ 	if (!request_mem_region(vesafb_fix.smem_start, size_total, "vesafb")) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING
+ 		       "vesafb: cannot reserve video memory at 0x%lx\n",
+@@ -302,9 +300,21 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct pl
+ 	printk(KERN_INFO "vesafb: mode is %dx%dx%d, linelength=%d, pages=%d\n",
+ 	       vesafb_defined.xres, vesafb_defined.yres, vesafb_defined.bits_per_pixel, vesafb_fix.line_length, screen_info.pages);
+ 
++#ifdef __i386__
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	pmi_code = module_alloc_exec(screen_info.vesapm_size);
++	if (!pmi_code)
++#elif !defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	if (0)
++#endif
++
++#endif
++	screen_info.vesapm_seg = 0;
++
+ 	if (screen_info.vesapm_seg) {
+-		printk(KERN_INFO "vesafb: protected mode interface info at %04x:%04x\n",
+-		       screen_info.vesapm_seg,screen_info.vesapm_off);
++		printk(KERN_INFO "vesafb: protected mode interface info at %04x:%04x %04x bytes\n",
++		       screen_info.vesapm_seg,screen_info.vesapm_off,screen_info.vesapm_size);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (screen_info.vesapm_seg < 0xc000)
+@@ -312,9 +322,29 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct pl
+ 
+ 	if (ypan || pmi_setpal) {
+ 		unsigned short *pmi_base;
+-		pmi_base  = (unsigned short*)phys_to_virt(((unsigned long)screen_info.vesapm_seg << 4) + screen_info.vesapm_off);
+-		pmi_start = (void*)((char*)pmi_base + pmi_base[1]);
+-		pmi_pal   = (void*)((char*)pmi_base + pmi_base[2]);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++		unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
++		pmi_base = (unsigned short*)phys_to_virt(((unsigned long)screen_info.vesapm_seg << 4) + screen_info.vesapm_off);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++		pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++		memcpy(pmi_code, pmi_base, screen_info.vesapm_size);
++#else
++		pmi_code = pmi_base;
++#endif
++
++		pmi_start = (void*)((char*)pmi_code + pmi_base[1]);
++		pmi_pal   = (void*)((char*)pmi_code + pmi_base[2]);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++		pmi_start = ktva_ktla(pmi_start);
++		pmi_pal = ktva_ktla(pmi_pal);
++		pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 		printk(KERN_INFO "vesafb: pmi: set display start = %p, set palette = %p\n",pmi_start,pmi_pal);
+ 		if (pmi_base[3]) {
+ 			printk(KERN_INFO "vesafb: pmi: ports = ");
+@@ -456,6 +486,11 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct pl
+ 	       info->node, info->fix.id);
+ 	return 0;
+ err:
++
++#if defined(__i386__) && defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	module_free_exec(NULL, pmi_code);
++#endif
++
+ 	if (info->screen_base)
+ 		iounmap(info->screen_base);
+ 	framebuffer_release(info);
+diff -urNp a/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c b/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
+--- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ static void *v9fs_vfs_follow_link(struct
+ 
+ static void v9fs_vfs_put_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd, void *p)
+ {
+-	char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
++	const char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
+ 
+ 	P9_DPRINTK(P9_DEBUG_VFS, " %s %s\n", dentry->d_name.name, s);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(s))
+diff -urNp a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig
+--- a/fs/Kconfig	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/Kconfig	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ config PROC_FS
+ 
+ config PROC_KCORE
+ 	bool "/proc/kcore support" if !ARM
+-	depends on PROC_FS && MMU
++	depends on PROC_FS && MMU && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ 
+ config PROC_VMCORE
+         bool "/proc/vmcore support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+diff -urNp a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
+--- a/fs/aio.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/aio.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx 
+ 	size += sizeof(struct io_event) * nr_events;
+ 	nr_pages = (size + PAGE_SIZE-1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 
+-	if (nr_pages < 0)
++	if (nr_pages <= 0)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	nr_events = (PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages - sizeof(struct aio_ring)) / sizeof(struct io_event);
+diff -urNp a/fs/autofs4/symlink.c b/fs/autofs4/symlink.c
+--- a/fs/autofs4/symlink.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/autofs4/symlink.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
+ static void *autofs4_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+ {
+ 	struct autofs_info *ino = autofs4_dentry_ino(dentry);
+-	nd_set_link(nd, (char *)ino->u.symlink);
++	nd_set_link(nd, ino->u.symlink);
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c
+--- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static void befs_put_link(struct dentry 
+ {
+ 	befs_inode_info *befs_ino = BEFS_I(dentry->d_inode);
+ 	if (befs_ino->i_flags & BEFS_LONG_SYMLINK) {
+-		char *p = nd_get_link(nd);
++		const char *p = nd_get_link(nd);
+ 		if (!IS_ERR(p))
+ 			kfree(p);
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/fs/binfmt_aout.c b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
+--- a/fs/binfmt_aout.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/binfmt_aout.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -124,18 +125,22 @@ static int aout_core_dump(long signr, st
+ /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
+    if we wrote the stack, but not the data area.  */
+ #ifdef __sparc__
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize + dump.u_ssize, 1);
+ 	if ((dump.u_dsize + dump.u_ssize) > limit)
+ 		dump.u_dsize = 0;
+ #else
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize + dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
+ 	if ((dump.u_dsize + dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > limit)
+ 		dump.u_dsize = 0;
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
+ #ifdef __sparc__
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize, 1);
+ 	if (dump.u_ssize > limit)
+ 		dump.u_ssize = 0;
+ #else
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize + 1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
+ 	if ((dump.u_ssize + 1) * PAGE_SIZE > limit)
+ 		dump.u_ssize = 0;
+ #endif
+@@ -291,6 +296,8 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
+ 	rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
+ 	if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
+ 		rlim = ~0;
++
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss, 1);
+ 	if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+@@ -322,6 +329,28 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
+ 
+ 	compute_creds(bprm);
+  	current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++	current->mm->pax_flags = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
++		current->mm->pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++		if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++			current->mm->pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT))
++			current->mm->pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef __sparc__
+ 	if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) {
+ 		loff_t pos = fd_offset;
+@@ -417,7 +446,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
+ 
+ 		down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+  		error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
+-				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
++				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ 				MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
+ 				fd_offset + ex.a_text);
+ 		up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urNp a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -39,10 +39,16 @@
+ #include <linux/random.h>
+ #include <linux/elf.h>
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/param.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#include <asm/desc.h>
++#endif
++
+ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs);
+ static int load_elf_library(struct file *);
+ static unsigned long elf_map(struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *,
+@@ -85,6 +91,8 @@ static struct linux_binfmt elf_format = 
+ 
+ static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+ {
++	unsigned long e = end;
++
+ 	start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start);
+ 	end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end);
+ 	if (end > start) {
+@@ -95,7 +103,7 @@ static int set_brk(unsigned long start, 
+ 		if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
+ 			return addr;
+ 	}
+-	current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end;
++	current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = e;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -352,10 +360,10 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
+ {
+ 	struct elf_phdr *elf_phdata;
+ 	struct elf_phdr *eppnt;
+-	unsigned long load_addr = 0;
++	unsigned long load_addr = 0, pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+ 	int load_addr_set = 0;
+ 	unsigned long last_bss = 0, elf_bss = 0;
+-	unsigned long error = ~0UL;
++	unsigned long error = -EINVAL;
+ 	unsigned long total_size;
+ 	int retval, i, size;
+ 
+@@ -401,6 +409,11 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
+ 		goto out_close;
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
+ 	eppnt = elf_phdata;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {
+ 		if (eppnt->p_type == PT_LOAD) {
+@@ -444,8 +457,8 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
+ 			k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr;
+ 			if (BAD_ADDR(k) ||
+ 			    eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz ||
+-			    eppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE ||
+-			    TASK_SIZE - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
++			    eppnt->p_memsz > pax_task_size ||
++			    pax_task_size - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
+ 				error = -ENOMEM;
+ 				goto out_close;
+ 			}
+@@ -499,6 +512,177 @@ out:
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++#if (defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE)
++static unsigned long pax_parse_softmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC)
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) == (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++		if (nx_enabled)
++			pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++		else
++			pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP)
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_MPROTECT)
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
++	if (randomize_va_space && (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++	return pax_flags;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++static unsigned long pax_parse_hardmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) == (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++		if (nx_enabled)
++			pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++		else
++			pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
++	if (randomize_va_space && !(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++	return pax_flags;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
++static unsigned long pax_parse_ei_pax(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) == (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++		if (nx_enabled)
++			pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++		else
++			pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && (elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_MPROTECT))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	if (randomize_va_space && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
++		pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++	return pax_flags;
++}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
++static long pax_parse_elf_flags(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex, const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
++{
++	unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	unsigned long i;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
++	pax_flags = pax_parse_ei_pax(elf_ex);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	for (i = 0UL; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++)
++		if (elf_phdata[i].p_type == PT_PAX_FLAGS) {
++			if (((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) ||
++			    ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)))
++				return -EINVAL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++			if (pax_softmode)
++				pax_flags = pax_parse_softmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
++			else
++#endif
++
++				pax_flags = pax_parse_hardmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
++			break;
++		}
++#endif
++
++	if (0 > pax_check_flags(&pax_flags))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	current->mm->pax_flags = pax_flags;
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * These are the functions used to load ELF style executables and shared
+  * libraries.  There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
+@@ -515,6 +699,11 @@ static unsigned long randomize_stack_top
+ {
+ 	unsigned int random_variable = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	if (randomize_va_space)
++		return stack_top - current->mm->delta_stack;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
+ 		!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
+ 		random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
+@@ -533,7 +722,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+  	unsigned long load_addr = 0, load_bias = 0;
+ 	int load_addr_set = 0;
+ 	char * elf_interpreter = NULL;
+-	unsigned long error;
++	unsigned long error = 0;
+ 	struct elf_phdr *elf_ppnt, *elf_phdata;
+ 	unsigned long elf_bss, elf_brk;
+ 	int elf_exec_fileno;
+@@ -545,12 +734,12 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+ 	unsigned long reloc_func_desc = 0;
+ 	struct files_struct *files;
+ 	int executable_stack = EXSTACK_DEFAULT;
+-	unsigned long def_flags = 0;
+ 	struct {
+ 		struct elfhdr elf_ex;
+ 		struct elfhdr interp_elf_ex;
+   		struct exec interp_ex;
+ 	} *loc;
++	unsigned long pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	loc = kmalloc(sizeof(*loc), GFP_KERNEL);
+ 	if (!loc) {
+@@ -736,11 +925,79 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+ 
+ 	/* OK, This is the point of no return */
+ 	current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
+-	current->mm->def_flags = def_flags;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++	current->mm->pax_flags = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
++	current->mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	current->mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	current->mm->delta_mmap = 0UL;
++	current->mm->delta_stack = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++	current->mm->def_flags = 0;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
++	if (0 > pax_parse_elf_flags(&loc->elf_ex, elf_phdata)) {
++		send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
++		goto out_free_dentry;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	pax_set_initial_flags(bprm);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
++	if (pax_set_initial_flags_func)
++		(pax_set_initial_flags_func)(bprm);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++	if ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !nx_enabled) {
++		current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
++		current->mm->def_flags |= VM_PAGEEXEC;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		current->mm->context.user_cs_base = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++		current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = TASK_SIZE-SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++		set_user_cs(current->mm->context.user_cs_base, current->mm->context.user_cs_limit, get_cpu());
++		put_cpu_no_resched();
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
++		current->mm->delta_mmap = (pax_get_random_long() & ((1UL << PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN)-1)) << PAGE_SHIFT;
++		current->mm->delta_stack = (pax_get_random_long() & ((1UL << PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN)-1)) << PAGE_SHIFT;
++	}
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Do this immediately, since STACK_TOP as used in setup_arg_pages
+ 	   may depend on the personality.  */
+ 	SET_PERSONALITY(loc->elf_ex, 0);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++		executable_stack = EXSTACK_DISABLE_X;
++	else
++#endif
++
+ 	if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack))
+ 		current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
+ 
+@@ -821,6 +1078,20 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+ #else
+ 			load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++			/* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */
++			if ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && elf_interpreter) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC64
++				load_bias = (pax_get_random_long() & ((1UL << PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN) - 1)) << (PAGE_SHIFT+1);
++#else
++				load_bias = (pax_get_random_long() & ((1UL << PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN) - 1)) << PAGE_SHIFT;
++#endif
++				load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr + load_bias);
++				elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
++			}
++#endif
++
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt,
+@@ -853,9 +1124,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+ 		 * allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
+ 		 * <= p_memsz so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
+ 		 */
+-		if (BAD_ADDR(k) || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
+-		    elf_ppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE ||
+-		    TASK_SIZE - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
++		if (k >= pax_task_size || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
++		    elf_ppnt->p_memsz > pax_task_size ||
++		    pax_task_size - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
+ 			/* set_brk can never work. Avoid overflows. */
+ 			send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
+ 			retval = -EINVAL;
+@@ -883,6 +1154,11 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+ 	start_data += load_bias;
+ 	end_data += load_bias;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		elf_brk += PAGE_SIZE + ((pax_get_random_long() & ~PAGE_MASK) << 4);
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
+ 	 * for the bss and break sections.  We must do this before
+ 	 * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind
+@@ -894,9 +1170,11 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+ 		goto out_free_dentry;
+ 	}
+ 	if (likely(elf_bss != elf_brk) && unlikely(padzero(elf_bss))) {
+-		send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
+-		retval = -EFAULT; /* Nobody gets to see this, but.. */
+-		goto out_free_dentry;
++		/*
++		 * This bss-zeroing can fail if the ELF
++		 * file specifies odd protections. So
++		 * we don't check the return value
++		 */
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (elf_interpreter) {
+@@ -1142,8 +1420,10 @@ static int dump_seek(struct file *file, 
+ 			unsigned long n = off;
+ 			if (n > PAGE_SIZE)
+ 				n = PAGE_SIZE;
+-			if (!dump_write(file, buf, n))
++			if (!dump_write(file, buf, n)) {
++				free_page((unsigned long)buf);
+ 				return 0;
++			}
+ 			off -= n;
+ 		}
+ 		free_page((unsigned long)buf);
+@@ -1155,7 +1435,7 @@ static int dump_seek(struct file *file, 
+  * Decide what to dump of a segment, part, all or none.
+  */
+ static unsigned long vma_dump_size(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+-				   unsigned long mm_flags)
++				   unsigned long mm_flags, long signr)
+ {
+ 	/* The vma can be set up to tell us the answer directly.  */
+ 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ALWAYSDUMP)
+@@ -1181,7 +1461,7 @@ static unsigned long vma_dump_size(struc
+ 	if (vma->vm_file == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	if (FILTER(MAPPED_PRIVATE))
++	if (signr == SIGKILL || FILTER(MAPPED_PRIVATE))
+ 		goto whole;
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -1267,8 +1547,11 @@ static int writenote(struct memelfnote *
+ #undef DUMP_WRITE
+ 
+ #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr)	\
++	do { \
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr), 1); \
+ 	if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \
+-		goto end_coredump;
++		goto end_coredump; \
++	} while (0);
+ #define DUMP_SEEK(off)	\
+ 	if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \
+ 		goto end_coredump;
+@@ -1985,7 +2268,7 @@ static int elf_core_dump(long signr, str
+ 		phdr.p_offset = offset;
+ 		phdr.p_vaddr = vma->vm_start;
+ 		phdr.p_paddr = 0;
+-		phdr.p_filesz = vma_dump_size(vma, mm_flags);
++		phdr.p_filesz = vma_dump_size(vma, mm_flags, signr);
+ 		phdr.p_memsz = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+ 		offset += phdr.p_filesz;
+ 		phdr.p_flags = vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PF_R : 0;
+@@ -2017,7 +2300,7 @@ static int elf_core_dump(long signr, str
+ 		unsigned long addr;
+ 		unsigned long end;
+ 
+-		end = vma->vm_start + vma_dump_size(vma, mm_flags);
++		end = vma->vm_start + vma_dump_size(vma, mm_flags, signr);
+ 
+ 		for (addr = vma->vm_start; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ 			struct page *page;
+@@ -2037,6 +2320,7 @@ static int elf_core_dump(long signr, str
+ 					flush_cache_page(vma, addr,
+ 							 page_to_pfn(page));
+ 					kaddr = kmap(page);
++					gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + PAGE_SIZE, 1);
+ 					if ((size += PAGE_SIZE) > limit ||
+ 					    !dump_write(file, kaddr,
+ 					    PAGE_SIZE)) {
+diff -urNp a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
+--- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -560,7 +560,9 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
+ 				realdatastart = (unsigned long) -ENOMEM;
+ 			printk("Unable to allocate RAM for process data, errno %d\n",
+ 					(int)-realdatastart);
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			ret = realdatastart;
+ 			goto err;
+ 		}
+@@ -582,8 +584,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
+ 		}
+ 		if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
+ 			printk("Unable to read data+bss, errno %d\n", (int)-result);
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, realdatastart, data_len + extra);
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			ret = result;
+ 			goto err;
+ 		}
+@@ -656,8 +660,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
+ 		}
+ 		if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
+ 			printk("Unable to read code+data+bss, errno %d\n",(int)-result);
++			down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len + data_len + extra +
+ 				MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long));
++			up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+ 			ret = result;
+ 			goto err;
+ 		}
+diff -urNp a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
+--- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -113,9 +113,11 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux
+ 	struct files_struct *files = NULL;
+ 
+ 	retval = -ENOEXEC;
+-	if (!enabled)
++	if (!enabled || bprm->misc)
+ 		goto _ret;
+ 
++	bprm->misc++;
++
+ 	/* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */
+ 	read_lock(&entries_lock);
+ 	fmt = check_file(bprm);
+@@ -720,7 +722,7 @@ static int bm_fill_super(struct super_bl
+ 	static struct tree_descr bm_files[] = {
+ 		[2] = {"status", &bm_status_operations, S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO},
+ 		[3] = {"register", &bm_register_operations, S_IWUSR},
+-		/* last one */ {""}
++		/* last one */ {"", NULL, 0}
+ 	};
+ 	int err = simple_fill_super(sb, 0x42494e4d, bm_files);
+ 	if (!err)
+diff -urNp a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c
+--- a/fs/buffer.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/buffer.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
+ #include <linux/bitops.h>
+ #include <linux/mpage.h>
+ #include <linux/bit_spinlock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ static int fsync_buffers_list(spinlock_t *lock, struct list_head *list);
+ 
+@@ -2188,6 +2189,7 @@ int generic_cont_expand_simple(struct in
+ 
+ 	err = -EFBIG;
+         limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size, 1);
+ 	if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) {
+ 		send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
+ 		goto out;
+diff -urNp a/fs/cifs/cifs_uniupr.h b/fs/cifs/cifs_uniupr.h
+--- a/fs/cifs/cifs_uniupr.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_uniupr.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ const struct UniCaseRange CifsUniUpperRa
+ 	{0x0490, 0x04cc, UniCaseRangeU0490},
+ 	{0x1e00, 0x1ffc, UniCaseRangeU1e00},
+ 	{0xff40, 0xff5a, UniCaseRangeUff40},
+-	{0}
++	{0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urNp a/fs/cifs/link.c b/fs/cifs/link.c
+--- a/fs/cifs/link.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/cifs/link.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ cifs_readlink(struct dentry *direntry, c
+ 
+ void cifs_put_link(struct dentry *direntry, struct nameidata *nd, void *cookie)
+ {
+-	char *p = nd_get_link(nd);
++	const char *p = nd_get_link(nd);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(p))
+ 		kfree(p);
+ }
+diff -urNp a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c
+--- a/fs/compat.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/compat.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #include <linux/poll.h>
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <linux/eventpoll.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+@@ -1293,14 +1294,12 @@ static int compat_copy_strings(int argc,
+ 			if (!kmapped_page || kpos != (pos & PAGE_MASK)) {
+ 				struct page *page;
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
+ 				ret = expand_stack_downwards(bprm->vma, pos);
+ 				if (ret < 0) {
+ 					/* We've exceed the stack rlimit. */
+ 					ret = -E2BIG;
+ 					goto out;
+ 				}
+-#endif
+ 				ret = get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos,
+ 						     1, 1, 1, &page, NULL);
+ 				if (ret <= 0) {
+@@ -1346,6 +1345,11 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
+ 	compat_uptr_t __user *envp,
+ 	struct pt_regs * regs)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct file *old_exec_file;
++	struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
++	struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
++#endif
+ 	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
+ 	struct file *file;
+ 	int retval;
+@@ -1366,6 +1370,14 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
+ 	bprm->filename = filename;
+ 	bprm->interp = filename;
+ 
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes), 1);
++	retval = -EAGAIN;
++	if (gr_handle_nproc())
++		goto out_file;
++	retval = -EACCES;
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt))
++		goto out_file;
++
+ 	retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		goto out_file;
+@@ -1399,8 +1411,36 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++	gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, (char __user * __user *)argv);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	old_acl = current->acl;
++	memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
++	get_file(file);
++	current->exec_file = file;
++#endif
++
++	gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
+ 	retval = search_binary_handler(bprm, regs);
+ 	if (retval >= 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (old_exec_file)
++			fput(old_exec_file);
++#endif
+ 		/* execve success */
+ 		security_bprm_free(bprm);
+ 		acct_update_integrals(current);
+@@ -1408,6 +1448,13 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	current->acl = old_acl;
++	memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	fput(current->exec_file);
++	current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
++#endif
++
+ out:
+ 	if (bprm->security)
+ 		security_bprm_free(bprm);
+diff -urNp a/fs/compat_ioctl.c b/fs/compat_ioctl.c
+--- a/fs/compat_ioctl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/compat_ioctl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1889,15 +1889,15 @@ struct ioctl_trans {
+ };
+ 
+ #define HANDLE_IOCTL(cmd,handler) \
+-	{ (cmd), (ioctl_trans_handler_t)(handler) },
++	{ (cmd), (ioctl_trans_handler_t)(handler), NULL },
+ 
+ /* pointer to compatible structure or no argument */
+ #define COMPATIBLE_IOCTL(cmd) \
+-	{ (cmd), do_ioctl32_pointer },
++	{ (cmd), do_ioctl32_pointer, NULL },
+ 
+ /* argument is an unsigned long integer, not a pointer */
+ #define ULONG_IOCTL(cmd) \
+-	{ (cmd), (ioctl_trans_handler_t)sys_ioctl },
++	{ (cmd), (ioctl_trans_handler_t)sys_ioctl, NULL },
+ 
+ /* ioctl should not be warned about even if it's not implemented.
+    Valid reasons to use this:
+diff -urNp a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static inline int debugfs_positive(struc
+ 
+ static int debug_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+ {
+-	static struct tree_descr debug_files[] = {{""}};
++	static struct tree_descr debug_files[] = {{"", NULL, 0}};
+ 
+ 	return simple_fill_super(sb, DEBUGFS_MAGIC, debug_files);
+ }
+diff -urNp a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
+--- a/fs/exec.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/exec.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
+ #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
+ #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+@@ -60,6 +62,11 @@
+ #include <linux/kmod.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_set_initial_flags_func);
++#endif
++
+ int core_uses_pid;
+ char core_pattern[CORENAME_MAX_SIZE] = "core";
+ int suid_dumpable = 0;
+@@ -158,18 +165,10 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct 
+ 		int write)
+ {
+ 	struct page *page;
+-	int ret;
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
+-	if (write) {
+-		ret = expand_stack_downwards(bprm->vma, pos);
+-		if (ret < 0)
+-			return NULL;
+-	}
+-#endif
+-	ret = get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos,
+-			1, write, 1, &page, NULL);
+-	if (ret <= 0)
++	if (0 > expand_stack_downwards(bprm->vma, pos))
++		return NULL;
++	if (0 >= get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos, 1, write, 1, &page, NULL))
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (write) {
+@@ -242,6 +241,11 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_b
+ 	vma->vm_start = vma->vm_end - PAGE_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC);
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
+ 	err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+ 	if (err) {
+@@ -254,6 +258,11 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_b
+ 
+ 	bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	if (randomize_va_space)
++		bprm->p ^= (pax_get_random_long() & ~15) & ~PAGE_MASK;
++#endif
++
+ 	return 0;
+ 
+ err:
+@@ -377,7 +386,7 @@ static int count(char __user * __user * 
+ 			if (!p)
+ 				break;
+ 			argv++;
+-			if(++i > max)
++			if (++i > max)
+ 				return -E2BIG;
+ 			cond_resched();
+ 		}
+@@ -517,6 +526,10 @@ static int shift_arg_pages(struct vm_are
+ 	if (vma != find_vma(mm, new_start))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	BUG_ON(pax_find_mirror_vma(vma));
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * cover the whole range: [new_start, old_end)
+ 	 */
+@@ -605,6 +618,14 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm 
+ 	bprm->exec -= stack_shift;
+ 
+ 	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
++
++	/* Move stack pages down in memory. */
++	if (stack_shift) {
++		ret = shift_arg_pages(vma, stack_shift);
++		if (ret)
++			goto out_unlock;
++	}
++
+ 	vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -618,21 +639,24 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm 
+ 		vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
+ 	vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++		vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++			vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
+ 			vm_flags);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 	BUG_ON(prev != vma);
+ 
+-	/* Move stack pages down in memory. */
+-	if (stack_shift) {
+-		ret = shift_arg_pages(vma, stack_shift);
+-		if (ret) {
+-			up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+-			return ret;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
+ 	stack_base = vma->vm_end + EXTRA_STACK_VM_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE;
+ #else
+@@ -644,7 +668,7 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm 
+ 
+ out_unlock:
+ 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+-	return 0;
++	return ret;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_arg_pages);
+ 
+@@ -663,7 +687,7 @@ struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
+ 		struct inode *inode = nd.path.dentry->d_inode;
+ 		file = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+ 		if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
+-			int err = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_EXEC);
++			err = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_EXEC);
+ 			file = ERR_PTR(err);
+ 			if (!err) {
+ 				file = nameidata_to_filp(&nd,
+@@ -1280,6 +1304,11 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
+ 	char __user *__user *envp,
+ 	struct pt_regs * regs)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct file *old_exec_file;
++	struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
++	struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
++#endif
+ 	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
+ 	struct file *file;
+ 	unsigned long env_p;
+@@ -1295,6 +1324,20 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
+ 	if (IS_ERR(file))
+ 		goto out_kfree;
+ 
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes), 1);
++
++	if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
++		allow_write_access(file);
++		fput(file);
++		return -EAGAIN;
++	}
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
++		allow_write_access(file);
++		fput(file);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++
+ 	sched_exec();
+ 
+ 	bprm->file = file;
+@@ -1336,8 +1379,38 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
+ 		goto out;
+ 	bprm->argv_len = env_p - bprm->p;
+ 
++	if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++	gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, argv);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	old_acl = current->acl;
++	memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
++	get_file(file);
++	current->exec_file = file;
++#endif
++
++	retval = gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++	if (retval < 0)
++		goto out_fail;
++
+ 	retval = search_binary_handler(bprm,regs);
+ 	if (retval >= 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++		if (old_exec_file)
++			fput(old_exec_file);
++#endif
+ 		/* execve success */
+ 		free_arg_pages(bprm);
+ 		security_bprm_free(bprm);
+@@ -1346,6 +1419,14 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
+ 		return retval;
+ 	}
+ 
++out_fail:
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	current->acl = old_acl;
++	memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++	fput(current->exec_file);
++	current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
++#endif
++
+ out:
+ 	free_arg_pages(bprm);
+ 	if (bprm->security)
+@@ -1510,6 +1591,116 @@ out:
+ 	return ispipe;
+ }
+ 
++int pax_check_flags(unsigned long *flags)
++{
++	int retval = 0;
++
++#if !defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || !defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	{
++		*flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++#endif
++
++	if ((*flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	    &&  (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		*flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	if ((*flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	    && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		*flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	if ((*flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	    && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++#endif
++
++	   )
++	{
++		*flags &= ~MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++		retval = -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_check_flags);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
++	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++	char *buffer_exec = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
++	char *buffer_fault = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
++	char *path_exec = NULL;
++	char *path_fault = NULL;
++	unsigned long start = 0UL, end = 0UL, offset = 0UL;
++
++	if (buffer_exec && buffer_fault) {
++		struct vm_area_struct *vma, *vma_exec = NULL, *vma_fault = NULL;
++
++		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		vma = mm->mmap;
++		while (vma && (!vma_exec || !vma_fault)) {
++			if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file)
++				vma_exec = vma;
++			if (vma->vm_start <= (unsigned long)pc && (unsigned long)pc < vma->vm_end)
++				vma_fault = vma;
++			vma = vma->vm_next;
++		}
++		if (vma_exec) {
++			struct path path = {vma_exec->vm_file->f_path.mnt, vma_exec->vm_file->f_path.dentry};
++			path_exec = d_path(&path, buffer_exec, PAGE_SIZE);
++			if (IS_ERR(path_exec))
++				path_exec = "<path too long>";
++		}
++		if (vma_fault) {
++			start = vma_fault->vm_start;
++			end = vma_fault->vm_end;
++			offset = vma_fault->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
++			if (vma_fault->vm_file) {
++				struct path path = {vma_fault->vm_file->f_path.mnt, vma_fault->vm_file->f_path.dentry};
++				path_fault = d_path(&path, buffer_fault, PAGE_SIZE);
++				if (IS_ERR(path_fault))
++					path_fault = "<path too long>";
++			} else
++				path_fault = "<anonymous mapping>";
++		}
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++	}
++	if (tsk->signal->curr_ip)
++		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", NIPQUAD(tsk->signal->curr_ip), path_fault, start, end, offset);
++	else
++		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
++	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
++			"PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
++			tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp);
++	free_page((unsigned long)buffer_exec);
++	free_page((unsigned long)buffer_fault);
++	pax_report_insns(pc, sp);
++	do_coredump(SIGKILL, SIGKILL, regs);
++}
++#endif
++
+ static void zap_process(struct task_struct *start)
+ {
+ 	struct task_struct *t;
+@@ -1707,6 +1898,10 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_cod
+ 	 */
+ 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
+ 
++	if (signr == SIGKILL || signr == SIGILL)
++		gr_handle_brute_attach(current);
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, binfmt->min_coredump, 1);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * lock_kernel() because format_corename() is controlled by sysctl, which
+ 	 * uses lock_kernel()
+@@ -1727,6 +1922,8 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_cod
+ 
+  	if (ispipe) {
+ 		helper_argv = argv_split(GFP_KERNEL, corename+1, &helper_argc);
++		if (!helper_argv)
++			goto fail_unlock;
+ 		/* Terminate the string before the first option */
+ 		delimit = strchr(corename, ' ');
+ 		if (delimit)
+diff -urNp a/fs/ext2/balloc.c b/fs/ext2/balloc.c
+--- a/fs/ext2/balloc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ext2/balloc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ static int ext2_has_free_blocks(struct e
+ 
+ 	free_blocks = percpu_counter_read_positive(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
+ 	root_blocks = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_r_blocks_count);
+-	if (free_blocks < root_blocks + 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
++	if (free_blocks < root_blocks + 1 && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
+ 		sbi->s_resuid != current->fsuid &&
+ 		(sbi->s_resgid == 0 || !in_group_p (sbi->s_resgid))) {
+ 		return 0;
+diff -urNp a/fs/ext3/balloc.c b/fs/ext3/balloc.c
+--- a/fs/ext3/balloc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ext3/balloc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@ static int ext3_has_free_blocks(struct e
+ 
+ 	free_blocks = percpu_counter_read_positive(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
+ 	root_blocks = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_r_blocks_count);
+-	if (free_blocks < root_blocks + 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
++	if (free_blocks < root_blocks + 1 && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
+ 		sbi->s_resuid != current->fsuid &&
+ 		(sbi->s_resgid == 0 || !in_group_p (sbi->s_resgid))) {
+ 		return 0;
+diff -urNp a/fs/ext3/namei.c b/fs/ext3/namei.c
+--- a/fs/ext3/namei.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ext3/namei.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1166,9 +1166,9 @@ static struct ext3_dir_entry_2 *do_split
+ 	u32 hash2;
+ 	struct dx_map_entry *map;
+ 	char *data1 = (*bh)->b_data, *data2;
+-	unsigned split, move, size, i;
++	unsigned split, move, size;
+ 	struct ext3_dir_entry_2 *de = NULL, *de2;
+-	int	err = 0;
++	int	i, err = 0;
+ 
+ 	bh2 = ext3_append (handle, dir, &newblock, &err);
+ 	if (!(bh2)) {
+diff -urNp a/fs/ext3/xattr.c b/fs/ext3/xattr.c
+--- a/fs/ext3/xattr.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ext3/xattr.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@
+ 		printk("\n"); \
+ 	} while (0)
+ #else
+-# define ea_idebug(f...)
+-# define ea_bdebug(f...)
++# define ea_idebug(f...) do {} while (0)
++# define ea_bdebug(f...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ static void ext3_xattr_cache_insert(struct buffer_head *);
+diff -urNp a/fs/ext4/balloc.c b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
+--- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1557,7 +1557,7 @@ static int ext4_has_free_blocks(struct e
+ 
+ 	free_blocks = percpu_counter_read_positive(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
+ 	root_blocks = ext4_r_blocks_count(sbi->s_es);
+-	if (free_blocks < root_blocks + 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
++	if (free_blocks < root_blocks + 1 && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
+ 		sbi->s_resuid != current->fsuid &&
+ 		(sbi->s_resgid == 0 || !in_group_p (sbi->s_resgid))) {
+ 		return 0;
+diff -urNp a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
+--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1168,9 +1168,9 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split
+ 	u32 hash2;
+ 	struct dx_map_entry *map;
+ 	char *data1 = (*bh)->b_data, *data2;
+-	unsigned split, move, size, i;
++	unsigned split, move, size;
+ 	struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = NULL, *de2;
+-	int	err = 0;
++	int	i, err = 0;
+ 
+ 	bh2 = ext4_append (handle, dir, &newblock, &err);
+ 	if (!(bh2)) {
+diff -urNp a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
+--- a/fs/fcntl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/fcntl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <linux/signal.h>
+ #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/poll.h>
+ #include <asm/siginfo.h>
+@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ static int locate_fd(struct files_struct
+ 	struct fdtable *fdt;
+ 
+ 	error = -EINVAL;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start, 0);
+ 	if (orig_start >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ repeat:
+ 					   fdt->max_fds, start);
+ 	
+ 	error = -EMFILE;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
+ 	if (newfd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -144,6 +147,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_dup2(unsigned int ol
+ 	struct files_struct * files = current->files;
+ 	struct fdtable *fdt;
+ 
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
++
+ 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ 	if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd)))
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+@@ -463,7 +468,8 @@ static inline int sigio_perm(struct task
+ 	return (((fown->euid == 0) ||
+ 		 (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) ||
+ 		 (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
+-		!security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig));
++		!security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig) &&
++		!gr_check_protected_task(p) && !gr_pid_is_chrooted(p));
+ }
+ 
+ static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
+diff -urNp a/fs/fuse/control.c b/fs/fuse/control.c
+--- a/fs/fuse/control.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/fuse/control.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void fuse_ctl_remove_conn(struct fuse_co
+ 
+ static int fuse_ctl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+ {
+-	struct tree_descr empty_descr = {""};
++	struct tree_descr empty_descr = {"", NULL, 0};
+ 	struct fuse_conn *fc;
+ 	int err;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
+--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ static char *read_link(struct dentry *de
+ 	return link;
+ }
+ 
+-static void free_link(char *link)
++static void free_link(const char *link)
+ {
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(link))
+ 		free_page((unsigned long) link);
+diff -urNp a/fs/hfs/inode.c b/fs/hfs/inode.c
+--- a/fs/hfs/inode.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/hfs/inode.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode,
+ 
+ 	if (S_ISDIR(main_inode->i_mode)) {
+ 		if (fd.entrylength < sizeof(struct hfs_cat_dir))
+-			/* panic? */;
++			{/* panic? */}
+ 		hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,
+ 			   sizeof(struct hfs_cat_dir));
+ 		if (rec.type != HFS_CDR_DIR ||
+@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode,
+ 				sizeof(struct hfs_cat_file));
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (fd.entrylength < sizeof(struct hfs_cat_file))
+-			/* panic? */;
++			{/* panic? */}
+ 		hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,
+ 			   sizeof(struct hfs_cat_file));
+ 		if (rec.type != HFS_CDR_FIL ||
+diff -urNp a/fs/hfsplus/inode.c b/fs/hfsplus/inode.c
+--- a/fs/hfsplus/inode.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/hfsplus/inode.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_read_inode(struct inode 
+ 		struct hfsplus_cat_folder *folder = &entry.folder;
+ 
+ 		if (fd->entrylength < sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_folder))
+-			/* panic? */;
++			{/* panic? */}
+ 		hfs_bnode_read(fd->bnode, &entry, fd->entryoffset,
+ 					sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_folder));
+ 		hfsplus_get_perms(inode, &folder->permissions, 1);
+@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_read_inode(struct inode 
+ 		struct hfsplus_cat_file *file = &entry.file;
+ 
+ 		if (fd->entrylength < sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_file))
+-			/* panic? */;
++			{/* panic? */}
+ 		hfs_bnode_read(fd->bnode, &entry, fd->entryoffset,
+ 					sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_file));
+ 
+@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_write_inode(struct inode
+ 		struct hfsplus_cat_folder *folder = &entry.folder;
+ 
+ 		if (fd.entrylength < sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_folder))
+-			/* panic? */;
++			{/* panic? */}
+ 		hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &entry, fd.entryoffset,
+ 					sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_folder));
+ 		/* simple node checks? */
+@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_write_inode(struct inode
+ 		struct hfsplus_cat_file *file = &entry.file;
+ 
+ 		if (fd.entrylength < sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_file))
+-			/* panic? */;
++			{/* panic? */}
+ 		hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &entry, fd.entryoffset,
+ 					sizeof(struct hfsplus_cat_file));
+ 		hfsplus_inode_write_fork(inode, &file->data_fork);
+diff -urNp a/fs/jffs2/debug.h b/fs/jffs2/debug.h
+--- a/fs/jffs2/debug.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/jffs2/debug.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -51,13 +51,13 @@
+ #if CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_DEBUG > 0
+ #define D1(x) x
+ #else
+-#define D1(x)
++#define D1(x) do {} while (0);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_DEBUG > 1
+ #define D2(x) x
+ #else
+-#define D2(x)
++#define D2(x) do {} while (0);
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* The prefixes of JFFS2 messages */
+@@ -113,68 +113,68 @@
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_READINODE_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_readinode(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_readinode(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_readinode(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Fragtree build debugging messages */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_FRAGTREE_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_fragtree(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_fragtree(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_fragtree(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_FRAGTREE2_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_fragtree2(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_fragtree2(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_fragtree2(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Directory entry list manilulation debugging messages */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_DENTLIST_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_dentlist(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_dentlist(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_dentlist(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Print the messages about manipulating node_refs */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_NODEREF_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_noderef(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_noderef(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_noderef(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Manipulations with the list of inodes (JFFS2 inocache) */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_INOCACHE_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_inocache(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_inocache(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_inocache(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Summary debugging messages */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_SUMMARY_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_summary(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_summary(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_summary(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* File system build messages */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_FSBUILD_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_fsbuild(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_fsbuild(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_fsbuild(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Watch the object allocations */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_MEMALLOC_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_memalloc(fmt, ...)	JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_memalloc(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_memalloc(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* Watch the XATTR subsystem */
+ #ifdef JFFS2_DBG_XATTR_MESSAGES
+ #define dbg_xattr(fmt, ...)  JFFS2_DEBUG(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+ #else
+-#define dbg_xattr(fmt, ...)
++#define dbg_xattr(fmt, ...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif 
+ 
+ /* "Sanity" checks */
+diff -urNp a/fs/jffs2/erase.c b/fs/jffs2/erase.c
+--- a/fs/jffs2/erase.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/jffs2/erase.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -425,7 +425,8 @@ static void jffs2_mark_erased_block(stru
+ 		struct jffs2_unknown_node marker = {
+ 			.magic =	cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK),
+ 			.nodetype =	cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_NODETYPE_CLEANMARKER),
+-			.totlen =	cpu_to_je32(c->cleanmarker_size)
++			.totlen =	cpu_to_je32(c->cleanmarker_size),
++			.hdr_crc =	cpu_to_je32(0)
+ 		};
+ 
+ 		jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs(c, jeb, 1);
+diff -urNp a/fs/jffs2/summary.h b/fs/jffs2/summary.h
+--- a/fs/jffs2/summary.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/jffs2/summary.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -188,18 +188,18 @@ int jffs2_sum_scan_sumnode(struct jffs2_
+ 
+ #define jffs2_sum_active() (0)
+ #define jffs2_sum_init(a) (0)
+-#define jffs2_sum_exit(a)
+-#define jffs2_sum_disable_collecting(a)
++#define jffs2_sum_exit(a) do {} while (0)
++#define jffs2_sum_disable_collecting(a) do {} while (0)
+ #define jffs2_sum_is_disabled(a) (0)
+-#define jffs2_sum_reset_collected(a)
++#define jffs2_sum_reset_collected(a) do {} while (0)
+ #define jffs2_sum_add_kvec(a,b,c,d) (0)
+-#define jffs2_sum_move_collected(a,b)
++#define jffs2_sum_move_collected(a,b) do {} while (0)
+ #define jffs2_sum_write_sumnode(a) (0)
+-#define jffs2_sum_add_padding_mem(a,b)
+-#define jffs2_sum_add_inode_mem(a,b,c)
+-#define jffs2_sum_add_dirent_mem(a,b,c)
+-#define jffs2_sum_add_xattr_mem(a,b,c)
+-#define jffs2_sum_add_xref_mem(a,b,c)
++#define jffs2_sum_add_padding_mem(a,b) do {} while (0)
++#define jffs2_sum_add_inode_mem(a,b,c) do {} while (0)
++#define jffs2_sum_add_dirent_mem(a,b,c) do {} while (0)
++#define jffs2_sum_add_xattr_mem(a,b,c) do {} while (0)
++#define jffs2_sum_add_xref_mem(a,b,c) do {} while (0)
+ #define jffs2_sum_scan_sumnode(a,b,c,d,e) (0)
+ 
+ #endif /* CONFIG_JFFS2_SUMMARY */
+diff -urNp a/fs/jffs2/wbuf.c b/fs/jffs2/wbuf.c
+--- a/fs/jffs2/wbuf.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/jffs2/wbuf.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1015,7 +1015,8 @@ static const struct jffs2_unknown_node o
+ {
+ 	.magic = constant_cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK),
+ 	.nodetype = constant_cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_NODETYPE_CLEANMARKER),
+-	.totlen = constant_cpu_to_je32(8)
++	.totlen = constant_cpu_to_je32(8),
++	.hdr_crc = constant_cpu_to_je32(0)
+ };
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
+--- a/fs/namei.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/namei.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include <linux/capability.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/fcntl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/namei.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -670,7 +671,7 @@ static __always_inline int __do_follow_l
+ 	cookie = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
+ 	error = PTR_ERR(cookie);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(cookie)) {
+-		char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
++		const char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
+ 		error = 0;
+ 		if (s)
+ 			error = __vfs_follow_link(nd, s);
+@@ -701,6 +702,13 @@ static inline int do_follow_link(struct 
+ 	err = security_inode_follow_link(path->dentry, nd);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto loop;
++
++	if (gr_handle_follow_link(path->dentry->d_parent->d_inode,
++				  path->dentry->d_inode, path->dentry, nd->path.mnt)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto loop;
++	}
++
+ 	current->link_count++;
+ 	current->total_link_count++;
+ 	nd->depth++;
+@@ -1049,11 +1057,18 @@ return_reval:
+ 				break;
+ 		}
+ return_base:
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->path.dentry, nd->path.mnt)) {
++			path_put(&nd->path);
++			return -ENOENT;
++		}
+ 		return 0;
+ out_dput:
+ 		path_put_conditional(&next, nd);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->path.dentry, nd->path.mnt))
++		err = -ENOENT;
++
+ 	path_put(&nd->path);
+ return_err:
+ 	return err;
+@@ -1698,9 +1713,17 @@ static int open_namei_create(struct name
+ 	int error;
+ 	struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(path->dentry, nd->path.dentry, nd->path.mnt, flag, mode)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out_unlock_dput;
++	}
++
+ 	if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
+ 		mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+ 	error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, path->dentry, mode, nd);
++	if (!error)
++		gr_handle_create(path->dentry, nd->path.mnt);
++out_unlock_dput:
+ 	mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
+ 	dput(nd->path.dentry);
+ 	nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
+@@ -1751,6 +1774,17 @@ int open_namei(int dfd, const char *path
+ 					 nd, flag);
+ 		if (error)
+ 			return error;
++
++		if (gr_handle_rawio(nd->path.dentry->d_inode)) {
++			error = -EPERM;
++			goto exit;
++		}
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->path.dentry, nd->path.mnt, flag)) {
++			error = -EACCES;
++			goto exit;
++		}
++
+ 		goto ok;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1800,6 +1834,23 @@ do_last:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * It already exists.
+ 	 */
++
++	if (gr_handle_rawio(path.dentry->d_inode)) {
++		mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
++		error = -EPERM;
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_open(path.dentry, nd->path.mnt, flag)) {
++		mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++	if (gr_handle_fifo(path.dentry, nd->path.mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) {
++		mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++
+ 	mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
+ 	audit_inode(pathname, path.dentry);
+ 
+@@ -1855,6 +1906,13 @@ do_link:
+ 	error = security_inode_follow_link(path.dentry, nd);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		goto exit_dput;
++
++	if (gr_handle_follow_link(path.dentry->d_parent->d_inode, path.dentry->d_inode,
++				  path.dentry, nd->path.mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto exit_dput;
++	}
++
+ 	error = __do_follow_link(&path, nd);
+ 	if (error) {
+ 		/* Does someone understand code flow here? Or it is only
+@@ -1987,6 +2045,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
+ 	if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.path.dentry->d_inode))
+ 		mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
++		if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.path.mnt, mode)) {
++			error = -EPERM;
++			goto out_free;
++		}
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt, mode)) {
++			error = -EACCES;
++			goto out_free;
++		}
++
+ 		switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ 		case 0: case S_IFREG:
+ 			error = vfs_create(nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
+@@ -2004,6 +2072,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
+ 		default:
+ 			error = -EINVAL;
+ 		}
++
++		if (!error)
++			gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.path.mnt);
++
++out_free:
+ 		dput(dentry);
+ 	}
+ 	mutex_unlock(&nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
+@@ -2061,9 +2134,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con
+ 	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out_unlock_dput;
++	}
++
+ 	if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.path.dentry->d_inode))
+ 		mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+ 	error = vfs_mkdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
++
++	if (!error)
++		gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.path.mnt);
++out_unlock_dput:
+ 	dput(dentry);
+ out_unlock:
+ 	mutex_unlock(&nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
+@@ -2145,6 +2227,8 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char
+ 	char * name;
+ 	struct dentry *dentry;
+ 	struct nameidata nd;
++	ino_t saved_ino = 0;
++	dev_t saved_dev = 0;
+ 
+ 	name = getname(pathname);
+ 	if(IS_ERR(name))
+@@ -2170,7 +2254,23 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char
+ 	error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ 	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ 		goto exit2;
++
++	if (dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
++		if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
++			saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
++			saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
++		}
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.path.mnt)) {
++			error = -EACCES;
++			goto dput_exit2;
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	error = vfs_rmdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++	if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino))
++		gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
++dput_exit2:
+ 	dput(dentry);
+ exit2:
+ 	mutex_unlock(&nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
+@@ -2230,6 +2330,8 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c
+ 	struct dentry *dentry;
+ 	struct nameidata nd;
+ 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
++	ino_t saved_ino = 0;
++	dev_t saved_dev = 0;
+ 
+ 	name = getname(pathname);
+ 	if(IS_ERR(name))
+@@ -2245,13 +2347,26 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c
+ 	dentry = lookup_hash(&nd);
+ 	error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
++		error = 0;
+ 		/* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
+ 		if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
+ 			goto slashes;
+ 		inode = dentry->d_inode;
+-		if (inode)
++		if (inode) {
++			if (inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
++				saved_ino = inode->i_ino;
++				saved_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
++			}
++
++			if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.path.mnt))
++				error = -EACCES;
++
+ 			atomic_inc(&inode->i_count);
+-		error = vfs_unlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++		}
++		if (!error)
++			error = vfs_unlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++		if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev))
++			gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
+ 	exit2:
+ 		dput(dentry);
+ 	}
+@@ -2332,7 +2447,17 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char
+ 	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt, from)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out_dput_unlock;
++	}
++
+ 	error = vfs_symlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO);
++
++	if (!error)
++		gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.path.mnt);
++
++out_dput_unlock:
+ 	dput(dentry);
+ out_unlock:
+ 	mutex_unlock(&nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
+@@ -2427,7 +2552,26 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c
+ 	error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
+ 	if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
+ 		goto out_unlock;
++
++	if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.path.dentry, old_nd.path.mnt,
++			       old_nd.path.dentry->d_inode,
++			       old_nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out_unlock_dput;
++	}
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt,
++				old_nd.path.dentry, old_nd.path.mnt, to)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out_unlock_dput;
++	}
++
+ 	error = vfs_link(old_nd.path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
++
++	if (!error)
++		gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.path.mnt);
++
++out_unlock_dput:
+ 	dput(new_dentry);
+ out_unlock:
+ 	mutex_unlock(&nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
+@@ -2653,8 +2797,16 @@ static int do_rename(int olddfd, const c
+ 	if (new_dentry == trap)
+ 		goto exit5;
+ 
+-	error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
++	error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.path.dentry, newnd.path.mnt,
++				     old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.path.mnt,
++				     newname);
++
++	if (!error)
++		error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
+ 				   new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
++	if (!error)
++		gr_handle_rename(old_dir->d_inode, newnd.path.dentry->d_inode, old_dentry, 
++				 new_dentry, oldnd.path.mnt, new_dentry->d_inode ? 1 : 0);
+ exit5:
+ 	dput(new_dentry);
+ exit4:
+diff -urNp a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
+--- a/fs/namespace.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/namespace.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/ramfs.h>
+ #include <linux/log2.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+ #include "pnode.h"
+@@ -644,6 +645,8 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn
+ 			DQUOT_OFF(sb);
+ 			retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, NULL, 0);
+ 			unlock_kernel();
++
++			gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
+ 		}
+ 		up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ 		return retval;
+@@ -667,6 +670,9 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn
+ 		security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
+ 	up_write(&namespace_sem);
+ 	release_mounts(&umount_list);
++
++	gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
++
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1438,6 +1444,11 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		goto dput_out;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt, dev_name)) {
++		retval = -EPERM;
++		goto dput_out;
++	}
++
+ 	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ 		retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
+ 				    data_page);
+@@ -1452,6 +1463,9 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
+ 				      dev_name, data_page);
+ dput_out:
+ 	path_put(&nd.path);
++
++	gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval);
++
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1681,6 +1695,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pivot_root(const cha
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	lock_kernel();
+ 
+ 	error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY,
+diff -urNp a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static int _nfs4_do_open_reclaim(struct 
+ static int nfs4_do_open_reclaim(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
+ {
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = _nfs4_do_open_reclaim(ctx, state);
+@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ static int _nfs4_open_delegation_recall(
+ 
+ int nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ static int _nfs4_open_expired(struct nfs
+ static inline int nfs4_do_open_expired(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state)
+ {
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	do {
+@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ out_err:
+ 
+ static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	struct nfs4_state *res;
+ 	int status;
+ 
+@@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ static int nfs4_do_setattr(struct inode 
+                 struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_state *state)
+ {
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(server,
+@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ static int _nfs4_server_capabilities(str
+ 
+ int nfs4_server_capabilities(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(server,
+@@ -1529,7 +1529,7 @@ static int _nfs4_lookup_root(struct nfs_
+ static int nfs4_lookup_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
+ 		struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(server,
+@@ -1618,7 +1618,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_getattr(struct nfs
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_getattr(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(server,
+@@ -1708,7 +1708,7 @@ static int nfs4_proc_lookupfh(struct nfs
+ 			      struct qstr *name, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
+ 			      struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = _nfs4_proc_lookupfh(server, dirfh, name, fhandle, fattr);
+@@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_lookup(struct inod
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct qstr *name, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
+@@ -1801,7 +1801,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_access(struct inod
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_access(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_access_entry *entry)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(inode),
+@@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_readlink(struct in
+ static int nfs4_proc_readlink(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
+ 		unsigned int pgbase, unsigned int pglen)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(inode),
+@@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_remove(struct inod
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_remove(struct inode *dir, struct qstr *name)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
+@@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_rename(struct inod
+ static int nfs4_proc_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct qstr *old_name,
+ 		struct inode *new_dir, struct qstr *new_name)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(old_dir),
+@@ -2071,7 +2071,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_link(struct inode 
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, struct qstr *name)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(inode),
+@@ -2128,7 +2128,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_symlink(struct ino
+ static int nfs4_proc_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ 		struct page *page, unsigned int len, struct iattr *sattr)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
+@@ -2181,7 +2181,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_mkdir(struct inode
+ static int nfs4_proc_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ 		struct iattr *sattr)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
+@@ -2230,7 +2230,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_readdir(struct den
+ static int nfs4_proc_readdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct rpc_cred *cred,
+                   u64 cookie, struct page *page, unsigned int count, int plus)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dentry->d_inode),
+@@ -2300,7 +2300,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_mknod(struct inode
+ static int nfs4_proc_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ 		struct iattr *sattr, dev_t rdev)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
+@@ -2329,7 +2329,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_statfs(struct nfs_
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_statfs(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs_fsstat *fsstat)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(server,
+@@ -2357,7 +2357,7 @@ static int _nfs4_do_fsinfo(struct nfs_se
+ 
+ static int nfs4_do_fsinfo(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs_fsinfo *fsinfo)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	do {
+@@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ static int _nfs4_proc_pathconf(struct nf
+ static int nfs4_proc_pathconf(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
+ 		struct nfs_pathconf *pathconf)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	do {
+@@ -2687,7 +2687,7 @@ out_free:
+ 
+ static ssize_t nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	ssize_t ret;
+ 	do {
+ 		ret = __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(inode, buf, buflen);
+@@ -2744,7 +2744,7 @@ static int __nfs4_proc_set_acl(struct in
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_set_acl(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t buflen)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(inode),
+@@ -3036,7 +3036,7 @@ out:
+ int nfs4_proc_delegreturn(struct inode *inode, struct rpc_cred *cred, const nfs4_stateid *stateid, int issync)
+ {
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 	do {
+ 		err = _nfs4_proc_delegreturn(inode, cred, stateid, issync);
+@@ -3111,7 +3111,7 @@ out:
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_getlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *request)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	do {
+@@ -3457,7 +3457,7 @@ static int _nfs4_do_setlk(struct nfs4_st
+ static int nfs4_lock_reclaim(struct nfs4_state *state, struct file_lock *request)
+ {
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	do {
+@@ -3475,7 +3475,7 @@ static int nfs4_lock_reclaim(struct nfs4
+ static int nfs4_lock_expired(struct nfs4_state *state, struct file_lock *request)
+ {
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	err = nfs4_set_lock_state(state, request);
+@@ -3536,7 +3536,7 @@ out:
+ 
+ static int nfs4_proc_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *request)
+ {
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	do {
+@@ -3586,7 +3586,7 @@ nfs4_proc_lock(struct file *filp, int cm
+ int nfs4_lock_delegation_recall(struct nfs4_state *state, struct file_lock *fl)
+ {
+ 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
+-	struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
++	struct nfs4_exception exception = {0, 0};
+ 	int err;
+ 
+ 	err = nfs4_set_lock_state(state, fl);
+diff -urNp a/fs/nfsd/export.c b/fs/nfsd/export.c
+--- a/fs/nfsd/export.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/nfsd/export.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static int secinfo_parse(char **mesg, ch
+ 		 * probably discover the problem when someone fails to
+ 		 * authenticate.
+ 		 */
+-		if (f->pseudoflavor < 0)
++		if ((s32)f->pseudoflavor < 0)
+ 			return -EINVAL;
+ 		err = get_int(mesg, &f->flags);
+ 		if (err)
+diff -urNp a/fs/nls/nls_base.c b/fs/nls/nls_base.c
+--- a/fs/nls/nls_base.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/nls/nls_base.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static const struct utf8_table utf8_tabl
+     {0xF8,  0xF0,   3*6,    0x1FFFFF,       0x10000,   /* 4 byte sequence */},
+     {0xFC,  0xF8,   4*6,    0x3FFFFFF,      0x200000,  /* 5 byte sequence */},
+     {0xFE,  0xFC,   5*6,    0x7FFFFFFF,     0x4000000, /* 6 byte sequence */},
+-    {0,						       /* end of table    */}
++    {0, 0, 0, 0, 0,				       /* end of table    */}
+ };
+ 
+ int
+diff -urNp a/fs/ntfs/file.c b/fs/ntfs/file.c
+--- a/fs/ntfs/file.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ntfs/file.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2291,6 +2291,6 @@ const struct inode_operations ntfs_file_
+ #endif /* NTFS_RW */
+ };
+ 
+-const struct file_operations ntfs_empty_file_ops = {};
++const struct file_operations ntfs_empty_file_ops;
+ 
+-const struct inode_operations ntfs_empty_inode_ops = {};
++const struct inode_operations ntfs_empty_inode_ops;
+diff -urNp a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
+--- a/fs/open.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/open.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/falloc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
+ {
+@@ -204,6 +205,9 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, l
+ 	if (length < 0)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
++	if (filp && !gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, filp->f_path.mnt))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_size = length;
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | time_attrs;
+ 	if (filp) {
+@@ -461,6 +465,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, c
+ 	if(IS_RDONLY(nd.path.dentry->d_inode))
+ 		res = -EROFS;
+ 
++	if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt, mode))
++		res = -EACCES;
++
+ out_path_release:
+ 	path_put(&nd.path);
+ out:
+@@ -490,6 +497,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __u
+ 	if (error)
+ 		goto dput_and_out;
+ 
++	gr_log_chdir(nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt);
++
+ 	set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &nd.path);
+ 
+ dput_and_out:
+@@ -516,6 +525,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int 
+ 		goto out_putf;
+ 
+ 	error = file_permission(file, MAY_EXEC);
++
++	if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt))
++		error = -EPERM;
++
++	if (!error)
++		gr_log_chdir(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt);
++
+ 	if (!error)
+ 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path);
+ out_putf:
+@@ -541,8 +557,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ 		goto dput_and_out;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt))
++		goto dput_and_out;
++
+ 	set_fs_root(current->fs, &nd.path);
+ 	set_fs_altroot();
++
++	gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
++
++	gr_handle_chroot_chdir(&nd.path);
++
+ 	error = 0;
+ dput_and_out:
+ 	path_put(&nd.path);
+@@ -573,9 +597,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int 
+ 	err = -EPERM;
+ 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ 		goto out_putf;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, mode)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto out_putf;
++	}
++
+ 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
+ 		mode = inode->i_mode;
++
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, mode)) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
++		goto out_putf;
++	}
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
+ 	err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+@@ -608,9 +645,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmodat(int dfd, co
+ 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ 		goto dput_and_out;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt, mode)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto dput_and_out;
++	};
++
+ 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
+ 		mode = inode->i_mode;
++
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt, mode)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
++		goto dput_and_out;
++	}
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
+ 	error = notify_change(nd.path.dentry, &newattrs);
+@@ -627,7 +676,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chmod(const char __u
+ 	return sys_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
+ }
+ 
+-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
++static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+ {
+ 	struct inode * inode;
+ 	int error;
+@@ -644,6 +693,12 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry * 
+ 	error = -EPERM;
+ 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ 		goto out;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	newattrs.ia_valid =  ATTR_CTIME;
+ 	if (user != (uid_t) -1) {
+ 		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_UID;
+@@ -671,7 +726,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chown(const char __u
+ 	error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		goto out;
+-	error = chown_common(nd.path.dentry, user, group);
++	error = chown_common(nd.path.dentry, user, group, nd.path.mnt);
+ 	path_put(&nd.path);
+ out:
+ 	return error;
+@@ -691,7 +746,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchownat(int dfd, co
+ 	error = __user_walk_fd(dfd, filename, follow, &nd);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		goto out;
+-	error = chown_common(nd.path.dentry, user, group);
++	error = chown_common(nd.path.dentry, user, group, nd.path.mnt);
+ 	path_put(&nd.path);
+ out:
+ 	return error;
+@@ -705,7 +760,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lchown(const char __
+ 	error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		goto out;
+-	error = chown_common(nd.path.dentry, user, group);
++	error = chown_common(nd.path.dentry, user, group, nd.path.mnt);
+ 	path_put(&nd.path);
+ out:
+ 	return error;
+@@ -724,7 +779,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int 
+ 
+ 	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ 	audit_inode(NULL, dentry);
+-	error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
++	error = chown_common(dentry, user, group, file->f_path.mnt);
+ 	fput(file);
+ out:
+ 	return error;
+@@ -948,6 +1003,7 @@ repeat:
+ 	 * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test
+ 	 * will limit the total number of files that can be opened.
+ 	 */
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd, 0);
+ 	if (fd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/fs/partitions/efi.c b/fs/partitions/efi.c
+--- a/fs/partitions/efi.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/partitions/efi.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
+ #ifdef EFI_DEBUG
+ #define Dprintk(x...) printk(KERN_DEBUG x)
+ #else
+-#define Dprintk(x...)
++#define Dprintk(x...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* This allows a kernel command line option 'gpt' to override
+diff -urNp a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
+--- a/fs/pipe.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/pipe.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ void free_pipe_info(struct inode *inode)
+ 	inode->i_pipe = NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-static struct vfsmount *pipe_mnt __read_mostly;
++struct vfsmount *pipe_mnt __read_mostly;
+ static int pipefs_delete_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
+ {
+ 	/*
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
+--- a/fs/proc/array.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/array.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -308,6 +308,21 @@ static inline void task_context_switch_c
+ 			p->nivcsw);
+ }
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++static inline void task_pax(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
++{
++	if (p->mm)
++		seq_printf(m, "PaX:\t%c%c%c%c%c\n",
++			   p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC ? 'P' : 'p',
++			   p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP ? 'E' : 'e',
++			   p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT ? 'M' : 'm',
++			   p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP ? 'R' : 'r',
++			   p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 'S' : 's');
++	else
++		seq_printf(m, "PaX:\t-----\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
+ 			struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
+ {
+@@ -327,6 +342,11 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, 
+ 	task_show_regs(m, task);
+ #endif
+ 	task_context_switch_counts(m, task);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++	task_pax(m, task);
++#endif
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -389,6 +409,12 @@ static cputime_t task_gtime(struct task_
+ 	return p->gtime;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS(_mm) (_mm != NULL && _mm != current->mm && \
++			     (_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
++			      _mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++#endif
++
+ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
+ 			struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task, int whole)
+ {
+@@ -481,6 +507,19 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file 
+ 		gtime = task_gtime(task);
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm)) {
++		eip = 0;
++		esp = 0;
++		wchan = 0;
++	}
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	wchan = 0;
++	eip =0;
++	esp =0;
++#endif
++
+ 	/* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */
+ 	/* to make it look like a "normal" Unix priority/nice value  */
+ 	priority = task_prio(task);
+@@ -521,9 +560,15 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file 
+ 		vsize,
+ 		mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0,
+ 		rsslim,
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++		PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 1 : (mm ? mm->start_code : 0),
++		PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 1 : (mm ? mm->end_code : 0),
++		PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_stack : 0),
++#else
+ 		mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
+ 		mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+ 		mm ? mm->start_stack : 0,
++#endif
+ 		esp,
+ 		eip,
+ 		/* The signal information here is obsolete.
+@@ -576,3 +621,10 @@ int proc_pid_statm(struct seq_file *m, s
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
++{
++	return sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
++}
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
+--- a/fs/proc/base.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/base.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
+ #include <linux/oom.h>
+ #include <linux/elf.h>
+ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
+ #include "internal.h"
+ 
+ /* NOTE:
+@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs
+ 	return count;
+ }
+ 
+-int maps_protect;
++int maps_protect = 1;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(maps_protect);
+ 
+ static struct fs_struct *get_fs_struct(struct task_struct *task)
+@@ -219,7 +221,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *
+ 	(task->parent == current && \
+ 	(task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && \
+ 	 (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) && \
+-	 security_ptrace(current,task) == 0))
++	 security_ptrace(current,task) == 0 && !gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task)))
+ 
+ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
+ {
+@@ -284,9 +286,9 @@ static int proc_pid_auxv(struct task_str
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ 	if (mm) {
+ 		unsigned int nwords = 0;
+-		do
++		do {
+ 			nwords += 2;
+-		while (mm->saved_auxv[nwords - 2] != 0); /* AT_NULL */
++		} while (mm->saved_auxv[nwords - 2] != 0); /* AT_NULL */
+ 		res = nwords * sizeof(mm->saved_auxv[0]);
+ 		if (res > PAGE_SIZE)
+ 			res = PAGE_SIZE;
+@@ -734,7 +736,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * fi
+ 	if (!task)
+ 		goto out_no_task;
+ 
+-	if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
++	if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task) || gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task))
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
+@@ -804,7 +806,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * f
+ 	if (!task)
+ 		goto out_no_task;
+ 
+-	if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
++	if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task) || gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task))
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	copied = -ENOMEM;
+@@ -1307,7 +1309,11 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode
+ 	inode->i_gid = 0;
+ 	if (task_dumpable(task)) {
+ 		inode->i_uid = task->euid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++		inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ 		inode->i_gid = task->egid;
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
+ 
+@@ -1323,17 +1329,45 @@ static int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *
+ {
+ 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ 	struct task_struct *task;
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	struct task_struct *tmp = current;
++#endif
++
+ 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
+ 
+ 	rcu_read_lock();
+ 	stat->uid = 0;
+ 	stat->gid = 0;
+ 	task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
+-	if (task) {
++
++	if (task && (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task) || gr_check_hidden_task(task))) {
++		rcu_read_unlock();
++		return -ENOENT;
++	}
++
++
++	if (task
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	    && (!tmp->uid || (tmp->uid == task->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	    || in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++	    )
++#endif
++	) {
+ 		if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++		    (inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR)) ||
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++		    (inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) ||
++#endif
+ 		    task_dumpable(task)) {
+ 			stat->uid = task->euid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++			stat->gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ 			stat->gid = task->egid;
++#endif
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	rcu_read_unlock();
+@@ -1361,11 +1395,21 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry 
+ {
+ 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ 	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
++
+ 	if (task) {
+ 		if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++		    (inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR)) ||
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++		    (inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) ||
++#endif
+ 		    task_dumpable(task)) {
+ 			inode->i_uid = task->euid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++			inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ 			inode->i_gid = task->egid;
++#endif
+ 		} else {
+ 			inode->i_uid = 0;
+ 			inode->i_gid = 0;
+@@ -1736,12 +1780,22 @@ static int proc_fd_permission(struct ino
+ 				struct nameidata *nd)
+ {
+ 	int rv;
++	struct task_struct *task;
+ 
+ 	rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
+-	if (rv == 0)
+-		return 0;
++
+ 	if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
+ 		rv = 0;
++
++	task = get_proc_task(inode);
++	if (task == NULL)
++		return rv;
++
++	if (gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task))
++		rv = -EACCES;
++
++	put_task_struct(task);
++
+ 	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1852,6 +1906,9 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup
+ 	if (!task)
+ 		goto out_no_task;
+ 
++	if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task) || gr_check_hidden_task(task))
++		goto out;
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Yes, it does not scale. And it should not. Don't add
+ 	 * new entries into /proc/<tgid>/ without very good reasons.
+@@ -1896,6 +1953,9 @@ static int proc_pident_readdir(struct fi
+ 	if (!task)
+ 		goto out_no_task;
+ 
++	if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task) || gr_check_hidden_task(task))
++		goto out;
++
+ 	ret = 0;
+ 	i = filp->f_pos;
+ 	switch (i) {
+@@ -2258,6 +2318,9 @@ static struct dentry *proc_base_lookup(s
+ 	if (p > last)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task) || gr_check_hidden_task(task))
++		goto out;
++
+ 	error = proc_base_instantiate(dir, dentry, task, p);
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -2369,6 +2432,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
+ 	INF("io",	S_IRUGO, pid_io_accounting),
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	INF("ipaddr",	  S_IRUSR, pid_ipaddr),
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file * filp,
+@@ -2498,7 +2564,14 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pid_instantia
+ 	if (!inode)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP;
++#else
+ 	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
++#endif
+ 	inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
+ 	inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
+ 	inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
+@@ -2540,7 +2613,11 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct in
+ 	if (!task)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (gr_check_hidden_task(task))
++		goto out_put_task;
++
+ 	result = proc_pid_instantiate(dir, dentry, task, NULL);
++out_put_task:
+ 	put_task_struct(task);
+ out:
+ 	return result;
+@@ -2605,6 +2682,9 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ {
+ 	unsigned int nr = filp->f_pos - FIRST_PROCESS_ENTRY;
+ 	struct task_struct *reaper = get_proc_task(filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	struct task_struct *tmp = current;
++#endif
+ 	struct tgid_iter iter;
+ 	struct pid_namespace *ns;
+ 
+@@ -2623,6 +2703,17 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ 	for (iter = next_tgid(ns, iter);
+ 	     iter.task;
+ 	     iter.tgid += 1, iter = next_tgid(ns, iter)) {
++		if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(iter.task) || gr_check_hidden_task(iter.task)
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++		    || (tmp->uid && (iter.task->uid != tmp->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++			&& !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++			)
++#endif
++		)
++			continue;
++
+ 		filp->f_pos = iter.tgid + TGID_OFFSET;
+ 		if (proc_pid_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, iter) < 0) {
+ 			put_task_struct(iter.task);
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
+--- a/fs/proc/inode.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/inode.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -406,7 +406,11 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct supe
+ 			if (de->mode) {
+ 				inode->i_mode = de->mode;
+ 				inode->i_uid = de->uid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++				inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ 				inode->i_gid = de->gid;
++#endif
+ 			}
+ 			if (de->size)
+ 				inode->i_size = de->size;
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
+--- a/fs/proc/internal.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/internal.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ extern int proc_pid_status(struct seq_fi
+ 				struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task);
+ extern int proc_pid_statm(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
+ 				struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++extern int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer);
++#endif
+ extern loff_t mem_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig);
+ 
+ extern const struct file_operations proc_maps_operations;
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/proc_misc.c b/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
+--- a/fs/proc/proc_misc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/proc_misc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -822,6 +822,8 @@ void create_seq_entry(char *name, mode_t
+ 
+ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ {
++	int gr_mode = 0;
++
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char *name;
+ 		int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);
+@@ -837,13 +839,24 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ 		{"stram",	stram_read_proc},
+ #endif
+ 		{"filesystems",	filesystems_read_proc},
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ 		{"cmdline",	cmdline_read_proc},
++#endif
+ 		{"execdomains",	execdomains_read_proc},
+ 		{NULL,}
+ 	};
+ 	for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
+ 		create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	gr_mode = S_IRUSR;
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL);
++#endif
++
+ 	proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
+ 
+ 	/* And now for trickier ones */
+@@ -856,7 +869,11 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 	create_seq_entry("locks", 0, &proc_locks_operations);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	create_seq_entry("devices", gr_mode, &proc_devinfo_operations);
++#else
+ 	create_seq_entry("devices", 0, &proc_devinfo_operations);
++#endif
+ 	create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+ 	create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
+@@ -864,7 +881,11 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ 	create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations);
+ 	create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SLABINFO
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKRENSEC_PROC_ADD
++	create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
++#else
+ 	create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK
+ 	create_seq_entry("slab_allocators", 0 ,&proc_slabstats_operations);
+ #endif
+@@ -882,7 +903,7 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
+ 	create_seq_entry("schedstat", 0, &proc_schedstat_operations);
+ #endif
+-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_KCORE
++#if defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD)
+ 	proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
+ 	if (proc_root_kcore) {
+ 		proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/proc_net.c b/fs/proc/proc_net.c
+--- a/fs/proc/proc_net.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/proc_net.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ static struct net *get_proc_task_net(str
+ 	struct nsproxy *ns;
+ 	struct net *net = NULL;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	if (current->fsuid)
++		return net;
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	if (current->fsuid && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID))
++		return net;
++#endif
++
+ 	rcu_read_lock();
+ 	task = pid_task(proc_pid(dir), PIDTYPE_PID);
+ 	if (task != NULL) {
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include "internal.h"
+ 
++extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const int op);
++
+ static struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations;
+ static const struct file_operations proc_sys_file_operations;
+ static const struct inode_operations proc_sys_inode_operations;
+@@ -151,6 +153,9 @@ static struct dentry *proc_sys_lookup(st
+ 	if (!table)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_sysctl(table, 001))
++		goto out;
++
+ 	err = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ 	inode = proc_sys_make_inode(dir, table);
+ 	if (!inode)
+@@ -360,6 +365,9 @@ static int proc_sys_readdir(struct file 
+ 			if (pos < filp->f_pos)
+ 				continue;
+ 
++			if (gr_handle_sysctl(table, 0))
++				continue;
++
+ 			if (proc_sys_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, table) < 0)
+ 				goto out;
+ 			filp->f_pos = pos + 1;
+@@ -422,6 +430,30 @@ out:
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++/* Eric Biederman is to blame */
++static int proc_sys_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
++{
++	int error = 0;
++	struct ctl_table_header *head;
++	struct ctl_table *table;
++
++	table = do_proc_sys_lookup(dentry->d_parent, &dentry->d_name, &head);
++	/* Has the sysctl entry disappeared on us? */
++	if (!table)
++		goto out;
++
++	if (gr_handle_sysctl(table, 001)) {
++		error = -ENOENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++out:
++	sysctl_head_finish(head);
++
++	generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
++
++	return error;
++}
+ static int proc_sys_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+ {
+ 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+@@ -450,6 +482,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations pro
+ 	.lookup		= proc_sys_lookup,
+ 	.permission	= proc_sys_permission,
+ 	.setattr	= proc_sys_setattr,
++	.getattr	= proc_sys_getattr,
+ };
+ 
+ static int proc_sys_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
+--- a/fs/proc/root.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/root.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -137,7 +137,15 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE
+ 	proc_device_tree_init();
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", NULL);
++#endif
+ 	proc_sys_init();
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -48,15 +48,26 @@ void task_mem(struct seq_file *m, struct
+ 		"VmStk:\t%8lu kB\n"
+ 		"VmExe:\t%8lu kB\n"
+ 		"VmLib:\t%8lu kB\n"
+-		"VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n",
+-		hiwater_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
++		"VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n"
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++		"CsBase:\t%8lx\nCsLim:\t%8lx\n"
++#endif
++
++		,hiwater_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		(total_vm - mm->reserved_vm) << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		mm->locked_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		hiwater_rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		total_rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		data << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
+ 		mm->stack_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), text, lib,
+-		(PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10);
++		(PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++		, mm->context.user_cs_base, mm->context.user_cs_limit
++#endif
++
++	);
+ }
+ 
+ unsigned long task_vsize(struct mm_struct *mm)
+@@ -234,6 +245,12 @@ static int do_maps_open(struct inode *in
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS(_mm) (_mm != NULL && _mm != current->mm && \
++			     (_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
++			      _mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++#endif
++
+ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+ {
+ 	struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
+@@ -256,13 +273,22 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, 
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	seq_printf(m, "%08lx-%08lx %c%c%c%c %08lx %02x:%02x %lu %n",
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++			PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0UL : vma->vm_start,
++			PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0UL : vma->vm_end,
++#else
+ 			vma->vm_start,
+ 			vma->vm_end,
++#endif
+ 			flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-',
+ 			flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
+ 			flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',
+ 			flags & VM_MAYSHARE ? 's' : 'p',
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++			PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0UL : vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT,
++#else
+ 			vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT,
++#endif
+ 			MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), ino, &len);
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -276,11 +302,11 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, 
+ 		const char *name = arch_vma_name(vma);
+ 		if (!name) {
+ 			if (mm) {
+-				if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk &&
+-						vma->vm_end >= mm->brk) {
++				if (vma->vm_start <= mm->brk && vma->vm_end >= mm->start_brk) {
+ 					name = "[heap]";
+-				} else if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
+-					   vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {
++				} else if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN | VM_GROWSUP)) ||
++					   (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
++					    vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack)) {
+ 					name = "[stack]";
+ 				}
+ 			} else {
+@@ -404,10 +430,17 @@ static int show_smap(struct seq_file *m,
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	memset(&mss, 0, sizeof mss);
+-	mss.vma = vma;
+-	if (vma->vm_mm && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
+-		walk_page_range(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
+-				&smaps_walk, &mss);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	if (!PAX_RAND_FLAGS(vma->vm_mm)) {
++#endif
++		mss.vma = vma;
++		if (vma->vm_mm && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
++			walk_page_range(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
++					&smaps_walk, &mss);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	}
++#endif
+ 
+ 	ret = show_map(m, v);
+ 	if (ret)
+@@ -422,7 +455,11 @@ static int show_smap(struct seq_file *m,
+ 		   "Private_Clean:  %8lu kB\n"
+ 		   "Private_Dirty:  %8lu kB\n"
+ 		   "Referenced:     %8lu kB\n",
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++		   PAX_RAND_FLAGS(vma->vm_mm) ? 0UL : (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >> 10,
++#else
+ 		   (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >> 10,
++#endif
+ 		   mss.resident >> 10,
+ 		   (unsigned long)(mss.pss >> (10 + PSS_SHIFT)),
+ 		   mss.shared_clean  >> 10,
+diff -urNp a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c
+--- a/fs/readdir.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/readdir.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -67,6 +69,7 @@ struct old_linux_dirent {
+ 
+ struct readdir_callback {
+ 	struct old_linux_dirent __user * dirent;
++	struct file * file;
+ 	int result;
+ };
+ 
+@@ -82,6 +85,10 @@ static int fillonedir(void * __buf, cons
+ 	d_ino = ino;
+ 	if (sizeof(d_ino) < sizeof(ino) && d_ino != ino)
+ 		return -EOVERFLOW;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	buf->result++;
+ 	dirent = buf->dirent;
+ 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dirent,
+@@ -113,6 +120,7 @@ asmlinkage long old_readdir(unsigned int
+ 
+ 	buf.result = 0;
+ 	buf.dirent = dirent;
++	buf.file = file;
+ 
+ 	error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf);
+ 	if (error >= 0)
+@@ -139,6 +147,7 @@ struct linux_dirent {
+ struct getdents_callback {
+ 	struct linux_dirent __user * current_dir;
+ 	struct linux_dirent __user * previous;
++	struct file * file;
+ 	int count;
+ 	int error;
+ };
+@@ -157,6 +166,10 @@ static int filldir(void * __buf, const c
+ 	d_ino = ino;
+ 	if (sizeof(d_ino) < sizeof(ino) && d_ino != ino)
+ 		return -EOVERFLOW;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	dirent = buf->previous;
+ 	if (dirent) {
+ 		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
+@@ -203,6 +216,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents(unsigned in
+ 	buf.previous = NULL;
+ 	buf.count = count;
+ 	buf.error = 0;
++	buf.file = file;
+ 
+ 	error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir, &buf);
+ 	if (error < 0)
+@@ -225,6 +239,7 @@ out:
+ struct getdents_callback64 {
+ 	struct linux_dirent64 __user * current_dir;
+ 	struct linux_dirent64 __user * previous;
++	struct file *file;
+ 	int count;
+ 	int error;
+ };
+@@ -239,6 +254,10 @@ static int filldir64(void * __buf, const
+ 	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */
+ 	if (reclen > buf->count)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	dirent = buf->previous;
+ 	if (dirent) {
+ 		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
+@@ -285,6 +304,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents64(unsigned 
+ 
+ 	buf.current_dir = dirent;
+ 	buf.previous = NULL;
++	buf.file = file;
+ 	buf.count = count;
+ 	buf.error = 0;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/fs/smbfs/symlink.c b/fs/smbfs/symlink.c
+--- a/fs/smbfs/symlink.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/smbfs/symlink.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static void *smb_follow_link(struct dent
+ 
+ static void smb_put_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd, void *p)
+ {
+-	char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
++	const char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(s))
+ 		__putname(s);
+ }
+diff -urNp a/fs/sysfs/symlink.c b/fs/sysfs/symlink.c
+--- a/fs/sysfs/symlink.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/sysfs/symlink.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void *sysfs_follow_link(struct de
+ 
+ static void sysfs_put_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd, void *cookie)
+ {
+-	char *page = nd_get_link(nd);
++	const char *page = nd_get_link(nd);
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(page))
+ 		free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ }
+diff -urNp a/fs/udf/balloc.c b/fs/udf/balloc.c
+--- a/fs/udf/balloc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/udf/balloc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -170,9 +170,7 @@ static void udf_bitmap_free_blocks(struc
+ 	unsigned long overflow;
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
+-	if (bloc.logicalBlockNum < 0 ||
+-	    (bloc.logicalBlockNum + count) >
+-		sbi->s_partmaps[bloc.partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) {
++	if (bloc.logicalBlockNum + count > sbi->s_partmaps[bloc.partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) {
+ 		udf_debug("%d < %d || %d + %d > %d\n",
+ 			  bloc.logicalBlockNum, 0, bloc.logicalBlockNum, count,
+ 			  sbi->s_partmaps[bloc.partitionReferenceNum].
+@@ -240,7 +238,7 @@ static int udf_bitmap_prealloc_blocks(st
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
+ 	part_len = sbi->s_partmaps[partition].s_partition_len;
+-	if (first_block < 0 || first_block >= part_len)
++	if (first_block >= part_len)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	if (first_block + block_count > part_len)
+@@ -301,7 +299,7 @@ static int udf_bitmap_new_block(struct s
+ 	mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
+ 
+ repeat:
+-	if (goal < 0 || goal >= sbi->s_partmaps[partition].s_partition_len)
++	if (goal >= sbi->s_partmaps[partition].s_partition_len)
+ 		goal = 0;
+ 
+ 	nr_groups = bitmap->s_nr_groups;
+@@ -439,9 +437,7 @@ static void udf_table_free_blocks(struct
+ 	struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
+-	if (bloc.logicalBlockNum < 0 ||
+-	    (bloc.logicalBlockNum + count) >
+-		sbi->s_partmaps[bloc.partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) {
++	if (bloc.logicalBlockNum + count > sbi->s_partmaps[bloc.partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) {
+ 		udf_debug("%d < %d || %d + %d > %d\n",
+ 			  bloc.logicalBlockNum, 0, bloc.logicalBlockNum, count,
+ 			  sbi->s_partmaps[bloc.partitionReferenceNum].
+@@ -676,8 +672,7 @@ static int udf_table_prealloc_blocks(str
+ 	int8_t etype = -1;
+ 	struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
+ 
+-	if (first_block < 0 ||
+-		first_block >= sbi->s_partmaps[partition].s_partition_len)
++	if (first_block >= sbi->s_partmaps[partition].s_partition_len)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	iinfo = UDF_I(table);
+@@ -755,7 +750,7 @@ static int udf_table_new_block(struct su
+ 		return newblock;
+ 
+ 	mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
+-	if (goal < 0 || goal >= sbi->s_partmaps[partition].s_partition_len)
++	if (goal >= sbi->s_partmaps[partition].s_partition_len)
+ 		goal = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* We search for the closest matching block to goal. If we find
+diff -urNp a/fs/udf/inode.c b/fs/udf/inode.c
+--- a/fs/udf/inode.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/udf/inode.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -323,9 +323,6 @@ static int udf_get_block(struct inode *i
+ 
+ 	lock_kernel();
+ 
+-	if (block < 0)
+-		goto abort_negative;
+-
+ 	iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
+ 	if (block == iinfo->i_next_alloc_block + 1) {
+ 		iinfo->i_next_alloc_block++;
+@@ -347,10 +344,6 @@ static int udf_get_block(struct inode *i
+ abort:
+ 	unlock_kernel();
+ 	return err;
+-
+-abort_negative:
+-	udf_warning(inode->i_sb, "udf_get_block", "block < 0");
+-	goto abort;
+ }
+ 
+ static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, long block,
+diff -urNp a/fs/ufs/inode.c b/fs/ufs/inode.c
+--- a/fs/ufs/inode.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/ufs/inode.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -56,9 +56,7 @@ static int ufs_block_to_path(struct inod
+ 
+ 
+ 	UFSD("ptrs=uspi->s_apb = %d,double_blocks=%ld \n",ptrs,double_blocks);
+-	if (i_block < 0) {
+-		ufs_warning(inode->i_sb, "ufs_block_to_path", "block < 0");
+-	} else if (i_block < direct_blocks) {
++	if (i_block < direct_blocks) {
+ 		offsets[n++] = i_block;
+ 	} else if ((i_block -= direct_blocks) < indirect_blocks) {
+ 		offsets[n++] = UFS_IND_BLOCK;
+@@ -440,8 +438,6 @@ int ufs_getfrag_block(struct inode *inod
+ 	lock_kernel();
+ 
+ 	UFSD("ENTER, ino %lu, fragment %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)fragment);
+-	if (fragment < 0)
+-		goto abort_negative;
+ 	if (fragment >
+ 	    ((UFS_NDADDR + uspi->s_apb + uspi->s_2apb + uspi->s_3apb)
+ 	     << uspi->s_fpbshift))
+@@ -504,10 +500,6 @@ abort:
+ 	unlock_kernel();
+ 	return err;
+ 
+-abort_negative:
+-	ufs_warning(sb, "ufs_get_block", "block < 0");
+-	goto abort;
+-
+ abort_too_big:
+ 	ufs_warning(sb, "ufs_get_block", "block > big");
+ 	goto abort;
+diff -urNp a/fs/utimes.c b/fs/utimes.c
+--- a/fs/utimes.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/utimes.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
+ #include <linux/stat.h>
+ #include <linux/utime.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+ 
+@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ long do_utimes(int dfd, char __user *fil
+ 	int error;
+ 	struct nameidata nd;
+ 	struct dentry *dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt;
+ 	struct inode *inode;
+ 	struct iattr newattrs;
+ 	struct file *f = NULL;
+@@ -84,12 +86,14 @@ long do_utimes(int dfd, char __user *fil
+ 		if (!f)
+ 			goto out;
+ 		dentry = f->f_path.dentry;
++		mnt = f->f_path.mnt;
+ 	} else {
+ 		error = __user_walk_fd(dfd, filename, (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd);
+ 		if (error)
+ 			goto out;
+ 
+ 		dentry = nd.path.dentry;
++		mnt = nd.path.mnt;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	inode = dentry->d_inode;
+@@ -144,6 +148,12 @@ long do_utimes(int dfd, char __user *fil
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(dentry, mnt)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto dput_and_out;
++	}
++
+ 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ 	error = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+ 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+diff -urNp a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
+--- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ xfs_vn_put_link(
+ 	struct nameidata *nd,
+ 	void		*p)
+ {
+-	char		*s = nd_get_link(nd);
++	const char	*s = nd_get_link(nd);
+ 
+ 	if (!IS_ERR(s))
+ 		kfree(s);
+diff -urNp a/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap.c
+--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_bmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ xfs_bmap_validate_ret(
+ 	int			nmap,
+ 	int			ret_nmap);
+ #else
+-#define	xfs_bmap_validate_ret(bno,len,flags,mval,onmap,nmap)
++#define	xfs_bmap_validate_ret(bno,len,flags,mval,onmap,nmap) do {} while (0)
+ #endif /* DEBUG */
+ 
+ #if defined(XFS_RW_TRACE)
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
+--- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,861 @@
++#
++# grecurity configuration
++#
++
++menu "Grsecurity"
++
++config GRKERNSEC
++	bool "Grsecurity"
++	select CRYPTO
++	select CRYPTO_SHA256
++	select SECURITY
++	select SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features
++	  that will enhance the security of your system.  It is highly
++	  recommended that you say Y here and read through the help
++	  for each option so that you fully understand the features and
++	  can evaluate their usefulness for your machine.
++
++choice
++	prompt "Security Level"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC
++	default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
++
++config GRKERNSEC_LOW
++	bool "Low"
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
++
++	help
++	  If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will
++	  be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number
++	  of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any
++	  conflicts with the additional security measures.  If you run a lot
++	  of unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher
++	  security levels, you should say Y here.  With this option, the
++	  following features are enabled:
++
++	  - Linking restrictions
++	  - FIFO restrictions
++	  - Enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC on execve
++	  - Restricted dmesg
++	  - Enforced chdir("/") on chroot
++	  - Runtime module disabling
++
++config GRKERNSEC_MEDIUM
++	bool "Medium"
++	select PAX
++	select PAX_EI_PAX
++	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
++	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	select PAX_ASLR
++	select PAX_RANDMMAP
++
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included
++	  in the low additional security level will be enabled.  These
++	  features provide even more security to your system, though in rare
++	  cases they may be incompatible with very old or poorly written
++	  software.  If you enable this option, make sure that your auth
++	  service (identd) is running as gid 1001.  With this option, 
++	  the following features (in addition to those provided in the 
++	  low additional security level) will be enabled:
++
++	  - Failed fork logging
++	  - Time change logging
++	  - Signal logging
++	  - Deny mounts in chroot
++	  - Deny double chrooting
++	  - Deny sysctl writes in chroot
++	  - Deny mknod in chroot
++	  - Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot
++	  - Deny pivot_root in chroot
++	  - Denied writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
++	  - /proc restrictions with special GID set to 10 (usually wheel)
++	  - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
++
++config GRKERNSEC_HIGH
++	bool "High"
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
++	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
++	select PAX
++	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	select PAX_ASLR
++	select PAX_RANDMMAP
++	select PAX_NOEXEC
++	select PAX_MPROTECT
++	select PAX_EI_PAX
++	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	select PAX_KERNEXEC if (X86 && !EFI && !COMPAT_VDSO && !PARAVIRT && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK))
++	select PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF if (!X86_64 && !COMPAT_VDSO)
++	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && !X86_64)
++	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86 && !X86_64)
++	select PAX_PAGEEXEC if (!X86)
++	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	select PAX_DLRESOLVE if (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	select PAX_SYSCALL if (PPC32)
++	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
++	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
++	select PAX_ETEXECRELOCS if (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be
++	  enabled, which will protect you against many kinds of attacks
++	  against your system.  The heightened security comes at a cost
++	  of an increased chance of incompatibilities with rare software
++	  on your machine.  Since this security level enables PaX, you should
++	  view <http://pax.grsecurity.net> and read about the PaX
++	  project.  While you are there, download chpax and run it on
++	  binaries that cause problems with PaX.  Also remember that
++	  since the /proc restrictions are enabled, you must run your
++	  identd as gid 1001.  This security level enables the following 
++	  features in addition to those listed in the low and medium 
++	  security levels:
++
++	  - Additional /proc restrictions
++	  - Chmod restrictions in chroot
++	  - No signals, ptrace, or viewing of processes outside of chroot
++	  - Capability restrictions in chroot
++	  - Deny fchdir out of chroot
++	  - Priority restrictions in chroot
++	  - Segmentation-based implementation of PaX
++	  - Mprotect restrictions
++	  - Removal of addresses from /proc/<pid>/[smaps|maps|stat]
++	  - Kernel stack randomization
++	  - Mount/unmount/remount logging
++	  - Kernel symbol hiding
++	  - Prevention of memory exhaustion-based exploits
++config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
++	bool "Custom"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity
++	  option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't
++	  covered in the basic security levels.  These additional features
++	  include TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for
++	  grsecurity.  It is advised that you read through the help for
++	  each option to determine its usefulness in your situation.
++
++endchoice
++
++menu "Address Space Protection"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	bool "Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to
++	  be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel.
++	  /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module
++	  support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are
++	  currently used  to insert malicious code into the running kernel.
++	  Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that
++	  you use the RBAC system, as it is still possible for an attacker to
++	  modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl.
++	  If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional
++	  case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing
++	  legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem,
++	  but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this
++	  case.  If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will
++	  not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later.
++	  It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the
++	  conditions above.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_IO
++	bool "Disable privileged I/O"
++	depends on X86
++	select RTC
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
++	  Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
++	  Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
++	  the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock.  hwclock can be
++	  remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is
++	  enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates
++	  correctly.  XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option
++	  enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86.  If you use XFree86
++	  and you still want to protect your kernel against modification,
++	  use the RBAC system.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	bool "Remove addresses from /proc/<pid>/[smaps|maps|stat]"
++	depends on PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/stat files will
++	  give no information about the addresses of its mappings if
++	  PaX features that rely on random addresses are enabled on the task.
++	  If you use PaX it is greatly recommended that you say Y here as it
++	  closes up a hole that makes the full ASLR useless for suid
++	  binaries.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
++	bool "Deter exploit bruteforcing"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
++	  daemons such as apache or sshd will be deterred.  When a child of a
++	  forking daemon is killed by PaX or crashes due to an illegal
++	  instruction, the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every
++	  subsequent fork until the administrator is able to assess the
++	  situation and restart the daemon.  It is recommended that you also
++	  enable signal logging in the auditing section so that logs are
++	  generated when a process performs an illegal instruction.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
++	bool "Runtime module disabling"
++	depends on MODULES
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to disable the ability to (un)load
++	  modules at runtime.  This feature is useful if you need the ability
++	  to load kernel modules at boot time, but do not want to allow an
++	  attacker to load a rootkit kernel module into the system, or to remove
++	  a loaded kernel module important to system functioning.  You should
++	  enable the /dev/mem protection feature as well, since rootkits can be
++	  inserted into the kernel via other methods than kernel modules.  Since
++	  an untrusted module could still be loaded by modifying init scripts and
++	  rebooting the system, it is also recommended that you enable the RBAC
++	  system.  If you enable this option, a sysctl option with name
++	  "disable_modules" will be created.  Setting this option to "1" disables
++	  module loading.  After this option is set, no further writes to it are
++	  allowed until the system is rebooted.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	bool "Hide kernel symbols"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and
++	  displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted
++	  to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE.  This option is only effective
++	  provided the following conditions are met:
++	  1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution
++	  2) You are using the RBAC system and hiding other files such as your
++	     kernel image and System.map
++	  3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes
++	     /proc/kcore
++	  If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a
++	  useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of
++	  overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Role Based Access Control Options"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
++	bool "Hide kernel processes"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all kernel threads will be hidden to all
++	  processes but those whose subject has the "view hidden processes"
++	  flag.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES
++	int "Maximum tries before password lockout"
++	default 3
++	help
++	  This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt
++	  to authorize themselves with the grsecurity RBAC system before being
++	  denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time.
++	  The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT
++	int "Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds"
++	default 30
++	help
++	  This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to
++	  authorize to the RBAC system with the maximum number of invalid
++	  passwords.  The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force
++	  a password.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Filesystem Protections"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	bool "Proc restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
++	  will be altered to enhance system security and privacy.  You MUST
++  	  choose either a user only restriction or a user and group restriction.
++	  Depending upon the option you choose, you can either restrict users to
++	  see only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
++	  view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose
++	  the "restrict to user only" option.  NOTE: If you're running identd as
++	  a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	bool "Restrict /proc to user only"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
++	  processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
++	  and viewing kernel symbol and module information.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	bool "Allow special group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
++	  able to view all processes, network-related information, and
++	  kernel and symbol information.  This option is useful if you want
++	  to run identd as a non-root user.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
++	int "GID for special group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	default 1001
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	bool "Additional restrictions"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on
++	  /proc that keep normal users from viewing device information and 
++	  slabinfo information that could be useful for exploits.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	bool "Linking restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
++	  will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
++	  world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
++	  symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
++	  able to hardlink to files they do not own.  If the sysctl option is
++	  enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	bool "FIFO restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
++	  own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
++	  the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	bool "Chroot jail restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will
++	  make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult.  If you
++	  encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it
++	  is recommended that you enable each one.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	bool "Deny mounts"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++	  mount or remount filesystems.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	bool "Deny double-chroots"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
++	  again outside the chroot.  This is a widely used method of breaking
++	  out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed.  If the sysctl 
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name 
++	  "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	bool "Deny pivot_root in chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
++	  a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41.  It
++	  works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem.  This
++	  function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
++	  of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	bool "Enforce chdir(\"/\") on all chroots"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
++	  applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
++	  The man page on chroot(2) states:
++	  Note that this call does not change  the  current  working
++	  directory,  so  that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
++	  `/'.  In particular, the  super-user  can  escape  from  a
++	  `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
++
++	  It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
++	  any software.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++	  name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	bool "Deny (f)chmod +s"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
++	  or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits.  This protects
++	  against another published method of breaking a chroot.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
++	  to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
++	  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  If the sysctl option
++	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	bool "Deny mknod"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
++	  mknod.  The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
++	  would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
++	  as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
++	  anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
++	  they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data).  It is recommended
++	  that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	bool "Deny shmat() out of chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
++	  to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
++	  It is recommended that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
++	  a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	bool "Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++	  connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
++	  domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot.  It is recommended
++	  that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	bool "Protect outside processes"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++	  kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, getpgid, getsid,
++	  or view any process outside of the chroot.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	bool "Restrict priority changes"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
++	  the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
++	  processes outside the chroot.  This provides more security than simply
++	  removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set.  If the
++	  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
++	  is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	bool "Deny sysctl writes"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
++	  write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
++	  interface.  It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
++	  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	bool "Capability restrictions"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a
++	  chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
++	  system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
++	  files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
++	  This is left an option because it can break some apps.  Disable this
++	  if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
++	  tasks.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++	  name "chroot_caps" is created.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Kernel Auditing"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	bool "Single group for auditing"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features
++	  will only operate on a group you specify.  This option is recommended
++	  if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large
++	  amount of logs from the entire system.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
++	  a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
++	int "GID for auditing"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	default 1007
++
++config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	bool "Exec logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
++	  other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
++	  will be logged).  Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
++	  of their users.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++	  name "exec_logging" is created.
++	  WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
++	  on an active system.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	bool "Resource logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
++	  be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
++	  limit.  It is highly recommended that you say Y here.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "resource_logging" is
++	  created.  If the RBAC system is enabled, the sysctl value is ignored.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	bool "Log execs within chroot"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
++	  to syslog.  This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
++	  applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
++	  is therefore left as an option.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	bool "Chdir logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged.  If the sysctl
++ 	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	bool "(Un)Mount logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged.  If the
++	  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	bool "IPC logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores,
++	  and shared memory will be logged.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	bool "Signal logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
++	  SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
++	  occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "signal_logging" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	bool "Fork failure logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
++	  This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
++	  their process limit.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	bool "Time change logging"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "timechange_logging" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	bool "/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid>
++	  directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task.
++	  The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets.
++	  This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response
++	  to a local attack.  The entry is readable by only the owner of the
++	  process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via
++	  the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	bool 'ELF text relocations logging (READ HELP)'
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, text relocations will be logged with the filename
++	  of the offending library or binary.  The purpose of the feature is
++	  to help Linux distribution developers get rid of libraries and
++	  binaries that need text relocations which hinder the future progress
++	  of PaX.  Only Linux distribution developers should say Y here, and
++	  never on a production machine, as this option creates an information
++	  leak that could aid an attacker in defeating the randomization of
++	  a single memory region.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
++	  option with name "audit_textrel" is created.
++
++endmenu
++
++menu "Executable Protections"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	bool "Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will
++	  have the value checked during execve() calls.  The current system
++	  only checks the system limit during fork() calls.  If the sysctl option
++	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	bool "Dmesg(8) restriction"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
++	  to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
++	  created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
++	  supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
++	  These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
++	  root-owned directories writable only by root.  If the sysctl option
++	  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	bool "Partially restrict non-root users"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the
++	  group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to
++	  execute files in directories they own that are not group or
++	  world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
++	  root.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++	  "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
++	bool "Invert GID option"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
++	  decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.  This
++	  option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
++	  users on the system.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
++	int "GID for untrusted users"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && !GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
++	default 1005
++	help
++	  If you have selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
++	  GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.
++	  If you have not selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
++	  GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *enabled* for.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid"
++	  is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
++	int "GID for trusted users"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
++	default 1005
++	help
++	  If you have selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
++	  GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.
++	  If you have not selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
++	  GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *enabled* for.
++	  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid"
++	  is created.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Network Protections"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	bool "Larger entropy pools"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux
++	  and grsecurity will be doubled in size.  Since several grsecurity
++	  features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y
++	  here.  Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying
++	  /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	bool "Socket restrictions"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options.
++	  If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary
++	  groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch
++	  will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	bool "Deny any sockets to group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++	  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
++	  applications from your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
++	int "GID to deny all sockets for"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	default 1004
++	help
++	  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
++	  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
++	  specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++	  with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	bool "Deny client sockets to group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++	  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
++	  able to run servers.  If this option is enabled, all users in the group
++	  you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
++	  from the shell on your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++	  sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
++	int "GID to deny client sockets for"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	default 1003
++	help
++	  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
++	  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
++	  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
++	  option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	bool "Deny server sockets to group"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++	  be unable to run server applications from your machine.  If the sysctl
++	  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
++	int "GID to deny server sockets for"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	default 1002
++	help
++	  Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
++	  Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
++	  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
++	  option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Sysctl support"
++depends on GRKERNSEC && SYSCTL
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	bool "Sysctl support"
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
++	  grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
++	  kernel.  You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
++	  to enable (1) or disable (0) various features.  All the sysctl entries
++	  are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value.
++	  All features enabled in the kernel configuration are disabled at boot
++	  if you do not say Y to the "Turn on features by default" option.
++	  All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock entry should
++	  be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set.
++	  *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
++
++config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
++	bool "Turn on features by default"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, instead of having all features enabled in the
++	  kernel configuration disabled at boot time, the features will be
++	  enabled at boot time.  It is recommended you say Y here unless
++	  there is some reason you would want all sysctl-tunable features to
++	  be disabled by default.  As mentioned elsewhere, it is important
++	  to enable the grsec_lock entry once you have finished modifying
++	  the sysctl entries.
++
++endmenu
++menu "Logging Options"
++depends on GRKERNSEC
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME
++	int "Seconds in between log messages (minimum)"
++	default 10
++	help
++	  This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between
++	  grsecurity log messages.  The default should be suitable for most
++	  people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough
++	  to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to
++	  prevent flooding.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST
++	int "Number of messages in a burst (maximum)"
++	default 4
++	help
++	  This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed
++	  within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option.  The
++	  default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that
++	  many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to
++	  raise this value.
++
++endmenu
++
++endmenu
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/Makefile b/grsecurity/Makefile
+--- a/grsecurity/Makefile	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/Makefile	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton
++# during 2001-2005 it has been completely redesigned by Brad Spengler
++# into an RBAC system
++#
++# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel
++# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL v2 or higher
++
++obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \
++	grsec_mount.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \
++	grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o grsec_textrel.o
++
++obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o \
++	gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \
++	gracl_learn.o grsec_log.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o
++
++ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++obj-y += grsec_disabled.o
++endif
++
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl.c b/grsecurity/gracl.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,3721 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/tty.h>
++#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++#include <linux/netdevice.h>
++#include <linux/ptrace.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/gralloc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/percpu.h>
++
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
++
++static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set;
++static struct name_db name_set;
++static struct inodev_db inodev_set;
++
++/* for keeping track of userspace pointers used for subjects, so we
++   can share references in the kernel as well
++*/
++
++static struct dentry *real_root;
++static struct vfsmount *real_root_mnt;
++
++static struct acl_subj_map_db subj_map_set;
++
++static struct acl_role_label *default_role;
++
++static u16 acl_sp_role_value;
++
++extern char *gr_shared_page[4];
++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem);
++rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
++
++static unsigned int gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT;
++
++extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum);
++extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++extern void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++			    const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
++#endif
++
++unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
++unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
++
++static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL;
++static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0;
++
++static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL;
++
++static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0;
++static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL;
++
++extern struct vfsmount *sock_mnt;
++extern struct vfsmount *pipe_mnt;
++extern struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
++static struct acl_object_label *fakefs_obj;
++
++extern int gr_init_uidset(void);
++extern void gr_free_uidset(void);
++extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid);
++extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid);
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
++{
++	return (gr_status & GR_READY);
++}
++
++char gr_roletype_to_char(void)
++{
++	switch (current->role->roletype &
++		(GR_ROLE_DEFAULT | GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP |
++		 GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) {
++	case GR_ROLE_DEFAULT:
++		return 'D';
++	case GR_ROLE_USER:
++		return 'U';
++	case GR_ROLE_GROUP:
++		return 'G';
++	case GR_ROLE_SPECIAL:
++		return 'S';
++	}
++
++	return 'X';
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_tpe_check(void)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++	if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_TPE)
++		return 1;
++	else
++		return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) &&
++	    grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
++	    !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++		return 1;
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const unsigned int lena, const unsigned int lenb)
++{
++	int i;
++	unsigned long *l1;
++	unsigned long *l2;
++	unsigned char *c1;
++	unsigned char *c2;
++	int num_longs;
++
++	if (likely(lena != lenb))
++		return 0;
++
++	l1 = (unsigned long *)a;
++	l2 = (unsigned long *)b;
++
++	num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long);
++
++	for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) {
++		if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2))
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	c1 = (unsigned char *) l1;
++	c2 = (unsigned char *) l2;
++
++	i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long));	
++
++	for (; i--; c1++, c2++) {
++		if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2))
++			return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static char * __our_d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++	                   struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
++			   char *buffer, int buflen)
++{
++	char * end = buffer+buflen;
++	char * retval;
++	int namelen;
++
++	*--end = '\0';
++	buflen--;
++
++	if (buflen < 1)
++		goto Elong;
++	/* Get '/' right */
++	retval = end-1;
++	*retval = '/';
++
++	for (;;) {
++		struct dentry * parent;
++
++		if (dentry == root && vfsmnt == rootmnt)
++			break;
++		if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
++			/* Global root? */
++			spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
++			if (vfsmnt->mnt_parent == vfsmnt) {
++				spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
++				goto global_root;
++			}
++			dentry = vfsmnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			vfsmnt = vfsmnt->mnt_parent;
++			spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
++			continue;
++		}
++		parent = dentry->d_parent;
++		prefetch(parent);
++		namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
++		buflen -= namelen + 1;
++		if (buflen < 0)
++			goto Elong;
++		end -= namelen;
++		memcpy(end, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
++		*--end = '/';
++		retval = end;
++		dentry = parent;
++	}
++
++	return retval;
++
++global_root:
++	namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
++	buflen -= namelen;
++	if (buflen < 0)
++		goto Elong;
++	retval -= namelen-1;	/* hit the slash */
++	memcpy(retval, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
++	return retval;
++Elong:
++	return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
++}
++
++static char *
++gen_full_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++              struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt, char *buf, int buflen)
++{
++	char *retval;
++
++	retval = __our_d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
++	if (unlikely(IS_ERR(retval)))
++		retval = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>");
++	else if (unlikely(retval[1] == '/' && retval[2] == '\0'))
++		retval[1] = '\0';
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static char *
++__d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++		char *buf, int buflen)
++{
++	char *res;
++
++	/* we can use real_root, real_root_mnt, because this is only called
++	   by the RBAC system */
++	res = gen_full_path((struct dentry *)dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, real_root, real_root_mnt, buf, buflen);
++
++	return res;
++}
++
++static char *
++d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++	    char *buf, int buflen)
++{
++	char *res;
++	struct dentry *root;
++	struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++	struct task_struct *reaper = current->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper;
++
++	/* we can't use real_root, real_root_mnt, because they belong only to the RBAC system */
++	read_lock(&reaper->fs->lock);
++	root = dget(reaper->fs->root.dentry);
++	rootmnt = mntget(reaper->fs->root.mnt);
++	read_unlock(&reaper->fs->lock);
++
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++	res = gen_full_path((struct dentry *)dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	dput(root);
++	mntput(rootmnt);
++	return res;
++}
++
++static char *
++gr_to_filename_rbac(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	char *ret;
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++	ret = __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0],smp_processor_id()),
++			     PAGE_SIZE);
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename_nolock(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0],smp_processor_id()),
++			     PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[1], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[2], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[3], smp_processor_id()),
++			   PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode)
++{
++	/* masks off auditable permission flags, then shifts them to create
++	   auditing flags, and adds the special case of append auditing if
++	   we're requesting write */
++	return (((reqmode & ~GR_AUDITS) << 10) | ((reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0));
++}
++
++struct acl_subject_label *
++lookup_subject_map(const struct acl_subject_label *userp)
++{
++	unsigned int index = shash(userp, subj_map_set.s_size);
++	struct subject_map *match;
++
++	match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && match->user != userp)
++		match = match->next;
++
++	if (match != NULL)
++		return match->kernel;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_subj_map_entry(struct subject_map *subjmap)
++{
++	unsigned int index = shash(subjmap->user, subj_map_set.s_size);
++	struct subject_map **curr;
++
++	subjmap->prev = NULL;
++
++	curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
++	if (*curr != NULL)
++		(*curr)->prev = subjmap;
++
++	subjmap->next = *curr;
++	*curr = subjmap;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static struct acl_role_label *
++lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
++		      const gid_t gid)
++{
++	unsigned int index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size);
++	struct acl_role_label *match;
++	struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
++	unsigned int x;
++
++	match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++
++	while (match) {
++		if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) {
++			for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) {
++				if (match->domain_children[x] == uid)
++					goto found;
++			}
++		} else if (match->uidgid == uid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER)
++			break;
++		match = match->next;
++	}
++found:
++	if (match == NULL) {
++	      try_group:
++		index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size);
++		match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++
++		while (match) {
++			if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) {
++				for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) {
++					if (match->domain_children[x] == gid)
++						goto found2;
++				}
++			} else if (match->uidgid == gid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP)
++				break;
++			match = match->next;
++		}
++found2:
++		if (match == NULL)
++			match = default_role;
++		if (match->allowed_ips == NULL)
++			return match;
++		else {
++			for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
++				if (likely
++				    ((ntohl(task->signal->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
++				     (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask)))
++					return match;
++			}
++			match = default_role;
++		}
++	} else if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) {
++		return match;
++	} else {
++		for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
++			if (likely
++			    ((ntohl(task->signal->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
++			     (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask)))
++				return match;
++		}
++		goto try_group;
++	}
++
++	return match;
++}
++
++struct acl_subject_label *
++lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
++		      const struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, role->subj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_subject_label *match;
++
++	match = role->subj_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		match = match->next;
++	}
++
++	if (match && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
++		     const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, subj->obj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_object_label *match;
++
++	match = subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		match = match->next;
++	}
++
++	if (match && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
++		     const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, subj->obj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_object_label *match;
++
++	match = subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		match = match->next;
++	}
++
++	if (match && (match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++
++	match = subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++	       (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++		match = match->next;
++	}
++
++	if (match && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static struct name_entry *
++lookup_name_entry(const char *name)
++{
++	unsigned int len = strlen(name);
++	unsigned int key = full_name_hash(name, len);
++	unsigned int index = key % name_set.n_size;
++	struct name_entry *match;
++
++	match = name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->key != key || !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	return match;
++}
++
++static struct name_entry *
++lookup_name_entry_create(const char *name)
++{
++	unsigned int len = strlen(name);
++	unsigned int key = full_name_hash(name, len);
++	unsigned int index = key % name_set.n_size;
++	struct name_entry *match;
++
++	match = name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->key != key || !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len) ||
++			 !match->deleted))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	if (match && match->deleted)
++		return match;
++
++	match = name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->key != key || !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len) ||
++			 match->deleted))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	if (match && !match->deleted)
++		return match;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++static struct inodev_entry *
++lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.i_size);
++	struct inodev_entry *match;
++
++	match = inodev_set.i_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->nentry->inode != ino || match->nentry->device != dev))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	return match;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_inodev_entry(struct inodev_entry *entry)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(entry->nentry->inode, entry->nentry->device,
++				    inodev_set.i_size);
++	struct inodev_entry **curr;
++
++	entry->prev = NULL;
++
++	curr = &inodev_set.i_hash[index];
++	if (*curr != NULL)
++		(*curr)->prev = entry;
++	
++	entry->next = *curr;
++	*curr = entry;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++__insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role, uid_t uidgid)
++{
++	unsigned int index =
++	    rhash(uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size);
++	struct acl_role_label **curr;
++
++	role->prev = NULL;
++
++	curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++	if (*curr != NULL)
++		(*curr)->prev = role;
++
++	role->next = *curr;
++	*curr = role;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	int i;
++
++	if (role->roletype & GR_ROLE_DOMAIN) {
++		for (i = 0; i < role->domain_child_num; i++)
++			__insert_acl_role_label(role, role->domain_children[i]);
++	} else
++		__insert_acl_role_label(role, role->uidgid);
++}
++					
++static int
++insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const dev_t device, __u8 deleted)
++{
++	struct name_entry **curr, *nentry;
++	struct inodev_entry *ientry;
++	unsigned int len = strlen(name);
++	unsigned int key = full_name_hash(name, len);
++	unsigned int index = key % name_set.n_size;
++
++	curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++	while (*curr && ((*curr)->key != key || !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)))
++		curr = &((*curr)->next);
++
++	if (*curr != NULL)
++		return 1;
++
++	nentry = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
++	if (nentry == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	ientry = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct inodev_entry));
++	if (ientry == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	ientry->nentry = nentry;
++
++	nentry->key = key;
++	nentry->name = name;
++	nentry->inode = inode;
++	nentry->device = device;
++	nentry->len = len;
++	nentry->deleted = deleted;
++
++	nentry->prev = NULL;
++	curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
++	if (*curr != NULL)
++		(*curr)->prev = nentry;
++	nentry->next = *curr;
++	*curr = nentry;
++
++	/* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */
++	insert_inodev_entry(ientry);
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj,
++		     struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned int index =
++	    fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_object_label **curr;
++
++	
++	obj->prev = NULL;
++
++	curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++	if (*curr != NULL)
++		(*curr)->prev = obj;
++
++	obj->next = *curr;
++	*curr = obj;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj,
++		      struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, role->subj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_subject_label **curr;
++
++	obj->prev = NULL;
++
++	curr = &role->subj_hash[index];
++	if (*curr != NULL)
++		(*curr)->prev = obj;
++
++	obj->next = *curr;
++	*curr = obj;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++/* allocating chained hash tables, so optimal size is where lambda ~ 1 */
++
++static void *
++create_table(__u32 * len, int elementsize)
++{
++	unsigned int table_sizes[] = {
++		7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381,
++		32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143,
++		4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689,
++		268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647
++	};
++	void *newtable = NULL;
++	unsigned int pwr = 0;
++
++	while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) &&
++	       table_sizes[pwr] <= *len)
++		pwr++;
++
++	if (table_sizes[pwr] <= *len)
++		return newtable;
++
++	if ((table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++		newtable =
++		    kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize, GFP_KERNEL);
++	else
++		newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize);
++
++	*len = table_sizes[pwr];
++
++	return newtable;
++}
++
++static int
++init_variables(const struct gr_arg *arg)
++{
++	struct task_struct *reaper = current->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper;
++	unsigned int stacksize;
++
++	subj_map_set.s_size = arg->role_db.num_subjects;
++	acl_role_set.r_size = arg->role_db.num_roles + arg->role_db.num_domain_children;
++	name_set.n_size = arg->role_db.num_objects;
++	inodev_set.i_size = arg->role_db.num_objects;
++
++	if (!subj_map_set.s_size || !acl_role_set.r_size ||
++	    !name_set.n_size || !inodev_set.i_size)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!gr_init_uidset())
++		return 1;
++
++	/* set up the stack that holds allocation info */
++
++	stacksize = arg->role_db.num_pointers + 5;
++
++	if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize))
++		return 1;
++
++	/* grab reference for the real root dentry and vfsmount */
++	read_lock(&reaper->fs->lock);
++	real_root_mnt = mntget(reaper->fs->root.mnt);
++	real_root = dget(reaper->fs->root.dentry);
++	read_unlock(&reaper->fs->lock);
++	
++	fakefs_obj = acl_alloc(sizeof(struct acl_object_label));
++	if (fakefs_obj == NULL)
++		return 1;
++	fakefs_obj->mode = GR_FIND | GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_EXEC;
++
++	subj_map_set.s_hash =
++	    (struct subject_map **) create_table(&subj_map_set.s_size, sizeof(void *));
++	acl_role_set.r_hash =
++	    (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size, sizeof(void *));
++	name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size, sizeof(void *));
++	inodev_set.i_hash =
++	    (struct inodev_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.i_size, sizeof(void *));
++
++	if (!subj_map_set.s_hash || !acl_role_set.r_hash ||
++	    !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.i_hash)
++		return 1;
++
++	memset(subj_map_set.s_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof(struct subject_map *) * subj_map_set.s_size);
++	memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size);
++	memset(name_set.n_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size);
++	memset(inodev_set.i_hash, 0,
++	       sizeof (struct inodev_entry *) * inodev_set.i_size);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/* free information not needed after startup
++   currently contains user->kernel pointer mappings for subjects
++*/
++
++static void
++free_init_variables(void)
++{
++	__u32 i;
++
++	if (subj_map_set.s_hash) {
++		for (i = 0; i < subj_map_set.s_size; i++) {
++			if (subj_map_set.s_hash[i]) {
++				kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash[i]);
++				subj_map_set.s_hash[i] = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++		if ((subj_map_set.s_size * sizeof (struct subject_map *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++free_variables(void)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *s;
++	struct acl_role_label *r;
++	struct task_struct *task, *task2;
++	unsigned int i, x;
++
++	gr_clear_learn_entries();
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	do_each_thread(task2, task) {
++		task->acl_sp_role = 0;
++		task->acl_role_id = 0;
++		task->acl = NULL;
++		task->role = NULL;
++	} while_each_thread(task2, task);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	/* release the reference to the real root dentry and vfsmount */
++	if (real_root)
++		dput(real_root);
++	real_root = NULL;
++	if (real_root_mnt)
++		mntput(real_root_mnt);
++	real_root_mnt = NULL;
++
++	/* free all object hash tables */
++
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(r, i)
++		if (r->subj_hash == NULL)
++			break;
++		FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(r, s, x)
++			if (s->obj_hash == NULL)
++				break;
++			if ((s->obj_hash_size * sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++				kfree(s->obj_hash);
++			else
++				vfree(s->obj_hash);
++		FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(s, x)
++		FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(r, s)
++			if (s->obj_hash == NULL)
++				break;
++			if ((s->obj_hash_size * sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++				kfree(s->obj_hash);
++			else
++				vfree(s->obj_hash);
++		FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(s)
++		if ((r->subj_hash_size * sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(r->subj_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(r->subj_hash);
++		r->subj_hash = NULL;
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(r,i)
++
++	acl_free_all();
++
++	if (acl_role_set.r_hash) {
++		if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
++	}
++	if (name_set.n_hash) {
++		if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(name_set.n_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(name_set.n_hash);
++	}
++
++	if (inodev_set.i_hash) {
++		if ((inodev_set.i_size * sizeof (struct inodev_entry *)) <=
++		    PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(inodev_set.i_hash);
++		else
++			vfree(inodev_set.i_hash);
++	}
++
++	gr_free_uidset();
++
++	memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
++	memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct inodev_db));
++	memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db));
++	memset(&subj_map_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subj_map_db));
++
++	default_role = NULL;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __u32
++count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label o_tmp;
++	__u32 num = 0;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++			break;
++
++		userp = o_tmp.prev;
++		num++;
++	}
++
++	return num;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role);
++
++static int
++copy_user_glob(struct acl_object_label *obj)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *g_tmp, **guser;
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++
++	if (obj->globbed == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	guser = &obj->globbed;
++	while (*guser) {
++		g_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
++			acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
++		if (g_tmp == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(g_tmp, *guser,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		len = strnlen_user(g_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++		if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, g_tmp->filename, len))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		g_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++		*guser = g_tmp;
++		guser = &(g_tmp->next);
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj,
++	       struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *o_tmp;
++	unsigned int len;
++	int ret;
++	char *tmp;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
++		     acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		userp = o_tmp->prev;
++
++		len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++		if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		o_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++		insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj);
++		if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode,
++				       o_tmp->device, (o_tmp->mode & GR_DELETED) ? 1 : 0))
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		ret = copy_user_glob(o_tmp);
++		if (ret)
++			return ret;
++
++		if (o_tmp->nested) {
++			o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role);
++			if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested))
++				return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested);
++
++			/* insert into nested subject list */
++			o_tmp->nested->next = role->hash->first;
++			role->hash->first = o_tmp->nested;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static __u32
++count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label s_tmp;
++	__u32 num = 0;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++			break;
++
++		userp = s_tmp.prev;
++		/* do not count nested subjects against this count, since
++		   they are not included in the hash table, but are
++		   attached to objects.  We have already counted
++		   the subjects in userspace for the allocation 
++		   stack
++		*/
++		if (!(s_tmp.mode & GR_NESTED))
++			num++;
++	}
++
++	return num;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
++{
++	struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
++
++	ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips;
++
++	while (ruserip) {
++		rlast = rtmp;
++
++		if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *)
++		     acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip,
++				   sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		ruserip = rtmp->prev;
++
++		if (!rlast) {
++			rtmp->prev = NULL;
++			rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp;
++		} else {
++			rlast->next = rtmp;
++			rtmp->prev = rlast;
++		}
++
++		if (!ruserip)
++			rtmp->next = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
++{
++	struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
++	
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++
++	rusertp = rolep->transitions;
++
++	while (rusertp) {
++		rlast = rtmp;
++
++		if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *)
++		     acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp,
++				   sizeof (struct role_transition)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		rusertp = rtmp->prev;
++
++		len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
++
++		if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN)
++			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len))
++			return -EFAULT;
++
++		rtmp->rolename = tmp;
++
++		if (!rlast) {
++			rtmp->prev = NULL;
++			rolep->transitions = rtmp;
++		} else {
++			rlast->next = rtmp;
++			rtmp->prev = rlast;
++		}
++
++		if (!rusertp)
++			rtmp->next = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL, *s_tmp2;
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++	__u32 num_objs;
++	struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2;
++	struct gr_hash_struct ghash;
++	struct subject_map *subjmap;
++	unsigned int i_num;
++	int err;
++
++	s_tmp = lookup_subject_map(userp);
++
++	/* we've already copied this subject into the kernel, just return
++	   the reference to it, and don't copy it over again
++	*/
++	if (s_tmp)
++		return(s_tmp);
++
++	if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *)
++	    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	subjmap = (struct subject_map *)kmalloc(sizeof (struct subject_map), GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (subjmap == NULL)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	subjmap->user = userp;
++	subjmap->kernel = s_tmp;
++	insert_subj_map_entry(subjmap);
++
++	if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp,
++			   sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++	len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++	if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++	if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len))
++		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++	s_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++	if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/"))
++		role->root_label = s_tmp;
++
++	if (copy_from_user(&ghash, s_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct)))
++		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++	/* copy user and group transition tables */
++
++	if (s_tmp->user_trans_num) {
++		uid_t *uidlist;
++
++		uidlist = (uid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t));
++		if (uidlist == NULL)
++			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++		if (copy_from_user(uidlist, s_tmp->user_transitions, s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		s_tmp->user_transitions = uidlist;
++	}
++
++	if (s_tmp->group_trans_num) {
++		gid_t *gidlist;
++
++		gidlist = (gid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t));
++		if (gidlist == NULL)
++			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++		if (copy_from_user(gidlist, s_tmp->group_transitions, s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		s_tmp->group_transitions = gidlist;
++	}
++
++	/* set up object hash table */
++	num_objs = count_user_objs(ghash.first);
++
++	s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs;
++	s_tmp->obj_hash =
++	    (struct acl_object_label **)
++	    create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size), sizeof(void *));
++
++	if (!s_tmp->obj_hash)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0,
++	       s_tmp->obj_hash_size *
++	       sizeof (struct acl_object_label *));
++
++	/* add in objects */
++	err = copy_user_objs(ghash.first, s_tmp, role);
++
++	if (err)
++		return ERR_PTR(err);
++
++	/* set pointer for parent subject */
++	if (s_tmp->parent_subject) {
++		s_tmp2 = do_copy_user_subj(s_tmp->parent_subject, role);
++
++		if (IS_ERR(s_tmp2))
++			return s_tmp2;
++
++		s_tmp->parent_subject = s_tmp2;
++	}
++
++	/* add in ip acls */
++
++	if (!s_tmp->ip_num) {
++		s_tmp->ips = NULL;
++		goto insert;
++	}
++
++	i_tmp =
++	    (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num *
++					       sizeof (struct
++						       acl_ip_label *));
++
++	if (!i_tmp)
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) {
++		*(i_tmp + i_num) =
++		    (struct acl_ip_label *)
++		    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label));
++		if (!*(i_tmp + i_num))
++			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++		if (copy_from_user
++		    (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num,
++		     sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++		if (copy_from_user
++		    (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2,
++		     sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++		
++		if ((*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface == NULL)
++			continue;
++
++		len = strnlen_user((*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface, IFNAMSIZ);
++		if (!len || len >= IFNAMSIZ)
++			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++		tmp = acl_alloc(len);
++		if (tmp == NULL)
++			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, (*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface, len))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++		(*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface = tmp;
++	}
++
++	s_tmp->ips = i_tmp;
++
++insert:
++	if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode,
++			       s_tmp->device, (s_tmp->mode & GR_DELETED) ? 1 : 0))
++		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++	return s_tmp;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label s_pre;
++	struct acl_subject_label * ret;
++	int err;
++
++	while (userp) {
++		if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++			return -EFAULT;
++		
++		/* do not add nested subjects here, add
++		   while parsing objects
++		*/
++
++		if (s_pre.mode & GR_NESTED) {
++			userp = s_pre.prev;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role);
++
++		err = PTR_ERR(ret);
++		if (IS_ERR(ret))
++			return err;
++
++		insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role);
++
++		userp = s_pre.prev;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg)
++{
++	struct acl_role_label *r_tmp = NULL, **r_utmp, *r_utmp2;
++	struct sprole_pw *sptmp;
++	struct gr_hash_struct *ghash;
++	uid_t *domainlist;
++	unsigned int r_num;
++	unsigned int len;
++	char *tmp;
++	int err = 0;
++	__u16 i;
++	__u32 num_subjs;
++
++	/* we need a default and kernel role */
++	if (arg->role_db.num_roles < 2)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* copy special role authentication info from userspace */
++
++	num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws;
++	acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *));
++
++	if (!acl_special_roles) {
++		err = -ENOMEM;
++		goto cleanup;
++	}
++
++	for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
++		sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw));
++		if (!sptmp) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i,
++				   sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		len =
++		    strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
++
++		if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) {
++			err = -EINVAL;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp);
++#endif
++		sptmp->rolename = tmp;
++		acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp;
++	}
++
++	r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table;
++
++	for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.num_roles; r_num++) {
++		r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label));
++
++		if (!r_tmp) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2,
++				   sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
++
++		if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) {
++			err = -EINVAL;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		r_tmp->rolename = tmp;
++
++		if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default")
++		    && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) {
++			default_role = r_tmp;
++		} else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) {
++			kernel_role = r_tmp;
++		}
++
++		if ((ghash = (struct gr_hash_struct *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) == NULL) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++		if (copy_from_user(ghash, r_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) {
++			err = -EFAULT;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		r_tmp->hash = ghash;
++
++		num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first);
++
++		r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs;
++		r_tmp->subj_hash =
++		    (struct acl_subject_label **)
++		    create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size), sizeof(void *));
++
++		if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) {
++			err = -ENOMEM;
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++
++		err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp);
++		if (err)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		/* copy domain info */
++		if (r_tmp->domain_children != NULL) {
++			domainlist = acl_alloc(r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t));
++			if (domainlist == NULL) {
++				err = -ENOMEM;
++				goto cleanup;
++			}
++			if (copy_from_user(domainlist, r_tmp->domain_children, r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t))) {
++				err = -EFAULT;
++				goto cleanup;
++			}
++			r_tmp->domain_children = domainlist;
++		}
++
++		err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp);
++		if (err)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0,
++		       r_tmp->subj_hash_size *
++		       sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *));
++
++		err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first, r_tmp);
++
++		if (err)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		/* set nested subject list to null */
++		r_tmp->hash->first = NULL;
++
++		insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp);
++	}
++
++	goto return_err;
++      cleanup:
++	free_variables();
++      return_err:
++	return err;
++
++}
++
++static int
++gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args)
++{
++	int error = 0;
++
++	memcpy(gr_system_salt, args->salt, GR_SALT_LEN);
++	memcpy(gr_system_sum, args->sum, GR_SHA_LEN);
++
++	if (init_variables(args)) {
++		gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++		error = -ENOMEM;
++		free_variables();
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	error = copy_user_acl(args);
++	free_init_variables();
++	if (error) {
++		free_variables();
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) {
++		free_variables();
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	gr_status |= GR_READY;
++      out:
++	return error;
++}
++
++/* derived from glibc fnmatch() 0: match, 1: no match*/
++
++static int
++glob_match(const char *p, const char *n)
++{
++	char c;
++
++	while ((c = *p++) != '\0') {
++	switch (c) {
++		case '?':
++			if (*n == '\0')
++				return 1;
++			else if (*n == '/')
++				return 1;
++			break;
++		case '\\':
++			if (*n != c)
++				return 1;
++			break;
++		case '*':
++			for (c = *p++; c == '?' || c == '*'; c = *p++) {
++				if (*n == '/')
++					return 1;
++				else if (c == '?') {
++					if (*n == '\0')
++						return 1;
++					else
++						++n;
++				}
++			}
++			if (c == '\0') {
++				return 0;
++			} else {
++				const char *endp;
++
++				if ((endp = strchr(n, '/')) == NULL)
++					endp = n + strlen(n);
++
++				if (c == '[') {
++					for (--p; n < endp; ++n)
++						if (!glob_match(p, n))
++							return 0;
++				} else if (c == '/') {
++					while (*n != '\0' && *n != '/')
++						++n;
++					if (*n == '/' && !glob_match(p, n + 1))
++						return 0;
++				} else {
++					for (--p; n < endp; ++n)
++						if (*n == c && !glob_match(p, n))
++							return 0;
++				}
++
++				return 1;
++			}
++		case '[':
++			{
++			int not;
++			char cold;
++
++			if (*n == '\0' || *n == '/')
++				return 1;
++
++			not = (*p == '!' || *p == '^');
++			if (not)
++				++p;
++
++			c = *p++;
++			for (;;) {
++				unsigned char fn = (unsigned char)*n;
++
++				if (c == '\0')
++					return 1;
++				else {
++					if (c == fn)
++						goto matched;
++					cold = c;
++					c = *p++;
++
++					if (c == '-' && *p != ']') {
++						unsigned char cend = *p++;
++
++						if (cend == '\0')
++							return 1;
++
++						if (cold <= fn && fn <= cend)
++							goto matched;
++
++						c = *p++;
++					}
++				}
++
++				if (c == ']')
++					break;
++			}
++			if (!not)
++				return 1;
++			break;
++		matched:
++			while (c != ']') {
++				if (c == '\0')
++					return 1;
++
++				c = *p++;
++			}
++			if (not)
++				return 1;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		if (c != *n)
++			return 1;
++	}
++
++	++n;
++	}
++
++	if (*n == '\0')
++		return 0;
++
++	if (*n == '/')
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++chk_glob_label(struct acl_object_label *globbed,
++	struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char **path)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *tmp;
++
++	if (*path == NULL)
++		*path = gr_to_filename_nolock(dentry, mnt);
++
++	tmp = globbed;
++
++	while (tmp) {
++		if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, *path))
++			return tmp;
++		tmp = tmp->next;
++	}
++
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++__full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt,
++	    const ino_t curr_ino, const dev_t curr_dev,
++	    const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *tmpsubj;
++	struct acl_object_label *retval;
++	struct acl_object_label *retval2;
++
++	tmpsubj = (struct acl_subject_label *) subj;
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	do {
++		retval = lookup_acl_obj_label(curr_ino, curr_dev, tmpsubj);
++		if (retval) {
++			if (retval->globbed) {
++				retval2 = chk_glob_label(retval->globbed, (struct dentry *)orig_dentry,
++						(struct vfsmount *)orig_mnt, path);
++				if (retval2)
++					retval = retval2;
++			}
++			break;
++		}
++	} while ((tmpsubj = tmpsubj->parent_subject));
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt,
++	    const struct dentry *curr_dentry,
++	    const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path)
++{
++	return __full_lookup(orig_dentry, orig_mnt,
++			     curr_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, 
++			     curr_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj, path);
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++__chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++	      const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path)
++{
++	struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
++	struct acl_object_label *retval;
++
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	if (unlikely(mnt == shm_mnt || mnt == pipe_mnt || mnt == sock_mnt ||
++		/* ignore Eric Biederman */
++	    IS_PRIVATE(l_dentry->d_inode))) {
++		retval = fakefs_obj;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	for (;;) {
++		if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt)
++			break;
++
++		if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
++			if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++				break;
++
++			retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++			if (retval != NULL)
++				goto out;
++
++			dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++		if (retval != NULL)
++			goto out;
++
++		dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++	}
++
++	retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
++
++	if (retval == NULL)
++		retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, real_root, subj, &path);
++out:
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++	      const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	char *path = NULL;
++	return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path);
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++chk_obj_create_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++		     const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path)
++{
++	return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path);
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++	       const struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
++	struct acl_subject_label *retval;
++
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	for (;;) {
++		if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt)
++			break;
++		if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
++			if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++				break;
++
++			read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++			retval =
++				lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++						dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++			read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++			if (retval != NULL)
++				goto out;
++
++			dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					  dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++		read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		if (retval != NULL)
++			goto out;
++
++		dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++	}
++
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				  dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
++		read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(real_root->d_inode->i_ino,
++					  real_root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++		read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	}
++out:
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static void
++gr_log_learn(const struct task_struct *task, const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode)
++{
++	security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype,
++		       task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_path.dentry,
++		       task->exec_file->f_path.mnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
++		       1, 1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++gr_log_learn_sysctl(const struct task_struct *task, const char *path, const __u32 mode)
++{
++	security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype,
++		       task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_path.dentry,
++		       task->exec_file->f_path.mnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
++		       1, 1, path, (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++gr_log_learn_id_change(const struct task_struct *task, const char type, const unsigned int real, 
++		       const unsigned int effective, const unsigned int fs)
++{
++	security_learn(GR_ID_LEARN_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype,
++		       task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_path.dentry,
++		       task->exec_file->f_path.mnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
++		       type, real, effective, fs, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
++
++	return;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++	      const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++	      const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++	      const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	__u32 oldmode, newmode;
++	__u32 needmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
++
++	obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl);
++	oldmode = obj->mode;
++
++	if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
++		oldmode |= (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
++
++	needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS;
++	if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))
++		needmode |= GR_SETID | GR_AUDIT_SETID;
++
++	newmode =
++	    gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++			    oldmode | needmode);
++
++	needmode = newmode & (GR_FIND | GR_APPEND | GR_WRITE | GR_EXEC |
++			      GR_SETID | GR_READ | GR_FIND | GR_DELETE |
++			      GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
++
++	if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID) && !(newmode & GR_SETID))
++		goto bad;
++
++	if ((oldmode & needmode) != needmode)
++		goto bad;
++
++	needmode = oldmode & (GR_NOPTRACE | GR_PTRACERD | GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDITS);
++	if ((newmode & needmode) != needmode)
++		goto bad;
++
++	if ((newmode & (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK)) == (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK))
++		return newmode;
++bad:
++	needmode = oldmode;
++	if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))
++		needmode |= GR_SETID;
++	
++	if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
++		gr_log_learn(current, old_dentry, old_mnt, needmode);
++		return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
++	} else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS)
++		return GR_SUPPRESS;
++	else
++		return 0;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode,
++	       const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	__u32 retval = mode;
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	struct acl_object_label *currobj;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
++
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl);
++	retval = currobj->mode & mode;
++
++	if (unlikely
++	    ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) && !(mode & GR_NOPTRACE)
++	     && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) {
++		__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++		new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++		retval = new_mode;
++
++		if (new_mode & GR_EXEC && curracl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN)
++			new_mode |= GR_INHERIT;
++
++		if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN))
++			gr_log_learn(current, dentry, mnt, new_mode);
++	}
++
++	return retval;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent,
++		const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode)
++{
++	struct name_entry *match;
++	struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	char *path;
++	__u32 retval;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	path = gr_to_filename_rbac(new_dentry, mnt);
++	match = lookup_name_entry_create(path);
++
++	if (!match)
++		goto check_parent;
++
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl);
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	if (matchpo) {
++		if ((matchpo->mode & mode) !=
++		    (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))
++		    && curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
++			__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++			new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++			gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode);
++
++			preempt_enable();
++			return new_mode;
++		}
++		preempt_enable();
++		return (matchpo->mode & mode);
++	}
++
++      check_parent:
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	matchpo = chk_obj_create_label(parent, mnt, curracl, path);
++	retval = matchpo->mode & mode;
++
++	if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	    && (curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) {
++		__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++		new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++		gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode);
++		preempt_enable();
++		return new_mode;
++	}
++
++	preempt_enable();
++	return retval;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCFIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task))
++		return 0;
++
++	if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL) &&
++	    task->acl != current->acl)
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	tsk->signal->used_accept = 0;
++	tsk->acl_sp_role = 0;
++	tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
++	tsk->acl = current->acl;
++	tsk->role = current->role;
++	tsk->signal->curr_ip = current->signal->curr_ip;
++	if (current->exec_file)
++		get_file(current->exec_file);
++	tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file;
++	tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable;
++	if (unlikely(current->signal->used_accept))
++		current->signal->curr_ip = 0;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++gr_set_proc_res(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *proc;
++	unsigned short i;
++
++	proc = task->acl;
++
++	if (proc->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
++		return;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < (GR_NLIMITS - 1); i++) {
++		if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i)))
++			continue;
++
++		task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur;
++		task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max;
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++	__u16 num;
++	uid_t *uidlist;
++	int curuid;
++	int realok = 0;
++	int effectiveok = 0;
++	int fsok = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
++		gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'u', real, effective, fs);
++
++	num = current->acl->user_trans_num;
++	uidlist = current->acl->user_transitions;
++
++	if (uidlist == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (real == -1)
++		realok = 1;
++	if (effective == -1)
++		effectiveok = 1;
++	if (fs == -1)
++		fsok = 1;
++
++	if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
++			if (real == curuid)
++				realok = 1;
++			if (effective == curuid)
++				effectiveok = 1;
++			if (fs == curuid)
++				fsok = 1;
++		}
++	} else if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
++			if (real == curuid)
++				break;
++			if (effective == curuid)
++				break;
++			if (fs == curuid)
++				break;
++		}
++		/* not in deny list */
++		if (i == num) {
++			realok = 1;
++			effectiveok = 1;
++			fsok = 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
++		return 0;
++	else {
++		gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real);
++		return 1;
++	}
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	unsigned int i;
++	__u16 num;
++	gid_t *gidlist;
++	int curgid;
++	int realok = 0;
++	int effectiveok = 0;
++	int fsok = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
++		gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'g', real, effective, fs);
++
++	num = current->acl->group_trans_num;
++	gidlist = current->acl->group_transitions;
++
++	if (gidlist == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (real == -1)
++		realok = 1;
++	if (effective == -1)
++		effectiveok = 1;
++	if (fs == -1)
++		fsok = 1;
++
++	if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
++			if (real == curgid)
++				realok = 1;
++			if (effective == curgid)
++				effectiveok = 1;
++			if (fs == curgid)
++				fsok = 1;
++		}
++	} else if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
++		for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
++			curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
++			if (real == curgid)
++				break;
++			if (effective == curgid)
++				break;
++			if (fs == curgid)
++				break;
++		}
++		/* not in deny list */
++		if (i == num) {
++			realok = 1;
++			effectiveok = 1;
++			fsok = 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
++		return 0;
++	else {
++		gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real);
++		return 1;
++	}
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid)
++{
++	struct acl_role_label *role = task->role;
++	struct acl_subject_label *subj = NULL;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	struct file *filp;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	filp = task->exec_file;
++
++	/* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */
++	if (unlikely(!filp)) {
++		task->role = kernel_role;
++		task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++		return;
++	} else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
++		role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid);
++
++	/* perform subject lookup in possibly new role
++	   we can use this result below in the case where role == task->role
++	*/
++	subj = chk_subj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, role);
++
++	/* if we changed uid/gid, but result in the same role
++	   and are using inheritance, don't lose the inherited subject
++	   if current subject is other than what normal lookup
++	   would result in, we arrived via inheritance, don't
++	   lose subject
++	*/
++	if (role != task->role || (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) &&
++				   (subj == task->acl)))
++		task->acl = subj;
++
++	task->role = role;
++
++	task->is_writable = 0;
++
++	/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++	   by the default ACL */
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, default_role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, task->role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++	printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++
++	gr_set_proc_res(task);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task = current;
++	struct acl_subject_label *newacl;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	__u32 retmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role);
++
++	task_lock(task);
++	if (((task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(task->acl->mode &
++	     GR_POVERRIDE) && (task->acl != newacl) &&
++	     !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
++	     !gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt) &&
++	     !(task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) ||
++	    (atomic_read(&task->fs->count) > 1 ||
++	     atomic_read(&task->files->count) > 1 ||
++	     atomic_read(&task->sighand->count) > 1)) {
++                task_unlock(task);
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++	task_unlock(task);
++
++	obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl);
++	retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
++
++	if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) &&
++	    ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT))) {
++		if (obj->nested)
++			task->acl = obj->nested;
++		else
++			task->acl = newacl;
++	} else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT)
++		gr_log_str_fs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, task->acl->filename, dentry, mnt);
++
++	task->is_writable = 0;
++
++	/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++	   by the default ACL */
++	obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++	obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		task->is_writable = 1;
++
++	gr_set_proc_res(task);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++	printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/* always called with valid inodev ptr */
++static void
++do_handle_delete(struct inodev_entry *inodev, const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
++	struct acl_subject_label *matchps;
++	struct acl_subject_label *subj;
++	struct acl_role_label *role;
++	unsigned int i, x;
++
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(role, i)
++		FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(role, subj, x)
++			if ((matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, subj)) != NULL)
++				matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++		FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(subj,x)
++		FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(role, subj)
++			if (subj->inode == ino && subj->device == dev)
++				subj->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++		FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(subj)
++		if ((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL)
++			matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(role,i)
++
++	inodev->nentry->deleted = 1;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	struct inodev_entry *inodev;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	inodev = lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev);
++	if (inodev != NULL)
++		do_handle_delete(inodev, ino, dev);
++	write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
++		     const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
++		     struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_object_label *match;
++
++	match = subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != oldinode ||
++	       match->device != olddevice ||
++	       !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	if (match && (match->inode == oldinode)
++	    && (match->device == olddevice)
++	    && (match->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
++		if (match->prev == NULL) {
++			subj->obj_hash[index] = match->next;
++			if (match->next != NULL)
++				match->next->prev = NULL;
++		} else {
++			match->prev->next = match->next;
++			if (match->next != NULL)
++				match->next->prev = match->prev;
++		}
++		match->prev = NULL;
++		match->next = NULL;
++		match->inode = newinode;
++		match->device = newdevice;
++		match->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
++
++		insert_acl_obj_label(match, subj);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
++		      const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
++		      struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, role->subj_hash_size);
++	struct acl_subject_label *match;
++
++	match = role->subj_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->inode != oldinode ||
++	       match->device != olddevice ||
++	       !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	if (match && (match->inode == oldinode)
++	    && (match->device == olddevice)
++	    && (match->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
++		if (match->prev == NULL) {
++			role->subj_hash[index] = match->next;
++			if (match->next != NULL)
++				match->next->prev = NULL;
++		} else {
++			match->prev->next = match->next;
++			if (match->next != NULL)
++				match->next->prev = match->prev;
++		}
++		match->prev = NULL;
++		match->next = NULL;
++		match->inode = newinode;
++		match->device = newdevice;
++		match->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
++
++		insert_acl_subj_label(match, role);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
++		    const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice)
++{
++	unsigned int index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.i_size);
++	struct inodev_entry *match;
++
++	match = inodev_set.i_hash[index];
++
++	while (match && (match->nentry->inode != oldinode ||
++	       match->nentry->device != olddevice || !match->nentry->deleted))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	if (match && (match->nentry->inode == oldinode)
++	    && (match->nentry->device == olddevice) &&
++	    match->nentry->deleted) {
++		if (match->prev == NULL) {
++			inodev_set.i_hash[index] = match->next;
++			if (match->next != NULL)
++				match->next->prev = NULL;
++		} else {
++			match->prev->next = match->next;
++			if (match->next != NULL)
++				match->next->prev = match->prev;
++		}
++		match->prev = NULL;
++		match->next = NULL;
++		match->nentry->inode = newinode;
++		match->nentry->device = newdevice;
++		match->nentry->deleted = 0;
++
++		insert_inodev_entry(match);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void
++do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry,
++		 const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *subj;
++	struct acl_role_label *role;
++	unsigned int i, x;
++
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(role, i)
++		update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++				      dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				      dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
++
++		FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(role, subj)
++			if ((subj->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) &&
++			    (subj->device == dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev)) {
++				subj->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
++				subj->device = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
++			}
++		FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(subj)
++		FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(role, subj, x)
++			update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++					     dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					     dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj);
++		FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(subj,x)
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(role,i)
++
++	update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++			    dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	struct name_entry *matchn;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename_rbac(dentry, mnt));
++
++	if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) {
++		write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++		do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt);
++		write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	}
++	preempt_enable();
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++		 struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		 struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		 struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
++{
++	struct name_entry *matchn;
++	struct inodev_entry *inodev;
++
++	/* vfs_rename swaps the name and parent link for old_dentry and
++	   new_dentry
++	   at this point, old_dentry has the new name, parent link, and inode
++	   for the renamed file
++	   if a file is being replaced by a rename, new_dentry has the inode
++	   and name for the replaced file
++	*/
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename_rbac(old_dentry, mnt));
++
++	/* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for
++	   NFS silly-renaming
++	 */
++
++	write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) {
++		inodev = lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					     new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++		if (inodev != NULL && (new_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))
++			do_handle_delete(inodev, new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++					 new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++	}
++
++	inodev = lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				     old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++	if (inodev != NULL && (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))
++		do_handle_delete(inodev, old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				 old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
++
++	if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn))
++		do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt);
++
++	write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	preempt_enable();
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static int
++lookup_special_role_auth(__u16 mode, const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt,
++			 unsigned char **sum)
++{
++	struct acl_role_label *r;
++	struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
++	struct role_transition *trans;
++	unsigned int i;
++	int found = 0;
++
++	/* check transition table */
++
++	for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) {
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) {
++			found = 1;
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (!found)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* handle special roles that do not require authentication
++	   and check ip */
++
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(r, i)
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
++		    (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) {
++			found = 0;
++			if (r->allowed_ips != NULL) {
++				for (ipp = r->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
++					if ((ntohl(current->signal->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
++					     (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask))
++						found = 1;
++				}
++			} else
++				found = 2;
++			if (!found)
++				return 0;
++
++			if (((mode == SPROLE) && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW)) ||
++			    ((mode == SPROLEPAM) && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_PAM))) {
++				*salt = NULL;
++				*sum = NULL;
++				return 1;
++			}
++		}
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(r,i)
++
++	for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) {
++			*salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt;
++			*sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum;
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++assign_special_role(char *rolename)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	struct acl_role_label *r;
++	struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL;
++	struct task_struct *tsk;
++	struct file *filp;
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(r, i)
++		if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
++		    (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
++			assigned = r;
++	FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(r,i)
++
++	if (!assigned)
++		return;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++
++	tsk = current->parent;
++	if (tsk == NULL)
++		goto out_unlock;
++
++	filp = tsk->exec_file;
++	if (filp == NULL)
++		goto out_unlock;
++
++	tsk->is_writable = 0;
++
++	tsk->acl_sp_role = 1;
++	tsk->acl_role_id = ++acl_sp_role_value;
++	tsk->role = assigned;
++	tsk->acl = chk_subj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, tsk->role);
++
++	/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++	   by the default ACL */
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, default_role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		tsk->is_writable = 1;
++	obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, tsk->role->root_label);
++	if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++		tsk->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++	printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid);
++#endif
++
++out_unlock:
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++	return;
++}
++
++int gr_check_secure_terminal(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	struct task_struct *p, *p2, *p3;
++	struct files_struct *files;
++	struct fdtable *fdt;
++	struct file *our_file = NULL, *file;
++	int i;
++
++	if (task->signal->tty == NULL)
++		return 1;
++
++	files = get_files_struct(task);
++	if (files != NULL) {
++		rcu_read_lock();
++		fdt = files_fdtable(files);
++		for (i=0; i < fdt->max_fds; i++) {
++			file = fcheck_files(files, i);
++			if (file && (our_file == NULL) && (file->private_data == task->signal->tty)) {
++				get_file(file);
++				our_file = file;
++			}
++		}
++		rcu_read_unlock();
++		put_files_struct(files);
++	}
++
++	if (our_file == NULL)
++		return 1;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	do_each_thread(p2, p) {
++		files = get_files_struct(p);
++		if (files == NULL ||
++		    (p->signal && p->signal->tty == task->signal->tty)) {
++			if (files != NULL)
++				put_files_struct(files);
++			continue;
++		}
++		rcu_read_lock();
++		fdt = files_fdtable(files);
++		for (i=0; i < fdt->max_fds; i++) {
++			file = fcheck_files(files, i);
++			if (file && S_ISCHR(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
++			    file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_rdev == our_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_rdev) {
++				p3 = task;
++				while (p3->pid > 0) {
++					if (p3 == p)
++						break;
++					p3 = p3->parent;
++				}
++				if (p3 == p)
++					break;
++				gr_log_ttysniff(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG, p);
++				gr_handle_alertkill(p);
++				rcu_read_unlock();
++				put_files_struct(files);
++				read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++				fput(our_file);
++				return 0;
++			}
++		}
++		rcu_read_unlock();
++		put_files_struct(files);
++	} while_each_thread(p2, p);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	fput(our_file);
++	return 1;
++}
++
++ssize_t
++write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++	struct gr_arg_wrapper uwrap;
++	unsigned char *sprole_salt;
++	unsigned char *sprole_sum;
++	int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper);
++	int error2 = 0;
++
++	down(&gr_dev_sem);
++
++	if ((gr_status & GR_READY) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KERNELAUTH)) {
++		error = -EPERM;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper)) {
++		gr_log_int_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, (int)count, (int)sizeof(struct gr_arg_wrapper));
++		error = -EINVAL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	
++	if (gr_auth_expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), gr_auth_expires)) {
++		gr_auth_expires = 0;
++		gr_auth_attempts = 0;
++	}
++
++	if (copy_from_user(&uwrap, buf, sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper))) {
++		error = -EFAULT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((uwrap.version != GRSECURITY_VERSION) || (uwrap.size != sizeof(struct gr_arg))) {
++		error = -EINVAL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (copy_from_user(gr_usermode, uwrap.arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) {
++		error = -EFAULT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != SPROLEPAM &&
++	    gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES &&
++	    time_after(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) {
++		error = -EBUSY;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role,
++	   do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication
++	   locking
++	 */
++
++	if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != STATUS &&
++	    gr_usermode->mode != UNSPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != SPROLEPAM &&
++	    current->uid) {
++		error = -EPERM;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */
++
++	gr_usermode->pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0';
++	gr_usermode->sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0';
++
++	/* Okay. 
++	 * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet
++	 * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables
++	 * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */
++
++	switch (gr_usermode->mode) {
++	case STATUS:
++			if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
++				error = 1;
++				if (!gr_check_secure_terminal(current))
++					error = 3;
++			} else
++				error = 2;
++			goto out;
++	case SHUTDOWN:
++		if ((gr_status & GR_READY)
++		    && !(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++			gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG);
++			free_variables();
++			memset(gr_usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg));
++			memset(gr_system_salt, 0, GR_SALT_LEN);
++			memset(gr_system_sum, 0, GR_SHA_LEN);
++		} else if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG);
++			error = -EPERM;
++		} else {
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++		}
++		break;
++	case ENABLE:
++		if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode)))
++			gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++		else {
++			if (gr_status & GR_READY)
++				error = -EAGAIN;
++			else
++				error = error2;
++			gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++		}
++		break;
++	case RELOAD:
++		if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) {
++			gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++		} else if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++			lock_kernel();
++			gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
++			free_variables();
++			if (!(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) {
++				unlock_kernel();
++				gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++			} else {
++				unlock_kernel();
++				error = error2;
++				gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++			}
++		} else {
++			gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++			error = -EPERM;
++		}
++		break;
++	case SEGVMOD:
++		if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG);
++			if (gr_usermode->segv_device && gr_usermode->segv_inode) {
++				struct acl_subject_label *segvacl;
++				segvacl =
++				    lookup_acl_subj_label(gr_usermode->segv_inode,
++							  gr_usermode->segv_device,
++							  current->role);
++				if (segvacl) {
++					segvacl->crashes = 0;
++					segvacl->expires = 0;
++				}
++			} else if (gr_find_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid) >= 0) {
++				gr_remove_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid);
++			}
++		} else {
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG);
++			error = -EPERM;
++		}
++		break;
++	case SPROLE:
++	case SPROLEPAM:
++		if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		if (current->role->expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), current->role->expires)) {
++			current->role->expires = 0;
++			current->role->auth_attempts = 0;
++		}
++
++		if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES &&
++		    time_after(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) {
++			error = -EBUSY;
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		if (lookup_special_role_auth
++		    (gr_usermode->mode, gr_usermode->sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum)
++		    && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum)
++			|| !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) {
++			char *p = "";
++			assign_special_role(gr_usermode->sp_role);
++			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++			if (current->parent)
++				p = current->parent->role->rolename;
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++			gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG,
++					p, acl_sp_role_value);
++		} else {
++			gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role);
++			error = -EPERM;
++			if(!(current->role->auth_attempts++))
++				current->role->expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
++
++			goto out;
++		}
++		break;
++	case UNSPROLE:
++		if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG);
++			error = -EAGAIN;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL) {
++			char *p = "";
++			int i = 0;
++
++			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++			if (current->parent) {
++				p = current->parent->role->rolename;
++				i = current->parent->acl_role_id;
++			}
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++			gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG, p, i);
++			gr_set_acls(1);
++		} else {
++			gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG, current->role->rolename);
++			error = -EPERM;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->mode);
++		error = -EINVAL;
++		break;
++	}
++
++	if (error != -EPERM)
++		goto out;
++
++	if(!(gr_auth_attempts++))
++		gr_auth_expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
++
++      out:
++	up(&gr_dev_sem);
++	return error;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_acls(const int type)
++{
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	struct task_struct *task, *task2;
++	struct file *filp;
++	struct acl_role_label *role = current->role;
++	__u16 acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	do_each_thread(task2, task) {
++		/* check to see if we're called from the exit handler,
++		   if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin
++		   ACL */
++
++		if (type && (task->role != role ||
++			     task->acl_role_id != acl_role_id))
++			continue;
++
++		task->acl_role_id = 0;
++		task->acl_sp_role = 0;
++
++		if ((filp = task->exec_file)) {
++			task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid);
++
++			task->acl =
++			    chk_subj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt,
++					   task->role);
++			if (task->acl) {
++				struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++				curr = task->acl;
++
++				task->is_writable = 0;
++				/* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable 
++				   by the default ACL */
++				obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, default_role->root_label);
++				if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++					task->is_writable = 1;
++				obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, task->role->root_label);
++				if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++					task->is_writable = 1;
++
++				gr_set_proc_res(task);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++				printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++			} else {
++				read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++				read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++				gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm, task->pid);
++				return 1;
++			}
++		} else {
++			// it's a kernel process
++			task->role = kernel_role;
++			task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
++			task->acl->mode &= ~GR_PROCFIND;
++#endif
++		}
++	} while_each_thread(task2, task);
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++		  const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *acl;
++
++	if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) &&
++		     task->acl && (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))))
++		goto skip_reslog;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted, gt);
++#endif
++      skip_reslog:
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted))
++		return;
++
++	acl = task->acl;
++
++	if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) ||
++		   !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res))))
++		return;
++
++	if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) {
++		unsigned long res_add;
++
++		res_add = wanted;
++		switch (res) {
++		case RLIMIT_CPU:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_FSIZE:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_DATA:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_STACK:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_CORE:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_RSS:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_NPROC:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_NOFILE:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_AS:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP;
++			break;
++		case RLIMIT_LOCKS:
++			res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add;
++
++		if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max)
++			acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add;
++
++		security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename,
++			       task->role->roletype, acl->filename,
++			       acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max,
++			       "", (unsigned long) res);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++void
++pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task = current;
++        struct acl_subject_label *proc;
++	unsigned long flags;
++
++        if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++                return;
++
++	flags = pax_get_flags(task);
++
++        proc = task->acl;
++
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_PAGEEXEC)
++		flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_SEGMEXEC)
++		flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_RANDMMAP)
++		flags &= ~MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_EMUTRAMP)
++		flags &= ~MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_MPROTECT)
++		flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_PAGEEXEC)
++		flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_SEGMEXEC)
++		flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_RANDMMAP)
++		flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_EMUTRAMP)
++		flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++	if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_MPROTECT)
++		flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++
++	pax_set_flags(task, flags);
++
++        return;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++/* Eric Biederman likes breaking userland ABI and every inode-based security
++   system to save 35kb of memory */
++
++/* we modify the passed in filename, but adjust it back before returning */
++static struct acl_object_label *gr_lookup_by_name(char *name, unsigned int len)
++{
++	struct name_entry *nmatch;
++	char *p, *lastp = NULL;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj = NULL, *tmp;
++	struct acl_subject_label *tmpsubj;
++	char c = '\0';
++
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	p = name + len - 1;
++	do {
++		nmatch = lookup_name_entry(name);
++		if (lastp != NULL)
++			*lastp = c;
++
++		if (nmatch == NULL)
++			goto next_component;
++		tmpsubj = current->acl;
++		do {
++			obj = lookup_acl_obj_label(nmatch->inode, nmatch->device, tmpsubj);
++			if (obj != NULL) {
++				tmp = obj->globbed;
++				while (tmp) {
++					if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, name)) {
++						obj = tmp;
++						goto found_obj;
++					}
++					tmp = tmp->next;
++				}
++				goto found_obj;
++			}
++		} while ((tmpsubj = tmpsubj->parent_subject));
++next_component:
++		/* end case */
++		if (p == name)
++			break;
++
++		while (*p != '/')
++			p--;
++		if (p == name)
++			lastp = p + 1;
++		else {
++			lastp = p;
++			p--;
++		}
++		c = *lastp;
++		*lastp = '\0';
++	} while (1);
++found_obj:
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	/* obj returned will always be non-null */
++	return obj;
++}
++
++/* returns 0 when allowing, non-zero on error
++   op of 0 is used for readdir, so we don't log the names of hidden files
++*/
++__u32
++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const int op)
++{
++	ctl_table *tmp;
++	const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys";
++	char *path;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj;
++	unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i;
++	__u32 err = 0;
++	__u32 mode = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	/* for now, ignore operations on non-sysctl entries if it's not a
++	   readdir*/
++	if (table->child != NULL && op != 0)
++		return 0;
++
++	mode |= GR_FIND;
++	/* it's only a read if it's an entry, read on dirs is for readdir */
++	if (op & 004)
++		mode |= GR_READ;
++	if (op & 002)
++		mode |= GR_WRITE;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++
++	path = per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id());
++
++	/* it's only a read/write if it's an actual entry, not a dir
++	   (which are opened for readdir)
++	*/
++
++	/* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */
++
++	for (tmp = (ctl_table *)table; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->parent) {
++		len += strlen(tmp->procname);
++		len++;
++		depth++;
++	}
++
++	if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE) {
++		/* deny */
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++
++	memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys));
++
++	pos += strlen(proc_sys);
++
++	for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
++		path[pos] = '/';
++		pos++;
++		for (i = 1, tmp = (ctl_table *)table; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->parent) {
++			if (depth == i) {
++				memcpy(path + pos, tmp->procname,
++				       strlen(tmp->procname));
++				pos += strlen(tmp->procname);
++			}
++			i++;
++		}
++	}
++
++	obj = gr_lookup_by_name(path, pos);
++	err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) &&
++		     ((err & mode) != mode))) {
++		__u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++		new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++		err = 0;
++		gr_log_learn_sysctl(current, path, new_mode);
++	} else if (!(err & GR_FIND) && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS) && op != 0) {
++		gr_log_hidden_sysctl(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, path);
++		err = -ENOENT;
++	} else if (!(err & GR_FIND)) {
++		err = -ENOENT;
++	} else if (((err & mode) & ~GR_FIND) != (mode & ~GR_FIND) && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
++		gr_log_str4(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++			       path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
++			       (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "");
++		err = -EACCES;
++	} else if ((err & mode) != mode) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++	} else if ((((err & mode) & ~GR_FIND) == (mode & ~GR_FIND)) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		gr_log_str4(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++			       path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
++			       (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "");
++		err = 0;
++	} else
++		err = 0;
++
++      out:
++	preempt_enable();
++
++	return err;
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	struct file *filp;
++	struct task_struct *tmp = task;
++	struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
++	__u32 retmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	filp = task->exec_file;
++
++	while (tmp->pid > 0) {
++		if (tmp == curtemp)
++			break;
++		tmp = tmp->parent;
++	}
++
++	if (!filp || (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE))) {
++		read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_path.dentry, GR_NOPTRACE, filp->f_path.mnt);
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) && !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD)
++	    && (current->acl != task->acl || (current->acl != current->role->root_label
++	    && current->pid != task->pid)))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
++{
++	struct task_struct *tmp = task;
++	struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
++	__u32 retmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 0;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	while (tmp->pid > 0) {
++		if (tmp == curtemp)
++			break;
++		tmp = tmp->parent;
++	}
++
++	if (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE)) {
++		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (unlikely(!task->exec_file)) {
++		read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	retmode = gr_search_file(task->exec_file->f_path.dentry, GR_PTRACERD | GR_NOPTRACE, task->exec_file->f_path.mnt);
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++
++	if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) {
++		gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
++		return 1;
++	}
++		
++	if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) {
++		switch (request) {
++		case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
++		case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
++		case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PPC64) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA) && !defined(CONFIG_IA64)
++		case PTRACE_SETREGS:
++		case PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++		case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS:
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
++		case PTRACE_SETVRREGS:
++#endif
++			return 1;
++		default:
++			return 0;
++		}
++	} else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) &&
++		   !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
++		   (current->acl != task->acl)) {
++		gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int is_writable_mmap(const struct file *filp)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task = current;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2;
++
++	if (gr_status & GR_READY && !(task->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) &&
++	    !task->is_writable && S_ISREG(filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
++		obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt, default_role->root_label);
++		obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt,
++				     task->role->root_label);
++		if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) {
++			gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG, filp->f_path.dentry, filp->f_path.mnt);
++			return 1;
++		}
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (is_writable_mmap(file))
++		return 0;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(file->f_path.dentry,
++			   GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   file->f_path.mnt);
++
++	if (!gr_tpe_allow(file))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (is_writable_mmap(file))
++		return 0;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(file->f_path.dentry,
++			   GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   file->f_path.mnt);
++
++	if (!gr_tpe_allow(file))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
++{
++	unsigned long runtime;
++	unsigned long cputime;
++	unsigned int wday, cday;
++	__u8 whr, chr;
++	__u8 wmin, cmin;
++	__u8 wsec, csec;
++	struct timespec timeval;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl ||
++		     !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT)))
++		return;
++
++	do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&timeval);
++	runtime = timeval.tv_sec - task->start_time.tv_sec;
++	wday = runtime / (3600 * 24);
++	runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24);
++	whr = runtime / 3600;
++	runtime -= whr * 3600;
++	wmin = runtime / 60;
++	runtime -= wmin * 60;
++	wsec = runtime;
++
++	cputime = (task->utime + task->stime) / HZ;
++	cday = cputime / (3600 * 24);
++	cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24);
++	chr = cputime / 3600;
++	cputime -= chr * 3600;
++	cmin = cputime / 60;
++	cputime -= cmin * 60;
++	csec = cputime;
++
++	gr_log_procacct(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, task, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, code);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
++		task->role = kernel_role;
++		task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++	}
++	return;
++}
++
++int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name, const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task = current;
++	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
++	struct acl_object_label *obj, *tmp;
++	struct acl_subject_label *subj;
++	unsigned int bufsize;
++	int is_not_root;
++	char *path;
++
++	if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
++		return 1;
++
++	/* ignore Eric Biederman */
++	if (IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))
++		return 1;
++
++	subj = task->acl;
++	do {
++		obj = lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj);
++		if (obj != NULL)
++			return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
++	} while ((subj = subj->parent_subject));
++	
++	obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl);
++	if (obj->globbed == NULL)
++		return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
++
++	is_not_root = ((obj->filename[0] == '/') &&
++		   (obj->filename[1] == '\0')) ? 0 : 1;
++	bufsize = PAGE_SIZE - namelen - is_not_root;
++
++	/* check bufsize > PAGE_SIZE || bufsize == 0 */
++	if (unlikely((bufsize - 1) > (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
++		return 1;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++	path = d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
++			   bufsize);
++
++	bufsize = strlen(path);
++
++	/* if base is "/", don't append an additional slash */
++	if (is_not_root)
++		*(path + bufsize) = '/';
++	memcpy(path + bufsize + is_not_root, name, namelen);
++	*(path + bufsize + namelen + is_not_root) = '\0';
++
++	tmp = obj->globbed;
++	while (tmp) {
++		if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, path)) {
++			preempt_enable();
++			return (tmp->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
++		}
++		tmp = tmp->next;
++	}
++	preempt_enable();
++	return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change);
++#endif
++
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c b/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1;
++static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1;
++static void **alloc_stack;
++
++static __inline__ int
++alloc_pop(void)
++{
++	if (alloc_stack_next == 1)
++		return 0;
++
++	kfree(alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 2]);
++
++	alloc_stack_next--;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++alloc_push(void *buf)
++{
++	if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size)
++		BUG();
++
++	alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 1] = buf;
++
++	alloc_stack_next++;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void *
++acl_alloc(unsigned long len)
++{
++	void *ret;
++
++	if (len > PAGE_SIZE)
++		BUG();
++
++	ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++	if (ret)
++		alloc_push(ret);
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++void
++acl_free_all(void)
++{
++	if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack)
++		return;
++
++	while (alloc_pop()) ;
++
++	if (alloc_stack) {
++		if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++			kfree(alloc_stack);
++		else
++			vfree(alloc_stack);
++	}
++
++	alloc_stack = NULL;
++	alloc_stack_size = 1;
++	alloc_stack_next = 1;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size)
++{
++	if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++		alloc_stack =
++		    (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
++	else
++		alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *));
++
++	alloc_stack_size = size;
++
++	if (!alloc_stack)
++		return 0;
++	else
++		return 1;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c b/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static const char *captab_log[] = {
++	"CAP_CHOWN",
++	"CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
++	"CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH",
++	"CAP_FOWNER",
++	"CAP_FSETID",
++	"CAP_KILL",
++	"CAP_SETGID",
++	"CAP_SETUID",
++	"CAP_SETPCAP",
++	"CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE",
++	"CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
++	"CAP_NET_BROADCAST",
++	"CAP_NET_ADMIN",
++	"CAP_NET_RAW",
++	"CAP_IPC_LOCK",
++	"CAP_IPC_OWNER",
++	"CAP_SYS_MODULE",
++	"CAP_SYS_RAWIO",
++	"CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
++	"CAP_SYS_PTRACE",
++	"CAP_SYS_PACCT",
++	"CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
++	"CAP_SYS_BOOT",
++	"CAP_SYS_NICE",
++	"CAP_SYS_RESOURCE",
++	"CAP_SYS_TIME",
++	"CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG",
++	"CAP_MKNOD",
++	"CAP_LEASE",
++	"CAP_AUDIT_WRITE",
++	"CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL",
++	"CAP_SETFCAP",
++	"CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE",
++	"CAP_MAC_ADMIN"
++};
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_is_capable_nolog);
++
++int
++gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	kernel_cap_t cap_drop = __cap_empty_set, cap_mask = __cap_empty_set;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return 1;
++
++	curracl = task->acl;
++
++	cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
++	cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
++
++	while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
++		/* if the cap isn't specified in the current computed mask but is specified in the
++		   current level subject, and is lowered in the current level subject, then add
++		   it to the set of dropped capabilities
++		   otherwise, add the current level subject's mask to the current computed mask
++		 */
++		if (!cap_raised(cap_mask, cap) && cap_raised(curracl->cap_mask, cap)) {
++			cap_raise(cap_mask, cap);
++			if (cap_raised(curracl->cap_lower, cap))
++				cap_raise(cap_drop, cap);
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
++		return 1;
++
++	curracl = task->acl;
++
++	if ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
++	    && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) {
++		security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename,
++			       task->role->roletype, task->uid,
++			       task->gid, task->exec_file ?
++			       gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_path.dentry,
++			       task->exec_file->f_path.mnt) : curracl->filename,
++			       curracl->filename, 0UL,
++			       0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < (sizeof(captab_log)/sizeof(captab_log[0]))) && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap))
++		gr_log_cap(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, task, captab_log[cap]);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	kernel_cap_t cap_drop = __cap_empty_set, cap_mask = __cap_empty_set;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return 1;
++
++	curracl = current->acl;
++
++	cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
++	cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
++
++	while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
++		/* if the cap isn't specified in the current computed mask but is specified in the
++		   current level subject, and is lowered in the current level subject, then add
++		   it to the set of dropped capabilities
++		   otherwise, add the current level subject's mask to the current computed mask
++		 */
++		if (!cap_raised(cap_mask, cap) && cap_raised(curracl->cap_mask, cap)) {
++			cap_raise(cap_mask, cap);
++			if (cap_raised(curracl->cap_lower, cap))
++				cap_raise(cap_drop, cap);
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c b/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/stat.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
++			  const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
++		return GR_FIND;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND)))
++		return 0;
++
++	return GR_FIND;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		   const int fmode)
++{
++	__u32 reqmode = GR_FIND;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
++		return reqmode;
++
++	if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
++		reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
++	else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE))
++		reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
++	if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
++		reqmode |= GR_READ;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++			       GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
++		return reqmode;
++	} else
++	    if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	{
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++			       GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return reqmode;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * p_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
++		    const int imode)
++{
++	__u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
++		reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
++	if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
++		reqmode |= GR_READ;
++	if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))))
++		reqmode |= GR_SETID;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt,
++			    reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt,
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++			       GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
++		return reqmode;
++	} else
++	    if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	{
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt,
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++			       GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return reqmode;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		     const int fmode)
++{
++	__u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND;
++
++	if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
++		reqmode |= GR_EXEC;
++	if (fmode & S_IWOTH)
++		reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
++	if (fmode & S_IROTH)
++		reqmode |= GR_READ;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
++			   mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "");
++		return reqmode;
++	} else
++	    if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++	{
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
++			       reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
++			       reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "");
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return reqmode;
++}
++
++static __u32 generic_fs_handler(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode)))
++		return 0;
++
++	return (reqmode);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++		     mode_t mode)
++{
++	if (unlikely(dentry->d_inode && S_ISSOCK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
++		return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
++				   GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	} else {
++		return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	}
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++		    mode_t mode)
++{
++	if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
++		return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
++				   GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	} else {
++		return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++	}
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE,
++			   GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++/* hardlinks require at minimum create permission,
++   any additional privilege required is based on the
++   privilege of the file being linked to
++*/
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		   const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		   const struct dentry * old_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++	__u32 needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_LINK;
++	__u32 needaudit = GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_LINK;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry,
++			  old_mnt);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && (mode & needaudit))) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		      const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		      const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
++{
++	__u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	mode =
++	    gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++			    GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
++			    GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
++		return 0;
++
++	return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++}
++
++static __u32 generic_fs_create_handler(const struct dentry *new_dentry, const struct dentry *parent_dentry, const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt)
++{
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++	if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
++		return mode;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
++		return 0;
++	} else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode)))
++		return 0;
++
++	return (reqmode);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		    const int mode)
++{
++	__u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++	if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))
++		reqmode |= GR_SETID;
++
++	return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++				  reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt)
++{
++	return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++				  GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \
++	(((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \
++	 ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)))
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		     struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++		     const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++		     struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		     struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++		     struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
++{
++	__u32 comp1, comp2;
++	int error = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!new_dentry->d_inode) {
++		comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++					GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
++					GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++		comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
++				       GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++				       GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
++				       GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
++	} else {
++		comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
++				       GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE |
++				       GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++				       GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
++				       GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt);
++		comp2 =
++		    gr_search_file(old_dentry,
++				   GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
++				   GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++				   GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
++	}
++
++	if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) &&
++	    ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS)))
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname);
++	else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS)
++		 && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
++		gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname);
++		error = -EACCES;
++	} else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2)))
++		error = -EACCES;
++
++	return error;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
++{
++	u16 id;
++	char *rolename;
++	struct file *exec_file;
++
++	if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) {
++		id = current->acl_role_id;
++		rolename = current->role->rolename;
++		gr_set_acls(1);
++		gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG, rolename, id);
++	}
++
++	write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	exec_file = current->exec_file;
++	current->exec_file = NULL;
++	write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++
++	if (exec_file)
++		fput(exec_file);
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (task != current && task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD)
++		return -EACCES;
++
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c b/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <linux/udp.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/netdevice.h>
++#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++#define GR_BIND 	0x01
++#define GR_CONNECT 	0x02
++#define GR_INVERT 	0x04
++
++static const char * gr_protocols[256] = {
++	"ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt",
++	"egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet",
++	"chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1",
++	"trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp",
++	"merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++",
++	"il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre",
++	"mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile",
++	"tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63",
++	"sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv",
++	"cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak", 
++	"iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf", 
++	"eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp",
++	"scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim",
++	"aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip",
++	"vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp",
++	"uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup",
++	"sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135",
++	"unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143",
++	"unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151",
++	"unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159",
++	"unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167",
++	"unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175",
++	"unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183",
++	"unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191",
++	"unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199",
++	"unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207",
++	"unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215",
++	"unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223",
++	"unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231",
++	"unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239",
++	"unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247",
++	"unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255",
++	};
++
++static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = {
++	"unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6", 
++	"unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet"
++	};
++
++const char *
++gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto)
++{
++	return gr_protocols[proto];
++}
++
++const char *
++gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type)
++{
++	return gr_socktypes[type];
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		goto exit;
++
++	if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET)
++	    || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255))
++		goto exit;	// let the kernel handle it
++
++	curr = current->acl;
++
++	if (!curr->ips)
++		goto exit;
++
++	if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) &&
++	    (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32))))
++		goto exit;
++
++	if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
++		/* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes
++		   dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not
++		   bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */
++		if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) {
++			__u32 fakeip = 0;
++			security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++				       current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++				       current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++				       gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_path.dentry,
++				       current->exec_file->f_path.mnt) :
++				       curr->filename, curr->filename,
++				       NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
++				       protocol, GR_CONNECT, 
++NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
++		} else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) {
++			__u32 fakeip = 0;
++			security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++				       current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++				       current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++				       gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_path.dentry,
++				       current->exec_file->f_path.mnt) :
++				       curr->filename, curr->filename,
++				       NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
++				       protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
++		}
++		/* we'll log when they use connect or bind */
++		goto exit;
++	}
++
++	gr_log_str3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet", 
++		    gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol));
++
++	return 0;
++      exit:
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int check_ip_policy(struct acl_ip_label *ip, __u32 ip_addr, __u16 ip_port, __u8 protocol, const int mode, const int type, __u32 our_addr, __u32 our_netmask)
++{
++	if ((ip->mode & mode) &&
++	    (ip_port >= ip->low) &&
++	    (ip_port <= ip->high) &&
++	    ((ntohl(ip_addr) & our_netmask) ==
++	     (ntohl(our_addr) & our_netmask))
++	    && (ip->proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32)))
++	    && (ip->type & (1 << type))) {
++		if (ip->mode & GR_INVERT)
++			return 2; // specifically denied
++		else
++			return 1; // allowed
++	}
++
++	return 0; // not specifically allowed, may continue parsing
++}
++
++static int
++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk,
++		      const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type)
++{
++	char iface[IFNAMSIZ] = {0};
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++	struct acl_ip_label *ip;
++	struct net_device *dev;
++	struct in_device *idev;
++	unsigned long i;
++	int ret;
++	__u32 ip_addr = 0;
++	__u32 our_addr;
++	__u32 our_netmask;
++	char *p;
++	__u16 ip_port = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->sk_family != PF_INET))
++		return 1;
++
++	curr = current->acl;
++
++	if (!curr->ips)
++		return 1;
++
++	ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
++	ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
++
++	if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
++		security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++			       current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++			       current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++			       gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_path.dentry,
++			       current->exec_file->f_path.mnt) :
++			       curr->filename, curr->filename,
++			       NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type,
++			       sk->sk_protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) {
++		ip = *(curr->ips + i);
++		if (ip->iface != NULL) {
++			strncpy(iface, ip->iface, IFNAMSIZ - 1);
++			p = strchr(iface, ':');
++			if (p != NULL)
++				*p = '\0';
++			dev = dev_get_by_name(sk->sk_net, iface);
++			if (dev == NULL)
++				continue;
++			idev = in_dev_get(dev);
++			if (idev == NULL) {
++				dev_put(dev);
++				continue;
++			}
++			rcu_read_lock();
++			for_ifa(idev) {
++				if (!strcmp(ip->iface, ifa->ifa_label)) {
++					our_addr = ifa->ifa_address;
++					our_netmask = 0xffffffff;
++					ret = check_ip_policy(ip, ip_addr, ip_port, sk->sk_protocol, mode, type, our_addr, our_netmask);
++					if (ret == 1) {
++						rcu_read_unlock();
++						in_dev_put(idev);
++						dev_put(dev);
++						return 1;
++					} else if (ret == 2) {
++						rcu_read_unlock();
++						in_dev_put(idev);
++						dev_put(dev);
++						goto denied;
++					}
++				}
++			} endfor_ifa(idev);
++			rcu_read_unlock();
++			in_dev_put(idev);
++			dev_put(dev);
++		} else {
++			our_addr = ip->addr;
++			our_netmask = ip->netmask;
++			ret = check_ip_policy(ip, ip_addr, ip_port, sk->sk_protocol, mode, type, our_addr, our_netmask);
++			if (ret == 1)
++				return 1;
++			else if (ret == 2)
++				goto denied;
++		}
++	}
++
++denied:
++	if (mode == GR_BIND)
++		gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol));
++	else if (mode == GR_CONNECT)
++		gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol));
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++	struct sockaddr_in addr;
++
++	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr;
++	addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
++
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock)
++{
++	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
++	struct sockaddr_in addr;
++
++	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr;
++	addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
++
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	if (addr)
++		return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM);
++	else {
++		struct sockaddr_in sin;
++		const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
++
++		sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet->daddr;
++		sin.sin_port = inet->dport;
++
++		return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
++	}
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_in sin;
++
++	if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr)))
++		return 1;	// skip this packet
++
++	sin.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
++	sin.sin_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
++
++	return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c b/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/poll.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
++				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++
++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait);
++static int gr_learn_attached;
++
++/* use a 512k buffer */
++#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE (512 * 1024)
++
++static spinlock_t gr_learn_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_learn_user_sem);
++
++/* we need to maintain two buffers, so that the kernel context of grlearn
++   uses a semaphore around the userspace copying, and the other kernel contexts
++   use a spinlock when copying into the buffer, since they cannot sleep
++*/
++static char *learn_buffer;
++static char *learn_buffer_user;
++static int learn_buffer_len;
++static int learn_buffer_user_len;
++
++static ssize_t
++read_learn(struct file *file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
++{
++	DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
++	ssize_t retval = 0;
++
++	add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
++	set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
++	do {
++		down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		if (learn_buffer_len)
++			break;
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
++			retval = -EAGAIN;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		if (signal_pending(current)) {
++			retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		schedule();
++	} while (1);
++
++	memcpy(learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer, learn_buffer_len);
++	learn_buffer_user_len = learn_buffer_len;
++	retval = learn_buffer_len;
++	learn_buffer_len = 0;
++
++	spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++
++	if (copy_to_user(buf, learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer_user_len))
++		retval = -EFAULT;
++
++	up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++out:
++	set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
++	remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
++	return retval;
++}
++
++static unsigned int
++poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait)
++{
++	poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait);
++
++	if (learn_buffer_len)
++		return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_clear_learn_entries(void)
++{
++	char *tmp;
++
++	down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++	if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
++		spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		tmp = learn_buffer;
++		learn_buffer = NULL;
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		vfree(learn_buffer);
++	}
++	if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
++		vfree(learn_buffer_user);
++		learn_buffer_user = NULL;
++	}
++	learn_buffer_len = 0;
++	up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++	va_list args;
++	unsigned int len;
++
++	if (!gr_learn_attached)
++		return;
++
++	spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++
++	/* leave a gap at the end so we know when it's "full" but don't have to
++	   compute the exact length of the string we're trying to append
++	*/
++	if (learn_buffer_len > LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 16384) {
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
++		return;
++	}
++	if (learn_buffer == NULL) {
++		spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	va_start(args, fmt);
++	len = vsnprintf(learn_buffer + learn_buffer_len, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - learn_buffer_len, fmt, args);
++	va_end(args);
++
++	learn_buffer_len += len + 1;
++
++	spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++	wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static int
++open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached)
++		return -EBUSY;
++	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
++		int retval = 0;
++		down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		if (learn_buffer == NULL)
++			learn_buffer = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
++		if (learn_buffer_user == NULL)
++			learn_buffer_user = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
++		if (learn_buffer == NULL) {
++			retval = -ENOMEM;
++			goto out_error;
++		}
++		if (learn_buffer_user == NULL) {
++			retval = -ENOMEM;
++			goto out_error;
++		}
++		learn_buffer_len = 0;
++		learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
++		gr_learn_attached = 1;
++out_error:
++		up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		return retval;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++	char *tmp;
++
++	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
++		down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++		if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
++			spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
++			tmp = learn_buffer;
++			learn_buffer = NULL;
++			spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
++			vfree(tmp);
++		}
++		if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
++			vfree(learn_buffer_user);
++			learn_buffer_user = NULL;
++		}
++		learn_buffer_len = 0;
++		learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
++		gr_learn_attached = 0;
++		up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++		
++struct file_operations grsec_fops = {
++	.read		= read_learn,
++	.write		= write_grsec_handler,
++	.open		= open_learn,
++	.release	= close_learn,
++	.poll		= poll_learn,
++};
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_res.c b/grsecurity/gracl_res.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_res.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_res.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static const char *restab_log[] = {
++	[RLIMIT_CPU] = "RLIMIT_CPU",
++	[RLIMIT_FSIZE] = "RLIMIT_FSIZE",
++	[RLIMIT_DATA] = "RLIMIT_DATA",
++	[RLIMIT_STACK] = "RLIMIT_STACK",
++	[RLIMIT_CORE] = "RLIMIT_CORE",
++	[RLIMIT_RSS] = "RLIMIT_RSS",
++	[RLIMIT_NPROC] = "RLIMIT_NPROC",
++	[RLIMIT_NOFILE] = "RLIMIT_NOFILE",
++	[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK] = "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK",
++	[RLIMIT_AS] = "RLIMIT_AS",
++	[RLIMIT_LOCKS] = "RLIMIT_LOCKS",
++	[RLIMIT_LOCKS + 1] = "RLIMIT_CRASH"
++};
++
++void
++gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++		const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
++{
++	if (res == RLIMIT_NPROC && 
++	    (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || 
++	     cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)))
++		return;
++	else if (res == RLIMIT_MEMLOCK &&
++		 cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_IPC_LOCK))
++		return;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled() && !grsec_resource_logging)
++		return;
++
++	preempt_disable();
++
++	if (unlikely(((gt && wanted > task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur) ||
++		      (!gt && wanted >= task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur)) &&
++		     task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY))
++		gr_log_res_ulong2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RESOURCE_MSG, task, wanted, restab_log[res], task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur);
++	preempt_enable_no_resched();
++
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c b/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/timer.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static struct crash_uid *uid_set;
++static unsigned short uid_used;
++static spinlock_t gr_uid_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock;
++extern struct acl_subject_label *
++	lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t inode, const dev_t dev,
++			      struct acl_role_label *role);
++extern int specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t);
++
++int
++gr_init_uidset(void)
++{
++	uid_set =
++	    kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL);
++	uid_used = 0;
++
++	return uid_set ? 1 : 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_free_uidset(void)
++{
++	if (uid_set)
++		kfree(uid_set);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++	struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set;
++	uid_t buid;
++	int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid;
++
++	while (high >= low) {
++		mid = (low + high) >> 1;
++		buid = tmp[mid].uid;
++		if (buid == uid)
++			return mid;
++		if (buid > uid)
++			high = mid - 1;
++		if (buid < uid)
++			low = mid + 1;
++	}
++
++	return -1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_insertsort(void)
++{
++	unsigned short i, j;
++	struct crash_uid index;
++
++	for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) {
++		index = uid_set[i];
++		j = i;
++		while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) {
++			uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1];
++			j--;
++		}
++		uid_set[j] = index;
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires)
++{
++	int loc;
++
++	if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX)
++		return;
++
++	loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
++
++	if (loc >= 0) {
++		uid_set[loc].expires = expires;
++		return;
++	}
++
++	uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid;
++	uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires;
++	uid_used++;
++
++	gr_insertsort();
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc)
++{
++	unsigned short i;
++
++	for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++)
++		uid_set[i - 1] = uid_set[i];
++
++	uid_used--;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++	int loc;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	spin_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++	loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
++
++	if (loc < 0)
++		goto out_unlock;
++
++	if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, get_seconds()))
++		gr_remove_uid(loc);
++	else
++		ret = 1;
++
++out_unlock:
++	spin_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++static __inline__ int
++proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid ||
++	    task->uid != task->fsuid)
++		return 1;
++	if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid ||
++	    task->gid != task->fsgid)
++		return 1;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++static __inline__ int
++gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
++{
++	unsigned long int flags;
++	int ret, blocked, ignored;
++	struct k_sigaction *action;
++
++	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
++	action = &t->sighand->action[sig-1];
++	ignored = action->sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN;
++	blocked = sigismember(&t->blocked, sig);
++	if (blocked || ignored) {
++		action->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
++		if (blocked) {
++			sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig);
++			recalc_sigpending_and_wake(t);
++		}
++	}
++	ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, (void*)1L, t);
++	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
++
++	return ret;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr2;
++	struct task_struct *tsk, *tsk2;
++
++	if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL)
++		return;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return;
++
++	curr = task->acl;
++
++	if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)))
++		return;
++
++	if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
++		curr->expires = 0;
++		curr->crashes = 0;
++	}
++
++	curr->crashes++;
++
++	if (!curr->expires)
++		curr->expires = get_seconds() + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max;
++
++	if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
++	    time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
++		if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) {
++			gr_log_crash1(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
++			spin_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++			gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires);
++			spin_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++			curr->expires = 0;
++			curr->crashes = 0;
++			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++			do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) {
++				if (tsk != task && tsk->uid == task->uid)
++					gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
++			} while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk);
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		} else {
++			gr_log_crash2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
++			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++			do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) {
++				if (likely(tsk != task)) {
++					curr2 = tsk->acl;
++
++					if (curr2->device == curr->device &&
++					    curr2->inode == curr->inode)
++						gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
++				}
++			} while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk);
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++		}
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return 0;
++
++	read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++	curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++				     filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev,
++				     current->role);
++	read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++	if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) ||
++	    (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires))
++		return 0;
++
++	if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
++	    time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds()))
++		return 1;
++	else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
++		curr->crashes = 0;
++		curr->expires = 0;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++	__u32 curr_ip;
++	struct task_struct *p, *p2;
++
++	if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++		return;
++
++	curracl = task->acl;
++	curr_ip = task->signal->curr_ip;
++
++	if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip) {
++		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++		do_each_thread(p2, p) {
++			if (p->signal->curr_ip == curr_ip)
++				gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, p);
++		} while_each_thread(p2, p);
++		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++	} else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC)
++		gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task);
++
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c b/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c
+--- a/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/ipc.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++		const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
++{
++	struct task_struct *task;
++
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return 1;
++
++	task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid);
++
++	if (unlikely(!task))
++		task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid);
++
++	if (unlikely(task && (time_before_eq((unsigned long)task->start_time.tv_sec, (unsigned long)shm_createtime) ||
++			      (task->pid == shm_lapid)) &&
++		     (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) &&
++		     (task->acl != current->acl))) {
++		gr_log_int3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c b/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group &&
++	     in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir &&
++					      !grsec_enable_group)) {
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++	}
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c b/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	struct pid *spid = NULL;
++
++	if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
++		return 1;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	spid = find_pid(pid);
++	if (spid) {
++		struct task_struct *p;
++		p = pid_task(spid, PIDTYPE_PID);
++		task_lock(p);
++		if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
++			task_unlock(p);
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG);
++			return 0;
++		}
++		task_unlock(p);
++	}
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_nice(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, const int niceval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (niceval < task_nice(p))
++			&& proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) && 
++	    inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++		return 1;
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || !proc_is_chrooted(current) || p == NULL)
++		return 0;
++
++	task_lock(p);
++	if ((p->exit_state & (EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD)) ||
++	    !have_same_root(current, p)) {
++		task_unlock(p);
++		return 1;
++	}
++	task_unlock(p);
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR)
++int gr_is_outside_chroot(const struct dentry *u_dentry, const struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
++{
++	struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *)u_dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *)u_mnt;
++	struct dentry *realroot;
++	struct vfsmount *realrootmnt;
++	struct dentry *currentroot;
++	struct vfsmount *currentmnt;
++	struct task_struct *reaper = current->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper;
++	int ret = 1;
++
++	read_lock(&reaper->fs->lock);
++	realrootmnt = mntget(reaper->fs->root.mnt);
++	realroot = dget(reaper->fs->root.dentry);
++	read_unlock(&reaper->fs->lock);
++
++	read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
++	currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->root.mnt);
++	currentroot = dget(current->fs->root.dentry);
++	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
++
++	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++	for (;;) {
++		if (unlikely((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
++		     || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt)))
++			break;
++		if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
++			if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++				break;
++			dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++			mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++			continue;
++		}
++		dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++	}
++	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++
++	dput(currentroot);
++	mntput(currentmnt);
++
++	/* access is outside of chroot */
++	if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
++		ret = 0;
++
++	dput(realroot);
++	mntput(realrootmnt);
++	return ret;
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
++		return 1;
++
++	if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
++		return 1;
++	else if (!gr_is_outside_chroot(u_dentry, u_mnt)) {
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG, u_dentry, u_mnt);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++		const time_t shm_createtime)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	struct pid *pid = NULL;
++	time_t starttime;
++
++	if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat))
++		return 1;
++
++	if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
++		return 1;
++
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++	pid = find_pid(shm_cprid);
++	if (pid) {
++		struct task_struct *p;
++		p = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
++		task_lock(p);
++		starttime = p->start_time.tv_sec;
++		if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p) &&
++			     time_before_eq((unsigned long)starttime, (unsigned long)shm_createtime))) {
++			task_unlock(p);
++			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++			gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG);
++			return 0;
++		}
++		task_unlock(p);
++	} else {
++		pid = find_pid(shm_lapid);
++		if (pid) {
++			struct task_struct *p;
++			p = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
++			task_lock(p);
++			if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
++				task_unlock(p);
++				read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++				gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG);
++				return 0;
++			}
++			task_unlock(p);
++		}
++	}
++
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current))
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISREG(mode) && 
++	    proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		gr_log_str_fs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name, dentry, mnt);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
++	    !gr_is_outside_chroot(dentry, mnt)) {
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) {
++		kernel_cap_t chroot_caps = GR_CHROOT_CAPS;
++		task->cap_permitted =
++		    cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, chroot_caps);
++		task->cap_inheritable =
++		    cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, chroot_caps);
++		task->cap_effective =
++		    cap_drop(task->cap_effective, chroot_caps);
++	}
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current)
++	    && (op & 002))
++		return -EACCES;
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct path *path)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir)
++		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, path);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod &&
++	    ((mode & S_ISUID) || ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))) &&
++	    proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_caps);
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c b/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++void
++pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++{
++	return;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++__u32
++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, const int op)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++		  const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_acls(const int type)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++		 struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		 struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		 struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock,
++		      const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
++			  const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		   const int fmode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot,
++		   unsigned int *vm_flags)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		       const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		     const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		     mode_t mode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++		    mode_t mode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++grsecurity_init(void)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		    const int mode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		      const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		      const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++		   const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++		   const struct dentry * old_dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++		     const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++		     const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++		     const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++		     const struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++		     const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name,
++		      const int namelen, const ino_t ino)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++		const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
++		    const struct dentry * p_dentry,
++		    const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
++		    const int imode)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++	return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
++{
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_is_capable_nolog);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change);
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c b/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++static char gr_exec_arg_buf[132];
++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_exec_arg_sem);
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_handle_nproc(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user &&
++	    (atomic_read(&current->user->processes) >
++	     current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) &&
++	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NPROC_MSG);
++		return -EAGAIN;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char __user *__user *argv)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	char *grarg = gr_exec_arg_buf;
++	unsigned int i, x, execlen = 0;
++	char c;
++
++	if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group &&
++	       in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid))
++	      || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group)))
++		return;
++
++	down(&gr_exec_arg_sem);
++	memset(grarg, 0, sizeof(gr_exec_arg_buf));
++
++	if (unlikely(argv == NULL))
++		goto log;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 128; i++) {
++		const char __user *p;
++		unsigned int len;
++
++		if (copy_from_user(&p, argv + i, sizeof(p)))
++			goto log;
++		if (!p)
++			goto log;
++		len = strnlen_user(p, 128 - execlen);
++		if (len > 128 - execlen)
++			len = 128 - execlen;
++		else if (len > 0)
++			len--;
++		if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len))
++			goto log;
++
++		/* rewrite unprintable characters */
++		for (x = 0; x < len; x++) {
++			c = *(grarg + execlen + x);
++			if (c < 32 || c > 126)
++				*(grarg + execlen + x) = ' ';
++		}
++
++		execlen += len;
++		*(grarg + execlen) = ' ';
++		*(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0';
++		execlen++;
++	}
++
++      log:
++	gr_log_fs_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, bprm->file->f_path.dentry,
++			bprm->file->f_path.mnt, grarg);
++	up(&gr_exec_arg_sem);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c b/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++	       const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
++	    !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
++	    (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) &&
++	    (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) {
++		if (!generic_permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode, NULL))
++			gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FIFO_MSG, dentry, mnt, dentry->d_inode->i_uid, dentry->d_inode->i_gid);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c b/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/errno.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_forkfail(const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	if (grsec_enable_forkfail && retval != -ERESTARTNOINTR)
++		gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_init.c b/grsecurity/grsec_init.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_init.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_init.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/percpu.h>
++
++int grsec_enable_link;
++int grsec_enable_dmesg;
++int grsec_enable_fifo;
++int grsec_enable_execve;
++int grsec_enable_execlog;
++int grsec_enable_signal;
++int grsec_enable_forkfail;
++int grsec_enable_time;
++int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
++int grsec_enable_group;
++int grsec_audit_gid;
++int grsec_enable_chdir;
++int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
++int grsec_enable_mount;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
++int grsec_enable_tpe;
++int grsec_tpe_gid;
++int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
++int grsec_enable_socket_all;
++int grsec_socket_all_gid;
++int grsec_enable_socket_client;
++int grsec_socket_client_gid;
++int grsec_enable_socket_server;
++int grsec_socket_server_gid;
++int grsec_resource_logging;
++int grsec_lock;
++
++spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0;
++unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
++
++spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++char *gr_shared_page[4];
++
++char *gr_alert_log_fmt;
++char *gr_audit_log_fmt;
++char *gr_alert_log_buf;
++char *gr_audit_log_buf;
++
++extern struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
++extern unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
++extern unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
++
++void
++grsecurity_init(void)
++{
++	int j;
++	/* create the per-cpu shared pages */
++
++	for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
++		gr_shared_page[j] = (char *)__alloc_percpu(PAGE_SIZE);
++		if (gr_shared_page[j] == NULL) {
++			panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page");
++			return;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* allocate log buffers */
++	gr_alert_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!gr_alert_log_fmt) {
++		panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log format buffer");
++		return;
++	}
++	gr_audit_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!gr_audit_log_fmt) {
++		panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log format buffer");
++		return;
++	}
++	gr_alert_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!gr_alert_log_buf) {
++		panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log buffer");
++		return;
++	}
++	gr_audit_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!gr_audit_log_buf) {
++		panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log buffer");
++		return;
++	}
++
++	/* allocate memory for authentication structure */
++	gr_usermode = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gr_arg), GFP_KERNEL);
++	gr_system_salt = kmalloc(GR_SALT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
++	gr_system_sum = kmalloc(GR_SHA_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++	if (!gr_usermode || !gr_system_salt || !gr_system_sum) {
++		panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity authentication structure");
++		return;
++	}
++
++#if !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON)
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	grsec_lock = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	grsec_enable_audit_textrel = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	grsec_enable_group = 1;
++	grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	grsec_enable_chdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	grsec_enable_mount = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	grsec_enable_link = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	grsec_enable_dmesg = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	grsec_enable_fifo = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	grsec_enable_execve = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	grsec_enable_execlog = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	grsec_enable_signal = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	grsec_enable_forkfail = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	grsec_enable_time = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	grsec_resource_logging = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	grsec_enable_tpe = 1;
++	grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1;
++#endif
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	grsec_enable_socket_all = 1;
++	grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	grsec_enable_socket_client = 1;
++	grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	grsec_enable_socket_server = 1;
++	grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID;
++#endif
++#endif
++
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c b/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/ipc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	      grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++					  !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0)
++	    && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT))
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	     grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++	    (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++		gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	      grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++					  !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
++	    && (semflg & IPC_CREAT))
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	     grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++	    (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++		gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	      grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++					  !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
++	    && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT))
++		gr_log_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++	     grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++	    (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++		gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_link.c b/grsecurity/grsec_link.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_link.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_link.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
++		      const struct inode *inode,
++		      const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
++	    (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) &&
++	    (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) {
++		gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++		   const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++		   struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
++	    (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
++	     ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
++	     (generic_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, NULL))) &&
++	    !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) {
++		gr_log_fs_int2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HARDLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_log.c b/grsecurity/grsec_log.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_log.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_log.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/tty.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++#define BEGIN_LOCKS(x) \
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock); \
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++	if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \
++		spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
++	else \
++		spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock)
++
++#define END_LOCKS(x) \
++	if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \
++		spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
++	else \
++		spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); \
++	if (x == GR_DONT_AUDIT) \
++		gr_handle_alertkill(current)
++
++enum {
++	FLOODING,
++	NO_FLOODING
++};
++
++extern char *gr_alert_log_fmt;
++extern char *gr_audit_log_fmt;
++extern char *gr_alert_log_buf;
++extern char *gr_audit_log_buf;
++
++static int gr_log_start(int audit)
++{
++	char *loglevel = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? KERN_INFO : KERN_ALERT;
++	char *fmt = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_fmt : gr_alert_log_fmt;
++	char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
++
++	if (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT)
++		goto set_fmt;
++
++	if (!grsec_alert_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) {
++		grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies;
++		grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
++	} else if ((jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) {
++		grsec_alert_fyet++;
++	} else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) {
++		grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies;
++		grsec_alert_fyet++;
++		printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for %d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME);
++		return FLOODING;
++	} else return FLOODING;
++
++set_fmt:
++	memset(buf, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++	if (current->signal->curr_ip && gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
++		sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) ");
++		snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip), current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename);
++	} else if (current->signal->curr_ip) {
++		sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: ");
++		snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
++	} else if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
++		sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) ");
++		snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename);
++	} else {
++		sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: ");
++		strcpy(buf, fmt);
++	}
++
++	return NO_FLOODING;
++}
++
++static void gr_log_middle(int audit, const char *msg, va_list ap)
++{
++	char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
++	unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
++
++	vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void gr_log_middle_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, ...)
++{
++	char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
++	unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
++	va_list ap;
++
++	va_start(ap, msg);
++	vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap);
++	va_end(ap);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void gr_log_end(int audit)
++{
++	char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
++	unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
++
++	snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, DEFAULTSECMSG, DEFAULTSECARGS(current));
++	printk("%s\n", buf);
++
++	return;
++}
++
++void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...)
++{
++	int logtype;
++	char *result = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? "successful" : "denied";
++	char *str1, *str2, *str3;
++	int num1, num2;
++	unsigned long ulong1, ulong2;
++	struct dentry *dentry;
++	struct vfsmount *mnt;
++	struct file *file;
++	struct task_struct *task;
++	va_list ap;
++
++	BEGIN_LOCKS(audit);
++	logtype = gr_log_start(audit);
++	if (logtype == FLOODING) {
++		END_LOCKS(audit);
++		return;
++	}
++	va_start(ap, argtypes);
++	switch (argtypes) {
++	case GR_TTYSNIFF:
++		task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip), gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid);
++		break;
++	case GR_SYSCTL_HIDDEN:
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, str1);
++		break;
++	case GR_RBAC:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
++		break;
++	case GR_RBAC_STR:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1);
++		break;
++	case GR_STR_RBAC:
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
++		break;
++	case GR_RBAC_MODE2:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		str2 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2);
++		break;
++	case GR_RBAC_MODE3:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		str2 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		str3 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2, str3);
++		break;
++	case GR_FILENAME:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
++		break;
++	case GR_STR_FILENAME:
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
++		break;
++	case GR_FILENAME_STR:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1);
++		break;
++	case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
++		num2 = va_arg(ap, int);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2);
++		break;
++	case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR:
++		dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
++		mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
++		num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
++		num2 = va_arg(ap, int);
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2, str1);
++		break;
++	case GR_TEXTREL:
++		file = va_arg(ap, struct file *);
++		ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
++		ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, file ? gr_to_filename(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt) : "<anonymous mapping>", ulong1, ulong2);
++		break;
++	case GR_PTRACE:
++		task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_path.dentry, task->exec_file->f_path.mnt) : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid);
++		break;
++	case GR_RESOURCE:
++		task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++		ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, ulong1, str1, ulong2, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
++		break;
++	case GR_CAP:
++		task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++		str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
++		break;
++	case GR_SIG:
++		task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++		num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, num1, gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
++		break;
++	case GR_CRASH1:
++		task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++		ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, task->uid, ulong1);
++		break;
++	case GR_CRASH2:
++		task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++		ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
++		gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, ulong1);
++		break;
++	case GR_PSACCT:
++		{
++			unsigned int wday, cday;
++			__u8 whr, chr;
++			__u8 wmin, cmin;
++			__u8 wsec, csec;
++			char cur_tty[64] = { 0 };
++			char parent_tty[64] = { 0 };
++
++			task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
++			wday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int);
++			cday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int);
++			whr = va_arg(ap, int);
++			chr = va_arg(ap, int);
++			wmin = va_arg(ap, int);
++			cmin = va_arg(ap, int);
++			wsec = va_arg(ap, int);
++			csec = va_arg(ap, int);
++			ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
++
++			gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip), tty_name(task->signal->tty, cur_tty), task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, (task->flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited", ulong1, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, NIPQUAD(task->parent->signal->curr_ip), tty_name(task->parent->signal->tty, parent_tty), task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		gr_log_middle(audit, msg, ap);
++	}
++	va_end(ap);
++	gr_log_end(audit);
++	END_LOCKS(audit);
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c b/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/mman.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_handle_ioperm(void)
++{
++	gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPERM_MSG);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_iopl(void)
++{
++	gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPL_MSG);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_mem_write(void)
++{
++	gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_kmem_write(void)
++{
++	gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_KMEM_MSG);
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_open_port(void)
++{
++	gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG);
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	unsigned long start, end;
++
++	start = offset;
++	end = start + vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
++
++	if (start > end) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG);
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++
++	/* allowed ranges : ISA I/O BIOS */
++	if ((start >= __pa(high_memory))
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++	    || (start >= 0x000a0000 && end <= 0x00100000)
++	    || (start >= 0x00000000 && end <= 0x00001000)
++#endif
++	)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG);
++		return -EPERM;
++	} else
++		vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c b/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++		gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none");
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++		gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none");
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++		gr_log_str_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c b/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/delay.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) ||
++				    (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) {
++		if (t->pid == current->pid) {
++			gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig);
++		} else {
++			gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, t, sig);
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) {
++		gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, p, sig);
++		return -EPERM;
++	} else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted((struct task_struct *)p)) {
++		return -EPERM;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
++	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (p->parent && p->parent->exec_file == p->exec_file)
++		p->parent->brute = 1;
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void gr_handle_brute_check(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
++	if (current->brute)
++		msleep(30 * 1000);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c b/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <net/inet_sock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE)
++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_v4_lookup);
++#endif
++
++kernel_cap_t gr_cap_rtnetlink(struct sock *sock);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink);
++
++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb);
++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++#define gr_conn_table_size 32749
++struct conn_table_entry {
++	struct conn_table_entry *next;
++	struct signal_struct *sig;
++};
++
++struct conn_table_entry *gr_conn_table[gr_conn_table_size];
++spinlock_t gr_conn_table_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++extern const char * gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type);
++extern const char * gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto);
++
++static __inline__ int 
++conn_hash(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport, __u16 dport, unsigned int size)
++{
++	return ((daddr + saddr + (sport << 8) + (dport << 16)) % size);
++}
++
++static __inline__ int
++conn_match(const struct signal_struct *sig, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, 
++	   __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
++{
++	if (unlikely(sig->gr_saddr == saddr && sig->gr_daddr == daddr &&
++		     sig->gr_sport == sport && sig->gr_dport == dport))
++		return 1;
++	else
++		return 0;
++}
++
++static void gr_add_to_task_ip_table_nolock(struct signal_struct *sig, struct conn_table_entry *newent)
++{
++	struct conn_table_entry **match;
++	unsigned int index;
++
++	index = conn_hash(sig->gr_saddr, sig->gr_daddr, 
++			  sig->gr_sport, sig->gr_dport, 
++			  gr_conn_table_size);
++
++	newent->sig = sig;
++	
++	match = &gr_conn_table[index];
++	newent->next = *match;
++	*match = newent;
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static void gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(struct signal_struct *sig)
++{
++	struct conn_table_entry *match, *last = NULL;
++	unsigned int index;
++
++	index = conn_hash(sig->gr_saddr, sig->gr_daddr, 
++			  sig->gr_sport, sig->gr_dport, 
++			  gr_conn_table_size);
++
++	match = gr_conn_table[index];
++	while (match && !conn_match(match->sig, 
++		sig->gr_saddr, sig->gr_daddr, sig->gr_sport, 
++		sig->gr_dport)) {
++		last = match;
++		match = match->next;
++	}
++
++	if (match) {
++		if (last)
++			last->next = match->next;
++		else
++			gr_conn_table[index] = NULL;
++		kfree(match);
++	}
++
++	return;
++}
++
++static struct signal_struct * gr_lookup_task_ip_table(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
++					     __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
++{
++	struct conn_table_entry *match;
++	unsigned int index;
++
++	index = conn_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, gr_conn_table_size);
++
++	match = gr_conn_table[index];
++	while (match && !conn_match(match->sig, saddr, daddr, sport, dport))
++		match = match->next;
++
++	if (match)
++		return match->sig;
++	else
++		return NULL;
++}
++
++#endif
++
++void gr_update_task_in_ip_table(struct task_struct *task, const struct inet_sock *inet)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal;
++	struct conn_table_entry *newent;
++
++	newent = kmalloc(sizeof(struct conn_table_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
++	if (newent == NULL)
++		return;
++	/* no bh lock needed since we are called with bh disabled */
++	spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++	gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(sig);
++	sig->gr_saddr = inet->rcv_saddr;
++	sig->gr_daddr = inet->daddr;
++	sig->gr_sport = inet->sport;
++	sig->gr_dport = inet->dport;
++	gr_add_to_task_ip_table_nolock(sig, newent);
++	spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++	gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task->signal);
++	spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct signal_struct *p, *set;
++	const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);	
++
++	if (unlikely(sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
++		return;
++
++	set = current->signal;
++
++	spin_lock_bh(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++	p = gr_lookup_task_ip_table(inet->daddr, inet->rcv_saddr,
++				    inet->dport, inet->sport);
++	if (unlikely(p != NULL)) {
++		set->curr_ip = p->curr_ip;
++		set->used_accept = 1;
++		gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(p);
++		spin_unlock_bh(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++		return;
++	}
++	spin_unlock_bh(&gr_conn_table_lock);
++
++	set->curr_ip = inet->daddr;
++	set->used_accept = 1;
++#endif
++	return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) &&
++	    (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++		gr_log_int_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK2_MSG, family, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol));
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
++	    in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
++	    sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
++	    (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct sock *sck)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
++	    in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
++	    sck && (sck->sk_family != AF_UNIX) &&
++	    (sck->sk_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) &&
++	    sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
++	    (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_MSG);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++kernel_cap_t
++gr_cap_rtnetlink(struct sock *sock)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++		return current->cap_effective;
++	else if (sock->sk_protocol == NETLINK_ISCSI &&
++		 cap_raised(current->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
++		 gr_task_is_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		return current->cap_effective;
++	else if (sock->sk_protocol == NETLINK_AUDIT &&
++		 cap_raised(current->cap_effective, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE) &&
++		 gr_task_is_capable(current, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE) &&
++		 cap_raised(current->cap_effective, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) &&
++		 gr_task_is_capable(current, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
++		return current->cap_effective;
++	else if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
++		 gr_task_is_capable(current, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
++		return current->cap_effective;
++	else
++		return __cap_empty_set;
++#else
++	return current->cap_effective;
++#endif
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c b/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,435 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
++int grsec_modstop;
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) {
++		gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
++	if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && !strcmp(name, "disable_modules") &&
++	    grsec_modstop && (op & 002)) {
++		gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name);
++		return -EACCES;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP)
++ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "linking_restrictions",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_link,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "fifo_restrictions",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_fifo,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "execve_limiting",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_execve,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "exec_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_execlog,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "signal_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_signal,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "forkfail_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_forkfail,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "timechange_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_time,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_shmat",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_unix",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_unix,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_mount",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_mount,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_fchdir",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_chroot",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_double,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_pivot",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_enforce_chdir",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_chmod",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_mknod",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_restrict_nice",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_nice,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_execlog",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_caps",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_caps,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_deny_sysctl",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "tpe",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_tpe,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "tpe_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_tpe_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "tpe_restrict_all",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_tpe_all,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "socket_all",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_socket_all,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "socket_all_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_socket_all_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "socket_client",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_socket_client,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "socket_client_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_socket_client_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "socket_server",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_socket_server,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "socket_server_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_socket_server_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "audit_group",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_group,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "audit_gid",
++		.data		= &grsec_audit_gid,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "audit_chdir",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chdir,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "audit_mount",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_mount,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "audit_ipc",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_audit_ipc,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "audit_textrel",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_audit_textrel,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "dmesg",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_dmesg,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "chroot_findtask",
++		.data		= &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "resource_logging",
++		.data		= &grsec_resource_logging,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "grsec_lock",
++		.data		= &grsec_lock,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "disable_modules",
++		.data		= &grsec_modstop,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
++	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
++};
++#endif
++
++int gr_check_modstop(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
++	if (grsec_modstop == 1) {
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_STOPMOD_MSG);
++		return 1;
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c b/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
++	if (grsec_enable_audit_textrel)
++		gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_time.c b/grsecurity/grsec_time.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_time.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_time.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_timechange(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	if (grsec_enable_time)
++		gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TIME_MSG);
++#endif
++	return;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c b/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern int gr_acl_tpe_check(void);
++
++int
++gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
++
++	if (current->uid && ((grsec_enable_tpe &&
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
++	    !in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)
++#else
++	    in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)
++#endif
++	    ) || gr_acl_tpe_check()) &&
++	    (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) ||
++						(inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) {
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++	if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all &&
++	    ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) ||
++	     (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) {
++		gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt);
++		return 0;
++	}
++#endif
++#endif
++	return 1;
++}
+diff -urNp a/grsecurity/grsum.c b/grsecurity/grsum.c
+--- a/grsecurity/grsum.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/grsecurity/grsum.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++#include <linux/err.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
++#include <linux/crypto.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++
++#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MODULE) || !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MODULE)
++#error "crypto and sha256 must be built into the kernel"
++#endif
++
++int
++chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum)
++{
++	char *p;
++	struct crypto_hash *tfm;
++	struct hash_desc desc;
++	struct scatterlist sg;
++	unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
++	volatile int retval = 0;
++	volatile int dummy = 0;
++	unsigned int i;
++
++	tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
++	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
++		/* should never happen, since sha256 should be built in */
++		return 1;
++	}
++
++	desc.tfm = tfm;
++	desc.flags = 0;
++
++	crypto_hash_init(&desc);
++
++	p = salt;
++	sg_set_buf(&sg, p, GR_SALT_LEN);
++	crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, sg.length);
++
++	p = entry->pw;
++	sg_set_buf(&sg, p, strlen(p));
++	
++	crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, sg.length);
++
++	crypto_hash_final(&desc, temp_sum);
++
++	memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN);
++
++	for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++)
++		if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i])
++			retval = 1;
++		else
++			dummy = 1;	// waste a cycle
++
++	crypto_free_hash(tfm);
++
++	return retval;
++}
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-alpha/elf.h b/include/asm-alpha/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-alpha/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-alpha/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -91,6 +91,13 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x1000000)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x10000 : 0x120000000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	(current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	(current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 19)
++#endif
++
+ /* $0 is set by ld.so to a pointer to a function which might be 
+    registered using atexit.  This provides a mean for the dynamic
+    linker to call DT_FINI functions for shared libraries that have
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-alpha/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-alpha/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-alpha/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-alpha/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ D(9)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(10)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(11)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(13)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(13)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h b/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h
+--- a/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -101,6 +101,17 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
+ #define PAGE_SHARED	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS)
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOE)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ASM | _PAGE_KRE | _PAGE_KWE)
+ 
+ #define _PAGE_NORMAL(x) __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | (x))
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-arm/elf.h b/include/asm-arm/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-arm/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-arm/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -87,7 +87,14 @@ extern char elf_platform[];
+    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
+    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
+ 
+-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x00008000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
++#endif
+ 
+ /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be 
+    registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI.  A value of 0 means we 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-arm/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-arm/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-arm/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-arm/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-avr32/elf.h b/include/asm-avr32/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-avr32/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-avr32/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -85,8 +85,14 @@ typedef struct user_fpu_struct elf_fpreg
+    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
+    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
+ 
+-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x00001000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	15
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	15
++#endif
+ 
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-avr32/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-avr32/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-avr32/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-avr32/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ D(10)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(11)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(13)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(14)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(15)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-blackfin/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-blackfin/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-blackfin/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-blackfin/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-cris/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-cris/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-cris/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-cris/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-frv/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-frv/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-frv/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-frv/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-generic/futex.h b/include/asm-generic/futex.h
+--- a/include/asm-generic/futex.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-generic/futex.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+ static inline int
+-futex_atomic_op_inuser (int encoded_op, int __user *uaddr)
++futex_atomic_op_inuser (int encoded_op, u32 __user *uaddr)
+ {
+ 	int op = (encoded_op >> 28) & 7;
+ 	int cmp = (encoded_op >> 24) & 15;
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ futex_atomic_op_inuser (int encoded_op, 
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int
+-futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(int __user *uaddr, int oldval, int newval)
++futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 __user *uaddr, int oldval, int newval)
+ {
+ 	return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
+--- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ 	.rodata           : AT(ADDR(.rodata) - LOAD_OFFSET) {		\
+ 		VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start_rodata) = .;			\
+ 		*(.rodata) *(.rodata.*)					\
++		*(.data.read_only)					\
+ 		*(__vermagic)		/* Kernel version magic */	\
+ 		*(__markers_strings)	/* Markers: strings */		\
+ 	}								\
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-h8300/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-h8300/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-h8300/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-h8300/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-ia64/elf.h b/include/asm-ia64/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-ia64/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-ia64/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -162,7 +162,12 @@ typedef elf_greg_t elf_gregset_t[ELF_NGR
+ typedef struct ia64_fpreg elf_fpreg_t;
+ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_NFPREG];
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(current->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
+ 
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	(current->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	(current->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
++#endif
+ 
+ struct pt_regs;	/* forward declaration... */
+ extern void ia64_elf_core_copy_regs (struct pt_regs *src, elf_gregset_t dst);
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-ia64/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-ia64/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-ia64/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-ia64/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ D(9)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(10)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(11)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(13)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(13)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h b/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h
+--- a/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -143,6 +143,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
+ #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RW)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_GATE	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_X_RX)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(__DIRTY_BITS  | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RWX)
+ #define PAGE_KERNELRX	__pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-m32r/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-m32r/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-m32r/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-m32r/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ D(9)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(10)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(11)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(13)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(13)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-m68k/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-m68k/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-m68k/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-m68k/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-m68knommu/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-m68knommu/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-m68knommu/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-m68knommu/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-mips/elf.h b/include/asm-mips/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-mips/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-mips/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -368,4 +368,11 @@ extern int dump_task_fpu(struct task_str
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	((current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _ASM_ELF_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-mips/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-mips/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-mips/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-mips/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ D(9)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(10)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(11)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(13)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(13)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-mips/page.h b/include/asm-mips/page.h
+--- a/include/asm-mips/page.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-mips/page.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ extern void copy_user_highpage(struct pa
+   #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32
+     typedef struct { unsigned long pte_low, pte_high; } pte_t;
+     #define pte_val(x)    ((x).pte_low | ((unsigned long long)(x).pte_high << 32))
+-    #define __pte(x)      ({ pte_t __pte = {(x), ((unsigned long long)(x)) >> 32}; __pte; })
++    #define __pte(x)      ({ pte_t __pte = {(x), (x) >> 32}; __pte; })
+   #else
+      typedef struct { unsigned long long pte; } pte_t;
+      #define pte_val(x)	((x).pte)
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-mips/system.h b/include/asm-mips/system.h
+--- a/include/asm-mips/system.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-mips/system.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -215,6 +215,6 @@ extern void per_cpu_trap_init(void);
+  */
+ #define __ARCH_WANT_UNLOCKED_CTXSW
+ 
+-extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp);
++#define arch_align_stack(x) (x)
+ 
+ #endif /* _ASM_SYSTEM_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-parisc/elf.h b/include/asm-parisc/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-parisc/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-parisc/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -333,6 +333,13 @@ struct pt_regs;	/* forward declaration..
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x01000000)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x10000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	16
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	16
++#endif
++
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
+    but it's not easy, and we've already done it here.  */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-parisc/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-parisc/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-parisc/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-parisc/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ D(9)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(10)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(11)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(13)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(13)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h b/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h
+--- a/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -202,6 +202,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_EXECREAD   __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_COPY       PAGE_EXECREAD
+ #define PAGE_RWX        __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO	__pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL & ~_PAGE_WRITE)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_UNC	__pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_NO_CACHE)
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h b/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -160,6 +160,18 @@ typedef elf_vrreg_t elf_vrregset_t[ELF_N
+ typedef elf_vrreg_t elf_vrregset_t32[ELF_NVRREG32];
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(0x10000000UL)
++
++#ifdef __powerpc64__
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 16 : 28)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 16 : 28)
++#else
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	15
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	15
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+ /*
+  * This is used to ensure we don't load something for the wrong architecture.
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-powerpc/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-powerpc/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-powerpc/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-powerpc/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+ 	KM_PPC_SYNC_PAGE,
+ 	KM_PPC_SYNC_ICACHE,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-powerpc/page.h b/include/asm-powerpc/page.h
+--- a/include/asm-powerpc/page.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-powerpc/page.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@
+  * and needs to be executable.  This means the whole heap ends
+  * up being executable.
+  */
+-#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS32	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+-				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
++#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS32 \
++	(((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0) | \
++	 VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
+ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS64	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | \
+ 				 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h b/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h
+--- a/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -170,15 +170,18 @@ do {						\
+  * stack by default, so in the absense of a PT_GNU_STACK program header
+  * we turn execute permission off.
+  */
+-#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS32	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
+-					 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
++#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS32 \
++	(((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0) | \
++	 VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
+ #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS64	(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | \
+ 					 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
+ 
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
+ #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS \
+ 	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
+ 	 VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS32 : VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS64)
++#endif
+ 
+ #include <asm-generic/page.h>
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-ppc/mmu_context.h b/include/asm-ppc/mmu_context.h
+--- a/include/asm-ppc/mmu_context.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-ppc/mmu_context.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -141,7 +141,8 @@ static inline void get_mmu_context(struc
+ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *t, struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+ 	mm->context.id = NO_CONTEXT;
+-	mm->context.vdso_base = 0;
++	if (t == current)
++		mm->context.vdso_base = ~0UL;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h b/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h
+--- a/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -390,11 +390,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema
+ 
+ #define PAGE_NONE	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
+-#define PAGE_READONLY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
++#define PAGE_READONLY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
+ #define PAGE_SHARED	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW)
+-#define PAGE_SHARED_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
++#define PAGE_SHARED_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
+ #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
+-#define PAGE_COPY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
++#define PAGE_COPY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_40x) && !defined(CONFIG_44x)
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
+ 
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL		__pgprot(_PAGE_RAM)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE	__pgprot(_PAGE_IO)
+@@ -406,21 +416,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema
+  * This is the closest we can get..
+  */
+ #define __P000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P010	PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_X
+-#define __P100	PAGE_READONLY
++#define __P001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011	PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P100	PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __P101	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P110	PAGE_COPY
++#define __P110	PAGE_COPY_X
+ #define __P111	PAGE_COPY_X
+ 
+ #define __S000	PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_X
+-#define __S100	PAGE_READONLY
++#define __S001	PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011	PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S100	PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __S101	PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S110	PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S110	PAGE_SHARED_X
+ #define __S111	PAGE_SHARED_X
+ 
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-s390/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-s390/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-s390/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-s390/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,	
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-sh/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-sh/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-sh/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-sh/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ D(9)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(10)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(11)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(13)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(13)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-sparc/elf.h b/include/asm-sparc/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-sparc/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-sparc/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -120,6 +120,13 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE         (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x10000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	16
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	16
++#endif
++
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this cpu supports.  This can NOT be done in userspace
+    on Sparc.  */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-sparc/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-sparc/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-sparc/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-sparc/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h b/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h
+--- a/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@ BTFIXUPDEF_SIMM13(user_ptrs_per_pgd)
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_none)
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy)
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared_noexec)
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy_noexec)
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly_noexec)
++#endif
++
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel)
+ 
+ #define PMD_SHIFT		SUN4C_PMD_SHIFT
+@@ -69,6 +76,16 @@ extern pgprot_t PAGE_SHARED;
+ #define PAGE_COPY      __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy))
+ #define PAGE_READONLY  __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly))
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++extern pgprot_t PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy_noexec))
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	__pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly_noexec))
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC	PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC	PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC	PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ extern unsigned long page_kernel;
+ 
+ #ifdef MODULE
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h b/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h
+--- a/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -115,6 +115,16 @@
+ 				    SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
+ #define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
+ 				    SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++					   SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF)
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC    __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++					   SRMMU_REF)
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++					   SRMMU_REF)
++#endif
++
+ #define SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL  __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | SRMMU_PRIV | \
+ 				    SRMMU_DIRTY | SRMMU_REF)
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h b/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ typedef struct {
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x0000010000000000UL
+ #define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x0000000070000000UL
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0x10000UL : 0x100000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 )
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	(test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 15 : 29 )
++#endif
+ 
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this cpu supports.  */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-sparc64/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-sparc64/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-sparc64/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-sparc64/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-um/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-um/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-um/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-um/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ 	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-v850/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-v850/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-v850/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-v850/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum km_type {
+ 	KM_PTE1,
+ 	KM_IRQ0,
+ 	KM_IRQ1,
++	KM_CLEARPAGE,
+ 	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/alternative.h b/include/asm-x86/alternative.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/alternative.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/alternative.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline void alternatives_smp_swit
+ 		      "	 .byte 662b-661b\n"	/* sourcelen */		\
+ 		      "	 .byte 664f-663f\n"	/* replacementlen */	\
+ 		      ".previous\n"					\
+-		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n"		\
++		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"a\"\n"		\
+ 		      "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n"  /* replacement */	\
+ 		      ".previous" :: "i" (feature) : "memory")
+ 
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static inline void alternatives_smp_swit
+ 		      "	 .byte 662b-661b\n"	/* sourcelen */		\
+ 		      "	 .byte 664f-663f\n"	/* replacementlen */	\
+ 		      ".previous\n"					\
+-		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n"		\
++		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"a\"\n"		\
+ 		      "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n"  /* replacement */	\
+ 		      ".previous" :: "i" (feature), ##input)
+ 
+@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static inline void alternatives_smp_swit
+ 		      "	 .byte 662b-661b\n"	/* sourcelen */		\
+ 		      "	 .byte 664f-663f\n"	/* replacementlen */	\
+ 		      ".previous\n"					\
+-		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n"		\
++		      ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"a\"\n"		\
+ 		      "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n"  /* replacement */ \
+ 		      ".previous" : output : [feat] "i" (feature), ##input)
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/apic.h b/include/asm-x86/apic.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/apic.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/apic.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+ 
+ #define ARCH_APICTIMER_STOPS_ON_C3	1
+ 
+-#define Dprintk(x...)
++#define Dprintk(x...) do {} while (0)
+ 
+ /*
+  * Debugging macros
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/boot.h b/include/asm-x86/boot.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/boot.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/boot.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -13,8 +13,13 @@
+ #define ASK_VGA		0xfffd		/* ask for it at bootup */
+ 
+ /* Physical address where kernel should be loaded. */
+-#define LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR ((CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START \
++#define ____LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR ((CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START \
+ 				+ (CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN - 1)) \
+ 				& ~(CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN - 1))
+ 
++#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
++extern unsigned char __LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR[];
++#define LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR ((unsigned long)__LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR)
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _ASM_BOOT_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/cache.h b/include/asm-x86/cache.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/cache.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/cache.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+ #define L1_CACHE_BYTES	(1 << L1_CACHE_SHIFT)
+ 
+ #define __read_mostly __attribute__((__section__(".data.read_mostly")))
++#define __read_only __attribute__((__section__(".data.read_only")))
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSMP
+ /* vSMP Internode cacheline shift */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/checksum_32.h b/include/asm-x86/checksum_32.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/checksum_32.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/checksum_32.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ asmlinkage __wsum csum_partial(const voi
+ asmlinkage __wsum csum_partial_copy_generic(const void *src, void *dst,
+ 						  int len, __wsum sum, int *src_err_ptr, int *dst_err_ptr);
+ 
++asmlinkage __wsum csum_partial_copy_generic_to_user(const void *src, void *dst,
++						  int len, __wsum sum, int *src_err_ptr, int *dst_err_ptr);
++
++asmlinkage __wsum csum_partial_copy_generic_from_user(const void *src, void *dst,
++						  int len, __wsum sum, int *src_err_ptr, int *dst_err_ptr);
++
+ /*
+  *	Note: when you get a NULL pointer exception here this means someone
+  *	passed in an incorrect kernel address to one of these functions.
+@@ -49,7 +55,7 @@ __wsum csum_partial_copy_from_user(const
+ 						int len, __wsum sum, int *err_ptr)
+ {
+ 	might_sleep();
+-	return csum_partial_copy_generic((__force void *)src, dst,
++	return csum_partial_copy_generic_from_user((__force void *)src, dst,
+ 					len, sum, err_ptr, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -180,7 +186,7 @@ static __inline__ __wsum csum_and_copy_t
+ {
+ 	might_sleep();
+ 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dst, len))
+-		return csum_partial_copy_generic(src, (__force void *)dst, len, sum, NULL, err_ptr);
++		return csum_partial_copy_generic_to_user(src, (__force void *)dst, len, sum, NULL, err_ptr);
+ 
+ 	if (len)
+ 		*err_ptr = -EFAULT;
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/desc.h b/include/asm-x86/desc.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/desc.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/desc.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static inline void fill_ldt(struct desc_
+ 	desc->base1 = (info->base_addr & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+ 	desc->type = (info->read_exec_only ^ 1) << 1;
+ 	desc->type |= info->contents << 2;
++	desc->type |= info->seg_not_present ^ 1;
+ 	desc->s = 1;
+ 	desc->dpl = 0x3;
+ 	desc->p = info->seg_not_present ^ 1;
+@@ -27,14 +28,15 @@ static inline void fill_ldt(struct desc_
+ }
+ 
+ extern struct desc_ptr idt_descr;
+-extern gate_desc idt_table[];
++extern gate_desc idt_table[256];
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+-extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES];
+-extern struct desc_ptr cpu_gdt_descr[];
+-/* the cpu gdt accessor */
+-#define get_cpu_gdt_table(x) ((struct desc_struct *)cpu_gdt_descr[x].address)
++extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[NR_CPUS][PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct desc_struct)];
++static inline struct desc_struct *get_cpu_gdt_table(unsigned int cpu)
++{
++	return cpu_gdt_table[cpu];
++}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ static inline void pack_gate(gate_desc *gate, unsigned type, unsigned long func,
+ 			     unsigned dpl, unsigned ist, unsigned seg)
+ {
+@@ -51,16 +53,6 @@ static inline void pack_gate(gate_desc *
+ }
+ 
+ #else
+-struct gdt_page {
+-	struct desc_struct gdt[GDT_ENTRIES];
+-} __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
+-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct gdt_page, gdt_page);
+-
+-static inline struct desc_struct *get_cpu_gdt_table(unsigned int cpu)
+-{
+-	return per_cpu(gdt_page, cpu).gdt;
+-}
+-
+ static inline void pack_gate(gate_desc *gate, unsigned char type,
+        unsigned long base, unsigned dpl, unsigned flags, unsigned short seg)
+ 
+@@ -69,7 +61,6 @@ static inline void pack_gate(gate_desc *
+ 	gate->b = (base & 0xffff0000) |
+ 		  (((0x80 | type | (dpl << 5)) & 0xff) << 8);
+ }
+-
+ #endif
+ 
+ static inline int desc_empty(const void *ptr)
+@@ -105,19 +96,48 @@ static inline int desc_empty(const void 
+ static inline void native_write_idt_entry(gate_desc *idt, int entry,
+ 					  const gate_desc *gate)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	memcpy(&idt[entry], gate, sizeof(*gate));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void native_write_ldt_entry(struct desc_struct *ldt, int entry,
+ 					  const void *desc)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	memcpy(&ldt[entry], desc, 8);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void native_write_gdt_entry(struct desc_struct *gdt, int entry,
+ 					  const void *desc, int type)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int size;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case DESC_TSS:
+ 		size = sizeof(tss_desc);
+@@ -129,7 +149,17 @@ static inline void native_write_gdt_entr
+ 		size = sizeof(struct desc_struct);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	memcpy(&gdt[entry], desc, size);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void pack_descriptor(struct desc_struct *desc, unsigned long base,
+@@ -201,7 +231,19 @@ static inline void native_set_ldt(const 
+ 
+ static inline void native_load_tr_desc(void)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	asm volatile("ltr %w0"::"q" (GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void native_load_gdt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr)
+@@ -236,8 +278,19 @@ static inline void native_load_tls(struc
+ 	unsigned int i;
+ 	struct desc_struct *gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	for (i = 0; i < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES; i++)
+ 		gdt[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + i] = t->tls_array[i];
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ #define _LDT_empty(info) (\
+@@ -353,6 +406,18 @@ static inline void set_system_gate_ist(i
+ 	_set_gate(n, GATE_INTERRUPT, addr, 0x3, ist, __KERNEL_CS);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++static inline void set_user_cs(unsigned long base, unsigned long limit, int cpu)
++{
++	struct desc_struct d;
++
++	if (likely(limit))
++		limit = (limit - 1UL) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++	pack_descriptor(&d, base, limit, 0xFB, 0xC);
++	write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
++}
++#endif
++
+ #else
+ /*
+  * GET_DESC_BASE reads the descriptor base of the specified segment.
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/elf.h b/include/asm-x86/elf.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -243,7 +243,25 @@ extern int force_personality32;
+    the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
+    that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3*2 : TASK_SIZE/3*2)
++#else
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x10000000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16)
++#else
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x400000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN	((test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) ? 16 : 32)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN	((test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) ? 16 : 32)
++#endif
++#endif
+ 
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
+@@ -292,7 +310,7 @@ do if (vdso_enabled) {							\
+ 
+ #define ARCH_DLINFO						\
+ do if (vdso_enabled) {						\
+-	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR,(unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso);\
++	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR,current->mm->context.vdso);\
+ } while (0)
+ 
+ #define AT_SYSINFO		32
+@@ -303,7 +321,7 @@ do if (vdso_enabled) {						\
+ 
+ #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */
+ 
+-#define VDSO_CURRENT_BASE	((unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso)
++#define VDSO_CURRENT_BASE	(current->mm->context.vdso)
+ 
+ #define VDSO_ENTRY \
+ 	((unsigned long) VDSO32_SYMBOL(VDSO_CURRENT_BASE, vsyscall))
+@@ -317,7 +335,4 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(s
+ extern int syscall32_setup_pages(struct linux_binprm *, int exstack);
+ #define compat_arch_setup_additional_pages	syscall32_setup_pages
+ 
+-extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm);
+-#define arch_randomize_brk arch_randomize_brk
+-
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/futex.h b/include/asm-x86/futex.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/futex.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/futex.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -11,6 +11,41 @@
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++#define __futex_atomic_op1(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg)	\
++  __asm__ __volatile(						\
++	"movw	%w6, %%ds\n"					\
++"1:	" insn "\n"						\
++"2:	pushl	%%ss\n						\
++	popl	%%ds\n						\
++	.section .fixup,\"ax\"\n				\
++3:	mov	%3, %1\n					\
++	jmp	2b\n						\
++	.previous\n"						\
++	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)					\
++	: "=r" (oldval), "=r" (ret), "+m" (*uaddr)		\
++	: "i" (-EFAULT), "0" (oparg), "1" (0), "r" (__USER_DS))
++
++#define __futex_atomic_op2(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg)	\
++  __asm__ __volatile(						\
++"	movw	%w7, %%es\n					\
++1:	movl	%%es:%2, %0\n					\
++	movl	%0, %3\n"					\
++	insn "\n"						\
++"2:	lock; cmpxchgl %3, %%es:%2\n				\
++	jnz	1b\n						\
++3:	pushl	%%ss\n						\
++	popl	%%es\n						\
++	.section .fixup,\"ax\"\n				\
++4:	mov	%5, %1\n					\
++	jmp	3b\n						\
++	.previous\n"						\
++	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,4b)					\
++	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b,4b)					\
++	: "=&a" (oldval), "=&r" (ret), "+m" (*uaddr),		\
++	  "=&r" (tem)						\
++	: "r" (oparg), "i" (-EFAULT), "1" (0), "r" (__USER_DS))
++#else
+ #define __futex_atomic_op1(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg)	\
+   __asm__ __volatile(						\
+ "1:	" insn "\n"						\
+@@ -38,6 +73,7 @@
+ 	: "=&a" (oldval), "=&r" (ret), "+m" (*uaddr),		\
+ 	  "=&r" (tem)						\
+ 	: "r" (oparg), "i" (-EFAULT), "1" (0))
++#endif
+ 
+ static inline int
+ futex_atomic_op_inuser(int encoded_op, int __user *uaddr)
+@@ -64,11 +100,20 @@ futex_atomic_op_inuser(int encoded_op, i
+ 
+ 	switch (op) {
+ 	case FUTEX_OP_SET:
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++		__futex_atomic_op1("xchgl %0, %%ds:%2", ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg);
++#else
+ 		__futex_atomic_op1("xchgl %0, %2", ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg);
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case FUTEX_OP_ADD:
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++		__futex_atomic_op1("lock ; xaddl %0, %%ds:%2", ret, oldval,
++				   uaddr, oparg);
++#else
+ 		__futex_atomic_op1("lock; xaddl %0, %2", ret, oldval,
+ 				   uaddr, oparg);
++#endif
+ 		break;
+ 	case FUTEX_OP_OR:
+ 		__futex_atomic_op2("orl %4, %3", ret, oldval, uaddr, oparg);
+@@ -113,14 +158,26 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(int __user
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++		"	movw %w5, %%ds				\n"
++		"1:	lock; cmpxchgl %3, %%ds:%1		\n"
++		"2:	pushl   %%ss				\n"
++		"	popl    %%ds				\n"
++		"	.section .fixup, \"ax\"			\n"
++#else
+ 		"1:	lock; cmpxchgl %3, %1			\n"
+ 		"2:	.section .fixup, \"ax\"			\n"
++#endif
+ 		"3:	mov     %2, %0				\n"
+ 		"	jmp     2b				\n"
+ 		"	.previous				\n"
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)
+ 		: "=a" (oldval), "+m" (*uaddr)
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++		: "i" (-EFAULT), "r" (newval), "0" (oldval), "r" (__USER_DS)
++#else
+ 		: "i" (-EFAULT), "r" (newval), "0" (oldval)
++#endif
+ 		: "memory"
+ 	);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/i387.h b/include/asm-x86/i387.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/i387.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/i387.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -202,13 +202,8 @@ static inline void restore_fpu(struct ta
+ }
+ 
+ /* We need a safe address that is cheap to find and that is already
+-   in L1 during context switch. The best choices are unfortunately
+-   different for UP and SMP */
+-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+-#define safe_address (__per_cpu_offset[0])
+-#else
+-#define safe_address (kstat_cpu(0).cpustat.user)
+-#endif
++   in L1 during context switch. */
++#define safe_address (init_tss[smp_processor_id()].x86_tss.sp0)
+ 
+ /*
+  * These must be called with preempt disabled
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/io_64.h b/include/asm-x86/io_64.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/io_64.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/io_64.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -143,6 +143,17 @@ static inline void * phys_to_virt(unsign
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
++#define ARCH_HAS_VALID_PHYS_ADDR_RANGE
++static inline int valid_phys_addr_range (unsigned long addr, size_t count)
++{
++	return ((addr + count + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT) < (1 << (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ? 1 : 0;
++}
++
++static inline int valid_mmap_phys_addr_range (unsigned long pfn, size_t count)
++{
++	return (pfn + (count >> PAGE_SHIFT)) < (1 << (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ? 1 : 0;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Change "struct page" to physical address.
+  */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/irqflags.h b/include/asm-x86/irqflags.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/irqflags.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/irqflags.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ static inline unsigned long __raw_local_
+ #define INTERRUPT_RETURN		iret
+ #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS_SYSCALL_RET	sti; sysexit
+ #define GET_CR0_INTO_EAX		movl %cr0, %eax
++#define GET_CR0_INTO_EDX		movl %cr0, %edx
++#define SET_CR0_FROM_EDX		movl %edx, %cr0
+ #endif
+ 
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-x86/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ D(9)	KM_IRQ0,
+ D(10)	KM_IRQ1,
+ D(11)	KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+ D(12)	KM_SOFTIRQ1,
+-D(13)	KM_TYPE_NR
++D(13)	KM_CLEARPAGE,
++D(14)	KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+ #undef D
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/linkage.h b/include/asm-x86/linkage.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/linkage.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/linkage.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ #define __ALIGN .p2align 4,,15
+ #define __ALIGN_STR ".p2align 4,,15"
++#else
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ALIGNMENT_16
++#define __ALIGN .align 16,0x90
++#define __ALIGN_STR ".align 16,0x90"
++#endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+@@ -49,10 +54,5 @@
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ALIGNMENT_16
+-#define __ALIGN .align 16,0x90
+-#define __ALIGN_STR ".align 16,0x90"
+-#endif
+-
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/mach-default/apm.h b/include/asm-x86/mach-default/apm.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/mach-default/apm.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/mach-default/apm.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
+ 		"pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ 		"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+-		"lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
+ 		"setc %%al\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%edi\n\t"
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static inline u8 apm_bios_call_simple_as
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
+ 		"pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ 		"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+-		"lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
++		"lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
+ 		"setc %%bl\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ 		"popl %%edi\n\t"
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/mman.h b/include/asm-x86/mman.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/mman.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/mman.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,4 +16,14 @@
+ #define MCL_CURRENT	1		/* lock all current mappings */
+ #define MCL_FUTURE	2		/* lock all future mappings */
+ 
++#ifdef __KERNEL__
++#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++#define arch_mmap_check	i386_mmap_check
++int i386_mmap_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
++		unsigned long flags);
++#endif
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/mmu.h b/include/asm-x86/mmu.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/mmu.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/mmu.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -11,13 +11,26 @@
+  * cpu_vm_mask is used to optimize ldt flushing.
+  */
+ typedef struct { 
+-	void *ldt;
++	struct desc_struct *ldt;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ 	rwlock_t ldtlock; 
+ #endif
+ 	int size;
+ 	struct mutex lock;
+-	void *vdso;
++	unsigned long vdso;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	unsigned long user_cs_base;
++	unsigned long user_cs_limit;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++	cpumask_t cpu_user_cs_mask;
++#endif
++
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ } mm_context_t;
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/mmu_context_32.h b/include/asm-x86/mmu_context_32.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/mmu_context_32.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/mmu_context_32.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -55,6 +55,22 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s
+ 		 */
+ 		if (unlikely(prev->context.ldt != next->context.ldt))
+ 			load_LDT_nolock(&next->context);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++		if (!nx_enabled) {
++			smp_mb__before_clear_bit();
++			cpu_clear(cpu, prev->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++			smp_mb__after_clear_bit();
++			cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++		}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		if (unlikely(prev->context.user_cs_base != next->context.user_cs_base ||
++			     prev->context.user_cs_limit != next->context.user_cs_limit))
++			set_user_cs(next->context.user_cs_base, next->context.user_cs_limit, cpu);
++#endif
++
+ 	}
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ 	else {
+@@ -67,6 +83,19 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s
+ 			 */
+ 			load_cr3(next->pgd);
+ 			load_LDT_nolock(&next->context);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			if (!nx_enabled)
++				cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++			if (!((next->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && nx_enabled))
++#endif
++				set_user_cs(next->context.user_cs_base, next->context.user_cs_limit, cpu);
++#endif
++
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/module.h b/include/asm-x86/module.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/module.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/module.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -76,7 +76,12 @@ struct mod_arch_specific {};
+ # else
+ #  define MODULE_STACKSIZE ""
+ # endif
+-# define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_STACKSIZE
++# ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++#  define MODULE_GRSEC "GRSECURITY "
++# else
++#  define MODULE_GRSEC ""
++# endif
++# define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_STACKSIZE MODULE_GRSEC
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* _ASM_MODULE_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/page_32.h b/include/asm-x86/page_32.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/page_32.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/page_32.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -13,6 +13,23 @@
+  */
+ #define __PAGE_OFFSET		_AC(CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET, UL)
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
++extern unsigned char MODULES_VADDR[];
++extern unsigned char MODULES_END[];
++extern unsigned char KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET[];
++#define ktla_ktva(addr)		(addr + (unsigned long)KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)
++#define ktva_ktla(addr)		(addr - (unsigned long)KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)
++#endif
++#else
++#define ktla_ktva(addr)		(addr)
++#define ktva_ktla(addr)		(addr)
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT 1
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
+ /* 44=32+12, the limit we can fit into an unsigned long pfn */
+ #define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT	44
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/page_64.h b/include/asm-x86/page_64.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/page_64.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/page_64.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
+ #define __START_KERNEL		(__START_KERNEL_map + __PHYSICAL_START)
+ #define __START_KERNEL_map	_AC(0xffffffff80000000, UL)
+ 
++#define ktla_ktva(addr)		(addr)
++#define ktva_ktla(addr)		(addr)
++
+ /* See Documentation/x86_64/mm.txt for a description of the memory map. */
+ #define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT	46
+ #define __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT	48
+@@ -87,5 +90,6 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
+ #define pfn_valid(pfn)          ((pfn) < end_pfn)
+ #endif
+ 
++#define nx_enabled (1)
+ 
+ #endif /* _X86_64_PAGE_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/paravirt.h b/include/asm-x86/paravirt.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/paravirt.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/paravirt.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1356,24 +1356,24 @@ static inline unsigned long __raw_local_
+ 
+ #define INTERRUPT_RETURN						\
+ 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_iret), CLBR_NONE,	\
+-		  jmp *%cs:pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret)
++		  jmp *%ss:pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_iret)
+ 
+ #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers)					\
+ 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_disable), clobbers, \
+ 		  PV_SAVE_REGS;			\
+-		  call *%cs:pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable;		\
++		  call *%ss:pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_disable;		\
+ 		  PV_RESTORE_REGS;)			\
+ 
+ #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers)					\
+ 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_irq_ops, PV_IRQ_irq_enable), clobbers,	\
+ 		  PV_SAVE_REGS;			\
+-		  call *%cs:pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable;		\
++		  call *%ss:pv_irq_ops+PV_IRQ_irq_enable;		\
+ 		  PV_RESTORE_REGS;)
+ 
+ #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS_SYSCALL_RET					\
+ 	PARA_SITE(PARA_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops, PV_CPU_irq_enable_syscall_ret),\
+ 		  CLBR_NONE,						\
+-		  jmp *%cs:pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_irq_enable_syscall_ret)
++		  jmp *%ss:pv_cpu_ops+PV_CPU_irq_enable_syscall_ret)
+ 
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pda.h b/include/asm-x86/pda.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pda.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pda.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,11 +16,9 @@ struct x8664_pda {
+ 	unsigned long oldrsp;		/* 24 user rsp for system call */
+ 	int irqcount;			/* 32 Irq nesting counter. Starts -1 */
+ 	unsigned int cpunumber;		/* 36 Logical CPU number */
+-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+ 	unsigned long stack_canary;	/* 40 stack canary value */
+ 					/* gcc-ABI: this canary MUST be at
+ 					   offset 40!!! */
+-#endif
+ 	char *irqstackptr;
+ 	unsigned int nodenumber;	/* number of current node */
+ 	unsigned int __softirq_pending;
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/percpu.h b/include/asm-x86/percpu.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/percpu.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/percpu.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct x8664_pda, pda);
+ 
+ #define __my_cpu_offset x86_read_percpu(this_cpu_off)
+ 
++#include <asm-generic/sections.h>
++#include <linux/threads.h>
++#define __per_cpu_offset __per_cpu_offset
++extern unsigned long __per_cpu_offset[NR_CPUS];
++#define per_cpu_offset(x) (__per_cpu_offset[x] + (unsigned long)__per_cpu_start)
++
+ /* fs segment starts at (positive) offset == __per_cpu_offset[cpu] */
+ #define __percpu_seg "%%fs:"
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_32.h b/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_32.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_32.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_32.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,7 +21,11 @@ static inline void pmd_populate_kernel(s
+ 				       pmd_t *pmd, pte_t *pte)
+ {
+ 	paravirt_alloc_pt(mm, __pa(pte) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO
+ 	set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _PAGE_TABLE));
++#else
++	set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void pmd_populate(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd, struct page *pte)
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_64.h b/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_64.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_64.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pgalloc_64.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ 
+ #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \
+-		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
++		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
+ #define pud_populate(mm, pud, pmd) \
+ 		set_pud(pud, __pud(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pmd)))
+ #define pgd_populate(mm, pgd, pud) \
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pgtable-2level.h b/include/asm-x86/pgtable-2level.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pgtable-2level.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pgtable-2level.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -18,7 +18,19 @@ static inline void native_set_pte(pte_t 
+ 
+ static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	*pmdp = pmd;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void native_set_pte_atomic(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pgtable-3level.h b/include/asm-x86/pgtable-3level.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pgtable-3level.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pgtable-3level.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -64,11 +64,35 @@ static inline void native_set_pte_atomic
+ }
+ static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	set_64bit((unsigned long long *)(pmdp),native_pmd_val(pmd));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ static inline void native_set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	set_64bit((unsigned long long *)(pudp),native_pud_val(pud));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pgtable.h b/include/asm-x86/pgtable.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pgtable.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@
+ #define PAGE_READONLY		__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ 
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ #define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC \
+ 	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+@@ -87,7 +90,7 @@ extern pteval_t __PAGE_KERNEL, __PAGE_KE
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE		(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL_UC_MINUS		(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PCD)
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL		(__PAGE_KERNEL_RX | _PAGE_USER)
+-#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL_NOCACHE	(__PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)
++#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL_NOCACHE	(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_USER)
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE		(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PSE)
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC	(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_PSE)
+ 
+@@ -140,10 +143,13 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAG
+ extern spinlock_t pgd_lock;
+ extern struct list_head pgd_list;
+ 
++extern pteval_t __supported_pte_mask;
++
+ /*
+  * The following only work if pte_present() is true.
+  * Undefined behaviour if not..
+  */
++static inline int pte_user(pte_t pte)		{ return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_USER; }
+ static inline int pte_dirty(pte_t pte)		{ return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY; }
+ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)		{ return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; }
+ static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)		{ return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_RW; }
+@@ -157,10 +163,31 @@ static inline int pmd_large(pmd_t pte) {
+ 		(_PAGE_PSE|_PAGE_PRESENT);
+ }
+ 
++static inline pte_t pte_exprotect(pte_t pte)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++	if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
++		return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_NX);
++	else
++#endif
++		return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_USER);
++}
++
+ static inline pte_t pte_mkclean(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(pteval_t)_PAGE_DIRTY); }
+ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(pteval_t)_PAGE_ACCESSED); }
+ static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(pteval_t)_PAGE_RW); }
+-static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(pteval_t)_PAGE_NX); }
++static inline pte_t pte_mkread(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_USER); }
++
++static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++	if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
++		return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(pteval_t)_PAGE_NX);
++	else
++#endif
++		return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_USER);
++}
++
+ static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_DIRTY); }
+ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_ACCESSED); }
+ static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_RW); }
+@@ -169,8 +196,6 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clrhuge(pte_t pt
+ static inline pte_t pte_mkglobal(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_GLOBAL); }
+ static inline pte_t pte_clrglobal(pte_t pte)	{ return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(pteval_t)_PAGE_GLOBAL); }
+ 
+-extern pteval_t __supported_pte_mask;
+-
+ static inline pte_t pfn_pte(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
+ {
+ 	return __pte((((phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT) |
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pgtable_32.h b/include/asm-x86/pgtable_32.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pgtable_32.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pgtable_32.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
+ struct mm_struct;
+ struct vm_area_struct;
+ 
+-extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[1024];
+-
+ static inline void pgtable_cache_init(void) { }
+ static inline void check_pgt_cache(void) { }
+ void paging_init(void);
+@@ -45,6 +43,11 @@ void paging_init(void);
+ # include <asm/pgtable-2level-defs.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD];
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
++extern pmd_t swapper_pm_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD][PTRS_PER_PMD];
++#endif
++
+ #define PGDIR_SIZE	(1UL << PGDIR_SHIFT)
+ #define PGDIR_MASK	(~(PGDIR_SIZE-1))
+ 
+@@ -83,7 +86,7 @@ void paging_init(void);
+ #undef TEST_ACCESS_OK
+ 
+ /* The boot page tables (all created as a single array) */
+-extern unsigned long pg0[];
++extern pte_t pg0[];
+ 
+ #define pte_present(x)	((x).pte_low & (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_PROTNONE))
+ 
+@@ -113,7 +116,19 @@ extern unsigned long pg0[];
+  */
+ static inline void clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count)
+ {
+-       memcpy(dst, src, count * sizeof(pgd_t));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	memcpy(dst, src, count * sizeof(pgd_t));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -223,6 +238,9 @@ static inline void paravirt_pagetable_se
+ 
+ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+ 
++#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA
++#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN
++
+ /*
+  * kern_addr_valid() is (1) for FLATMEM and (0) for
+  * SPARSEMEM and DISCONTIGMEM
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/pgtable_64.h b/include/asm-x86/pgtable_64.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/pgtable_64.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/pgtable_64.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -96,7 +96,19 @@ static inline pte_t native_ptep_get_and_
+ 
+ static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 	*pmdp = pmd;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void native_pmd_clear(pmd_t *pmd)
+@@ -148,17 +160,17 @@ static inline void native_pgd_clear(pgd_
+ 
+ static inline unsigned long pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd)
+ {
+-	return pgd_val(pgd) & ~(PTE_MASK | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER);
++	return pgd_val(pgd) & ~(PTE_MASK | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_NX);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline unsigned long pud_bad(pud_t pud)
+ {
+-	return pud_val(pud) & ~(PTE_MASK | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER);
++	return pud_val(pud) & ~(PTE_MASK | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_NX);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline unsigned long pmd_bad(pmd_t pmd)
+ {
+-	return pmd_val(pmd) & ~(PTE_MASK | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER);
++	return pmd_val(pmd) & ~(PTE_MASK | _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_NX);
+ }
+ 
+ #define pte_none(x)	(!pte_val(x))
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/include/asm-x86/processor.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/processor.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/processor.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ struct tss_struct {
+ 	unsigned long stack[64];
+ } __attribute__((packed));
+ 
+-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss);
++extern struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS];
+ 
+ /* Save the original ist values for checking stack pointers during debugging */
+ struct orig_ist {
+@@ -714,11 +714,20 @@ static inline void prefetchw(const void 
+  * User space process size: 3GB (default).
+  */
+ #define TASK_SIZE	(PAGE_OFFSET)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE	(TASK_SIZE / 2)
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define STACK_TOP	((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE:TASK_SIZE)
++#else
+ #define STACK_TOP	TASK_SIZE
+-#define STACK_TOP_MAX	STACK_TOP
++#endif
++#define STACK_TOP_MAX	TASK_SIZE
+ 
+ #define INIT_THREAD  {							\
+-	.sp0 = sizeof(init_stack) + (long)&init_stack,			\
++	.sp0 = sizeof(init_stack) + (long)&init_stack - 8,		\
+ 	.vm86_info = NULL,						\
+ 	.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS,					\
+ 	.io_bitmap_ptr = NULL,						\
+@@ -733,7 +742,7 @@ static inline void prefetchw(const void 
+  */
+ #define INIT_TSS  {							\
+ 	.x86_tss = {							\
+-		.sp0		= sizeof(init_stack) + (long)&init_stack, \
++		.sp0		= sizeof(init_stack) + (long)&init_stack - 8, \
+ 		.ss0		= __KERNEL_DS,				\
+ 		.ss1		= __KERNEL_CS,				\
+ 		.io_bitmap_base	= INVALID_IO_BITMAP_OFFSET,		\
+@@ -757,11 +766,7 @@ static inline void prefetchw(const void 
+ extern unsigned long thread_saved_pc(struct task_struct *tsk);
+ 
+ #define THREAD_SIZE_LONGS      (THREAD_SIZE/sizeof(unsigned long))
+-#define KSTK_TOP(info)                                                 \
+-({                                                                     \
+-       unsigned long *__ptr = (unsigned long *)(info);                 \
+-       (unsigned long)(&__ptr[THREAD_SIZE_LONGS]);                     \
+-})
++#define KSTK_TOP(info)         ((info)->task.thread.sp0)
+ 
+ /*
+  * The below -8 is to reserve 8 bytes on top of the ring0 stack.
+@@ -776,7 +781,7 @@ extern unsigned long thread_saved_pc(str
+ #define task_pt_regs(task)                                             \
+ ({                                                                     \
+        struct pt_regs *__regs__;                                       \
+-       __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)(KSTK_TOP(task_stack_page(task))-8); \
++       __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)((task)->thread.sp0);              \
+        __regs__ - 1;                                                   \
+ })
+ 
+@@ -792,7 +797,7 @@ extern unsigned long thread_saved_pc(str
+  * space during mmap's.
+  */
+ #define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET ((current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_3GB) ? \
+-			   0xc0000000 : 0xFFFFe000)
++			   0xc0000000 : 0xFFFFf000)
+ 
+ #define TASK_SIZE 		(test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? \
+ 				 IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE64)
+@@ -837,6 +842,10 @@ extern unsigned long thread_saved_pc(str
+  */
+ #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 3))
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(PAGE_ALIGN(SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE / 3))
++#endif
++
+ #define KSTK_EIP(task) (task_pt_regs(task)->ip)
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/ptrace.h b/include/asm-x86/ptrace.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/ptrace.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/ptrace.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct pt_regs {
+ };
+ 
+ #include <asm/vm86.h>
+-#include <asm/segment.h>
+ 
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+@@ -129,6 +128,7 @@ struct pt_regs {
+ 
+ /* the DS BTS struct is used for ptrace as well */
+ #include <asm/ds.h>
++#include <asm/segment.h>
+ 
+ struct task_struct;
+ 
+@@ -148,28 +148,29 @@ void signal_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, 
+ #define regs_return_value(regs) ((regs)->ax)
+ 
+ /*
+- * user_mode_vm(regs) determines whether a register set came from user mode.
++ * user_mode(regs) determines whether a register set came from user mode.
+  * This is true if V8086 mode was enabled OR if the register set was from
+  * protected mode with RPL-3 CS value.  This tricky test checks that with
+  * one comparison.  Many places in the kernel can bypass this full check
+- * if they have already ruled out V8086 mode, so user_mode(regs) can be used.
++ * if they have already ruled out V8086 mode, so user_mode_novm(regs) can
++ * be used.
+  */
+-static inline int user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
++static inline int user_mode_novm(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ 	return (regs->cs & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) == USER_RPL;
+ #else
+-	return !!(regs->cs & 3);
++	return !!(regs->cs & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-static inline int user_mode_vm(struct pt_regs *regs)
++static inline int user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ 	return ((regs->cs & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) |
+ 		(regs->flags & VM_MASK)) >= USER_RPL;
+ #else
+-	return user_mode(regs);
++	return user_mode_novm(regs);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/reboot.h b/include/asm-x86/reboot.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/reboot.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/reboot.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,6 @@ struct machine_ops
+ 
+ extern struct machine_ops machine_ops;
+ 
+-void machine_real_restart(unsigned char *code, int length);
++void machine_real_restart(const unsigned char *code, unsigned int length);
+ 
+ #endif	/* _ASM_REBOOT_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/segment.h b/include/asm-x86/segment.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/segment.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/segment.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -83,13 +83,19 @@
+ #define GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS		(GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_BASE + 14)
+ #define __ESPFIX_SS (GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS * 8)
+ 
+-#define GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU			(GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_BASE + 15)
++#define GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU		(GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_BASE + 15)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ #define __KERNEL_PERCPU (GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU * 8)
+ #else
+ #define __KERNEL_PERCPU 0
+ #endif
+ 
++#define GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_CS		(GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_BASE + 16)
++#define __PCIBIOS_CS (GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_CS * 8)
++
++#define GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_DS		(GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_BASE + 17)
++#define __PCIBIOS_DS (GDT_ENTRY_PCIBIOS_DS * 8)
++
+ #define GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS	31
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -130,10 +136,10 @@
+ #define SEGMENT_IS_KERNEL_CODE(x) (((x) & 0xfc) == GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS * 8)
+ 
+ /* Matches __KERNEL_CS and __USER_CS (they must be 2 entries apart) */
+-#define SEGMENT_IS_FLAT_CODE(x)  (((x) & 0xec) == GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS * 8)
++#define SEGMENT_IS_FLAT_CODE(x)  (((x) & 0xFFFCU) == __KERNEL_CS || ((x) & 0xFFFCU) == __USER_CS)
+ 
+ /* Matches PNP_CS32 and PNP_CS16 (they must be consecutive) */
+-#define SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(x)   (((x) & 0xf4) == GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_BASE * 8)
++#define SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(x)   (((x) & 0xFFFCU) == PNP_CS32 || ((x) & 0xFFFCU) == PNP_CS16)
+ 
+ 
+ #else
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/system.h b/include/asm-x86/system.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/system.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/system.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct t
+ 	     ".globl thread_return\n"					  \
+ 	     "thread_return:\n\t"					  \
+ 	     "movq %%gs:%P[pda_pcurrent],%%rsi\n\t"			  \
++	     "movq %P[task_canary](%%rsi),%%r8\n\t"			  \
++	     "movq %%r8,%%gs:%P[pda_canary]\n\t"			  \
+ 	     "movq %P[thread_info](%%rsi),%%r8\n\t"			  \
+ 	     LOCK_PREFIX "btr  %[tif_fork],%P[ti_flags](%%r8)\n\t"	  \
+ 	     "movq %%rax,%%rdi\n\t" 					  \
+@@ -81,7 +83,9 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct t
+ 	       [ti_flags] "i" (offsetof(struct thread_info, flags)),	  \
+ 	       [tif_fork] "i" (TIF_FORK),			  	  \
+ 	       [thread_info] "i" (offsetof(struct task_struct, stack)),   \
+-	       [pda_pcurrent] "i" (offsetof(struct x8664_pda, pcurrent))  \
++	       [task_canary] "i" (offsetof(struct task_struct, stack_canary)), \
++	       [pda_pcurrent] "i" (offsetof(struct x8664_pda, pcurrent)), \
++	       [pda_canary] "i" (offsetof(struct x8664_pda, stack_canary))\
+ 	     : "memory", "cc" __EXTRA_CLOBBER)
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -145,7 +149,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_limit(un
+ 	unsigned long __limit;
+ 	__asm__("lsll %1,%0"
+ 		:"=r" (__limit):"r" (segment));
+-	return __limit+1;
++	return __limit;
+ }
+ 
+ static inline void native_clts(void)
+@@ -269,6 +273,21 @@ static inline void native_wbinvd(void)
+ 
+ #define stts() write_cr0(8 | read_cr0())
+ 
++#define pax_open_kernel(cr0)		\
++do {					\
++	typecheck(unsigned long, cr0);	\
++	preempt_disable();		\
++	cr0 = read_cr0();		\
++	write_cr0(cr0 & ~X86_CR0_WP);	\
++} while (0)
++
++#define pax_close_kernel(cr0)		\
++do {					\
++	typecheck(unsigned long, cr0);	\
++	write_cr0(cr0);			\
++	preempt_enable_no_resched();	\
++} while (0)
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ 
+ static inline void clflush(volatile void *__p)
+@@ -284,7 +303,7 @@ void enable_hlt(void);
+ extern int es7000_plat;
+ void cpu_idle_wait(void);
+ 
+-extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp);
++#define arch_align_stack(x) (x)
+ extern void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end);
+ 
+ void default_idle(void);
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/uaccess_32.h b/include/asm-x86/uaccess_32.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/uaccess_32.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/uaccess_32.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <asm/asm.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
++#include <asm/segment.h>
+ 
+ #define VERIFY_READ 0
+ #define VERIFY_WRITE 1
+@@ -30,7 +31,8 @@
+ 
+ #define get_ds()	(KERNEL_DS)
+ #define get_fs()	(current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
+-#define set_fs(x)	(current_thread_info()->addr_limit = (x))
++void __set_fs(mm_segment_t x, int cpu);
++void set_fs(mm_segment_t x);
+ 
+ #define segment_eq(a,b)	((a).seg == (b).seg)
+ 
+@@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ struct exception_table_entry
+ };
+ 
+ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);
++#define ARCH_HAS_SORT_EXTABLE
+ 
+ /*
+  * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
+@@ -281,9 +284,12 @@ extern void __put_user_8(void);
+ 
+ #define __put_user_u64(x, addr, err)				\
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(					\
+-		"1:	movl %%eax,0(%2)\n"			\
+-		"2:	movl %%edx,4(%2)\n"			\
++		"	movw %w5,%%ds\n"			\
++		"1:	movl %%eax,%%ds:0(%2)\n"		\
++		"2:	movl %%edx,%%ds:4(%2)\n"		\
+ 		"3:\n"						\
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"				\
++		"	popl %%ds\n"				\
+ 		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"			\
+ 		"4:	movl %3,%0\n"				\
+ 		"	jmp 3b\n"				\
+@@ -291,7 +297,8 @@ extern void __put_user_8(void);
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,4b)				\
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(2b,4b)				\
+ 		: "=r"(err)					\
+-		: "A" (x), "r" (addr), "i"(-EFAULT), "0"(err))
++		: "A" (x), "r" (addr), "i"(-EFAULT), "0"(err),	\
++		  "r"(__USER_DS))
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_WP_WORKS_OK
+ 
+@@ -330,15 +337,19 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long bu
+  */
+ #define __put_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret)	\
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(						\
+-		"1:	mov"itype" %"rtype"1,%2\n"			\
++		"	movw %w5,%%ds\n"				\
++		"1:	mov"itype" %"rtype"1,%%ds:%2\n"			\
+ 		"2:\n"							\
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"					\
++		"	popl %%ds\n"					\
+ 		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				\
+ 		"3:	movl %3,%0\n"					\
+ 		"	jmp 2b\n"					\
+ 		".previous\n"						\
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)					\
+ 		: "=r"(err)						\
+-		: ltype (x), "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err))
++		: ltype (x), "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err),	\
++		  "r"(__USER_DS))
+ 
+ 
+ #define __get_user_nocheck(x,ptr,size)				\
+@@ -366,8 +377,11 @@ do {									\
+ 
+ #define __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret)	\
+ 	__asm__ __volatile__(						\
+-		"1:	mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n"			\
++		"	movw %w5,%%ds\n"				\
++		"1:	mov"itype" %%ds:%2,%"rtype"1\n"			\
+ 		"2:\n"							\
++		"	pushl %%ss\n"					\
++		"	popl %%ds\n"					\
+ 		".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"				\
+ 		"3:	movl %3,%0\n"					\
+ 		"	xor"itype" %"rtype"1,%"rtype"1\n"		\
+@@ -375,7 +389,7 @@ do {									\
+ 		".previous\n"						\
+ 		_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,3b)					\
+ 		: "=r"(err), ltype (x)					\
+-		: "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err))
++		: "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err), "r"(__USER_DS))
+ 
+ 
+ unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user_ll(void __user *to,
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h b/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h
+--- a/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-x86/uaccess_64.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct exception_table_entry
+ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);
+ 
+ #define ARCH_HAS_SEARCH_EXTABLE
++#define ARCH_HAS_SORT_EXTABLE
+ 
+ /*
+  * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
+diff -urNp a/include/asm-xtensa/kmap_types.h b/include/asm-xtensa/kmap_types.h
+--- a/include/asm-xtensa/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/asm-xtensa/kmap_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ enum km_type {
+   KM_IRQ1,
+   KM_SOFTIRQ0,
+   KM_SOFTIRQ1,
++  KM_CLEARPAGE,
+   KM_TYPE_NR
+ };
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/a.out.h b/include/linux/a.out.h
+--- a/include/linux/a.out.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/a.out.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@ enum machine_type {
+   M_MIPS2 = 152		/* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */
+ };
+ 
++/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */
++#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC	1	/* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP	2	/* Emulate trampolines */
++#define F_PAX_MPROTECT	4	/* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP	8	/* Randomize mmap() base */
++/*#define F_PAX_RANDEXEC	16*/	/* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define F_PAX_SEGMEXEC	32	/* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
+ #if !defined (N_MAGIC)
+ #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff)
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
+--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
+ 	unsigned interp_data;
+ 	unsigned long loader, exec;
+ 	unsigned long argv_len;
++	int misc;
+ };
+ 
+ #define BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP_BIT 0
+@@ -100,5 +101,8 @@ extern void compute_creds(struct linux_b
+ extern int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs);
+ extern int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new);
+ 
++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp);
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp);
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _LINUX_BINFMTS_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
+--- a/include/linux/cache.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/cache.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
+ #define __read_mostly
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifndef __read_only
++#define __read_only __read_mostly
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
+ #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
+ #endif
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
+--- a/include/linux/capability.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/capability.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -501,6 +501,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set
+ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
+ 
+ int capable(int cap);
++int capable_nolog(int cap);
+ int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+ 
+ extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap);
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/elf.h b/include/linux/elf.h
+--- a/include/linux/elf.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/elf.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -50,6 +50,16 @@ typedef __s64	Elf64_Sxword;
+ 
+ #define PT_GNU_STACK	(PT_LOOS + 0x474e551)
+ 
++#define PT_PAX_FLAGS	(PT_LOOS + 0x5041580)
++
++/* Constants for the e_flags field */
++#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC		1	/* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP		2	/* Emulate trampolines */
++#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT		4	/* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP		8	/* Randomize mmap() base */
++/*#define EF_PAX_RANDEXEC		16*/	/* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC		32	/* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
+ /* These constants define the different elf file types */
+ #define ET_NONE   0
+ #define ET_REL    1
+@@ -84,6 +94,8 @@ typedef __s64	Elf64_Sxword;
+ #define DT_DEBUG	21
+ #define DT_TEXTREL	22
+ #define DT_JMPREL	23
++#define DT_FLAGS	30
++  #define DF_TEXTREL  0x00000004
+ #define DT_ENCODING	32
+ #define OLD_DT_LOOS	0x60000000
+ #define DT_LOOS		0x6000000d
+@@ -230,6 +242,19 @@ typedef struct elf64_hdr {
+ #define PF_W		0x2
+ #define PF_X		0x1
+ 
++#define PF_PAGEEXEC	(1U << 4)	/* Enable  PAGEEXEC */
++#define PF_NOPAGEEXEC	(1U << 5)	/* Disable PAGEEXEC */
++#define PF_SEGMEXEC	(1U << 6)	/* Enable  SEGMEXEC */
++#define PF_NOSEGMEXEC	(1U << 7)	/* Disable SEGMEXEC */
++#define PF_MPROTECT	(1U << 8)	/* Enable  MPROTECT */
++#define PF_NOMPROTECT	(1U << 9)	/* Disable MPROTECT */
++/*#define PF_RANDEXEC	(1U << 10)*/	/* Enable  RANDEXEC */
++/*#define PF_NORANDEXEC	(1U << 11)*/	/* Disable RANDEXEC */
++#define PF_EMUTRAMP	(1U << 12)	/* Enable  EMUTRAMP */
++#define PF_NOEMUTRAMP	(1U << 13)	/* Disable EMUTRAMP */
++#define PF_RANDMMAP	(1U << 14)	/* Enable  RANDMMAP */
++#define PF_NORANDMMAP	(1U << 15)	/* Disable RANDMMAP */
++
+ typedef struct elf32_phdr{
+   Elf32_Word	p_type;
+   Elf32_Off	p_offset;
+@@ -322,6 +347,8 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {
+ #define	EI_OSABI	7
+ #define	EI_PAD		8
+ 
++#define	EI_PAX		14
++
+ #define	ELFMAG0		0x7f		/* EI_MAG */
+ #define	ELFMAG1		'E'
+ #define	ELFMAG2		'L'
+@@ -382,6 +409,7 @@ extern Elf32_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];
+ #define elf_phdr	elf32_phdr
+ #define elf_note	elf32_note
+ #define elf_addr_t	Elf32_Off
++#define elf_dyn		Elf32_Dyn
+ 
+ #else
+ 
+@@ -390,6 +418,7 @@ extern Elf64_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];
+ #define elf_phdr	elf64_phdr
+ #define elf_note	elf64_note
+ #define elf_addr_t	Elf64_Off
++#define elf_dyn		Elf64_Dyn
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/ext4_fs_extents.h b/include/linux/ext4_fs_extents.h
+--- a/include/linux/ext4_fs_extents.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/ext4_fs_extents.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
+ #ifdef EXT_DEBUG
+ #define ext_debug(a...)		printk(a)
+ #else
+-#define ext_debug(a...)
++#define ext_debug(a...)		do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/gracl.h b/include/linux/gracl.h
+--- a/include/linux/gracl.h	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/include/linux/gracl.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
++#ifndef GR_ACL_H
++#define GR_ACL_H
++
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/resource.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/dcache.h>
++#include <asm/resource.h>
++
++/* Major status information */
++
++#define GR_VERSION  "grsecurity 2.1.12"
++#define GRSECURITY_VERSION 0x2112
++
++enum {
++
++	SHUTDOWN = 0,
++	ENABLE = 1,
++	SPROLE = 2,
++	RELOAD = 3,
++	SEGVMOD = 4,
++	STATUS = 5,
++	UNSPROLE = 6,
++	PASSSET = 7,
++	SPROLEPAM = 8
++};
++
++/* Password setup definitions
++ * kernel/grhash.c */
++enum {
++	GR_PW_LEN = 128,
++	GR_SALT_LEN = 16,
++	GR_SHA_LEN = 32,
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64,
++};
++
++#define GR_NLIMITS (RLIMIT_LOCKS + 2)
++
++/* Begin Data Structures */
++
++struct sprole_pw {
++	unsigned char *rolename;
++	unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
++	unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];	/* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */
++};
++
++struct name_entry {
++	__u32 key;
++	ino_t inode;
++	dev_t device;
++	char *name;
++	__u16 len;
++	__u8 deleted;
++	struct name_entry *prev;
++	struct name_entry *next;
++};
++
++struct inodev_entry {
++	struct name_entry *nentry;
++	struct inodev_entry *prev;
++	struct inodev_entry *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_role_db {
++	struct acl_role_label **r_hash;
++	__u32 r_size;
++};
++
++struct inodev_db {
++	struct inodev_entry **i_hash;
++	__u32 i_size;
++};
++
++struct name_db {
++	struct name_entry **n_hash;
++	__u32 n_size;
++};
++
++struct crash_uid {
++	uid_t uid;
++	unsigned long expires;
++};
++
++struct gr_hash_struct {
++	void **table;
++	void **nametable;
++	void *first;
++	__u32 table_size;
++	__u32 used_size;
++	int type;
++};
++
++/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */
++
++struct acl_subject_label {
++	char *filename;
++	ino_t inode;
++	dev_t device;
++	__u32 mode;
++	kernel_cap_t cap_mask;
++	kernel_cap_t cap_lower;
++
++	struct rlimit res[GR_NLIMITS];
++	__u16 resmask;
++
++	__u8 user_trans_type;
++	__u8 group_trans_type;
++	uid_t *user_transitions;
++	gid_t *group_transitions;
++	__u16 user_trans_num;
++	__u16 group_trans_num;
++
++	__u32 ip_proto[8];
++	__u32 ip_type;
++	struct acl_ip_label **ips;
++	__u32 ip_num;
++
++	__u32 crashes;
++	unsigned long expires;
++
++	struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject;
++	struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
++	struct acl_subject_label *prev;
++	struct acl_subject_label *next;
++
++	struct acl_object_label **obj_hash;
++	__u32 obj_hash_size;
++	__u16 pax_flags;
++};
++
++struct role_allowed_ip {
++	__u32 addr;
++	__u32 netmask;
++
++	struct role_allowed_ip *prev;
++	struct role_allowed_ip *next;
++};
++
++struct role_transition {
++	char *rolename;
++
++	struct role_transition *prev;
++	struct role_transition *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_role_label {
++	char *rolename;
++	uid_t uidgid;
++	__u16 roletype;
++
++	__u16 auth_attempts;
++	unsigned long expires;
++
++	struct acl_subject_label *root_label;
++	struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
++
++	struct acl_role_label *prev;
++	struct acl_role_label *next;
++
++	struct role_transition *transitions;
++	struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips;
++	uid_t *domain_children;
++	__u16 domain_child_num;
++
++	struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash;
++	__u32 subj_hash_size;
++};
++
++struct user_acl_role_db {
++	struct acl_role_label **r_table;
++	__u32 num_pointers;		/* Number of allocations to track */
++	__u32 num_roles;		/* Number of roles */
++	__u32 num_domain_children;	/* Number of domain children */
++	__u32 num_subjects;		/* Number of subjects */
++	__u32 num_objects;		/* Number of objects */
++};
++
++struct acl_object_label {
++	char *filename;
++	ino_t inode;
++	dev_t device;
++	__u32 mode;
++
++	struct acl_subject_label *nested;
++	struct acl_object_label *globbed;
++
++	/* next two structures not used */
++
++	struct acl_object_label *prev;
++	struct acl_object_label *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_ip_label {
++	char *iface;
++	__u32 addr;
++	__u32 netmask;
++	__u16 low, high;
++	__u8 mode;
++	__u32 type;
++	__u32 proto[8];
++
++	/* next two structures not used */
++
++	struct acl_ip_label *prev;
++	struct acl_ip_label *next;
++};
++
++struct gr_arg {
++	struct user_acl_role_db role_db;
++	unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN];
++	unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
++	unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
++	unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN];
++	struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws;
++	dev_t segv_device;
++	ino_t segv_inode;
++	uid_t segv_uid;
++	__u16 num_sprole_pws;
++	__u16 mode;
++};
++
++struct gr_arg_wrapper {
++	struct gr_arg *arg;
++	__u32 version;
++	__u32 size;
++};
++
++struct subject_map {
++	struct acl_subject_label *user;
++	struct acl_subject_label *kernel;
++	struct subject_map *prev;
++	struct subject_map *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_subj_map_db {
++	struct subject_map **s_hash;
++	__u32 s_size;
++};
++
++/* End Data Structures Section */
++
++/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler
++   Makes good use of the low bits of the inode.  Generally 0-1 times
++   in loop for successful match.  0-3 for unsuccessful match.
++   Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/
++
++static __inline__ unsigned int
++rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned int sz)
++{
++	return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz);
++}
++
++ static __inline__ unsigned int
++shash(const struct acl_subject_label *userp, const unsigned int sz)
++{
++	return ((const unsigned long)userp % sz);
++}
++
++static __inline__ unsigned int
++fhash(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, const unsigned int sz)
++{
++	return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz);
++}
++
++static __inline__ unsigned int
++nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned int sz)
++{
++	return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz;
++}
++
++#define FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(role,iter) \
++	role = NULL; \
++	iter = 0; \
++	while (iter < acl_role_set.r_size) { \
++		if (role == NULL) \
++			role = acl_role_set.r_hash[iter]; \
++		if (role == NULL) { \
++			iter++; \
++			continue; \
++		}
++
++#define FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(role,iter) \
++		role = role->next; \
++		if (role == NULL) \
++			iter++; \
++	}
++
++#define FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(role,subj,iter) \
++	subj = NULL; \
++	iter = 0; \
++	while (iter < role->subj_hash_size) { \
++		if (subj == NULL) \
++			subj = role->subj_hash[iter]; \
++		if (subj == NULL) { \
++			iter++; \
++			continue; \
++		}
++
++#define FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(subj,iter) \
++		subj = subj->next; \
++		if (subj == NULL) \
++			iter++; \
++	}
++
++
++#define FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(role,subj) \
++	subj = role->hash->first; \
++	while (subj != NULL) {
++
++#define FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(subj) \
++		subj = subj->next; \
++	}
++
++#endif
++
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/gralloc.h b/include/linux/gralloc.h
+--- a/include/linux/gralloc.h	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/include/linux/gralloc.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++#ifndef __GRALLOC_H
++#define __GRALLOC_H
++
++void acl_free_all(void);
++int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size);
++void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len);
++
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/grdefs.h b/include/linux/grdefs.h
+--- a/include/linux/grdefs.h	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/include/linux/grdefs.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
++#ifndef GRDEFS_H
++#define GRDEFS_H
++
++/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */
++
++enum {
++	GR_READY = 0x01,
++	GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00	// disabled state
++};
++
++/* Begin  ACL declarations */
++
++/* Role flags */
++
++enum {
++	GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001,
++	GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002,
++	GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004,
++	GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008,
++	GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010,
++	GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020,
++	GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040,
++	GR_ROLE_LEARN = 0x0080,
++	GR_ROLE_TPE = 0x0100,
++	GR_ROLE_DOMAIN = 0x0200,
++	GR_ROLE_PAM = 0x0400
++};
++
++/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */
++enum {
++	GR_DELETED = 0x80000000
++};
++
++/* ACL Object-only mode flags */
++enum {
++	GR_READ 	= 0x00000001,
++	GR_APPEND 	= 0x00000002,
++	GR_WRITE 	= 0x00000004,
++	GR_EXEC 	= 0x00000008,
++	GR_FIND 	= 0x00000010,
++	GR_INHERIT 	= 0x00000020,
++	GR_SETID 	= 0x00000040,
++	GR_CREATE 	= 0x00000080,
++	GR_DELETE 	= 0x00000100,
++	GR_LINK		= 0x00000200,
++	GR_AUDIT_READ 	= 0x00000400,
++	GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00000800,
++	GR_AUDIT_WRITE 	= 0x00001000,
++	GR_AUDIT_EXEC 	= 0x00002000,
++	GR_AUDIT_FIND 	= 0x00004000,
++	GR_AUDIT_INHERIT= 0x00008000,
++	GR_AUDIT_SETID 	= 0x00010000,
++	GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00020000,
++	GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x00040000,
++	GR_AUDIT_LINK	= 0x00080000,
++	GR_PTRACERD 	= 0x00100000,
++	GR_NOPTRACE	= 0x00200000,
++	GR_SUPPRESS 	= 0x00400000,
++	GR_NOLEARN 	= 0x00800000
++};
++
++#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \
++		   GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \
++		   GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_LINK)
++
++/* ACL subject-only mode flags */
++enum {
++	GR_KILL 	= 0x00000001,
++	GR_VIEW 	= 0x00000002,
++	GR_PROTECTED 	= 0x00000004,
++	GR_LEARN 	= 0x00000008,
++	GR_OVERRIDE 	= 0x00000010,
++	/* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
++	GR_DUMMY 	= 0x00000020,
++	GR_PROTSHM	= 0x00000040,
++	GR_KILLPROC	= 0x00000080,
++	GR_KILLIPPROC	= 0x00000100,
++	/* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
++	GR_NOTROJAN	= 0x00000200,
++	GR_PROTPROCFD	= 0x00000400,
++	GR_PROCACCT	= 0x00000800,
++	GR_RELAXPTRACE	= 0x00001000,
++	GR_NESTED	= 0x00002000,
++	GR_INHERITLEARN	= 0x00004000,
++	GR_PROCFIND	= 0x00008000,
++	GR_POVERRIDE	= 0x00010000,
++	GR_KERNELAUTH	= 0x00020000,
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_PAX_ENABLE_SEGMEXEC	= 0x0001,
++	GR_PAX_ENABLE_PAGEEXEC	= 0x0002,
++	GR_PAX_ENABLE_MPROTECT	= 0x0004,
++	GR_PAX_ENABLE_RANDMMAP	= 0x0008,
++	GR_PAX_ENABLE_EMUTRAMP	= 0x0010,
++	GR_PAX_DISABLE_SEGMEXEC	= 0x0100,
++	GR_PAX_DISABLE_PAGEEXEC	= 0x0200,
++	GR_PAX_DISABLE_MPROTECT	= 0x0400,
++	GR_PAX_DISABLE_RANDMMAP	= 0x0800,
++	GR_PAX_DISABLE_EMUTRAMP	= 0x1000,
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_ID_USER	= 0x01,
++	GR_ID_GROUP	= 0x02,
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_ID_ALLOW	= 0x01,
++	GR_ID_DENY	= 0x02,
++};
++
++#define GR_CRASH_RES	11
++#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500
++
++/* begin resource learning section */
++enum {
++	GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60,
++	GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000,
++	GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000,
++	GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000,
++	GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000,
++	GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000,
++	GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1,
++	GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5,
++	GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000,
++	GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000,
++	GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2
++};
++
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/grinternal.h b/include/linux/grinternal.h
+--- a/include/linux/grinternal.h	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/include/linux/grinternal.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
++#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H
++#define __GRINTERNAL_H
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/grmsg.h>
++
++void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...);
++__u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++__u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++			     const struct dentry *parent,
++			     const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode);
++int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
++__u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode);
++int gr_set_acls(const int type);
++
++int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++char gr_roletype_to_char(void);
++
++void gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task);
++char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++char *gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++char *gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++char *gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++
++extern int grsec_enable_link;
++extern int grsec_enable_fifo;
++extern int grsec_enable_execve;
++extern int grsec_enable_shm;
++extern int grsec_enable_execlog;
++extern int grsec_enable_signal;
++extern int grsec_enable_forkfail;
++extern int grsec_enable_time;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
++extern int grsec_enable_tpe;
++extern int grsec_tpe_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
++extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_all;
++extern int grsec_socket_all_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_client;
++extern int grsec_socket_client_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_server;
++extern int grsec_socket_server_gid;
++extern int grsec_audit_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_group;
++extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
++extern int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
++extern int grsec_enable_mount;
++extern int grsec_enable_chdir;
++extern int grsec_resource_logging;
++extern int grsec_lock;
++
++extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet;
++
++extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock;
++
++extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
++
++#define gr_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename2(tsk->exec_file->f_path.dentry, \
++			tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define gr_parent_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename3(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_path.dentry, \
++			tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define gr_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename(tsk->exec_file->f_path.dentry, \
++			tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define gr_parent_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
++			gr_to_filename1(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_path.dentry, \
++			tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a)  ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && (tsk_a->fs != NULL) && \
++			  ((tsk_a->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev != \
++			  tsk_a->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) || \
++			  (tsk_a->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_ino != \
++			  tsk_a->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_ino)))
++
++#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs != NULL) && (tsk_b->fs != NULL) && \
++			  (tsk_a->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev == \
++			  tsk_b->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && \
++			  (tsk_a->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_ino == \
++			  tsk_b->fs->root.dentry->d_inode->i_ino))
++
++#define DEFAULTSECARGS(task) gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, \
++		       task->pid, task->uid, \
++		       task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, \
++		       gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), \
++		       task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, \
++		       task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, \
++		       task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid
++
++#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS {{ \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \
++	CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER) , 0 }}
++
++#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++	read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++	gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
++	read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
++})
++
++enum {
++	GR_DO_AUDIT,
++	GR_DONT_AUDIT,
++	GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD
++};
++
++enum {
++	GR_TTYSNIFF,
++	GR_RBAC,
++	GR_RBAC_STR,
++	GR_STR_RBAC,
++	GR_RBAC_MODE2,
++	GR_RBAC_MODE3,
++	GR_FILENAME,
++	GR_SYSCTL_HIDDEN,
++	GR_NOARGS,
++	GR_ONE_INT,
++	GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR,
++	GR_ONE_STR,
++	GR_STR_INT,
++	GR_TWO_INT,
++	GR_THREE_INT,
++	GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR,
++	GR_TWO_STR,
++	GR_THREE_STR,
++	GR_FOUR_STR,
++	GR_STR_FILENAME,
++	GR_FILENAME_STR,
++	GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT,
++	GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR,
++	GR_TEXTREL,
++	GR_PTRACE,
++	GR_RESOURCE,
++	GR_CAP,
++	GR_SIG,
++	GR_CRASH1,
++	GR_CRASH2,
++	GR_PSACCT
++};
++
++#define gr_log_hidden_sysctl(audit, msg, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_SYSCTL_HIDDEN, str)
++#define gr_log_ttysniff(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TTYSNIFF, task)
++#define gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC, dentry, mnt)
++#define gr_log_fs_rbac_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_STR, dentry, mnt, str)
++#define gr_log_fs_str_rbac(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_RBAC, str, dentry, mnt)
++#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE2, dentry, mnt, str1, str2)
++#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE3, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3)
++#define gr_log_fs_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME, dentry, mnt)
++#define gr_log_noargs(audit, msg) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_NOARGS)
++#define gr_log_int(audit, msg, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT, num)
++#define gr_log_int_str2(audit, msg, num, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR, num, str1, str2)
++#define gr_log_str(audit, msg, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_STR, str)
++#define gr_log_str_int(audit, msg, str, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_INT, str, num)
++#define gr_log_int_int(audit, msg, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_INT, num1, num2)
++#define gr_log_int3(audit, msg, num1, num2, num3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_INT, num1, num2, num3)
++#define gr_log_int5_str2(audit, msg, num1, num2, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR, num1, num2, str1, str2)
++#define gr_log_str_str(audit, msg, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_STR, str1, str2)
++#define gr_log_str3(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_STR, str1, str2, str3)
++#define gr_log_str4(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3, str4) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FOUR_STR, str1, str2, str3, str4)
++#define gr_log_str_fs(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_FILENAME, str, dentry, mnt)
++#define gr_log_fs_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_STR, dentry, mnt, str)
++#define gr_log_fs_int2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT, dentry, mnt, num1, num2)
++#define gr_log_fs_int2_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str)
++#define gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(audit, msg, file, ulong1, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TEXTREL, file, ulong1, ulong2)
++#define gr_log_ptrace(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PTRACE, task)
++#define gr_log_res_ulong2_str(audit, msg, task, ulong1, str, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RESOURCE, task, ulong1, str, ulong2)
++#define gr_log_cap(audit, msg, task, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CAP, task, str)
++#define gr_log_sig(audit, msg, task, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_SIG, task, num)
++#define gr_log_crash1(audit, msg, task, ulong) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH1, task, ulong)
++#define gr_log_crash2(audit, msg, task, ulong1) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH2, task, ulong1)
++#define gr_log_procacct(audit, msg, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PSACCT, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9)
++
++void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...);
++
++#endif
++
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/grmsg.h b/include/linux/grmsg.h
+--- a/include/linux/grmsg.h	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/include/linux/grmsg.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
++#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
++#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by "
++#define GR_STOPMOD_MSG "denied modification of module state by "
++#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by "
++#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by "
++#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by "
++#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect() to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by "
++#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by "
++#define GR_KMEM_MSG "denied write of /dev/kmem by "
++#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "denied open of /dev/port by "
++#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "denied write of /dev/mem by "
++#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "denied mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by "
++#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by "
++#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
++#define GR_ID_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%c\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
++#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by "
++#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by "
++#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by "
++#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by "
++#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied mknod of %.950s from chroot by "
++#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by "
++#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect() to the unix domain socket %.950s by "
++#define GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG "terminal being sniffed by IP:%u.%u.%u.%u %.480s[%.16s:%d], parent %.480s[%.16s:%d] against "
++#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by "
++#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by "
++#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by "
++#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by "
++#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for "
++#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by "
++#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by "
++#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by "
++#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by "
++#define GR_NPROC_MSG "denied overstep of process limit by "
++#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by "
++#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by "
++#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds"
++#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning execution for %lu seconds"
++#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied mount of %.30s as %.930s from chroot by "
++#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied pivot_root from chroot by "
++#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by "
++#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by "
++#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by "
++#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied double chroot to %.950s by "
++#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by "
++#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied chmod +s of %.950s by "
++#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by "
++#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "denied fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by "
++#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by "
++#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by "
++#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s by "
++#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use <kernel image name> gracl=off from your boot loader"
++#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: %d bytes sent %d required, being fed garbaged by "
++#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for "
++#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for "
++#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for "
++#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for "
++#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for "
++#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for "
++#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system loaded by "
++#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "unable to load %s for "
++#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system"
++#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system reloaded by "
++#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "failed reload of %s for "
++#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for "
++#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by "
++#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by "
++#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for "
++#define GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring unauth of special role for disabled RBAC system for "
++#define GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful unauth of special role %s (id %d) by "
++#define GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role unauth of %s failure for "
++#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "invalid mode %d by "
++#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by "
++#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by "
++#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change by "
++#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to "
++#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by "
++#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "denied send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by "
++#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "denied modification of grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by "
++#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by "
++#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by "
++#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "fatal: unable to find subject for (%.16s:%d), loaded by "
++#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by "
++#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by "
++#define GR_SOCK_MSG "denied socket(%.16s,%.16s,%.16s) by "
++#define GR_SOCK2_MSG "denied socket(%d,%.16s,%.16s) by "
++#define GR_BIND_MSG "denied bind() by "
++#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "denied connect() by "
++#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "denied bind() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by "
++#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "denied connect() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by "
++#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
++#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process "
++#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for "
++#define GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to uid %u denied for "
++#define GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to gid %u denied for "
++#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by "
++#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by "
++#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount of %.30s to %.64s by "
++#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by "
++#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.128s) by "
++#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by "
++#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%u euid:%u removed by "
++#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by "
++#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%u euid:%u removed by "
++#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by "
++#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%u euid:%u removed by "
++#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "denied resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu for "
++#define GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG "text relocation in %s, VMA:0x%08lx 0x%08lx by "
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/grsecurity.h b/include/linux/grsecurity.h
+--- a/include/linux/grsecurity.h	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/include/linux/grsecurity.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
++#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
++#define GR_SECURITY_H
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/binfmts.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++/* notify of brain-dead configs */
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++#error "CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC enabled, but PAGEEXEC, SEGMEXEC, and KERNEXEC are disabled."
++#endif
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
++#error "CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC enabled, but neither CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX nor CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS are enabled."
++#endif
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) && (defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
++#error "CONFIG_PAX_ASLR enabled, but neither CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX nor CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS are enabled."
++#endif
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++#error "CONFIG_PAX_ASLR enabled, but RANDKSTACK, RANDUSTACK, and RANDMMAP are disabled."
++#endif
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++#error "CONFIG_PAX enabled, but no PaX options are enabled."
++#endif
++
++void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p);
++void gr_handle_brute_check(void);
++
++char gr_roletype_to_char(void);
++
++int gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
++int gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
++
++void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *p);
++
++int gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p);
++int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void);
++int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
++int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p,
++					const int niceval);
++int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
++int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				   const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task);
++void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct path *path);
++int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
++int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
++int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++				  const char *dev_name);
++int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void);
++int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid);
++
++int gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode);
++int gr_handle_nproc(void);
++
++void gr_handle_ioperm(void);
++void gr_handle_iopl(void);
++
++int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file);
++
++int gr_random_pid(void);
++
++void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval);
++void gr_log_timechange(void);
++void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t);
++void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			       const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv);
++void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval);
++void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval);
++void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval);
++void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg);
++void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg);
++void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size);
++void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++void gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
++
++int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
++				 const struct inode *inode,
++				 const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			  const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++			  const struct dentry *dir, const int flag,
++			  const int acc_mode);
++int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			      const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++			      struct inode *inode,
++			      const int mode, const char *to);
++
++int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap);
++int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap);
++void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit,
++			      const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
++void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk);
++void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig);
++int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig);
++int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid);
++int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
++int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file,
++			      const unsigned long prot);
++int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file,
++				  const unsigned long prot);
++int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				    const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request);
++int gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp);
++int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task);
++void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
++			      const gid_t gid);
++int gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			      const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				       const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct dentry *p_dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode,
++				 const int imode);
++void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry,
++			     const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				 const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				 const int mode);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				 const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				  const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				   const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				   const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				   const char *from);
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to);
++int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++				struct dentry *old_dentry,
++				struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++				struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname);
++void gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++				struct dentry *old_dentry,
++				struct dentry *new_dentry,
++				struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace);
++__u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++			   const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++			   const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++			   const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++			   const struct vfsmount *old_mnt);
++int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name,
++				 const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino);
++
++__u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry,
++				const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++void gr_acl_handle_exit(void);
++void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code);
++int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++void gr_handle_mem_write(void);
++void gr_handle_kmem_write(void);
++void gr_handle_open_port(void);
++int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset,
++			      struct vm_area_struct *vma);
++
++extern int grsec_enable_dmesg;
++extern int grsec_enable_randsrc;
++extern int grsec_enable_shm;
++#endif
++
++#endif
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h
+--- a/include/linux/highmem.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/highmem.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -122,6 +122,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct
+ 	kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
+ }
+ 
++static inline void sanitize_highpage(struct page *page)
++{
++	void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page, KM_CLEARPAGE);
++	clear_page(kaddr);
++	kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_CLEARPAGE);
++}
++
+ static inline void zero_user_segments(struct page *page,
+ 	unsigned start1, unsigned end1,
+ 	unsigned start2, unsigned end2)
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/irqflags.h b/include/linux/irqflags.h
+--- a/include/linux/irqflags.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/irqflags.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -84,10 +84,10 @@
+ 
+ #define irqs_disabled()						\
+ ({								\
+-	unsigned long flags;					\
++	unsigned long __flags;					\
+ 								\
+-	raw_local_save_flags(flags);				\
+-	raw_irqs_disabled_flags(flags);				\
++	raw_local_save_flags(__flags);				\
++	raw_irqs_disabled_flags(__flags);			\
+ })
+ 
+ #define irqs_disabled_flags(flags)	raw_irqs_disabled_flags(flags)
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/jbd.h b/include/linux/jbd.h
+--- a/include/linux/jbd.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/jbd.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ extern u8 journal_enable_debug;
+ 		}							\
+ 	} while (0)
+ #else
+-#define jbd_debug(f, a...)	/**/
++#define jbd_debug(f, a...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ static inline void *jbd_alloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/jbd2.h b/include/linux/jbd2.h
+--- a/include/linux/jbd2.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/jbd2.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ extern u8 jbd2_journal_enable_debug;
+ 		}							\
+ 	} while (0)
+ #else
+-#define jbd_debug(f, a...)	/**/
++#define jbd_debug(f, a...)	do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ static inline void *jbd2_alloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/libata.h b/include/linux/libata.h
+--- a/include/linux/libata.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/libata.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@
+ #ifdef ATA_VERBOSE_DEBUG
+ #define VPRINTK(fmt, args...) printk(KERN_ERR "%s: " fmt, __FUNCTION__, ## args)
+ #else
+-#define VPRINTK(fmt, args...)
++#define VPRINTK(fmt, args...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif	/* ATA_VERBOSE_DEBUG */
+ #else
+-#define DPRINTK(fmt, args...)
+-#define VPRINTK(fmt, args...)
++#define DPRINTK(fmt, args...) do {} while (0)
++#define VPRINTK(fmt, args...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif	/* ATA_DEBUG */
+ 
+ #define BPRINTK(fmt, args...) if (ap->flags & ATA_FLAG_DEBUGMSG) printk(KERN_ERR "%s: " fmt, __FUNCTION__, ## args)
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
+--- a/include/linux/mm.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/mm.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
+ 
+ #define nth_page(page,n) pfn_to_page(page_to_pfn((page)) + (n))
+ 
+@@ -108,6 +109,14 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void 
+ 
+ #define VM_CAN_NONLINEAR 0x08000000	/* Has ->fault & does nonlinear pages */
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define VM_PAGEEXEC	0x10000000	/* vma->vm_page_prot needs special handling */
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define VM_MAYNOTWRITE	0x20000000	/* vma cannot be granted VM_WRITE any more */
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS		/* arch can override this */
+ #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
+ #endif
+@@ -836,6 +845,8 @@ struct shrinker {
+ extern void register_shrinker(struct shrinker *);
+ extern void unregister_shrinker(struct shrinker *);
+ 
++pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags);
++
+ int vma_wants_writenotify(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+ 
+ extern pte_t *get_locked_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, spinlock_t **ptl);
+@@ -1074,6 +1085,7 @@ out:
+ }
+ 
+ extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t);
++extern int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t);
+ 
+ extern unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long, unsigned long);
+ 
+@@ -1126,6 +1138,10 @@ extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma(
+ extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_prev(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr,
+ 					     struct vm_area_struct **pprev);
+ 
++extern struct vm_area_struct *pax_find_mirror_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
++extern void pax_mirror_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma_m, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
++extern void pax_mirror_file_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct page *page_m, spinlock_t *ptl);
++
+ /* Look up the first VMA which intersects the interval start_addr..end_addr-1,
+    NULL if none.  Assume start_addr < end_addr. */
+ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long start_addr, unsigned long end_addr)
+@@ -1142,7 +1158,6 @@ static inline unsigned long vma_pages(st
+ 	return (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ }
+ 
+-pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags);
+ struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long addr);
+ int remap_pfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *, unsigned long addr,
+ 			unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size, pgprot_t);
+@@ -1230,5 +1245,11 @@ int vmemmap_populate_basepages(struct pa
+ 						unsigned long pages, int node);
+ int vmemmap_populate(struct page *start_page, unsigned long pages, int node);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++extern void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
++#else
++static inline void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot) {}
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+ #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
+--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct vm_area_struct {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ 	struct mempolicy *vm_policy;	/* NUMA policy for the VMA */
+ #endif
++
++	struct vm_area_struct *vm_mirror;/* PaX: mirror vma or NULL */
+ };
+ 
+ struct mm_struct {
+@@ -225,6 +227,24 @@ struct mm_struct {
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR
+ 	struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup;
+ #endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++	unsigned long pax_flags;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
++	unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++	unsigned long call_syscall;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
++	unsigned long delta_mmap;		/* randomized offset */
++	unsigned long delta_stack;		/* randomized offset */
++#endif
++
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* _LINUX_MM_TYPES_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
+--- a/include/linux/module.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/module.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -296,16 +296,16 @@ struct module
+ 	int (*init)(void);
+ 
+ 	/* If this is non-NULL, vfree after init() returns */
+-	void *module_init;
++	void *module_init_rx, *module_init_rw;
+ 
+ 	/* Here is the actual code + data, vfree'd on unload. */
+-	void *module_core;
++	void *module_core_rx, *module_core_rw;
+ 
+ 	/* Here are the sizes of the init and core sections */
+-	unsigned long init_size, core_size;
++	unsigned long init_size_rw, core_size_rw;
+ 
+ 	/* The size of the executable code in each section.  */
+-	unsigned long init_text_size, core_text_size;
++	unsigned long init_size_rx, core_size_rx;
+ 
+ 	/* The handle returned from unwind_add_table. */
+ 	void *unwind_info;
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/moduleloader.h b/include/linux/moduleloader.h
+--- a/include/linux/moduleloader.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/moduleloader.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -17,9 +17,21 @@ int module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *
+    sections.  Returns NULL on failure. */
+ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++void *module_alloc_exec(unsigned long size);
++#else
++#define module_alloc_exec(x) module_alloc(x)
++#endif
++
+ /* Free memory returned from module_alloc. */
+ void module_free(struct module *mod, void *module_region);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++void module_free_exec(struct module *mod, void *module_region);
++#else
++#define module_free_exec(x, y) module_free(x, y)
++#endif
++
+ /* Apply the given relocation to the (simplified) ELF.  Return -error
+    or 0. */
+ int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
+--- a/include/linux/namei.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/namei.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct nameidata {
+ 	unsigned int	flags;
+ 	int		last_type;
+ 	unsigned	depth;
+-	char *saved_names[MAX_NESTED_LINKS + 1];
++	const char *saved_names[MAX_NESTED_LINKS + 1];
+ 
+ 	/* Intent data */
+ 	union {
+@@ -83,12 +83,12 @@ extern int follow_up(struct vfsmount **,
+ extern struct dentry *lock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
+ extern void unlock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
+ 
+-static inline void nd_set_link(struct nameidata *nd, char *path)
++static inline void nd_set_link(struct nameidata *nd, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	nd->saved_names[nd->depth] = path;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline char *nd_get_link(struct nameidata *nd)
++static inline const char *nd_get_link(struct nameidata *nd)
+ {
+ 	return nd->saved_names[nd->depth];
+ }
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h
+--- a/include/linux/percpu.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/percpu.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define PERCPU_ENOUGH_ROOM						\
+-	(__per_cpu_end - __per_cpu_start + PERCPU_MODULE_RESERVE)
++	((unsigned long)(__per_cpu_end - __per_cpu_start + PERCPU_MODULE_RESERVE))
+ #endif	/* PERCPU_ENOUGH_ROOM */
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/poison.h b/include/linux/poison.h
+--- a/include/linux/poison.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/poison.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
+  * under normal circumstances, used to verify that nobody uses
+  * non-initialized list entries.
+  */
+-#define LIST_POISON1  ((void *) 0x00100100)
+-#define LIST_POISON2  ((void *) 0x00200200)
++#define LIST_POISON1  ((void *) 0xFF1001FFFF1001FFULL)
++#define LIST_POISON2  ((void *) 0xFF2002FFFF2002FFULL)
+ 
+ /********** mm/slab.c **********/
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
+--- a/include/linux/random.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/random.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned l
+ u32 random32(void);
+ void srandom32(u32 seed);
+ 
++static inline unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void)
++{
++	return random32() + (sizeof(long) > 4 ? (unsigned long)random32() << 32 : 0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* __KERNEL___ */
+ 
+ #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
+--- a/include/linux/sched.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/sched.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct exec_domain;
+ struct futex_pi_state;
+ struct robust_list_head;
+ struct bio;
++struct linux_binprm;
+ 
+ /*
+  * List of flags we want to share for kernel threads,
+@@ -542,6 +543,15 @@ struct signal_struct {
+ 	unsigned audit_tty;
+ 	struct tty_audit_buf *tty_audit_buf;
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	u32 curr_ip;
++	u32 gr_saddr;
++	u32 gr_daddr;
++	u16 gr_sport;
++	u16 gr_dport;
++	u8 used_accept:1;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ /* Context switch must be unlocked if interrupts are to be enabled */
+@@ -993,7 +1003,7 @@ struct sched_rt_entity {
+ 
+ struct task_struct {
+ 	volatile long state;	/* -1 unrunnable, 0 runnable, >0 stopped */
+-	void *stack;
++	struct thread_info *stack;
+ 	atomic_t usage;
+ 	unsigned int flags;	/* per process flags, defined below */
+ 	unsigned int ptrace;
+@@ -1063,10 +1073,9 @@ struct task_struct {
+ 	pid_t pid;
+ 	pid_t tgid;
+ 
+-#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+ 	/* Canary value for the -fstack-protector gcc feature */
+ 	unsigned long stack_canary;
+-#endif
++
+ 	/* 
+ 	 * pointers to (original) parent process, youngest child, younger sibling,
+ 	 * older sibling, respectively.  (p->father can be replaced with 
+@@ -1087,8 +1096,8 @@ struct task_struct {
+ 	struct list_head thread_group;
+ 
+ 	struct completion *vfork_done;		/* for vfork() */
+-	int __user *set_child_tid;		/* CLONE_CHILD_SETTID */
+-	int __user *clear_child_tid;		/* CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID */
++	pid_t __user *set_child_tid;		/* CLONE_CHILD_SETTID */
++	pid_t __user *clear_child_tid;		/* CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID */
+ 
+ 	unsigned int rt_priority;
+ 	cputime_t utime, stime, utimescaled, stimescaled;
+@@ -1271,8 +1280,60 @@ struct task_struct {
+ 	int latency_record_count;
+ 	struct latency_record latency_record[LT_SAVECOUNT];
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	/* grsecurity */
++	struct acl_subject_label *acl;
++	struct acl_role_label *role;
++	struct file *exec_file;
++	u16 acl_role_id;
++	u8 acl_sp_role;
++	u8 is_writable;
++	u8 brute;
++#endif
++
+ };
+ 
++#define MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC		0x01000000	/* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP		0x02000000	/* Emulate trampolines */
++#define MF_PAX_MPROTECT		0x04000000	/* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define MF_PAX_RANDMMAP		0x08000000	/* Randomize mmap() base */
++/*#define MF_PAX_RANDEXEC		0x10000000*/	/* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC		0x20000000	/* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++extern unsigned int pax_softmode;
++#endif
++
++extern int pax_check_flags(unsigned long *);
++
++/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
++static inline unsigned long pax_get_flags(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++	if (likely(tsk->mm))
++		return tsk->mm->pax_flags;
++	else
++		return 0UL;
++}
++
++/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */
++static inline long pax_set_flags(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags)
++{
++	if (likely(tsk->mm)) {
++		tsk->mm->pax_flags = flags;
++		return 0;
++	}
++	return -EINVAL;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++extern void pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
++extern void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Priority of a process goes from 0..MAX_PRIO-1, valid RT
+  * priority is 0..MAX_RT_PRIO-1, and SCHED_NORMAL/SCHED_BATCH
+@@ -1775,7 +1836,7 @@ extern void __cleanup_signal(struct sign
+ extern void __cleanup_sighand(struct sighand_struct *);
+ extern void exit_itimers(struct signal_struct *);
+ 
+-extern NORET_TYPE void do_group_exit(int);
++extern NORET_TYPE void do_group_exit(int) ATTRIB_NORET;
+ 
+ extern void daemonize(const char *, ...);
+ extern int allow_signal(int);
+@@ -1877,8 +1938,8 @@ static inline void unlock_task_sighand(s
+ 
+ #ifndef __HAVE_THREAD_FUNCTIONS
+ 
+-#define task_thread_info(task)	((struct thread_info *)(task)->stack)
+-#define task_stack_page(task)	((task)->stack)
++#define task_thread_info(task)	((task)->stack)
++#define task_stack_page(task)	((void *)(task)->stack)
+ 
+ static inline void setup_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *org)
+ {
+@@ -2026,6 +2087,12 @@ extern void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct
+ static inline void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ {
+ 	mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ 	mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
+ 	mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
+ }
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/screen_info.h b/include/linux/screen_info.h
+--- a/include/linux/screen_info.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/screen_info.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ struct screen_info {
+ 	__u16 pages;		/* 0x32 */
+ 	__u16 vesa_attributes;	/* 0x34 */
+ 	__u32 capabilities;     /* 0x36 */
+-	__u8  _reserved[6];	/* 0x3a */
++	__u16 vesapm_size;	/* 0x3a */
++	__u8  _reserved[4];	/* 0x3c */
+ } __attribute__((packed));
+ 
+ #define VIDEO_TYPE_MDA		0x10	/* Monochrome Text Display	*/
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/shm.h b/include/linux/shm.h
+--- a/include/linux/shm.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/shm.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ struct shmid_kernel /* private to the ke
+ 	pid_t			shm_cprid;
+ 	pid_t			shm_lprid;
+ 	struct user_struct	*mlock_user;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	time_t			shm_createtime;
++	pid_t			shm_lapid;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ /* shm_mode upper byte flags */
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
+--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -163,9 +163,21 @@ enum
+ 	KERN_MAX_LOCK_DEPTH=74,
+ 	KERN_NMI_WATCHDOG=75, /* int: enable/disable nmi watchdog */
+ 	KERN_PANIC_ON_NMI=76, /* int: whether we will panic on an unrecovered */
+-};
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	KERN_GRSECURITY=98,	/* grsecurity */
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	KERN_PAX=99,		/* PaX control */
++#endif
+ 
++};
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++enum {
++	PAX_SOFTMODE=1		/* PaX: disable/enable soft mode */
++};
++#endif
+ 
+ /* CTL_VM names: */
+ enum
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
+--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ static inline unsigned long __copy_from_
+ 		long ret;				\
+ 		mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();		\
+ 							\
+-		set_fs(KERNEL_DS);			\
+ 		pagefault_disable();			\
++		set_fs(KERNEL_DS);			\
+ 		ret = __get_user(retval, (__force typeof(retval) __user *)(addr));		\
+-		pagefault_enable();			\
+ 		set_fs(old_fs);				\
++		pagefault_enable();			\
+ 		ret;					\
+ 	})
+ 
+diff -urNp a/include/linux/udf_fs.h b/include/linux/udf_fs.h
+--- a/include/linux/udf_fs.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/linux/udf_fs.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
+ 		printk (f, ##a); \
+ 	} while (0)
+ #else
+-#define udf_debug(f, a...) /**/
++#define udf_debug(f, a...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define udf_info(f, a...) \
+diff -urNp a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
+--- a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ extern int sctp_debug_flag;
+ 
+ #else	/* SCTP_DEBUG */
+ 
+-#define SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK(whatever...)
+-#define SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK_IPADDR(whatever...)
++#define SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK(whatever...) do {} while (0)
++#define SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK_IPADDR(whatever...) do {} while (0)
+ #define SCTP_ENABLE_DEBUG
+ #define SCTP_DISABLE_DEBUG
+ #define SCTP_ASSERT(expr, str, func)
+diff -urNp a/include/sound/core.h b/include/sound/core.h
+--- a/include/sound/core.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/include/sound/core.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -406,9 +406,9 @@ void snd_verbose_printd(const char *file
+ 
+ #else /* !CONFIG_SND_DEBUG */
+ 
+-#define snd_printd(fmt, args...)	/* nothing */
++#define snd_printd(fmt, args...)	do {} while (0)
+ #define snd_assert(expr, args...)	(void)(expr)
+-#define snd_BUG()			/* nothing */
++#define snd_BUG()			do {} while (0)
+ 
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SND_DEBUG */
+ 
+@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ void snd_verbose_printd(const char *file
+  */
+ #define snd_printdd(format, args...) snd_printk(format, ##args)
+ #else
+-#define snd_printdd(format, args...) /* nothing */
++#define snd_printdd(format, args...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 
+diff -urNp a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
+--- a/init/Kconfig	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/init/Kconfig	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ config SYSCTL_SYSCALL
+ config KALLSYMS
+ 	 bool "Load all symbols for debugging/ksymoops" if EMBEDDED
+ 	 default y
++	 depends on !GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
+ 	 help
+ 	   Say Y here to let the kernel print out symbolic crash information and
+ 	   symbolic stack backtraces. This increases the size of the kernel
+diff -urNp a/init/do_mounts.c b/init/do_mounts.c
+--- a/init/do_mounts.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/init/do_mounts.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -188,11 +188,11 @@ static void __init get_fs_names(char *pa
+ 
+ static int __init do_mount_root(char *name, char *fs, int flags, void *data)
+ {
+-	int err = sys_mount(name, "/root", fs, flags, data);
++	int err = sys_mount((char __user *)name, (char __user *)"/root", (char __user *)fs, flags, (void __user *)data);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
+ 
+-	sys_chdir("/root");
++	sys_chdir((char __user *)"/root");
+ 	ROOT_DEV = current->fs->pwd.mnt->mnt_sb->s_dev;
+ 	printk("VFS: Mounted root (%s filesystem)%s.\n",
+ 	       current->fs->pwd.mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->name,
+@@ -278,18 +278,18 @@ void __init change_floppy(char *fmt, ...
+ 	va_start(args, fmt);
+ 	vsprintf(buf, fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+-	fd = sys_open("/dev/root", O_RDWR | O_NDELAY, 0);
++	fd = sys_open((char __user *)"/dev/root", O_RDWR | O_NDELAY, 0);
+ 	if (fd >= 0) {
+ 		sys_ioctl(fd, FDEJECT, 0);
+ 		sys_close(fd);
+ 	}
+ 	printk(KERN_NOTICE "VFS: Insert %s and press ENTER\n", buf);
+-	fd = sys_open("/dev/console", O_RDWR, 0);
++	fd = sys_open((char __user *)"/dev/console", O_RDWR, 0);
+ 	if (fd >= 0) {
+ 		sys_ioctl(fd, TCGETS, (long)&termios);
+ 		termios.c_lflag &= ~ICANON;
+ 		sys_ioctl(fd, TCSETSF, (long)&termios);
+-		sys_read(fd, &c, 1);
++		sys_read(fd, (char __user *)&c, 1);
+ 		termios.c_lflag |= ICANON;
+ 		sys_ioctl(fd, TCSETSF, (long)&termios);
+ 		sys_close(fd);
+@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ void __init prepare_namespace(void)
+ 
+ 	mount_root();
+ out:
+-	sys_mount(".", "/", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
+-	sys_chroot(".");
++	sys_mount((char __user *)".", (char __user *)"/", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
++	sys_chroot((char __user *)".");
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/init/do_mounts.h b/init/do_mounts.h
+--- a/init/do_mounts.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/init/do_mounts.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,15 +15,15 @@ extern char *root_device_name;
+ 
+ static inline int create_dev(char *name, dev_t dev)
+ {
+-	sys_unlink(name);
+-	return sys_mknod(name, S_IFBLK|0600, new_encode_dev(dev));
++	sys_unlink((char __user *)name);
++	return sys_mknod((char __user *)name, S_IFBLK|0600, new_encode_dev(dev));
+ }
+ 
+ #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ static inline u32 bstat(char *name)
+ {
+ 	struct stat64 stat;
+-	if (sys_stat64(name, &stat) != 0)
++	if (sys_stat64((char __user *)name, (struct stat64 __user *)&stat) != 0)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if (!S_ISBLK(stat.st_mode))
+ 		return 0;
+diff -urNp a/init/do_mounts_md.c b/init/do_mounts_md.c
+--- a/init/do_mounts_md.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/init/do_mounts_md.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static void __init md_setup_drive(void)
+ 			partitioned ? "_d" : "", minor,
+ 			md_setup_args[ent].device_names);
+ 
+-		fd = sys_open(name, 0, 0);
++		fd = sys_open((char __user *)name, 0, 0);
+ 		if (fd < 0) {
+ 			printk(KERN_ERR "md: open failed - cannot start "
+ 					"array %s\n", name);
+@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static void __init md_setup_drive(void)
+ 			 * array without it
+ 			 */
+ 			sys_close(fd);
+-			fd = sys_open(name, 0, 0);
++			fd = sys_open((char __user *)name, 0, 0);
+ 			sys_ioctl(fd, BLKRRPART, 0);
+ 		}
+ 		sys_close(fd);
+@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ void __init md_run_setup(void)
+ 	if (raid_noautodetect)
+ 		printk(KERN_INFO "md: Skipping autodetection of RAID arrays. (raid=noautodetect)\n");
+ 	else {
+-		int fd = sys_open("/dev/md0", 0, 0);
++		int fd = sys_open((char __user *)"/dev/md0", 0, 0);
+ 		if (fd >= 0) {
+ 			sys_ioctl(fd, RAID_AUTORUN, raid_autopart);
+ 			sys_close(fd);
+diff -urNp a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
+--- a/init/initramfs.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/init/initramfs.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static int __init maybe_link(void)
+ 	if (nlink >= 2) {
+ 		char *old = find_link(major, minor, ino, mode, collected);
+ 		if (old)
+-			return (sys_link(old, collected) < 0) ? -1 : 1;
++			return (sys_link((char __user *)old, (char __user *)collected) < 0) ? -1 : 1;
+ 	}
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ static void __init clean_path(char *path
+ {
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-	if (!sys_newlstat(path, &st) && (st.st_mode^mode) & S_IFMT) {
++	if (!sys_newlstat((char __user *)path, (struct stat __user *)&st) && (st.st_mode^mode) & S_IFMT) {
+ 		if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+-			sys_rmdir(path);
++			sys_rmdir((char __user *)path);
+ 		else
+-			sys_unlink(path);
++			sys_unlink((char __user *)path);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
+ 			int openflags = O_WRONLY|O_CREAT;
+ 			if (ml != 1)
+ 				openflags |= O_TRUNC;
+-			wfd = sys_open(collected, openflags, mode);
++			wfd = sys_open((char __user *)collected, openflags, mode);
+ 
+ 			if (wfd >= 0) {
+ 				sys_fchown(wfd, uid, gid);
+@@ -285,15 +285,15 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	} else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+-		sys_mkdir(collected, mode);
+-		sys_chown(collected, uid, gid);
+-		sys_chmod(collected, mode);
++		sys_mkdir((char __user *)collected, mode);
++		sys_chown((char __user *)collected, uid, gid);
++		sys_chmod((char __user *)collected, mode);
+ 	} else if (S_ISBLK(mode) || S_ISCHR(mode) ||
+ 		   S_ISFIFO(mode) || S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
+ 		if (maybe_link() == 0) {
+-			sys_mknod(collected, mode, rdev);
+-			sys_chown(collected, uid, gid);
+-			sys_chmod(collected, mode);
++			sys_mknod((char __user *)collected, mode, rdev);
++			sys_chown((char __user *)collected, uid, gid);
++			sys_chmod((char __user *)collected, mode);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -302,13 +302,13 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
+ static int __init do_copy(void)
+ {
+ 	if (count >= body_len) {
+-		sys_write(wfd, victim, body_len);
++		sys_write(wfd, (char __user *)victim, body_len);
+ 		sys_close(wfd);
+ 		eat(body_len);
+ 		state = SkipIt;
+ 		return 0;
+ 	} else {
+-		sys_write(wfd, victim, count);
++		sys_write(wfd, (char __user *)victim, count);
+ 		body_len -= count;
+ 		eat(count);
+ 		return 1;
+@@ -319,8 +319,8 @@ static int __init do_symlink(void)
+ {
+ 	collected[N_ALIGN(name_len) + body_len] = '\0';
+ 	clean_path(collected, 0);
+-	sys_symlink(collected + N_ALIGN(name_len), collected);
+-	sys_lchown(collected, uid, gid);
++	sys_symlink((char __user *)collected + N_ALIGN(name_len), (char __user *)collected);
++	sys_lchown((char __user *)collected, uid, gid);
+ 	state = SkipIt;
+ 	next_state = Reset;
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urNp a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
+--- a/init/main.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/init/main.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static inline void mark_rodata_ro(void) 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TC
+ extern void tc_init(void);
+ #endif
++extern void grsecurity_init(void);
+ 
+ enum system_states system_state;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(system_state);
+@@ -187,6 +188,40 @@ static int __init set_reset_devices(char
+ 
+ __setup("reset_devices", set_reset_devices);
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
++static int __init setup_pax_nouderef(char *str)
++{
++	unsigned int cpu;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++)
++		get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS].b = 0x00cf9300;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	return 1;
++}
++__setup("pax_nouderef", setup_pax_nouderef);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++unsigned int pax_softmode;
++
++static int __init setup_pax_softmode(char *str)
++{
++	get_option(&str, &pax_softmode);
++	return 1;
++}
++__setup("pax_softmode=", setup_pax_softmode);
++#endif
++
+ static char * argv_init[MAX_INIT_ARGS+2] = { "init", NULL, };
+ char * envp_init[MAX_INIT_ENVS+2] = { "HOME=/", "TERM=linux", NULL, };
+ static const char *panic_later, *panic_param;
+@@ -364,7 +399,7 @@ static inline void smp_prepare_cpus(unsi
+ #else
+ 
+ #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_SETUP_PER_CPU_AREA
+-unsigned long __per_cpu_offset[NR_CPUS] __read_mostly;
++unsigned long __per_cpu_offset[NR_CPUS] __read_only;
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_offset);
+ 
+@@ -668,7 +703,7 @@ static void __init do_initcalls(void)
+ 
+ 	for (call = __initcall_start; call < __initcall_end; call++) {
+ 		ktime_t t0, t1, delta;
+-		char *msg = NULL;
++		const char *msg1 = "", *msg2 = "";
+ 		char msgbuf[40];
+ 		int result;
+ 
+@@ -697,23 +732,22 @@ static void __init do_initcalls(void)
+ 				(unsigned long) *call);
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (result && result != -ENODEV && initcall_debug) {
+-			sprintf(msgbuf, "error code %d", result);
+-			msg = msgbuf;
+-		}
++		msgbuf[0] = 0;
++		if (result && result != -ENODEV && initcall_debug)
++			sprintf(msgbuf, " error code %d", result);
+ 		if (preempt_count() != count) {
+-			msg = "preemption imbalance";
++			msg1 = " preemption imbalance";
+ 			preempt_count() = count;
+ 		}
+ 		if (irqs_disabled()) {
+-			msg = "disabled interrupts";
++			msg2 = " disabled interrupts";
+ 			local_irq_enable();
+ 		}
+-		if (msg) {
++		if (msgbuf[0] || *msg1 || *msg2) {
+ 			printk(KERN_WARNING "initcall at 0x%p", *call);
+ 			print_fn_descriptor_symbol(": %s()",
+ 					(unsigned long) *call);
+-			printk(": returned with %s\n", msg);
++			printk(": returned with%s%s%s\n", msgbuf, msg1, msg2);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -848,6 +882,8 @@ static int __init kernel_init(void * unu
+ 		prepare_namespace();
+ 	}
+ 
++	grsecurity_init();
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
+ 	 * we're essentially up and running. Get rid of the
+diff -urNp a/init/noinitramfs.c b/init/noinitramfs.c
+--- a/init/noinitramfs.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/init/noinitramfs.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static int __init default_rootfs(void)
+ {
+ 	int err;
+ 
+-	err = sys_mkdir("/dev", 0755);
++	err = sys_mkdir((const char __user *)"/dev", 0755);
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int __init default_rootfs(void)
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	err = sys_mkdir("/root", 0700);
++	err = sys_mkdir((const char __user *)"/root", 0700);
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c b/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c
+--- a/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static struct ctl_table ipc_kern_table[]
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_ipc_dointvec,
+ 		.strategy	= sysctl_ipc_data,
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct ctl_table ipc_root_table[] = {
+@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static struct ctl_table ipc_root_table[]
+ 		.mode		= 0555,
+ 		.child		= ipc_kern_table,
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static int __init ipc_sysctl_init(void)
+diff -urNp a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
+--- a/ipc/msg.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/ipc/msg.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ #include <linux/rwsem.h>
+ #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+ #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/current.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -293,6 +294,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgget(key_t key, in
+ 	struct ipc_namespace *ns;
+ 	struct ipc_ops msg_ops;
+ 	struct ipc_params msg_params;
++	long err;
+ 
+ 	ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
+ 
+@@ -303,7 +305,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgget(key_t key, in
+ 	msg_params.key = key;
+ 	msg_params.flg = msgflg;
+ 
+-	return ipcget(ns, &msg_ids(ns), &msg_ops, &msg_params);
++	err = ipcget(ns, &msg_ids(ns), &msg_ops, &msg_params);
++
++	gr_log_msgget(err, msgflg);
++
++	return err;
+ }
+ 
+ static inline unsigned long
+@@ -564,6 +570,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl(int msqid, in
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	case IPC_RMID:
++		gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
+ 		freeque(ns, &msq->q_perm);
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+diff -urNp a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
+--- a/ipc/sem.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/ipc/sem.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
+ #include <linux/rwsem.h>
+ #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+ #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "util.h"
+@@ -312,6 +313,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_semget(key_t key, in
+ 	struct ipc_namespace *ns;
+ 	struct ipc_ops sem_ops;
+ 	struct ipc_params sem_params;
++	long err;
+ 
+ 	ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
+ 
+@@ -326,7 +328,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_semget(key_t key, in
+ 	sem_params.flg = semflg;
+ 	sem_params.u.nsems = nsems;
+ 
+-	return ipcget(ns, &sem_ids(ns), &sem_ops, &sem_params);
++	err = ipcget(ns, &sem_ids(ns), &sem_ops, &sem_params);
++
++	gr_log_semget(err, semflg);
++
++	return err;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Manage the doubly linked list sma->sem_pending as a FIFO:
+@@ -909,6 +915,7 @@ static int semctl_down(struct ipc_namesp
+ 
+ 	switch(cmd){
+ 	case IPC_RMID:
++		gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
+ 		freeary(ns, ipcp);
+ 		err = 0;
+ 		break;
+diff -urNp a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
+--- a/ipc/shm.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/ipc/shm.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -70,6 +71,14 @@ static void shm_destroy (struct ipc_name
+ static int sysvipc_shm_proc_show(struct seq_file *s, void *it);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++			   const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid,
++			   const int shmid);
++extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++			   const time_t shm_createtime);
++#endif
++
+ void shm_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
+ {
+ 	ns->shm_ctlmax = SHMMAX;
+@@ -88,6 +97,8 @@ static void do_shm_rmid(struct ipc_names
+ 	struct shmid_kernel *shp;
+ 	shp = container_of(ipcp, struct shmid_kernel, shm_perm);
+ 
++	gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid);
++
+ 	if (shp->shm_nattch){
+ 		shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_DEST;
+ 		/* Do not find it any more */
+@@ -428,6 +439,14 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *
+ 	shp->shm_lprid = 0;
+ 	shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
+ 	shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	{
++		struct timespec timeval;
++		do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&timeval);
++
++		shp->shm_createtime = timeval.tv_sec;
++	}
++#endif
+ 	shp->shm_segsz = size;
+ 	shp->shm_nattch = 0;
+ 	shp->shm_perm.id = shm_buildid(id, shp->shm_perm.seq);
+@@ -482,6 +501,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmget (key_t key, s
+ 	struct ipc_namespace *ns;
+ 	struct ipc_ops shm_ops;
+ 	struct ipc_params shm_params;
++	long err;
+ 
+ 	ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
+ 
+@@ -493,7 +513,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmget (key_t key, s
+ 	shm_params.flg = shmflg;
+ 	shm_params.u.size = size;
+ 
+-	return ipcget(ns, &shm_ids(ns), &shm_ops, &shm_params);
++	err = ipcget(ns, &shm_ids(ns), &shm_ops, &shm_params);
++
++	gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size);
++
++	return err;
+ }
+ 
+ static inline unsigned long copy_shmid_to_user(void __user *buf, struct shmid64_ds *in, int version)
+@@ -959,9 +983,21 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto out_unlock;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime,
++			     shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid) ||
++	    !gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto out_unlock;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	path.dentry = dget(shp->shm_file->f_path.dentry);
+ 	path.mnt    = shp->shm_file->f_path.mnt;
+ 	shp->shm_nattch++;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	shp->shm_lapid = current->pid;
++#endif
+ 	size = i_size_read(path.dentry->d_inode);
+ 	shm_unlock(shp);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c
+--- a/kernel/acct.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/acct.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct pid_n
+ 	 */
+ 	flim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
+ 	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
+-	file->f_op->write(file, (char *)&ac,
++	file->f_op->write(file, (char __user *)&ac,
+ 			       sizeof(acct_t), &file->f_pos);
+ 	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = flim;
+ 	set_fs(fs);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
+--- a/kernel/capability.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/capability.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -363,15 +364,25 @@ out:
+ 
+ int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+ {
+-	if (security_capable(t, cap) == 0) {
++	if ((security_capable(t, cap) == 0) && gr_task_is_capable(t, cap)) {
+ 		t->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++int capable_nolog(int cap)
++{
++	if ((security_capable(current, cap) == 0) && gr_is_capable_nolog(cap)) {
++		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ int capable(int cap)
+ {
+ 	return __capable(current, cap);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/configs.c b/kernel/configs.c
+--- a/kernel/configs.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/configs.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -79,8 +79,16 @@ static int __init ikconfig_init(void)
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 
+ 	/* create the current config file */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, &proc_root);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUGO,
+ 				  &proc_root);
++#endif
+ 	if (!entry)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
+--- a/kernel/cpu.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/cpu.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ /* Serializes the updates to cpu_online_map, cpu_present_map */
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(cpu_add_remove_lock);
+ 
+-static __cpuinitdata RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(cpu_chain);
++static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(cpu_chain);
+ 
+ /* If set, cpu_up and cpu_down will return -EBUSY and do nothing.
+  * Should always be manipulated under cpu_add_remove_lock
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static void cpu_hotplug_done(void)
+ 	mutex_unlock(&cpu_hotplug.lock);
+ }
+ /* Need to know about CPUs going up/down? */
+-int __cpuinit register_cpu_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
++int register_cpu_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+diff -urNp a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
+--- a/kernel/exit.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/exit.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@
+ #include <linux/resource.h>
+ #include <linux/blkdev.h>
+ #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
++#endif
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+@@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ static void __exit_signal(struct task_st
+ 
+ 	__unhash_process(tsk);
+ 
++	gr_del_task_from_ip_table(tsk);
+ 	tsk->signal = NULL;
+ 	tsk->sighand = NULL;
+ 	spin_unlock(&sighand->siglock);
+@@ -301,12 +307,23 @@ static void reparent_to_kthreadd(void)
+ {
+ 	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (current->exec_file) {
++		fput(current->exec_file);
++		current->exec_file = NULL;
++	}
++	write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++#endif
++
+ 	ptrace_unlink(current);
+ 	/* Reparent to init */
+ 	remove_parent(current);
+ 	current->real_parent = current->parent = kthreadd_task;
+ 	add_parent(current);
+ 
++	gr_set_kernel_label(current);
++
+ 	/* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
+ 	current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
+ 
+@@ -402,6 +419,17 @@ void daemonize(const char *name, ...)
+ 	vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++	write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++	if (current->exec_file) {
++		fput(current->exec_file);
++		current->exec_file = NULL;
++	}
++	write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
++#endif
++
++	gr_set_kernel_label(current);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the
+ 	 * user space pages.  We don't need them, and if we didn't close them
+@@ -962,6 +990,9 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
+ 	tsk->exit_code = code;
+ 	taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead);
+ 
++	gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code);
++	gr_acl_handle_exit();
++
+ 	exit_mm(tsk);
+ 
+ 	if (group_dead)
+@@ -1171,7 +1202,7 @@ static int wait_task_zombie(struct task_
+ 	if (unlikely(noreap)) {
+ 		uid_t uid = p->uid;
+ 		int exit_code = p->exit_code;
+-		int why, status;
++		int why;
+ 
+ 		get_task_struct(p);
+ 		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
+--- a/kernel/fork.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/fork.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <linux/tty.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/blkdev.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+@@ -194,7 +195,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_stru
+ 	setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
+-	tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int();
++	tsk->stack_canary = pax_get_random_long();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* One for us, one for whoever does the "release_task()" (usually parent) */
+@@ -226,8 +227,8 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm
+ 	mm->locked_vm = 0;
+ 	mm->mmap = NULL;
+ 	mm->mmap_cache = NULL;
+-	mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->mmap_base;
+-	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
++	mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->free_area_cache;
++	mm->cached_hole_size = oldmm->cached_hole_size;
+ 	mm->map_count = 0;
+ 	cpus_clear(mm->cpu_vm_mask);
+ 	mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
+@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm
+ 		tmp->vm_flags &= ~VM_LOCKED;
+ 		tmp->vm_mm = mm;
+ 		tmp->vm_next = NULL;
++		tmp->vm_mirror = NULL;
+ 		anon_vma_link(tmp);
+ 		file = tmp->vm_file;
+ 		if (file) {
+@@ -300,6 +302,31 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm
+ 		if (retval)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (oldmm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m;
++
++		for (mpnt = oldmm->mmap, mpnt_m = mm->mmap; mpnt; mpnt = mpnt->vm_next, mpnt_m = mpnt_m->vm_next) {
++			BUG_ON(!mpnt_m || mpnt_m->vm_mirror || mpnt->vm_mm != oldmm || mpnt_m->vm_mm != mm);
++
++			if (!mpnt->vm_mirror)
++				continue;
++
++			if (mpnt->vm_end <= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) {
++				BUG_ON(mpnt->vm_mirror->vm_mirror != mpnt);
++				mpnt->vm_mirror = mpnt_m;
++			} else {
++				BUG_ON(mpnt->vm_mirror->vm_mirror == mpnt || mpnt->vm_mirror->vm_mirror->vm_mm != mm);
++				mpnt_m->vm_mirror = mpnt->vm_mirror->vm_mirror;
++				mpnt_m->vm_mirror->vm_mirror = mpnt_m;
++				mpnt->vm_mirror->vm_mirror = mpnt;
++			}
++		}
++		BUG_ON(mpnt_m);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* a new mm has just been created */
+ 	arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
+ 	retval = 0;
+@@ -482,7 +509,7 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ 	if (tsk->clear_child_tid
+ 	    && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
+ 	    && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
+-		u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
++		pid_t __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
+ 		tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
+ 
+ 		/*
+@@ -490,7 +517,7 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ 		 * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
+ 		 */
+ 		put_user(0, tidptr);
+-		sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		sys_futex((u32 __user *)tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1046,6 +1073,9 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
+ 	DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
+ #endif
+ 	retval = -EAGAIN;
++
++	gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes), 0);
++
+ 	if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
+ 			p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
+@@ -1212,6 +1242,8 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
+ 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
+ 		p->tgid = current->tgid;
+ 
++	gr_copy_label(p);
++
+ 	p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Clear TID on mm_release()?
+@@ -1401,6 +1433,8 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count:
+ bad_fork_free:
+ 	free_task(p);
+ fork_out:
++	gr_log_forkfail(retval);
++
+ 	return ERR_PTR(retval);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1493,6 +1527,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ 		if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
+ 			put_user(nr, parent_tidptr);
+ 
++		gr_handle_brute_check();
++
+ 		if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
+ 			p->vfork_done = &vfork;
+ 			init_completion(&vfork);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
+--- a/kernel/futex.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/futex.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ static int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uad
+ 	struct page *page;
+ 	int err;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++		return -EFAULT;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
+ 	 */
+@@ -221,8 +226,8 @@ static int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uad
+ 	 * The futex is hashed differently depending on whether
+ 	 * it's in a shared or private mapping.  So check vma first.
+ 	 */
+-	vma = find_extend_vma(mm, address);
+-	if (unlikely(!vma))
++	vma = find_vma(mm, address);
++	if (unlikely(!vma || address < vma->vm_start))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -2032,7 +2037,7 @@ retry:
+  */
+ static inline int fetch_robust_entry(struct robust_list __user **entry,
+ 				     struct robust_list __user * __user *head,
+-				     int *pi)
++				     unsigned int *pi)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long uentry;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
+--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ struct irq_desc irq_desc[NR_IRQS] __cach
+ 		.depth = 1,
+ 		.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(irq_desc->lock),
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+-		.affinity = CPU_MASK_ALL
++		.affinity = CPU_MASK_ALL,
++		.cpu = 0,
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ };
+diff -urNp a/kernel/kallsyms.c b/kernel/kallsyms.c
+--- a/kernel/kallsyms.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/kallsyms.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -62,6 +62,19 @@ static inline int is_kernel_text(unsigne
+ 
+ static inline int is_kernel(unsigned long addr)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
++	if ((unsigned long)MODULES_VADDR <= ktla_ktva(addr) &&
++	    ktla_ktva(addr) < (unsigned long)MODULES_END)
++		return 0;
++#endif
++
++	if (is_kernel_inittext(addr))
++		return 1;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr >= (unsigned long)_stext && addr <= (unsigned long)_end)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	return in_gate_area_no_task(addr);
+@@ -366,7 +379,6 @@ static unsigned long get_ksymbol_core(st
+ 
+ static void reset_iter(struct kallsym_iter *iter, loff_t new_pos)
+ {
+-	iter->name[0] = '\0';
+ 	iter->nameoff = get_symbol_offset(new_pos);
+ 	iter->pos = new_pos;
+ }
+@@ -450,7 +462,7 @@ static int kallsyms_open(struct inode *i
+ 	struct kallsym_iter *iter;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	iter = kmalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
++	iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
+ 	if (!iter)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	reset_iter(iter, 0);
+@@ -474,7 +486,15 @@ static int __init kallsyms_init(void)
+ {
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", 0444, NULL);
++#endif
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &kallsyms_operations;
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
+--- a/kernel/kmod.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/kmod.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int request_module(const char *fmt, ...)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	ret = call_usermodehelper(modprobe_path, argv, envp, 1);
++	ret = call_usermodehelper(modprobe_path, argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
+ 	atomic_dec(&kmod_concurrent);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+diff -urNp a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c
+--- a/kernel/kprobes.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/kprobes.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ kprobe_opcode_t __kprobes *get_insn_slot
+ 	 * kernel image and loaded module images reside. This is required
+ 	 * so x86_64 can correctly handle the %rip-relative fixups.
+ 	 */
+-	kip->insns = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
++	kip->insns = module_alloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE);
+ 	if (!kip->insns) {
+ 		kfree(kip);
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int __kprobes collect_one_slot(st
+ 			hlist_add_head(&kip->hlist,
+ 				       &kprobe_insn_pages);
+ 		} else {
+-			module_free(NULL, kip->insns);
++			module_free_exec(NULL, kip->insns);
+ 			kfree(kip);
+ 		}
+ 		return 1;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/lockdep.c b/kernel/lockdep.c
+--- a/kernel/lockdep.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/lockdep.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -598,6 +598,10 @@ static int static_obj(void *obj)
+ 	int i;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	start = (unsigned long )&_data;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * static variable?
+ 	 */
+@@ -609,9 +613,12 @@ static int static_obj(void *obj)
+ 	 * percpu var?
+ 	 */
+ 	for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++		start = per_cpu_offset(i);
++#else
+ 		start = (unsigned long) &__per_cpu_start + per_cpu_offset(i);
+-		end   = (unsigned long) &__per_cpu_start + PERCPU_ENOUGH_ROOM
+-					+ per_cpu_offset(i);
++#endif
++		end   = start + PERCPU_ENOUGH_ROOM;
+ 
+ 		if ((addr >= start) && (addr < end))
+ 			return 1;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
+--- a/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/module.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/semaphore.h>
+ #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#include <asm/desc.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include <linux/license.h>
+ #include <asm/sections.h>
+ 
+@@ -71,6 +76,8 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(module_wq
+ 
+ static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(module_notify_list);
+ 
++extern int gr_check_modstop(void);
++
+ int register_module_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
+ {
+ 	return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&module_notify_list, nb);
+@@ -344,6 +351,8 @@ static inline unsigned int block_size(in
+ 	return val;
+ }
+ 
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_start);
++
+ static void *percpu_modalloc(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
+ 			     const char *name)
+ {
+@@ -351,7 +360,7 @@ static void *percpu_modalloc(unsigned lo
+ 	unsigned int i;
+ 	void *ptr;
+ 
+-	if (align > PAGE_SIZE) {
++	if (align-1 >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+ 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: per-cpu alignment %li > %li\n",
+ 		       name, align, PAGE_SIZE);
+ 		align = PAGE_SIZE;
+@@ -433,7 +442,11 @@ static void percpu_modcopy(void *pcpudes
+ 	int cpu;
+ 
+ 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
++		memcpy(pcpudest + __per_cpu_offset[cpu], from, size);
++#else
+ 		memcpy(pcpudest + per_cpu_offset(cpu), from, size);
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static int percpu_modinit(void)
+@@ -684,6 +697,9 @@ sys_delete_module(const char __user *nam
+ 	char name[MODULE_NAME_LEN];
+ 	int ret, forced = 0;
+ 
++	if (gr_check_modstop())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+@@ -1347,16 +1363,19 @@ static void free_module(struct module *m
+ 	module_unload_free(mod);
+ 
+ 	/* This may be NULL, but that's OK */
+-	module_free(mod, mod->module_init);
++	module_free(mod, mod->module_init_rw);
++	module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_init_rx);
+ 	kfree(mod->args);
+ 	if (mod->percpu)
+ 		percpu_modfree(mod->percpu);
+ 
+ 	/* Free lock-classes: */
+-	lockdep_free_key_range(mod->module_core, mod->core_size);
++	lockdep_free_key_range(mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx);
++	lockdep_free_key_range(mod->module_core_rw, mod->core_size_rw);
+ 
+ 	/* Finally, free the core (containing the module structure) */
+-	module_free(mod, mod->module_core);
++	module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_core_rx);
++	module_free(mod, mod->module_core_rw);
+ }
+ 
+ void *__symbol_get(const char *symbol)
+@@ -1421,10 +1440,14 @@ static int simplify_symbols(Elf_Shdr *se
+ 			    struct module *mod)
+ {
+ 	Elf_Sym *sym = (void *)sechdrs[symindex].sh_addr;
+-	unsigned long secbase;
++	unsigned long secbase, symbol;
+ 	unsigned int i, n = sechdrs[symindex].sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym);
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
+ 		switch (sym[i].st_shndx) {
+ 		case SHN_COMMON:
+@@ -1443,10 +1466,19 @@ static int simplify_symbols(Elf_Shdr *se
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case SHN_UNDEF:
+-			sym[i].st_value
+-			  = resolve_symbol(sechdrs, versindex,
++			symbol = resolve_symbol(sechdrs, versindex,
+ 					   strtab + sym[i].st_name, mod);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++			sym[i].st_value = symbol;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			/* Ok if resolved.  */
+ 			if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(sym[i].st_value))
+ 				break;
+@@ -1461,11 +1493,27 @@ static int simplify_symbols(Elf_Shdr *se
+ 
+ 		default:
+ 			/* Divert to percpu allocation if a percpu var. */
+-			if (sym[i].st_shndx == pcpuindex)
++			if (sym[i].st_shndx == pcpuindex) {
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++				secbase = (unsigned long)mod->percpu - (unsigned long)__per_cpu_start;
++#else
+ 				secbase = (unsigned long)mod->percpu;
+-			else
++#endif
++
++			} else
+ 				secbase = sechdrs[sym[i].st_shndx].sh_addr;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			sym[i].st_value += secbase;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+@@ -1517,11 +1565,14 @@ static void layout_sections(struct modul
+ 			    || strncmp(secstrings + s->sh_name,
+ 				       ".init", 5) == 0)
+ 				continue;
+-			s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->core_size, s);
++			if ((s->sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
++				s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->core_size_rw, s);
++			else
++				s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->core_size_rx, s);
+ 			DEBUGP("\t%s\n", secstrings + s->sh_name);
+ 		}
+ 		if (m == 0)
+-			mod->core_text_size = mod->core_size;
++			mod->core_size_rx = mod->core_size_rx;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	DEBUGP("Init section allocation order:\n");
+@@ -1535,12 +1586,15 @@ static void layout_sections(struct modul
+ 			    || strncmp(secstrings + s->sh_name,
+ 				       ".init", 5) != 0)
+ 				continue;
+-			s->sh_entsize = (get_offset(&mod->init_size, s)
+-					 | INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
++			if ((s->sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
++				s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->init_size_rw, s);
++			else
++				s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->init_size_rx, s);
++			s->sh_entsize |= INIT_OFFSET_MASK;
+ 			DEBUGP("\t%s\n", secstrings + s->sh_name);
+ 		}
+ 		if (m == 0)
+-			mod->init_text_size = mod->init_size;
++			mod->init_size_rx = mod->init_size_rx;
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1667,14 +1721,31 @@ static void add_kallsyms(struct module *
+ {
+ 	unsigned int i;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	mod->symtab = (void *)sechdrs[symindex].sh_addr;
+ 	mod->num_symtab = sechdrs[symindex].sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym);
+ 	mod->strtab = (void *)sechdrs[strindex].sh_addr;
+ 
+ 	/* Set types up while we still have access to sections. */
+-	for (i = 0; i < mod->num_symtab; i++)
+-		mod->symtab[i].st_info
+-			= elf_type(&mod->symtab[i], sechdrs, secstrings, mod);
++
++	for (i = 0; i < mod->num_symtab; i++) {
++		char type = elf_type(&mod->symtab[i], sechdrs, secstrings, mod);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++		mod->symtab[i].st_info = type;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	}
++
+ }
+ #else
+ static inline void add_kallsyms(struct module *mod,
+@@ -1724,6 +1795,10 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
+ 	struct exception_table_entry *extable;
+ 	mm_segment_t old_fs;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	unsigned long cr0;
++#endif
++
+ 	DEBUGP("load_module: umod=%p, len=%lu, uargs=%p\n",
+ 	       umod, len, uargs);
+ 	if (len < sizeof(*hdr))
+@@ -1882,21 +1957,57 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
+ 	layout_sections(mod, hdr, sechdrs, secstrings);
+ 
+ 	/* Do the allocs. */
+-	ptr = module_alloc(mod->core_size);
++	ptr = module_alloc(mod->core_size_rw);
+ 	if (!ptr) {
+ 		err = -ENOMEM;
+ 		goto free_percpu;
+ 	}
+-	memset(ptr, 0, mod->core_size);
+-	mod->module_core = ptr;
++	memset(ptr, 0, mod->core_size_rw);
++	mod->module_core_rw = ptr;
++
++	ptr = module_alloc(mod->init_size_rw);
++	if (!ptr && mod->init_size_rw) {
++		err = -ENOMEM;
++		goto free_core_rw;
++	}
++	memset(ptr, 0, mod->init_size_rw);
++	mod->module_init_rw = ptr;
++
++	ptr = module_alloc_exec(mod->core_size_rx);
++	if (!ptr) {
++		err = -ENOMEM;
++		goto free_init_rw;
++	}
+ 
+-	ptr = module_alloc(mod->init_size);
+-	if (!ptr && mod->init_size) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	memset(ptr, 0, mod->core_size_rx);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	mod->module_core_rx = ptr;
++
++	ptr = module_alloc_exec(mod->init_size_rx);
++	if (!ptr && mod->init_size_rx) {
+ 		err = -ENOMEM;
+-		goto free_core;
++		goto free_core_rx;
+ 	}
+-	memset(ptr, 0, mod->init_size);
+-	mod->module_init = ptr;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	memset(ptr, 0, mod->init_size_rx);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++#endif
++
++	mod->module_init_rx = ptr;
+ 
+ 	/* Transfer each section which specifies SHF_ALLOC */
+ 	DEBUGP("final section addresses:\n");
+@@ -1906,17 +2017,41 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
+ 		if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
+ 			continue;
+ 
+-		if (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & INIT_OFFSET_MASK)
+-			dest = mod->module_init
+-				+ (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & ~INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
+-		else
+-			dest = mod->module_core + sechdrs[i].sh_entsize;
++		if (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & INIT_OFFSET_MASK) {
++			if ((sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
++				dest = mod->module_init_rw
++					+ (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & ~INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
++			else
++				dest = mod->module_init_rx
++					+ (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & ~INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
++		} else {
++			if ((sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
++				dest = mod->module_core_rw + sechdrs[i].sh_entsize;
++			else
++				dest = mod->module_core_rx + sechdrs[i].sh_entsize;
++		}
++
++		if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_NOBITS) {
+ 
+-		if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_NOBITS)
+-			memcpy(dest, (void *)sechdrs[i].sh_addr,
+-			       sechdrs[i].sh_size);
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++			if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) && (sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)) {
++				pax_open_kernel(cr0);
++				memcpy(dest, (void *)sechdrs[i].sh_addr, sechdrs[i].sh_size);
++				pax_close_kernel(cr0);
++			} else
++#endif
++
++			memcpy(dest, (void *)sechdrs[i].sh_addr, sechdrs[i].sh_size);
++		}
+ 		/* Update sh_addr to point to copy in image. */
+-		sechdrs[i].sh_addr = (unsigned long)dest;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++		if (sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)
++			sechdrs[i].sh_addr = ktva_ktla((unsigned long)dest);
++		else
++#endif
++
++			sechdrs[i].sh_addr = (unsigned long)dest;
+ 		DEBUGP("\t0x%lx %s\n", sechdrs[i].sh_addr, secstrings + sechdrs[i].sh_name);
+ 	}
+ 	/* Module has been moved. */
+@@ -2057,12 +2192,12 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
+ 	 * Do it before processing of module parameters, so the module
+ 	 * can provide parameter accessor functions of its own.
+ 	 */
+-	if (mod->module_init)
+-		flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_init,
+-				   (unsigned long)mod->module_init
+-				   + mod->init_size);
+-	flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_core,
+-			   (unsigned long)mod->module_core + mod->core_size);
++	if (mod->module_init_rx)
++		flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_init_rx,
++				   (unsigned long)mod->module_init_rx
++				   + mod->init_size_rx);
++	flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_core_rx,
++			   (unsigned long)mod->module_core_rx + mod->core_size_rx);
+ 
+ 	set_fs(old_fs);
+ 
+@@ -2115,9 +2250,13 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
+ 	kobject_put(&mod->mkobj.kobj);
+  free_unload:
+ 	module_unload_free(mod);
+-	module_free(mod, mod->module_init);
+- free_core:
+-	module_free(mod, mod->module_core);
++	module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_init_rx);
++ free_core_rx:
++	module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_core_rx);
++ free_init_rw:
++	module_free(mod, mod->module_init_rw);
++ free_core_rw:
++	module_free(mod, mod->module_core_rw);
+  free_percpu:
+ 	if (percpu)
+ 		percpu_modfree(percpu);
+@@ -2142,6 +2281,9 @@ sys_init_module(void __user *umod,
+ 	struct module *mod;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
++	if (gr_check_modstop())
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	/* Must have permission */
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+@@ -2195,10 +2337,12 @@ sys_init_module(void __user *umod,
+ 	/* Drop initial reference. */
+ 	module_put(mod);
+ 	unwind_remove_table(mod->unwind_info, 1);
+-	module_free(mod, mod->module_init);
+-	mod->module_init = NULL;
+-	mod->init_size = 0;
+-	mod->init_text_size = 0;
++	module_free(mod, mod->module_init_rw);
++	module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_init_rx);
++	mod->module_init_rw = NULL;
++	mod->module_init_rx = NULL;
++	mod->init_size_rw = 0;
++	mod->init_size_rx = 0;
+ 	mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -2206,6 +2350,13 @@ sys_init_module(void __user *umod,
+ 
+ static inline int within(unsigned long addr, void *start, unsigned long size)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++	if (ktla_ktva(addr) >= (unsigned long)start &&
++	    ktla_ktva(addr) < (unsigned long)start + size)
++		return 1;
++#endif
++
+ 	return ((void *)addr >= start && (void *)addr < start + size);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2229,10 +2380,14 @@ static const char *get_ksymbol(struct mo
+ 	unsigned long nextval;
+ 
+ 	/* At worse, next value is at end of module */
+-	if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_size))
+-		nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_init+mod->init_text_size;
++	if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx))
++		nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_init_rx+mod->init_size_rx;
++	else if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rw, mod->init_size_rw))
++		nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_init_rw+mod->init_size_rw;
++	else if (within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx))
++		nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_core_rx+mod->core_size_rx;
+ 	else
+-		nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_core+mod->core_text_size;
++		nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_core_rw+mod->core_size_rw;
+ 
+ 	/* Scan for closest preceeding symbol, and next symbol. (ELF
+ 	   starts real symbols at 1). */
+@@ -2277,8 +2432,10 @@ const char *module_address_lookup(unsign
+ 
+ 	preempt_disable();
+ 	list_for_each_entry(mod, &modules, list) {
+-		if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_size)
+-		    || within(addr, mod->module_core, mod->core_size)) {
++		if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_init_rw, mod->init_size_rw) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_core_rw, mod->core_size_rw)) {
+ 			if (modname)
+ 				*modname = mod->name;
+ 			ret = get_ksymbol(mod, addr, size, offset);
+@@ -2300,8 +2457,10 @@ int lookup_module_symbol_name(unsigned l
+ 
+ 	preempt_disable();
+ 	list_for_each_entry(mod, &modules, list) {
+-		if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_size) ||
+-		    within(addr, mod->module_core, mod->core_size)) {
++		if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_init_rw, mod->init_size_rw) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_core_rw, mod->core_size_rw)) {
+ 			const char *sym;
+ 
+ 			sym = get_ksymbol(mod, addr, NULL, NULL);
+@@ -2324,8 +2483,10 @@ int lookup_module_symbol_attrs(unsigned 
+ 
+ 	preempt_disable();
+ 	list_for_each_entry(mod, &modules, list) {
+-		if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_size) ||
+-		    within(addr, mod->module_core, mod->core_size)) {
++		if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_init_rw, mod->init_size_rw) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_core_rw, mod->core_size_rw)) {
+ 			const char *sym;
+ 
+ 			sym = get_ksymbol(mod, addr, size, offset);
+@@ -2456,7 +2617,7 @@ static int m_show(struct seq_file *m, vo
+ 	char buf[8];
+ 
+ 	seq_printf(m, "%s %lu",
+-		   mod->name, mod->init_size + mod->core_size);
++		   mod->name, mod->init_size_rx + mod->init_size_rw + mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw);
+ 	print_unload_info(m, mod);
+ 
+ 	/* Informative for users. */
+@@ -2465,7 +2626,7 @@ static int m_show(struct seq_file *m, vo
+ 		   mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING ? "Loading":
+ 		   "Live");
+ 	/* Used by oprofile and other similar tools. */
+-	seq_printf(m, " 0x%p", mod->module_core);
++	seq_printf(m, " 0x%p 0x%p", mod->module_core_rx, mod->module_core_rw);
+ 
+ 	/* Taints info */
+ 	if (mod->taints)
+@@ -2521,7 +2682,8 @@ int is_module_address(unsigned long addr
+ 	preempt_disable();
+ 
+ 	list_for_each_entry(mod, &modules, list) {
+-		if (within(addr, mod->module_core, mod->core_size)) {
++		if (within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx) ||
++		    within(addr, mod->module_core_rw, mod->core_size_rw)) {
+ 			preempt_enable();
+ 			return 1;
+ 		}
+@@ -2539,8 +2701,8 @@ struct module *__module_text_address(uns
+ 	struct module *mod;
+ 
+ 	list_for_each_entry(mod, &modules, list)
+-		if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_text_size)
+-		    || within(addr, mod->module_core, mod->core_text_size))
++		if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx)
++		    || within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx))
+ 			return mod;
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff -urNp a/kernel/mutex.c b/kernel/mutex.c
+--- a/kernel/mutex.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/mutex.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ __mutex_lock_slowpath(atomic_t *lock_cou
+  *
+  * This function is similar to (but not equivalent to) down().
+  */
+-void inline __sched mutex_lock(struct mutex *lock)
++inline void __sched mutex_lock(struct mutex *lock)
+ {
+ 	might_sleep();
+ 	/*
+diff -urNp a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
+--- a/kernel/panic.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/panic.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_on_slowpath);
+  */
+ void __stack_chk_fail(void)
+ {
++	print_symbol("stack corrupted in: %s\n", (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0));
++	dump_stack();
+ 	panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted");
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
+--- a/kernel/pid.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/pid.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+ #include <linux/init_task.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #define pid_hashfn(nr, ns)	\
+ 	hash_long((unsigned long)nr + (unsigned long)ns, pidhash_shift)
+@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ struct pid init_struct_pid = INIT_STRUCT
+ 
+ int pid_max = PID_MAX_DEFAULT;
+ 
+-#define RESERVED_PIDS		300
++#define RESERVED_PIDS		500
+ 
+ int pid_max_min = RESERVED_PIDS + 1;
+ int pid_max_max = PID_MAX_LIMIT;
+@@ -375,7 +376,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(pid_task);
+ struct task_struct *find_task_by_pid_type_ns(int type, int nr,
+ 		struct pid_namespace *ns)
+ {
+-	return pid_task(find_pid_ns(nr, ns), type);
++	struct task_struct *task;
++
++	task = pid_task(find_pid_ns(nr, ns), type);
++
++	if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task))
++		return NULL;
++
++	return task;
+ }
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_task_by_pid_type_ns);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c b/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c
+--- a/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+ #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ static int check_clock(const clockid_t which_clock)
+ {
+@@ -1174,6 +1175,7 @@ static void check_process_timers(struct 
+ 			__group_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, tsk);
+ 			return;
+ 		}
++		gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_CPU, psecs, 1);
+ 		if (psecs >= sig->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur) {
+ 			/*
+ 			 * At the soft limit, send a SIGXCPU every second.
+diff -urNp a/kernel/power/poweroff.c b/kernel/power/poweroff.c
+--- a/kernel/power/poweroff.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/power/poweroff.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op	sysrq_powerof
+  	.enable_mask	= SYSRQ_ENABLE_BOOT,
+ };
+ 
+-static int pm_sysrq_init(void)
++static int __init pm_sysrq_init(void)
+ {
+ 	register_sysrq_key('o', &sysrq_poweroff_op);
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
+--- a/kernel/printk.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/printk.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ 
+@@ -299,6 +300,11 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf
+ 	char c;
+ 	int error = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	if (grsec_enable_dmesg && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ 	error = security_syslog(type);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- a/kernel/ptrace.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/ptrace.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -140,12 +141,12 @@ int __ptrace_may_attach(struct task_stru
+ 	     (current->uid != task->uid) ||
+ 	     (current->gid != task->egid) ||
+ 	     (current->gid != task->sgid) ||
+-	     (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
++	     (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 	smp_rmb();
+ 	if (task->mm)
+ 		dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
+-	if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
++	if (!dumpable && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+ 	return security_ptrace(current, task);
+@@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ repeat:
+ 
+ 	/* Go */
+ 	task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
+-	if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
++	if (capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ 		task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
+ 
+ 	__ptrace_link(task, current);
+@@ -577,6 +578,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ptrace(long request,
+ 	if (ret < 0)
+ 		goto out_put_task_struct;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) {
++		ret = -EPERM;
++		goto out_put_task_struct;
++	}
++
+ 	ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
+ 	if (ret < 0)
+ 		goto out_put_task_struct;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/relay.c b/kernel/relay.c
+--- a/kernel/relay.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/relay.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ static int subbuf_splice_actor(struct fi
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	ret = *nonpad_ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
+-	if (ret < 0 || ret < total_len)
++	if ((int)ret < 0 || ret < total_len)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+         if (read_start + ret == nonpad_end)
+diff -urNp a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
+--- a/kernel/resource.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/resource.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -133,10 +133,27 @@ static int __init ioresources_init(void)
+ {
+ 	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", 0, NULL);
++#endif
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_ioports_operations;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++	entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++	entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ 	entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", 0, NULL);
++#endif
+ 	if (entry)
+ 		entry->proc_fops = &proc_iomem_operations;
+ 	return 0;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c
+--- a/kernel/sched.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/sched.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <linux/unistd.h>
+ #include <linux/pagemap.h>
+ #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/tlb.h>
+ #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
+@@ -4499,7 +4500,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_nice(int increment)
+ 	if (nice > 19)
+ 		nice = 19;
+ 
+-	if (increment < 0 && !can_nice(current, nice))
++	if (increment < 0 && (!can_nice(current, nice) ||
++			      gr_handle_chroot_nice()))
+ 		return -EPERM;
+ 
+ 	retval = security_task_setnice(current, nice);
+@@ -5742,7 +5744,7 @@ static struct ctl_table sd_ctl_dir[] = {
+ 		.procname	= "sched_domain",
+ 		.mode		= 0555,
+ 	},
+-	{0, },
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct ctl_table sd_ctl_root[] = {
+@@ -5752,7 +5754,7 @@ static struct ctl_table sd_ctl_root[] = 
+ 		.mode		= 0555,
+ 		.child		= sd_ctl_dir,
+ 	},
+-	{0, },
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct ctl_table *sd_alloc_ctl_entry(int n)
+diff -urNp a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
+--- a/kernel/signal.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/signal.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <linux/capability.h>
+ #include <linux/freezer.h>
+ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/param.h>
+@@ -540,7 +541,9 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
+ 		    && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
+ 		    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
+ 		    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+-		return error;
++			return error;
++		if (gr_handle_signal(t, sig))
++			return error;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
+@@ -757,7 +760,7 @@ static int __init setup_print_fatal_sign
+ 
+ __setup("print-fatal-signals=", setup_print_fatal_signals);
+ 
+-static int
++int
+ specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 0;
+@@ -811,8 +814,12 @@ force_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, info, t);
++
+ 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
+ 
++	gr_log_signal(sig, t);
++	gr_handle_crash(t, sig);
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1012,6 +1019,8 @@ int group_send_sig_info(int sig, struct 
+ 			ret = __group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
+ 			unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
+ 		}
++		if (!ret)
++			gr_log_signal(sig, p);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c
+--- a/kernel/softirq.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/softirq.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -475,9 +475,9 @@ void tasklet_kill(struct tasklet_struct 
+ 		printk("Attempt to kill tasklet from interrupt\n");
+ 
+ 	while (test_and_set_bit(TASKLET_STATE_SCHED, &t->state)) {
+-		do
++		do {
+ 			yield();
+-		while (test_bit(TASKLET_STATE_SCHED, &t->state));
++		} while (test_bit(TASKLET_STATE_SCHED, &t->state));
+ 	}
+ 	tasklet_unlock_wait(t);
+ 	clear_bit(TASKLET_STATE_SCHED, &t->state);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
+--- a/kernel/sys.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/sys.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
+ #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+ #include <linux/cpu.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/compat.h>
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+@@ -119,6 +120,12 @@ static int set_one_prio(struct task_stru
+ 		error = -EACCES;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
+ 	if (no_nice) {
+ 		error = no_nice;
+@@ -175,10 +182,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int whic
+ 				if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
+ 					goto out_unlock;	/* No processes for this user */
+ 
+-			do_each_thread(g, p)
++			do_each_thread(g, p) {
+ 				if (p->uid == who)
+ 					error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
+-			while_each_thread(g, p);
++			} while_each_thread(g, p);
+ 			if (who != current->uid)
+ 				free_uid(user);		/* For find_user() */
+ 			break;
+@@ -237,13 +244,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int whic
+ 				if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
+ 					goto out_unlock;	/* No processes for this user */
+ 
+-			do_each_thread(g, p)
++			do_each_thread(g, p) {
+ 				if (p->uid == who) {
+ 					niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
+ 					if (niceval > retval)
+ 						retval = niceval;
+ 				}
+-			while_each_thread(g, p);
++			} while_each_thread(g, p);
+ 			if (who != current->uid)
+ 				free_uid(user);		/* for find_user() */
+ 			break;
+@@ -508,6 +515,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid,
+ 		else
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 	}
++
++	if (gr_check_group_change(new_rgid, new_egid, -1))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (new_egid != old_egid) {
+ 		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ 		smp_wmb();
+@@ -515,6 +526,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid,
+ 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
+ 	    (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
+ 		current->sgid = new_egid;
++
++	gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid);
++
+ 	current->fsgid = new_egid;
+ 	current->egid = new_egid;
+ 	current->gid = new_rgid;
+@@ -537,11 +551,17 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
+ 	if (retval)
+ 		return retval;
+ 
++	if (gr_check_group_change(gid, gid, gid))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+ 		if (old_egid != gid) {
+ 			set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ 			smp_wmb();
+ 		}
++
++		gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid);
++
+ 		current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
+ 	} else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid)) {
+ 		if (old_egid != gid) {
+@@ -579,6 +599,9 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int 
+ 		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ 		smp_wmb();
+ 	}
++
++	gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid);
++
+ 	current->uid = new_ruid;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -628,6 +651,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid,
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (gr_check_user_change(new_ruid, new_euid, -1))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (new_ruid != old_ruid && set_user(new_ruid, new_euid != old_euid) < 0)
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+ 
+@@ -674,6 +700,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
+ 	old_suid = current->suid;
+ 	new_suid = old_suid;
+ 	
++	if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid))
++		return -EPERM;
++
++	if (gr_check_user_change(uid, uid, uid))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ 		if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+@@ -721,6 +753,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid
+ 		    (suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid))
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 	}
++
++	if (gr_check_user_change(ruid, euid, -1))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
+ 		if (ruid != current->uid && set_user(ruid, euid != current->euid) < 0)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+@@ -775,6 +811,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid
+ 		    (sgid != current->egid) && (sgid != current->sgid))
+ 			return -EPERM;
+ 	}
++
++	if (gr_check_group_change(rgid, egid, -1))
++		return -EPERM;
++
+ 	if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
+ 		if (egid != current->egid) {
+ 			set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+@@ -783,8 +823,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid
+ 		current->egid = egid;
+ 	}
+ 	current->fsgid = current->egid;
+-	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
++	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
++		gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid);
+ 		current->gid = rgid;
++	}
+ 	if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
+ 		current->sgid = sgid;
+ 
+@@ -819,6 +861,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
+ 	if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
+ 		return old_fsuid;
+ 
++	if (gr_check_user_change(-1, -1, uid))
++		return old_fsuid;
++
+ 	if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid ||
+ 	    uid == current->suid || uid == current->fsuid || 
+ 	    capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+@@ -851,6 +896,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
+ 	if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid ||
+ 	    gid == current->sgid || gid == current->fsgid || 
+ 	    capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
++		if (gr_check_group_change(-1, -1, gid))
++			return old_fsgid;
++
+ 		if (gid != old_fsgid) {
+ 			set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ 			smp_wmb();
+@@ -932,7 +980,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpgid(pid_t pid, p
+ 	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ 
+ 	err = -ESRCH;
+-	p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
++	/* grsec: replaced find_task_by_vpid with equivalent call which
++	   lacks the chroot restriction
++	*/
++	p = pid_task(find_pid_ns(pid, current->nsproxy->pid_ns), PIDTYPE_PID);
+ 	if (!p)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -1647,7 +1698,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, un
+ 			error = get_dumpable(current->mm);
+ 			break;
+ 		case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
+-			if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) {
++			if (arg2 > 1) {
+ 				error = -EINVAL;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+diff -urNp a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@
+ static int deprecated_sysctl_warning(struct __sysctl_args *args);
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table *table, const int op);
++extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name,
++				const int op);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
+ 
+ /* External variables not in a header file. */
+ extern int C_A_D;
+@@ -156,6 +163,7 @@ static int proc_do_cad_pid(struct ctl_ta
+ static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+ 			       void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+ #endif
++extern ctl_table grsecurity_table[];
+ 
+ static struct ctl_table root_table[];
+ static struct ctl_table_root sysctl_table_root;
+@@ -183,6 +191,21 @@ extern struct ctl_table inotify_table[];
+ int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++static ctl_table pax_table[] = {
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "softmode",
++		.data		= &pax_softmode,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(unsigned int),
++		.mode		= 0600,
++		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
++	},
++
++	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
++};
++#endif
++
+ extern int prove_locking;
+ extern int lock_stat;
+ 
+@@ -219,6 +242,7 @@ static struct ctl_table root_table[] = {
+ 		.mode		= 0555,
+ 		.child		= dev_table,
+ 	},
++
+ /*
+  * NOTE: do not add new entries to this table unless you have read
+  * Documentation/sysctl/ctl_unnumbered.txt
+@@ -820,6 +844,24 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+ 		.proc_handler	= &proc_dostring,
+ 		.strategy	= &sysctl_string,
+ 	},
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP)
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "grsecurity",
++		.mode		= 0500,
++		.child		= grsecurity_table,
++	},
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
++	{
++		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
++		.procname	= "pax",
++		.mode		= 0500,
++		.child		= pax_table,
++	},
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * NOTE: do not add new entries to this table unless you have read
+  * Documentation/sysctl/ctl_unnumbered.txt
+@@ -1507,6 +1549,25 @@ static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
+ int sysctl_perm(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
+ {
+ 	int error;
++	if (table->parent != NULL && table->parent->procname != NULL &&
++	    table->procname != NULL &&
++	    gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->parent->procname, table->procname, op))
++		return -EACCES;
++	if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op))
++		return -EACCES;
++	error = gr_handle_sysctl(table, op);
++	if (error)
++		return error;
++	error = security_sysctl(table, op);
++	if (error)
++		return error;
++	return test_perm(table->mode, op);
++}
++
++int sysctl_perm_nochk(ctl_table *table, int op)
++{
++	int error;
++
+ 	error = security_sysctl(table, op);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+@@ -1531,13 +1592,14 @@ repeat:
+ 		if (n == table->ctl_name) {
+ 			int error;
+ 			if (table->child) {
+-				if (sysctl_perm(table, 001))
++				if (sysctl_perm_nochk(table, 001))
+ 					return -EPERM;
+ 				name++;
+ 				nlen--;
+ 				table = table->child;
+ 				goto repeat;
+ 			}
++
+ 			error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen,
+ 						   oldval, oldlenp,
+ 						   newval, newlen);
+diff -urNp a/kernel/time.c b/kernel/time.c
+--- a/kernel/time.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/time.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+@@ -90,6 +91,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_stime(time_t __user 
+ 		return err;
+ 
+ 	do_settimeofday(&tv);
++
++	gr_log_timechange();
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -198,6 +202,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_settimeofday(struct 
+ 			return -EFAULT;
+ 	}
+ 
++	gr_log_timechange();
++
+ 	return do_sys_settimeofday(tv ? &new_ts : NULL, tz ? &new_tz : NULL);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -236,7 +242,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_fs_time);
+  * Avoid unnecessary multiplications/divisions in the
+  * two most common HZ cases:
+  */
+-unsigned int inline jiffies_to_msecs(const unsigned long j)
++inline unsigned int jiffies_to_msecs(const unsigned long j)
+ {
+ #if HZ <= MSEC_PER_SEC && !(MSEC_PER_SEC % HZ)
+ 	return (MSEC_PER_SEC / HZ) * j;
+@@ -252,7 +258,7 @@ unsigned int inline jiffies_to_msecs(con
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(jiffies_to_msecs);
+ 
+-unsigned int inline jiffies_to_usecs(const unsigned long j)
++inline unsigned int jiffies_to_usecs(const unsigned long j)
+ {
+ #if HZ <= USEC_PER_SEC && !(USEC_PER_SEC % HZ)
+ 	return (USEC_PER_SEC / HZ) * j;
+diff -urNp a/kernel/utsname_sysctl.c b/kernel/utsname_sysctl.c
+--- a/kernel/utsname_sysctl.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/kernel/utsname_sysctl.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static struct ctl_table uts_kern_table[]
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_do_uts_string,
+ 		.strategy	= sysctl_uts_string,
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static struct ctl_table uts_root_table[] = {
+@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static struct ctl_table uts_root_table[]
+ 		.mode		= 0555,
+ 		.child		= uts_kern_table,
+ 	},
+-	{}
++	{ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ static int __init utsname_sysctl_init(void)
+diff -urNp a/lib/radix-tree.c b/lib/radix-tree.c
+--- a/lib/radix-tree.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/lib/radix-tree.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ struct radix_tree_preload {
+ 	int nr;
+ 	struct radix_tree_node *nodes[RADIX_TREE_MAX_PATH];
+ };
+-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct radix_tree_preload, radix_tree_preloads) = { 0, };
++DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct radix_tree_preload, radix_tree_preloads);
+ 
+ static inline gfp_t root_gfp_mask(struct radix_tree_root *root)
+ {
+diff -urNp a/localversion-grsec b/localversion-grsec
+--- a/localversion-grsec	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/localversion-grsec	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++-grsec
+diff -urNp a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c
+--- a/mm/filemap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/filemap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include <linux/cpuset.h>
+ #include <linux/hardirq.h> /* for BUG_ON(!in_atomic()) only */
+ #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include "internal.h"
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1481,7 +1482,7 @@ int generic_file_mmap(struct file * file
+ 	struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+ 
+ 	if (!mapping->a_ops->readpage)
+-		return -ENOEXEC;
++		return -ENODEV;
+ 	file_accessed(file);
+ 	vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops;
+ 	vma->vm_flags |= VM_CAN_NONLINEAR;
+@@ -1841,6 +1842,7 @@ inline int generic_write_checks(struct f
+                         *pos = i_size_read(inode);
+ 
+ 		if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) {
++			gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE,*pos, 0);
+ 			if (*pos >= limit) {
+ 				send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
+ 				return -EFBIG;
+diff -urNp a/mm/fremap.c b/mm/fremap.c
+--- a/mm/fremap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/fremap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -150,6 +150,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_remap_file_pages(uns
+  retry:
+ 	vma = find_vma(mm, start);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (vma && (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) {
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		return err;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Make sure the vma is shared, that it supports prefaulting,
+ 	 * and that the remapped range is valid and fully within
+diff -urNp a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c
+--- a/mm/hugetlb.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/hugetlb.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -847,6 +847,26 @@ void unmap_hugepage_range(struct vm_area
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++static void pax_mirror_huge_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct page *page_m)
++{
++	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++	unsigned long address_m;
++	pte_t *ptep_m;
++
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (!vma_m)
++		return;
++
++	BUG_ON(address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
++	address_m = address + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	ptep_m = huge_pte_offset(mm, address_m & HPAGE_MASK);
++	get_page(page_m);
++	set_huge_pte_at(mm, address_m, ptep_m, make_huge_pte(vma_m, page_m, 0));
++}
++#endif
++
+ static int hugetlb_cow(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 			unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
+ {
+@@ -881,6 +901,11 @@ static int hugetlb_cow(struct mm_struct 
+ 		/* Break COW */
+ 		set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep,
+ 				make_huge_pte(vma, new_page, 1));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		pax_mirror_huge_pte(vma, address, new_page);
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Make the old page be freed below */
+ 		new_page = old_page;
+ 	}
+@@ -953,6 +978,10 @@ retry:
+ 				&& (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)));
+ 	set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep, new_pte);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	pax_mirror_huge_pte(vma, address, page);
++#endif
++
+ 	if (write_access && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
+ 		/* Optimization, do the COW without a second fault */
+ 		ret = hugetlb_cow(mm, vma, address, ptep, new_pte);
+@@ -978,6 +1007,27 @@ int hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, 
+ 	int ret;
+ 	static DEFINE_MUTEX(hugetlb_instantiation_mutex);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (vma_m) {
++		unsigned long address_m;
++
++		if (vma->vm_start > vma_m->vm_start) {
++			address_m = address;
++			address -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++			vma = vma_m;
++		} else
++			address_m = address + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++
++		if (!huge_pte_alloc(mm, address_m))
++			return VM_FAULT_OOM;
++		address_m &= HPAGE_MASK;
++		unmap_hugepage_range(vma, address_m, address_m + HPAGE_SIZE);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	ptep = huge_pte_alloc(mm, address);
+ 	if (!ptep)
+ 		return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+diff -urNp a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
+--- a/mm/madvise.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/madvise.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_a
+ 	pgoff_t pgoff;
+ 	int new_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++#endif
++
+ 	switch (behavior) {
+ 	case MADV_NORMAL:
+ 		new_flags = new_flags & ~VM_RAND_READ & ~VM_SEQ_READ;
+@@ -92,6 +96,13 @@ success:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * vm_flags is protected by the mmap_sem held in write mode.
+ 	 */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (vma_m)
++		vma_m->vm_flags = new_flags & ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_ACCOUNT);
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -236,6 +247,17 @@ madvise_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, 
+ 
+ 	case MADV_DONTNEED:
+ 		error = madvise_dontneed(vma, prev, start, end);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (!error) {
++			struct vm_area_struct *vma_m, *prev_m;
++
++			vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++			if (vma_m)
++				error = madvise_dontneed(vma_m, &prev_m, start + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, end + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	default:
+@@ -308,6 +330,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_madvise(unsigned lon
+ 	if (end < start)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++			goto out;
++	} else
++#endif
++
++	if (end > TASK_SIZE)
++		goto out;
++
+ 	error = 0;
+ 	if (end == start)
+ 		goto out;
+diff -urNp a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
+--- a/mm/memory.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/memory.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/writeback.h>
+ #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -1026,11 +1027,11 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *t
+ 	vm_flags &= force ? (VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE) : (VM_READ | VM_WRITE);
+ 	i = 0;
+ 
+-	do {
++	while (len) {
+ 		struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ 		unsigned int foll_flags;
+ 
+-		vma = find_extend_vma(mm, start);
++		vma = find_vma(mm, start);
+ 		if (!vma && in_gate_area(tsk, start)) {
+ 			unsigned long pg = start & PAGE_MASK;
+ 			struct vm_area_struct *gate_vma = get_gate_vma(tsk);
+@@ -1070,7 +1071,7 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *t
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (!vma || (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
++		if (!vma || start < vma->vm_start || (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
+ 				|| !(vm_flags & vma->vm_flags))
+ 			return i ? : -EFAULT;
+ 
+@@ -1143,7 +1144,7 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *t
+ 			start += PAGE_SIZE;
+ 			len--;
+ 		} while (len && start < vma->vm_end);
+-	} while (len);
++	}
+ 	return i;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_user_pages);
+@@ -1569,6 +1570,186 @@ static inline void cow_user_page(struct 
+ 		copy_user_highpage(dst, src, va, vma);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++static void pax_unmap_mirror_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd)
++{
++	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
++	spinlock_t *ptl;
++	pte_t *pte, entry;
++
++	pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
++	entry = *pte;
++	if (!pte_present(entry)) {
++		if (!pte_none(entry)) {
++			BUG_ON(pte_file(entry));
++			free_swap_and_cache(pte_to_swp_entry(entry));
++			pte_clear_not_present_full(mm, address, pte, 0);
++		}
++	} else {
++		struct page *page;
++
++		flush_cache_page(vma, address, pte_pfn(entry));
++		entry = ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pte);
++		BUG_ON(pte_dirty(entry));
++		page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, entry);
++		if (page) {
++			update_hiwater_rss(mm);
++			if (PageAnon(page))
++				dec_mm_counter(mm, anon_rss);
++			else
++				dec_mm_counter(mm, file_rss);
++			page_remove_rmap(page, vma);
++			page_cache_release(page);
++		}
++	}
++	pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
++}
++
++/* PaX: if vma is mirrored, synchronize the mirror's PTE
++ *
++ * the ptl of the lower mapped page is held on entry and is not released on exit
++ * or inside to ensure atomic changes to the PTE states (swapout, mremap, munmap, etc)
++ */
++static void pax_mirror_anon_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct page *page_m, spinlock_t *ptl)
++{
++	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
++	unsigned long address_m;
++	spinlock_t *ptl_m;
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++	pmd_t *pmd_m;
++	pte_t *pte_m, entry_m;
++
++	BUG_ON(!page_m || !PageAnon(page_m));
++
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (!vma_m)
++		return;
++
++	BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page_m));
++	BUG_ON(address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
++	address_m = address + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	pmd_m = pmd_offset(pud_offset(pgd_offset(mm, address_m), address_m), address_m);
++	pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m);
++	ptl_m = pte_lockptr(mm, pmd_m);
++	if (ptl != ptl_m) {
++		spin_lock_nested(ptl_m, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
++		if (!pte_none(*pte_m))
++			goto out;
++	}
++
++	entry_m = pfn_pte(page_to_pfn(page_m), vma_m->vm_page_prot);
++	page_cache_get(page_m);
++	page_add_anon_rmap(page_m, vma_m, address_m);
++	inc_mm_counter(mm, anon_rss);
++	set_pte_at(mm, address_m, pte_m, entry_m);
++	update_mmu_cache(vma_m, address_m, entry_m);
++out:
++	if (ptl != ptl_m)
++		spin_unlock(ptl_m);
++	pte_unmap_nested(pte_m);
++	unlock_page(page_m);
++}
++
++void pax_mirror_file_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, struct page *page_m, spinlock_t *ptl)
++{
++	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
++	unsigned long address_m;
++	spinlock_t *ptl_m;
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++	pmd_t *pmd_m;
++	pte_t *pte_m, entry_m;
++
++	BUG_ON(!page_m || PageAnon(page_m));
++
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (!vma_m)
++		return;
++
++	BUG_ON(address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
++	address_m = address + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	pmd_m = pmd_offset(pud_offset(pgd_offset(mm, address_m), address_m), address_m);
++	pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m);
++	ptl_m = pte_lockptr(mm, pmd_m);
++	if (ptl != ptl_m) {
++		spin_lock_nested(ptl_m, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
++		if (!pte_none(*pte_m))
++			goto out;
++	}
++
++	entry_m = pfn_pte(page_to_pfn(page_m), vma_m->vm_page_prot);
++	page_cache_get(page_m);
++	page_add_file_rmap(page_m);
++	inc_mm_counter(mm, file_rss);
++	set_pte_at(mm, address_m, pte_m, entry_m);
++	update_mmu_cache(vma_m, address_m, entry_m);
++out:
++	if (ptl != ptl_m)
++		spin_unlock(ptl_m);
++	pte_unmap_nested(pte_m);
++}
++
++static void pax_mirror_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned long pfn_m, spinlock_t *ptl)
++{
++	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
++	unsigned long address_m;
++	spinlock_t *ptl_m;
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++	pmd_t *pmd_m;
++	pte_t *pte_m, entry_m;
++
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (!vma_m)
++		return;
++
++	BUG_ON(address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
++	address_m = address + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	pmd_m = pmd_offset(pud_offset(pgd_offset(mm, address_m), address_m), address_m);
++	pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m);
++	ptl_m = pte_lockptr(mm, pmd_m);
++	if (ptl != ptl_m) {
++		spin_lock_nested(ptl_m, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
++		if (!pte_none(*pte_m))
++			goto out;
++	}
++
++	entry_m = pfn_pte(pfn_m, vma_m->vm_page_prot);
++	set_pte_at(mm, address_m, pte_m, entry_m);
++out:
++	if (ptl != ptl_m)
++		spin_unlock(ptl_m);
++	pte_unmap_nested(pte_m);
++}
++
++static void pax_mirror_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pte_t *pte, pmd_t *pmd, spinlock_t *ptl)
++{
++	struct page *page_m;
++	pte_t entry;
++
++	if (!(vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++		goto out;
++
++	entry = *pte;
++	page_m  = vm_normal_page(vma, address, entry);
++	if (!page_m)
++		pax_mirror_pfn_pte(vma, address, pte_pfn(entry), ptl);
++	else if (PageAnon(page_m)) {
++		if (pax_find_mirror_vma(vma)) {
++			pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
++			lock_page(page_m);
++			pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
++			if (pte_same(entry, *pte))
++				pax_mirror_anon_pte(vma, address, page_m, ptl);
++			else
++				unlock_page(page_m);
++		}
++	} else
++		pax_mirror_file_pte(vma, address, page_m, ptl);
++
++out:
++	pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * This routine handles present pages, when users try to write
+  * to a shared page. It is done by copying the page to a new address
+@@ -1685,6 +1866,12 @@ gotten:
+ 	 */
+ 	page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
+ 	if (likely(pte_same(*page_table, orig_pte))) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (pax_find_mirror_vma(vma))
++			BUG_ON(TestSetPageLocked(new_page));
++#endif
++
+ 		if (old_page) {
+ 			page_remove_rmap(old_page, vma);
+ 			if (!PageAnon(old_page)) {
+@@ -1708,6 +1895,10 @@ gotten:
+ 		lru_cache_add_active(new_page);
+ 		page_add_new_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, address);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		pax_mirror_anon_pte(vma, address, new_page, ptl);
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Free the old page.. */
+ 		new_page = old_page;
+ 		ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE;
+@@ -1967,6 +2158,7 @@ int vmtruncate(struct inode * inode, lof
+ 		unsigned long limit;
+ 
+ 		limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset, 1);
+ 		if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
+ 			goto out_sig;
+ 		if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
+@@ -2117,6 +2309,11 @@ static int do_swap_page(struct mm_struct
+ 	swap_free(entry);
+ 	if (vm_swap_full())
+ 		remove_exclusive_swap_page(page);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (write_access || !pax_find_mirror_vma(vma))
++#endif
++
+ 	unlock_page(page);
+ 
+ 	if (write_access) {
+@@ -2128,6 +2325,11 @@ static int do_swap_page(struct mm_struct
+ 
+ 	/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
+ 	update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	pax_mirror_anon_pte(vma, address, page, ptl);
++#endif
++
+ unlock:
+ 	pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
+ out:
+@@ -2172,6 +2374,12 @@ static int do_anonymous_page(struct mm_s
+ 	page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
+ 	if (!pte_none(*page_table))
+ 		goto release;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (pax_find_mirror_vma(vma))
++		BUG_ON(TestSetPageLocked(page));
++#endif
++
+ 	inc_mm_counter(mm, anon_rss);
+ 	lru_cache_add_active(page);
+ 	page_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
+@@ -2179,6 +2387,11 @@ static int do_anonymous_page(struct mm_s
+ 
+ 	/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
+ 	update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	pax_mirror_anon_pte(vma, address, page, ptl);
++#endif
++
+ unlock:
+ 	pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -2320,6 +2533,12 @@ static int __do_fault(struct mm_struct *
+ 	 */
+ 	/* Only go through if we didn't race with anybody else... */
+ 	if (likely(pte_same(*page_table, orig_pte))) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (anon && pax_find_mirror_vma(vma))
++			BUG_ON(TestSetPageLocked(page));
++#endif
++
+ 		flush_icache_page(vma, page);
+ 		entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
+ 		if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)
+@@ -2340,6 +2559,14 @@ static int __do_fault(struct mm_struct *
+ 
+ 		/* no need to invalidate: a not-present page won't be cached */
+ 		update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (anon)
++			pax_mirror_anon_pte(vma, address, page, ptl);
++		else
++			pax_mirror_file_pte(vma, address, page, ptl);
++#endif
++
+ 	} else {
+ 		mem_cgroup_uncharge_page(page);
+ 		if (anon)
+@@ -2423,6 +2650,11 @@ static noinline int do_no_pfn(struct mm_
+ 		if (write_access)
+ 			entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+ 		set_pte_at(mm, address, page_table, entry);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		pax_mirror_pfn_pte(vma, address, pfn, ptl);
++#endif
++
+ 	}
+ 	pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -2525,6 +2757,12 @@ static inline int handle_pte_fault(struc
+ 		if (write_access)
+ 			flush_tlb_page(vma, address);
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	pax_mirror_pte(vma, address, pte, pmd, ptl);
++	return 0;
++#endif
++
+ unlock:
+ 	pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -2541,6 +2779,10 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *mm
+ 	pmd_t *pmd;
+ 	pte_t *pte;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++#endif
++
+ 	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+ 
+ 	count_vm_event(PGFAULT);
+@@ -2548,6 +2790,34 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *mm
+ 	if (unlikely(is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)))
+ 		return hugetlb_fault(mm, vma, address, write_access);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (vma_m) {
++		unsigned long address_m;
++		pgd_t *pgd_m;
++		pud_t *pud_m;
++		pmd_t *pmd_m;
++
++		if (vma->vm_start > vma_m->vm_start) {
++			address_m = address;
++			address -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++			vma = vma_m;
++		} else
++			address_m = address + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++
++		pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
++		pud_m = pud_alloc(mm, pgd_m, address_m);
++		if (!pud_m)
++			return VM_FAULT_OOM;
++		pmd_m = pmd_alloc(mm, pud_m, address_m);
++		if (!pmd_m)
++			return VM_FAULT_OOM;
++		if (!pmd_present(*pmd_m) && __pte_alloc(mm, pmd_m, address_m))
++			return VM_FAULT_OOM;
++		pax_unmap_mirror_pte(vma_m, address_m, pmd_m);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+ 	pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, address);
+ 	if (!pud)
+@@ -2651,7 +2921,7 @@ static int __init gate_vma_init(void)
+ 	gate_vma.vm_start = FIXADDR_USER_START;
+ 	gate_vma.vm_end = FIXADDR_USER_END;
+ 	gate_vma.vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_MAYREAD | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC;
+-	gate_vma.vm_page_prot = __P101;
++	gate_vma.vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(gate_vma.vm_flags);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Make sure the vDSO gets into every core dump.
+ 	 * Dumping its contents makes post-mortem fully interpretable later
+diff -urNp a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
+--- a/mm/mempolicy.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/mempolicy.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -433,6 +433,10 @@ static int mbind_range(struct vm_area_st
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *next;
+ 	int err;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++#endif
++
+ 	err = 0;
+ 	for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; vma = next) {
+ 		next = vma->vm_next;
+@@ -444,6 +448,16 @@ static int mbind_range(struct vm_area_st
+ 			err = policy_vma(vma, new);
+ 		if (err)
+ 			break;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++		if (vma_m) {
++			err = policy_vma(vma_m, new);
++			if (err)
++				break;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 	}
+ 	return err;
+ }
+@@ -809,6 +823,17 @@ static long do_mbind(unsigned long start
+ 
+ 	if (end < start)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++			return -EINVAL;
++	} else
++#endif
++
++	if (end > TASK_SIZE)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	if (end == start)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/mm/mlock.c b/mm/mlock.c
+--- a/mm/mlock.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/mlock.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ int can_do_mlock(void)
+ {
+@@ -93,6 +94,17 @@ static int do_mlock(unsigned long start,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	if (end == start)
+ 		return 0;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++			return -EINVAL;
++	} else
++#endif
++
++	if (end > TASK_SIZE)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev);
+ 	if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -150,6 +162,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlock(unsigned long 
+ 	lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 
+ 	/* check against resource limits */
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (current->mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1);
+ 	if ((locked <= lock_limit) || capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
+ 		error = do_mlock(start, len, 1);
+ 	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+@@ -171,10 +184,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_munlock(unsigned lon
+ static int do_mlockall(int flags)
+ {
+ 	struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev = NULL;
+-	unsigned int def_flags = 0;
++	unsigned int def_flags = current->mm->def_flags & ~VM_LOCKED;
+ 
+ 	if (flags & MCL_FUTURE)
+-		def_flags = VM_LOCKED;
++		def_flags |= VM_LOCKED;
+ 	current->mm->def_flags = def_flags;
+ 	if (flags == MCL_FUTURE)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -182,6 +195,12 @@ static int do_mlockall(int flags)
+ 	for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma ; vma = prev->vm_next) {
+ 		unsigned int newflags;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (vma->vm_start >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE))
++			break;
++#endif
++
++		BUG_ON(vma->vm_end > TASK_SIZE);
+ 		newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED;
+ 		if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT))
+ 			newflags &= ~VM_LOCKED;
+@@ -211,6 +230,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlockall(int flags)
+ 	lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm, 1);
+ 	if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT) || (current->mm->total_vm <= lock_limit) ||
+ 	    capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
+ 		ret = do_mlockall(flags);
+diff -urNp a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
+--- a/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/mmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
+ #include <linux/rmap.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+@@ -40,6 +41,16 @@
+ #define arch_rebalance_pgtables(addr, len)		(addr)
+ #endif
+ 
++static inline void verify_mm_writelocked(struct mm_struct *mm)
++{
++#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM) || defined(CONFIG_PAX)
++	if (unlikely(down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) {
++		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++		BUG();
++	}
++#endif
++}
++
+ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ 		struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct *prev,
+ 		unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
+@@ -65,15 +76,23 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struc
+  *		x: (no) no	x: (no) yes	x: (no) yes	x: (yes) yes
+  *
+  */
+-pgprot_t protection_map[16] = {
++pgprot_t protection_map[16] __read_only = {
+ 	__P000, __P001, __P010, __P011, __P100, __P101, __P110, __P111,
+ 	__S000, __S001, __S010, __S011, __S100, __S101, __S110, __S111
+ };
+ 
+ pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags)
+ {
+-	return protection_map[vm_flags &
+-				(VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)];
++	pgprot_t prot = protection_map[vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)];
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
++	if (!nx_enabled &&
++	    (vm_flags & (VM_PAGEEXEC | VM_EXEC)) == VM_PAGEEXEC &&
++	    (vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)))
++		prot = __pgprot(pte_val(pte_exprotect(__pte(pgprot_val(prot)))));
++#endif
++
++	return prot;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_get_page_prot);
+ 
+@@ -228,6 +247,7 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *remove_vma
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *next = vma->vm_next;
+ 
+ 	might_sleep();
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_mirror);
+ 	if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close)
+ 		vma->vm_ops->close(vma);
+ 	if (vma->vm_file)
+@@ -261,6 +281,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigne
+ 	 * not page aligned -Ram Gupta
+ 	 */
+ 	rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, (brk - mm->start_brk) + (mm->end_data - mm->start_data), 1);
+ 	if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && (brk - mm->start_brk) +
+ 			(mm->end_data - mm->start_data) > rlim)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -362,8 +383,12 @@ find_vma_prepare(struct mm_struct *mm, u
+ 
+ 		if (vma_tmp->vm_end > addr) {
+ 			vma = vma_tmp;
+-			if (vma_tmp->vm_start <= addr)
+-				return vma;
++			if (vma_tmp->vm_start <= addr) {
++//printk("PAX: prep: %08lx-%08lx %08lx pr:%p l:%p pa:%p ",
++//vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, addr, *pprev, *rb_link, *rb_parent);
++//__print_symbol("%s\n", __builtin_extract_return_addr(__builtin_return_address(0)));
++				break;
++			}
+ 			__rb_link = &__rb_parent->rb_left;
+ 		} else {
+ 			rb_prev = __rb_parent;
+@@ -687,6 +712,12 @@ static int
+ can_vma_merge_before(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags,
+ 	struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file, pgoff_t vm_pgoff)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && vma->vm_start == SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++		return 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (is_mergeable_vma(vma, file, vm_flags) &&
+ 	    is_mergeable_anon_vma(anon_vma, vma->anon_vma)) {
+ 		if (vma->vm_pgoff == vm_pgoff)
+@@ -706,6 +737,12 @@ static int
+ can_vma_merge_after(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags,
+ 	struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file, pgoff_t vm_pgoff)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && vma->vm_end == SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++		return 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (is_mergeable_vma(vma, file, vm_flags) &&
+ 	    is_mergeable_anon_vma(anon_vma, vma->anon_vma)) {
+ 		pgoff_t vm_pglen;
+@@ -748,12 +785,19 @@ can_vma_merge_after(struct vm_area_struc
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ 			struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long addr,
+ 			unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags,
+-		     	struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file,
++			struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file,
+ 			pgoff_t pgoff, struct mempolicy *policy)
+ {
+ 	pgoff_t pglen = (end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *area, *next;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	unsigned long addr_m = addr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, end_m = end + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	struct vm_area_struct *area_m = NULL, *next_m = NULL, *prev_m = NULL;
++
++	BUG_ON((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE < end);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We later require that vma->vm_flags == vm_flags,
+ 	 * so this tests vma->vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL, too.
+@@ -769,6 +813,15 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct 
+ 	if (next && next->vm_end == end)		/* cases 6, 7, 8 */
+ 		next = next->vm_next;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (prev)
++		prev_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(prev);
++	if (area)
++		area_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(area);
++	if (next)
++		next_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(next);
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Can it merge with the predecessor?
+ 	 */
+@@ -788,9 +841,24 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct 
+ 							/* cases 1, 6 */
+ 			vma_adjust(prev, prev->vm_start,
+ 				next->vm_end, prev->vm_pgoff, NULL);
+-		} else					/* cases 2, 5, 7 */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			if (prev_m)
++				vma_adjust(prev_m, prev_m->vm_start,
++					next_m->vm_end, prev_m->vm_pgoff, NULL);
++#endif
++
++		} else {				/* cases 2, 5, 7 */
+ 			vma_adjust(prev, prev->vm_start,
+ 				end, prev->vm_pgoff, NULL);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			if (prev_m)
++				vma_adjust(prev_m, prev_m->vm_start,
++					end_m, prev_m->vm_pgoff, NULL);
++#endif
++
++		}
+ 		return prev;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -801,12 +869,27 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct 
+  			mpol_equal(policy, vma_policy(next)) &&
+ 			can_vma_merge_before(next, vm_flags,
+ 					anon_vma, file, pgoff+pglen)) {
+-		if (prev && addr < prev->vm_end)	/* case 4 */
++		if (prev && addr < prev->vm_end) {	/* case 4 */
+ 			vma_adjust(prev, prev->vm_start,
+ 				addr, prev->vm_pgoff, NULL);
+-		else					/* cases 3, 8 */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			if (prev_m)
++				vma_adjust(prev_m, prev_m->vm_start,
++					addr_m, prev_m->vm_pgoff, NULL);
++#endif
++
++		} else {				/* cases 3, 8 */
+ 			vma_adjust(area, addr, next->vm_end,
+ 				next->vm_pgoff - pglen, NULL);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			if (area_m)
++				vma_adjust(area_m, addr_m, next_m->vm_end,
++					next_m->vm_pgoff - pglen, NULL);
++#endif
++
++		}
+ 		return area;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -881,14 +964,11 @@ none:
+ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
+ 						struct file *file, long pages)
+ {
+-	const unsigned long stack_flags
+-		= VM_STACK_FLAGS & (VM_GROWSUP|VM_GROWSDOWN);
+-
+ 	if (file) {
+ 		mm->shared_vm += pages;
+ 		if ((flags & (VM_EXEC|VM_WRITE)) == VM_EXEC)
+ 			mm->exec_vm += pages;
+-	} else if (flags & stack_flags)
++	} else if (flags & (VM_GROWSUP|VM_GROWSDOWN))
+ 		mm->stack_vm += pages;
+ 	if (flags & (VM_RESERVED|VM_IO))
+ 		mm->reserved_vm += pages;
+@@ -916,7 +996,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file 
+ 	 * (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec
+ 	 *  mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.)
+ 	 */
+-	if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
++	if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+ 		if (!(file && (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)))
+ 			prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+ 
+@@ -926,15 +1006,15 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file 
+ 	if (!(flags & MAP_FIXED))
+ 		addr = round_hint_to_min(addr);
+ 
+-	error = arch_mmap_check(addr, len, flags);
+-	if (error)
+-		return error;
+-
+ 	/* Careful about overflows.. */
+ 	len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
+ 	if (!len || len > TASK_SIZE)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
++	error = arch_mmap_check(addr, len, flags);
++	if (error)
++		return error;
++
+ 	/* offset overflow? */
+ 	if ((pgoff + (len >> PAGE_SHIFT)) < pgoff)
+                return -EOVERFLOW;
+@@ -946,7 +1026,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file 
+ 	/* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
+ 	 * that it represents a valid section of the address space.
+ 	 */
+-	addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
++	addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags | ((prot & PROT_EXEC) ? MAP_EXECUTABLE : 0));
+ 	if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
+@@ -957,6 +1037,26 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file 
+ 	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+ 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) {
++			if ((prot & (PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_EXEC)
++				vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC);
++			else
++				vm_flags &= ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE);
++		}
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && file)
++		vm_flags &= ~VM_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED) {
+ 		if (!can_do_mlock())
+ 			return -EPERM;
+@@ -969,6 +1069,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file 
+ 		locked += mm->locked_vm;
+ 		lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur;
+ 		lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
+ 		if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+@@ -1037,6 +1138,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file 
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+ 	return mmap_region(file, addr, len, flags, vm_flags, pgoff,
+ 			   accountable);
+ }
+@@ -1050,10 +1154,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(do_mmap_pgoff);
+  */
+ int vma_wants_writenotify(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+ {
+-	unsigned int vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
++	unsigned long vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+ 
+ 	/* If it was private or non-writable, the write bit is already clear */
+-	if ((vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_SHARED)) != ((VM_WRITE|VM_SHARED)))
++	if ((vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_SHARED)) != (VM_WRITE|VM_SHARED))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	/* The backer wishes to know when pages are first written to? */
+@@ -1088,14 +1192,24 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *f
+ 	unsigned long charged = 0;
+ 	struct inode *inode =  file ? file->f_path.dentry->d_inode : NULL;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m = NULL;
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * mm->mmap_sem is required to protect against another thread
++	 * changing the mappings in case we sleep.
++	 */
++	verify_mm_writelocked(mm);
++
+ 	/* Clear old maps */
+ 	error = -ENOMEM;
+-munmap_back:
+ 	vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
+ 	if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) {
+ 		if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len))
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+-		goto munmap_back;
++		vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
++		BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check against address space limit. */
+@@ -1139,6 +1253,16 @@ munmap_back:
+ 		goto unacct_error;
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++		vma_m = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++		if (!vma_m) {
++			error = -ENOMEM;
++			goto free_vma;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_mm = mm;
+ 	vma->vm_start = addr;
+ 	vma->vm_end = addr + len;
+@@ -1161,6 +1285,14 @@ munmap_back:
+ 		error = file->f_op->mmap(file, vma);
+ 		if (error)
+ 			goto unmap_and_free_vma;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
++		if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL)) {
++			vma->vm_flags |= VM_PAGEEXEC;
++			vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 	} else if (vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
+ 		error = shmem_zero_setup(vma);
+ 		if (error)
+@@ -1191,6 +1323,12 @@ munmap_back:
+ 			vma->vm_flags, NULL, file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma))) {
+ 		file = vma->vm_file;
+ 		vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (vma_m)
++			pax_mirror_vma(vma_m, vma);
++#endif
++
+ 		if (correct_wcount)
+ 			atomic_inc(&inode->i_writecount);
+ 	} else {
+@@ -1201,10 +1339,18 @@ munmap_back:
+ 		}
+ 		mpol_free(vma_policy(vma));
+ 		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++		vma = NULL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (vma_m)
++			kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma_m);
++#endif
++
+ 	}
+ out:	
+ 	mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 	vm_stat_account(mm, vm_flags, file, len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++	track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, vm_flags);
+ 	if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ 		mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 		make_pages_present(addr, addr + len);
+@@ -1223,6 +1369,12 @@ unmap_and_free_vma:
+ 	unmap_region(mm, vma, prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end);
+ 	charged = 0;
+ free_vma:
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (vma_m)
++		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma_m);
++#endif
++
+ 	kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+ unacct_error:
+ 	if (charged)
+@@ -1256,6 +1408,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
+ 	if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
++#endif
++
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
+ 		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+@@ -1264,10 +1420,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
+ 			return addr;
+ 	}
+ 	if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
+-	        start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
++		start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
+ 	} else {
+-	        start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+-	        mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
++		start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
++		mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ full_search:
+@@ -1278,9 +1434,8 @@ full_search:
+ 			 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
+ 			 * some holes.
+ 			 */
+-			if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
+-				addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+-			        start_addr = addr;
++			if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
++				start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
+ 				mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
+ 				goto full_search;
+ 			}
+@@ -1302,10 +1457,16 @@ full_search:
+ 
+ void arch_unmap_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE <= addr)
++		return;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Is this a new hole at the lowest possible address?
+ 	 */
+-	if (addr >= TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE && addr < mm->free_area_cache) {
++	if (addr >= mm->mmap_base && addr < mm->free_area_cache) {
+ 		mm->free_area_cache = addr;
+ 		mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1323,7 +1484,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
+ {
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+-	unsigned long addr = addr0;
++	unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0;
+ 
+ 	/* requested length too big for entire address space */
+ 	if (len > TASK_SIZE)
+@@ -1332,6 +1493,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
+ 	if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ 		return addr;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
++#endif
++
+ 	/* requesting a specific address */
+ 	if (addr) {
+ 		addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
+@@ -1389,13 +1554,21 @@ bottomup:
+ 	 * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
+ 	 * allocations.
+ 	 */
++	mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++		mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
++	mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
+ 	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
+-  	mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+ 	addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Restore the topdown base:
+ 	 */
+-	mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
++	mm->mmap_base = base;
++	mm->free_area_cache = base;
+ 	mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
+ 
+ 	return addr;
+@@ -1404,6 +1577,12 @@ bottomup:
+ 
+ void arch_unmap_area_topdown(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE <= addr)
++		return;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Is this a new hole at the highest possible address?
+ 	 */
+@@ -1411,8 +1590,10 @@ void arch_unmap_area_topdown(struct mm_s
+ 		mm->free_area_cache = addr;
+ 
+ 	/* dont allow allocations above current base */
+-	if (mm->free_area_cache > mm->mmap_base)
++	if (mm->free_area_cache > mm->mmap_base) {
+ 		mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
++		mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ unsigned long
+@@ -1512,6 +1693,33 @@ out:
+ 	return prev ? prev->vm_next : vma;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++struct vm_area_struct *pax_find_mirror_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++
++	BUG_ON(!vma || vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_end);
++	if (!(vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++		BUG_ON(vma->vm_mirror);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_end - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1 < vma->vm_start - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1);
++	vma_m = vma->vm_mirror;
++	BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_mirror != vma);
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_file != vma_m->vm_file);
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start);
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_pgoff != vma_m->vm_pgoff || vma->anon_vma != vma_m->anon_vma);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags ^ vma_m->vm_flags) & ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_ACCOUNT | VM_LOCKED | VM_MAYNOTWRITE));
++#else
++	BUG_ON((vma->vm_flags ^ vma_m->vm_flags) & ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_ACCOUNT | VM_LOCKED));
++#endif
++
++	return vma_m;
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Verify that the stack growth is acceptable and
+  * update accounting. This is shared with both the
+@@ -1528,6 +1736,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+ 	/* Stack limit test */
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, size, 1);
+ 	if (size > rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+@@ -1537,6 +1746,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
+ 		unsigned long limit;
+ 		locked = mm->locked_vm + grow;
+ 		limit = rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
+ 		if (locked > limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+@@ -1551,7 +1761,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
+ 	 * Overcommit..  This must be the final test, as it will
+ 	 * update security statistics.
+ 	 */
+-	if (security_vm_enough_memory(grow))
++	if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, grow))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+ 	/* Ok, everything looks good - let it rip */
+@@ -1572,35 +1782,40 @@ static inline
+ #endif
+ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
+ {
+-	int error;
++	int error, locknext;
+ 
+ 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
+ 		return -EFAULT;
+ 
++	/* Also guard against wrapping around to address 0. */
++	if (address < PAGE_ALIGN(address+1))
++		address = PAGE_ALIGN(address+1);
++	else
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated
+ 	 * so that the anon_vma locking is not a noop.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++	locknext = vma->vm_next && (vma->vm_next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN);
++	if (locknext && unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma->vm_next)))
++		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	anon_vma_lock(vma);
++	if (locknext)
++		anon_vma_lock(vma->vm_next);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
+ 	 * is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode.  We need the
+-	 * anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
+-	 * Also guard against wrapping around to address 0.
++	 * anon_vma locks to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks
++	 * and expand_upwards.
+ 	 */
+-	if (address < PAGE_ALIGN(address+4))
+-		address = PAGE_ALIGN(address+4);
+-	else {
+-		anon_vma_unlock(vma);
+-		return -ENOMEM;
+-	}
+ 	error = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
+-	if (address > vma->vm_end) {
++	if (address > vma->vm_end && (!locknext || vma->vm_next->vm_start >= address)) {
+ 		unsigned long size, grow;
+ 
+ 		size = address - vma->vm_start;
+@@ -1610,6 +1825,8 @@ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct
+ 		if (!error)
+ 			vma->vm_end = address;
+ 	}
++	if (locknext)
++		anon_vma_unlock(vma->vm_next);
+ 	anon_vma_unlock(vma);
+ 	return error;
+ }
+@@ -1621,7 +1838,8 @@ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct
+ static inline int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ 				   unsigned long address)
+ {
+-	int error;
++	int error, lockprev = 0;
++	struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated
+@@ -1635,6 +1853,15 @@ static inline int expand_downwards(struc
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP) || defined(CONFIG_IA64)
++	find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, address, &prev);
++	lockprev = prev && (prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP);
++#endif
++	if (lockprev && unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(prev)))
++		return -ENOMEM;
++	if (lockprev)
++		anon_vma_lock(prev);
++
+ 	anon_vma_lock(vma);
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -1644,9 +1871,15 @@ static inline int expand_downwards(struc
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
+-	if (address < vma->vm_start) {
++	if (address < vma->vm_start && (!lockprev || prev->vm_end <= address)) {
+ 		unsigned long size, grow;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++
++		vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++#endif
++
+ 		size = vma->vm_end - address;
+ 		grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 
+@@ -1654,9 +1887,20 @@ static inline int expand_downwards(struc
+ 		if (!error) {
+ 			vma->vm_start = address;
+ 			vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
++			track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			if (vma_m) {
++				vma_m->vm_start -= grow << PAGE_SHIFT;
++				vma_m->vm_pgoff -= grow;
++			}
++#endif
++
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	anon_vma_unlock(vma);
++	if (lockprev)
++		anon_vma_unlock(prev);
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1728,6 +1972,13 @@ static void remove_vma_list(struct mm_st
+ 	do {
+ 		long nrpages = vma_pages(vma);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (vma->vm_start >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)) {
++			vma = remove_vma(vma);
++			continue;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		mm->total_vm -= nrpages;
+ 		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
+ 			mm->locked_vm -= nrpages;
+@@ -1774,6 +2025,16 @@ detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_str
+ 
+ 	insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
+ 	do {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		if (vma->vm_mirror) {
++			BUG_ON(!vma->vm_mirror->vm_mirror || vma->vm_mirror->vm_mirror != vma);
++			vma->vm_mirror->vm_mirror = NULL;
++			vma->vm_mirror->vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
++			vma->vm_mirror = NULL;
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		rb_erase(&vma->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb);
+ 		mm->map_count--;
+ 		tail_vma = vma;
+@@ -1793,6 +2054,102 @@ detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_str
+  * Split a vma into two pieces at address 'addr', a new vma is allocated
+  * either for the first part or the tail.
+  */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++int split_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma,
++	      unsigned long addr, int new_below)
++{
++	struct mempolicy *pol;
++	struct vm_area_struct *new, *vma_m, *new_m = NULL;
++	unsigned long addr_m = addr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++
++	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) && (addr & ~HPAGE_MASK))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++	if (vma_m) {
++		BUG_ON(vma->vm_end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
++		if (mm->map_count >= sysctl_max_map_count-1)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++	} else if (mm->map_count >= sysctl_max_map_count)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
++	new = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!new)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
++	if (vma_m) {
++		new_m = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++		if (!new_m) {
++			kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, new);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* most fields are the same, copy all, and then fixup */
++	*new = *vma;
++
++	if (new_below)
++		new->vm_end = addr;
++	else {
++		new->vm_start = addr;
++		new->vm_pgoff += ((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++	}
++
++	if (vma_m) {
++		*new_m = *vma_m;
++		new_m->vm_mirror = new;
++		new->vm_mirror = new_m;
++
++		if (new_below)
++			new_m->vm_end = addr_m;
++		else {
++			new_m->vm_start = addr_m;
++			new_m->vm_pgoff += ((addr_m - vma_m->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++		}
++	}
++
++	pol = mpol_copy(vma_policy(vma));
++	if (IS_ERR(pol)) {
++		if (new_m)
++			kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, new_m);
++		kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, new);
++		return PTR_ERR(pol);
++	}
++	vma_set_policy(new, pol);
++
++	if (new->vm_file)
++		get_file(new->vm_file);
++
++	if (new->vm_ops && new->vm_ops->open)
++		new->vm_ops->open(new);
++
++	if (new_below)
++		vma_adjust(vma, addr, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_pgoff +
++			((addr - new->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT), new);
++	else
++		vma_adjust(vma, vma->vm_start, addr, vma->vm_pgoff, new);
++
++	if (vma_m) {
++		mpol_get(pol);
++		vma_set_policy(new_m, pol);
++
++		if (new_m->vm_file)
++			get_file(new_m->vm_file);
++
++		if (new_m->vm_ops && new_m->vm_ops->open)
++			new_m->vm_ops->open(new_m);
++
++		if (new_below)
++			vma_adjust(vma_m, addr_m, vma_m->vm_end, vma_m->vm_pgoff +
++				((addr_m - new_m->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT), new_m);
++		else
++			vma_adjust(vma_m, vma_m->vm_start, addr_m, vma_m->vm_pgoff, new_m);
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ int split_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma,
+ 	      unsigned long addr, int new_below)
+ {
+@@ -1840,17 +2197,37 @@ int split_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, str
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++#endif
+ 
+ /* Munmap is split into 2 main parts -- this part which finds
+  * what needs doing, and the areas themselves, which do the
+  * work.  This now handles partial unmappings.
+  * Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@××××.org>
+  */
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
+ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len)
+ {
++	int ret = __do_munmap(mm, start, len);
++	if (ret || !(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++		return ret;
++
++	return __do_munmap(mm, start + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, len);
++}
++
++int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len)
++#else
++int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len)
++#endif
++{
+ 	unsigned long end;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev, *last;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * mm->mmap_sem is required to protect against another thread
++	 * changing the mappings in case we sleep.
++	 */
++	verify_mm_writelocked(mm);
++
+ 	if ((start & ~PAGE_MASK) || start > TASK_SIZE || len > TASK_SIZE-start)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+@@ -1900,6 +2277,8 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi
+ 	/* Fix up all other VM information */
+ 	remove_vma_list(mm, vma);
+ 
++	track_exec_limit(mm, start, end, 0UL);
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1912,22 +2291,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_munmap(unsigned long
+ 
+ 	profile_munmap(addr);
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
++	    (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len))
++		return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ 	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len);
+ 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static inline void verify_mm_writelocked(struct mm_struct *mm)
+-{
+-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
+-	if (unlikely(down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) {
+-		WARN_ON(1);
+-		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+-	}
+-#endif
+-}
+-
+ /*
+  *  this is really a simplified "do_mmap".  it only handles
+  *  anonymous maps.  eventually we may be able to do some
+@@ -1941,6 +2316,11 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
+ 	struct rb_node ** rb_link, * rb_parent;
+ 	pgoff_t pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ 	int error;
++	unsigned long charged;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m = NULL;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
+ 	if (!len)
+@@ -1958,19 +2338,34 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
+ 
+ 	flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++	if (mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++		flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++			flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
++#endif
++
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	error = arch_mmap_check(addr, len, flags);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+ 
++	charged = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * mlock MCL_FUTURE?
+ 	 */
+ 	if (mm->def_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ 		unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
+-		locked = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		locked = charged;
+ 		locked += mm->locked_vm;
+ 		lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur;
+ 		lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
++		gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
+ 		if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 	}
+@@ -1984,22 +2379,22 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Clear old maps.  this also does some error checking for us
+ 	 */
+- munmap_back:
+ 	vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
+ 	if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) {
+ 		if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len))
+ 			return -ENOMEM;
+-		goto munmap_back;
++		vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
++		BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
+-	if (!may_expand_vm(mm, len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
++	if (!may_expand_vm(mm, charged))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+ 	if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+-	if (security_vm_enough_memory(len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
++	if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+ 	/* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
+@@ -2012,10 +2407,21 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
+ 	 */
+ 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ 	if (!vma) {
+-		vm_unacct_memory(len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++		vm_unacct_memory(charged);
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++		vma_m = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++		if (!vma_m) {
++			kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++			vm_unacct_memory(charged);
++			return -ENOMEM;
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_mm = mm;
+ 	vma->vm_start = addr;
+ 	vma->vm_end = addr + len;
+@@ -2023,12 +2429,19 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
+ 	vma->vm_flags = flags;
+ 	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(flags);
+ 	vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (vma_m)
++		pax_mirror_vma(vma_m, vma);
++#endif
++
+ out:
+-	mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++	mm->total_vm += charged;
+ 	if (flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+-		mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++		mm->locked_vm += charged;
+ 		make_pages_present(addr, addr + len);
+ 	}
++	track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, flags);
+ 	return addr;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2059,8 +2472,10 @@ void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
+ 	 * Walk the list again, actually closing and freeing it,
+ 	 * with preemption enabled, without holding any MM locks.
+ 	 */
+-	while (vma)
++	while (vma) {
++		vma->vm_mirror = NULL;
+ 		vma = remove_vma(vma);
++	}
+ 
+ 	BUG_ON(mm->nr_ptes > (FIRST_USER_ADDRESS+PMD_SIZE-1)>>PMD_SHIFT);
+ }
+@@ -2074,6 +2489,10 @@ int insert_vm_struct(struct mm_struct * 
+ 	struct vm_area_struct * __vma, * prev;
+ 	struct rb_node ** rb_link, * rb_parent;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The vm_pgoff of a purely anonymous vma should be irrelevant
+ 	 * until its first write fault, when page's anon_vma and index
+@@ -2096,7 +2515,22 @@ int insert_vm_struct(struct mm_struct * 
+ 	if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) &&
+ 	     security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, vma_pages(vma)))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++		vma_m = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++		if (!vma_m)
++			return -ENOMEM;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (vma_m)
++		pax_mirror_vma(vma_m, vma);
++#endif
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2114,6 +2548,8 @@ struct vm_area_struct *copy_vma(struct v
+ 	struct rb_node **rb_link, *rb_parent;
+ 	struct mempolicy *pol;
+ 
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_mirror);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If anonymous vma has not yet been faulted, update new pgoff
+ 	 * to match new location, to increase its chance of merging.
+@@ -2154,6 +2590,35 @@ struct vm_area_struct *copy_vma(struct v
+ 	return new_vma;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++void pax_mirror_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma_m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++	struct vm_area_struct *prev_m;
++	struct rb_node **rb_link_m, *rb_parent_m;
++	struct mempolicy *pol_m;
++
++	BUG_ON(!(vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC));
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_mirror || vma_m->vm_mirror);
++	BUG_ON(!vma_mpol_equal(vma, vma_m));
++	*vma_m = *vma;
++	pol_m = vma_policy(vma);
++	mpol_get(pol_m);
++	vma_set_policy(vma_m, pol_m);
++	vma_m->vm_start += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	vma_m->vm_end += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	vma_m->vm_flags &= ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_ACCOUNT | VM_LOCKED);
++	vma_m->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma_m->vm_flags);
++	if (vma_m->vm_file)
++		get_file(vma_m->vm_file);
++	if (vma_m->vm_ops && vma_m->vm_ops->open)
++		vma_m->vm_ops->open(vma_m);
++	find_vma_prepare(vma->vm_mm, vma_m->vm_start, &prev_m, &rb_link_m, &rb_parent_m);
++	vma_link(vma->vm_mm, vma_m, prev_m, rb_link_m, rb_parent_m);
++	vma_m->vm_mirror = vma;
++	vma->vm_mirror = vma_m;
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Return true if the calling process may expand its vm space by the passed
+  * number of pages
+@@ -2164,7 +2629,7 @@ int may_expand_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, 
+ 	unsigned long lim;
+ 
+ 	lim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+-
++	gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (cur + npages) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
+ 	if (cur + npages > lim)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return 1;
+@@ -2233,6 +2698,15 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
+ 	vma->vm_start = addr;
+ 	vma->vm_end = addr + len;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) {
++		if ((vm_flags & (VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
++			vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC);
++		else
++			vm_flags &= ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE);
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	vma->vm_flags = vm_flags | mm->def_flags | VM_DONTEXPAND;
+ 	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
+--- a/mm/mprotect.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/mprotect.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -21,10 +21,17 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/swap.h>
+ #include <linux/swapops.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++#include <linux/elf.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+ #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
++#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+ 
+ static void change_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
+ 		unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot,
+@@ -127,6 +134,48 @@ static void change_protection(struct vm_
+ 	flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++/* called while holding the mmap semaphor for writing except stack expansion */
++void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot)
++{
++	unsigned long oldlimit, newlimit = 0UL;
++
++	if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || nx_enabled)
++		return;
++
++	spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++	oldlimit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
++	if ((prot & VM_EXEC) && oldlimit < end)
++		/* USER_CS limit moved up */
++		newlimit = end;
++	else if (!(prot & VM_EXEC) && start < oldlimit && oldlimit <= end)
++		/* USER_CS limit moved down */
++		newlimit = start;
++
++	if (newlimit) {
++		mm->context.user_cs_limit = newlimit;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++		wmb();
++		cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++		cpu_set(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
++#endif
++
++		set_user_cs(mm->context.user_cs_base, mm->context.user_cs_limit, smp_processor_id());
++	}
++	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++	if (newlimit == end) {
++		struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, oldlimit);
++
++		for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; vma = vma->vm_next)
++			if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
++				hugetlb_change_protection(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_page_prot);
++			else
++				change_protection(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_page_prot, vma_wants_writenotify(vma));
++	}
++}
++#endif
++
+ int
+ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
+ 	unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
+@@ -139,6 +188,14 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm
+ 	int error;
+ 	int dirty_accountable = 0;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	struct vm_area_struct *vma_m = NULL;
++	unsigned long start_m, end_m;
++
++	start_m = start + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++	end_m = end + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
+ 	if (newflags == oldflags) {
+ 		*pprev = vma;
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -161,6 +218,38 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ((oldflags ^ newflags) & VM_EXEC)) {
++		if (start != vma->vm_start) {
++			error = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
++			if (error)
++				goto fail;
++			BUG_ON(!*pprev || (*pprev)->vm_next == vma);
++			*pprev = (*pprev)->vm_next;
++		}
++
++		if (end != vma->vm_end) {
++			error = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
++			if (error)
++				goto fail;
++		}
++
++		if (pax_find_mirror_vma(vma)) {
++			error = __do_munmap(mm, start_m, end_m - start_m);
++			if (error)
++				goto fail;
++		} else {
++			vma_m = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
++			if (!vma_m) {
++				error = -ENOMEM;
++				goto fail;
++			}
++			vma->vm_flags = newflags;
++			pax_mirror_vma(vma_m, vma);
++		}
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * First try to merge with previous and/or next vma.
+ 	 */
+@@ -211,6 +300,70 @@ fail:
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++/* PaX: non-PIC ELF libraries need relocations on their executable segments
++ * therefore we'll grant them VM_MAYWRITE once during their life.
++ *
++ * The checks favour ld-linux.so behaviour which operates on a per ELF segment
++ * basis because we want to allow the common case and not the special ones.
++ */
++static inline void pax_handle_maywrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start)
++{
++	struct elfhdr elf_h;
++	struct elf_phdr elf_p;
++	elf_addr_t dyn_offset = 0UL;
++	elf_dyn dyn;
++	unsigned long i, j = 65536UL / sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOELFRELOCS
++	if ((vma->vm_start != start) ||
++	    !vma->vm_file ||
++	    !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) ||
++	    (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
++#endif
++
++		return;
++
++	if (sizeof(elf_h) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, 0UL, (char *)&elf_h, sizeof(elf_h)) ||
++	    memcmp(elf_h.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) ||
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
++	    (elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN && elf_h.e_type != ET_EXEC) ||
++#else
++	    elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN ||
++#endif
++
++	    !elf_check_arch(&elf_h) ||
++	    elf_h.e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr) ||
++	    elf_h.e_phnum > j)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = 0UL; i < elf_h.e_phnum; i++) {
++		if (sizeof(elf_p) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, elf_h.e_phoff + i*sizeof(elf_p), (char *)&elf_p, sizeof(elf_p)))
++			return;
++		if (elf_p.p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) {
++			dyn_offset = elf_p.p_offset;
++			j = i;
++		}
++	}
++	if (elf_h.e_phnum <= j)
++		return;
++
++	i = 0UL;
++	do {
++		if (sizeof(dyn) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, dyn_offset + i*sizeof(dyn), (char *)&dyn, sizeof(dyn)))
++			return;
++		if (dyn.d_tag == DT_TEXTREL || (dyn.d_tag == DT_FLAGS && (dyn.d_un.d_val & DF_TEXTREL))) {
++			vma->vm_flags |= VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYNOTWRITE;
++			gr_log_textrel(vma);
++			return;
++		}
++		i++;
++	} while (dyn.d_tag != DT_NULL);
++	return;
++}
++#endif
++
+ asmlinkage long
+ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned long prot)
+ {
+@@ -230,6 +383,17 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
+ 	end = start + len;
+ 	if (end <= start)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++		if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++			return -EINVAL;
++	} else
++#endif
++
++	if (end > TASK_SIZE)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
+ 	if (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+@@ -237,7 +401,7 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC:
+ 	 */
+-	if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
++	if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+ 		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+ 
+ 	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot);
+@@ -269,6 +433,16 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
+ 	if (start > vma->vm_start)
+ 		prev = vma;
+ 
++	if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) {
++		error = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++	if ((vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
++		pax_handle_maywrite(vma, start);
++#endif
++
+ 	for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
+ 		unsigned long newflags;
+ 
+@@ -282,6 +456,12 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
++		/* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */
++		if ((vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && !(prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
++			newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++#endif
++
+ 		error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+ 		if (error)
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -292,6 +472,9 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
+ 		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
+ 		if (error)
+ 			goto out;
++
++		track_exec_limit(current->mm, nstart, tmp, vm_flags);
++
+ 		nstart = tmp;
+ 
+ 		if (nstart < prev->vm_end)
+diff -urNp a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
+--- a/mm/mremap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/mremap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ static void move_ptes(struct vm_area_str
+ 			continue;
+ 		pte = ptep_clear_flush(vma, old_addr, old_pte);
+ 		pte = move_pte(pte, new_vma->vm_page_prot, old_addr, new_addr);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
++		if (!nx_enabled && (new_vma->vm_flags & (VM_PAGEEXEC | VM_EXEC)) == VM_PAGEEXEC)
++			pte = pte_exprotect(pte);
++#endif
++
+ 		set_pte_at(mm, new_addr, new_pte, pte);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -254,6 +260,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ 	unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
+ 	unsigned long charged = 0;
++	unsigned long pax_task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	if (flags & ~(MREMAP_FIXED | MREMAP_MAYMOVE))
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -272,6 +279,15 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 	if (!new_len)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++		pax_task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++#endif
++
++	if (new_len > pax_task_size || addr > pax_task_size-new_len ||
++	    old_len > pax_task_size || addr > pax_task_size-old_len)
++		goto out;
++
+ 	/* new_addr is only valid if MREMAP_FIXED is specified */
+ 	if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
+ 		if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+@@ -279,16 +295,13 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 		if (!(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE))
+ 			goto out;
+ 
+-		if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len)
++		if (new_addr > pax_task_size - new_len)
+ 			goto out;
+ 
+ 		/* Check if the location we're moving into overlaps the
+ 		 * old location at all, and fail if it does.
+ 		 */
+-		if ((new_addr <= addr) && (new_addr+new_len) > addr)
+-			goto out;
+-
+-		if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
++		if (addr + old_len > new_addr && new_addr + new_len > addr)
+ 			goto out;
+ 
+ 		ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+@@ -326,6 +339,14 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 		ret = -EINVAL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	if (pax_find_mirror_vma(vma)) {
++		ret = -EINVAL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
+ 	if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -359,7 +380,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 	if (old_len == vma->vm_end - addr &&
+ 	    !((flags & MREMAP_FIXED) && (addr != new_addr)) &&
+ 	    (old_len != new_len || !(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE))) {
+-		unsigned long max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
++		unsigned long max_addr = pax_task_size;
+ 		if (vma->vm_next)
+ 			max_addr = vma->vm_next->vm_start;
+ 		/* can we just expand the current mapping? */
+@@ -377,6 +398,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 						   addr + new_len);
+ 			}
+ 			ret = addr;
++			track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, addr + new_len, vma->vm_flags);
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+@@ -387,8 +409,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 	 */
+ 	ret = -ENOMEM;
+ 	if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) {
++		unsigned long map_flags = 0;
+ 		if (!(flags & MREMAP_FIXED)) {
+-			unsigned long map_flags = 0;
+ 			if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
+ 				map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
+ 
+@@ -403,7 +425,12 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
+ 			if (ret)
+ 				goto out;
+ 		}
++		map_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+ 		ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
++		if (!(ret & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++			track_exec_limit(current->mm, addr, addr + old_len, 0UL);
++			track_exec_limit(current->mm, new_addr, new_addr + new_len, map_flags);
++		}
+ 	}
+ out:
+ 	if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK)
+diff -urNp a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
+--- a/mm/nommu.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/nommu.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -405,15 +405,6 @@ struct vm_area_struct *find_vma(struct m
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_vma);
+ 
+-/*
+- * find a VMA
+- * - we don't extend stack VMAs under NOMMU conditions
+- */
+-struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
+-{
+-	return find_vma(mm, addr);
+-}
+-
+ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
+ {
+ 	return -ENOMEM;
+diff -urNp a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
+--- a/mm/page_alloc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/page_alloc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -514,9 +514,20 @@ static void free_pages_bulk(struct zone 
+ 
+ static void free_one_page(struct zone *zone, struct page *page, int order)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
++	unsigned long index = 1UL << order;
++#endif
++
+ 	spin_lock(&zone->lock);
+ 	zone_clear_flag(zone, ZONE_ALL_UNRECLAIMABLE);
+ 	zone->pages_scanned = 0;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
++	for (; index; --index)
++		sanitize_highpage(page + index - 1);
++#endif
++
+ 	__free_one_page(page, zone, order);
+ 	spin_unlock(&zone->lock);
+ }
+@@ -641,8 +652,10 @@ static int prep_new_page(struct page *pa
+ 	arch_alloc_page(page, order);
+ 	kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 1);
+ 
++#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
+ 	if (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+ 		prep_zero_page(page, order, gfp_flags);
++#endif
+ 
+ 	if (order && (gfp_flags & __GFP_COMP))
+ 		prep_compound_page(page, order);
+@@ -1009,6 +1022,11 @@ static void free_hot_cold_page(struct pa
+ 		list_add(&page->lru, &pcp->list);
+ 	set_page_private(page, get_pageblock_migratetype(page));
+ 	pcp->count++;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
++	sanitize_highpage(page);
++#endif
++
+ 	if (pcp->count >= pcp->high) {
+ 		free_pages_bulk(zone, pcp->batch, &pcp->list, 0);
+ 		pcp->count -= pcp->batch;
+diff -urNp a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c
+--- a/mm/rmap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/rmap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ int anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_stru
+ 		struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+ 		struct anon_vma *allocated, *locked;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++		struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
++#endif
++
+ 		anon_vma = find_mergeable_anon_vma(vma);
+ 		if (anon_vma) {
+ 			allocated = NULL;
+@@ -80,6 +84,15 @@ int anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_stru
+ 		/* page_table_lock to protect against threads */
+ 		spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ 		if (likely(!vma->anon_vma)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++			vma_m = pax_find_mirror_vma(vma);
++			if (vma_m) {
++				vma_m->anon_vma = anon_vma;
++				__anon_vma_link(vma_m);
++			}
++#endif
++
+ 			vma->anon_vma = anon_vma;
+ 			list_add_tail(&vma->anon_vma_node, &anon_vma->head);
+ 			allocated = NULL;
+diff -urNp a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
+--- a/mm/shmem.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/shmem.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ static struct file_system_type tmpfs_fs_
+ 	.get_sb		= shmem_get_sb,
+ 	.kill_sb	= kill_litter_super,
+ };
+-static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
++struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
+ 
+ static int __init init_tmpfs(void)
+ {
+diff -urNp a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
+--- a/mm/slab.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/slab.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ struct kmem_list3 {
+  * Need this for bootstrapping a per node allocator.
+  */
+ #define NUM_INIT_LISTS (3 * MAX_NUMNODES)
+-struct kmem_list3 __initdata initkmem_list3[NUM_INIT_LISTS];
++struct kmem_list3 initkmem_list3[NUM_INIT_LISTS];
+ #define	CACHE_CACHE 0
+ #define	SIZE_AC MAX_NUMNODES
+ #define	SIZE_L3 (2 * MAX_NUMNODES)
+@@ -654,14 +654,14 @@ struct cache_names {
+ static struct cache_names __initdata cache_names[] = {
+ #define CACHE(x) { .name = "size-" #x, .name_dma = "size-" #x "(DMA)" },
+ #include <linux/kmalloc_sizes.h>
+-	{NULL,}
++	{NULL, NULL}
+ #undef CACHE
+ };
+ 
+ static struct arraycache_init initarray_cache __initdata =
+-    { {0, BOOT_CPUCACHE_ENTRIES, 1, 0} };
++    { {0, BOOT_CPUCACHE_ENTRIES, 1, 0}, {NULL} };
+ static struct arraycache_init initarray_generic =
+-    { {0, BOOT_CPUCACHE_ENTRIES, 1, 0} };
++    { {0, BOOT_CPUCACHE_ENTRIES, 1, 0}, {NULL} };
+ 
+ /* internal cache of cache description objs */
+ static struct kmem_cache cache_cache = {
+@@ -3007,7 +3007,7 @@ retry:
+ 		 * there must be at least one object available for
+ 		 * allocation.
+ 		 */
+-		BUG_ON(slabp->inuse < 0 || slabp->inuse >= cachep->num);
++		BUG_ON(slabp->inuse >= cachep->num);
+ 
+ 		while (slabp->inuse < cachep->num && batchcount--) {
+ 			STATS_INC_ALLOCED(cachep);
+diff -urNp a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c
+--- a/mm/swap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/swap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@
+ /* How many pages do we try to swap or page in/out together? */
+ int page_cluster;
+ 
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pagevec, lru_add_pvecs) = { 0, };
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pagevec, lru_add_active_pvecs) = { 0, };
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pagevec, lru_rotate_pvecs) = { 0, };
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pagevec, lru_add_pvecs);
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pagevec, lru_add_active_pvecs);
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pagevec, lru_rotate_pvecs);
+ 
+ /*
+  * This path almost never happens for VM activity - pages are normally
+diff -urNp a/mm/tiny-shmem.c b/mm/tiny-shmem.c
+--- a/mm/tiny-shmem.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/tiny-shmem.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static struct file_system_type tmpfs_fs_
+ 	.kill_sb	= kill_litter_super,
+ };
+ 
+-static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
++struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
+ 
+ static int __init init_tmpfs(void)
+ {
+diff -urNp a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
+--- a/mm/vmalloc.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/mm/vmalloc.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -246,20 +246,15 @@ static struct vm_struct *__get_vm_area_n
+ 					     (unsigned long)tmp->addr, align);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+-		if ((size + addr) < addr)
+-			goto out;
+ 		if (size + addr <= (unsigned long)tmp->addr)
+-			goto found;
++			break;
+ 		addr = ALIGN(tmp->size + (unsigned long)tmp->addr, align);
+-		if (addr > end - size)
+-			goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((size + addr) < addr)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if (addr > end - size)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-found:
+ 	area->next = *p;
+ 	*p = area;
+ 
+diff -urNp a/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c b/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c
+--- a/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static void br_stp_stop(struct net_bridg
+ 	char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ 
+ 	if (br->stp_enabled == BR_USER_STP) {
+-		r = call_usermodehelper(BR_STP_PROG, argv, envp, 1);
++		r = call_usermodehelper(BR_STP_PROG, argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
+ 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: userspace STP stopped, return code %d\n",
+ 			br->dev->name, r);
+ 
+diff -urNp a/net/core/flow.c b/net/core/flow.c
+--- a/net/core/flow.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/core/flow.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ atomic_t flow_cache_genid = ATOMIC_INIT(
+ 
+ static u32 flow_hash_shift;
+ #define flow_hash_size	(1 << flow_hash_shift)
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct flow_cache_entry **, flow_tables) = { NULL };
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct flow_cache_entry **, flow_tables);
+ 
+ #define flow_table(cpu) (per_cpu(flow_tables, cpu))
+ 
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct flow_percpu_info {
+ 	u32 hash_rnd;
+ 	int count;
+ };
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct flow_percpu_info, flow_hash_info) = { 0 };
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct flow_percpu_info, flow_hash_info);
+ 
+ #define flow_hash_rnd_recalc(cpu) \
+ 	(per_cpu(flow_hash_info, cpu).hash_rnd_recalc)
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct flow_flush_info {
+ 	atomic_t cpuleft;
+ 	struct completion completion;
+ };
+-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tasklet_struct, flow_flush_tasklets) = { NULL };
++static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tasklet_struct, flow_flush_tasklets);
+ 
+ #define flow_flush_tasklet(cpu) (&per_cpu(flow_flush_tasklets, cpu))
+ 
+diff -urNp a/net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c b/net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c
+--- a/net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/dccp/ccids/ccid3.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
+ static int ccid3_debug;
+ #define ccid3_pr_debug(format, a...)	DCCP_PR_DEBUG(ccid3_debug, format, ##a)
+ #else
+-#define ccid3_pr_debug(format, a...)
++#define ccid3_pr_debug(format, a...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/net/dccp/dccp.h b/net/dccp/dccp.h
+--- a/net/dccp/dccp.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/dccp/dccp.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ extern int dccp_debug;
+ #define dccp_pr_debug(format, a...)	  DCCP_PR_DEBUG(dccp_debug, format, ##a)
+ #define dccp_pr_debug_cat(format, a...)   DCCP_PRINTK(dccp_debug, format, ##a)
+ #else
+-#define dccp_pr_debug(format, a...)
+-#define dccp_pr_debug_cat(format, a...)
++#define dccp_pr_debug(format, a...) do {} while (0)
++#define dccp_pr_debug_cat(format, a...) do {} while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ extern struct inet_hashinfo dccp_hashinfo;
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
+--- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/jhash.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+ #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -18,11 +18,14 @@
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/wait.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+ #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+ 
++extern void gr_update_task_in_ip_table(struct task_struct *task, const struct inet_sock *inet);
++
+ /*
+  * Allocate and initialize a new local port bind bucket.
+  * The bindhash mutex for snum's hash chain must be held here.
+@@ -467,6 +470,8 @@ ok:
+ 		}
+ 		spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+ 
++		gr_update_task_in_ip_table(current, inet_sk(sk));
++
+ 		if (tw) {
+ 			inet_twsk_deschedule(tw, death_row);
+ 			inet_twsk_put(tw);
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -111,6 +111,21 @@ config IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE
+ 	  If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read
+ 	  <file:Documentation/kbuild/modules.txt>.  If unsure, say `N'.
+ 
++config IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH
++	tristate "stealth match support"
++	depends on IP_NF_IPTABLES
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp
++	  ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports.  If you
++	  are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT)
++	  you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will
++	  drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your
++	  machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be
++	  destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for
++	  instance.
++
++	  To compile it as a module, choose M here.  If unsure, say N.
++
+ # `filter', generic and specific targets
+ config IP_NF_FILTER
+ 	tristate "Packet filtering"
+@@ -380,4 +395,3 @@ config IP_NF_ARP_MANGLE
+ 	  hardware and network addresses.
+ 
+ endmenu
+-
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_MASQUERADE) +=
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_NETMAP) += ipt_NETMAP.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REDIRECT) += ipt_REDIRECT.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REJECT) += ipt_REJECT.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_TTL) += ipt_TTL.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_ULOG) += ipt_ULOG.o
+ 
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
++/* Kernel module to add stealth support.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2002-2006 Brad Spengler  <spender@××××××××××.net>
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/inet.h>
++#include <linux/stddef.h>
++
++#include <net/ip.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <net/tcp.h>
++#include <net/udp.h>
++#include <net/route.h>
++#include <net/inet_common.h>
++
++#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
++
++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
++
++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(struct net *net, u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
++
++static bool
++match(const struct sk_buff *skb,
++      const struct net_device *in,
++      const struct net_device *out,
++      const struct xt_match *match,
++      const void *matchinfo,
++      int offset,
++      unsigned int protoff,
++      bool *hotdrop)
++{
++	struct iphdr *ip = ip_hdr(skb);
++	struct tcphdr th;
++	struct udphdr uh;
++	struct sock *sk = NULL;
++
++	if (!ip || offset) return false;
++
++	switch(ip->protocol) {
++	case IPPROTO_TCP:
++		if (skb_copy_bits(skb, (ip_hdr(skb))->ihl*4, &th, sizeof(th)) < 0) {
++			*hotdrop = true;
++			return false;
++		}
++		if (!(th.syn && !th.ack)) return false;
++		sk = inet_lookup_listener(skb->dev->nd_net, &tcp_hashinfo, ip->daddr, th.dest, inet_iif(skb));	
++		break;
++	case IPPROTO_UDP:
++		if (skb_copy_bits(skb, (ip_hdr(skb))->ihl*4, &uh, sizeof(uh)) < 0) {
++			*hotdrop = true;
++			return false;
++		}
++		sk = udp_v4_lookup(skb->dev->nd_net, ip->saddr, uh.source, ip->daddr, uh.dest, skb->dev->ifindex);
++		break;
++	default:
++		return false;
++	}
++
++	if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this
++		return true;
++	else {
++		sock_put(sk);
++		return false;
++	}
++}
++
++/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */
++static bool
++checkentry(const char *tablename,
++           const void *nip,
++	   const struct xt_match *match,
++           void *matchinfo,
++           unsigned int hook_mask)
++{
++	const struct ipt_ip *ip = (const struct ipt_ip *)nip;
++
++	if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) ||
++		((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)))
++		&& (hook_mask & (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN)))
++			return true;
++
++	printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n");
++
++        return false;
++}
++
++
++static struct xt_match stealth_match __read_mostly = {
++	.name = "stealth",
++	.family = AF_INET,
++	.match = match,
++	.checkentry = checkentry,
++	.destroy = NULL,
++	.me = THIS_MODULE
++};
++
++static int __init init(void)
++{
++	return xt_register_match(&stealth_match);
++}
++
++static void __exit fini(void)
++{
++	xt_unregister_match(&stealth_match);
++}
++
++module_init(init);
++module_exit(fini);
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1206,7 +1206,8 @@ int tcp_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_
+ 		return -ENOTCONN;
+ 	while ((skb = tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq, &offset)) != NULL) {
+ 		if (offset < skb->len) {
+-			size_t used, len;
++			int used;
++			size_t len;
+ 
+ 			len = skb->len - offset;
+ 			/* Stop reading if we hit a patch of urgent data */
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ #include <linux/jhash.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/times.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+ #include <net/icmp.h>
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@
+ #include <linux/skbuff.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/seq_file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+ #include <net/icmp.h>
+ #include <net/route.h>
+@@ -106,6 +107,11 @@
+ #include <net/xfrm.h>
+ #include "udp_impl.h"
+ 
++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk,
++				 const struct sk_buff *skb);
++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk,
++				 const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
++
+ /*
+  *	Snmp MIB for the UDP layer
+  */
+@@ -314,6 +320,13 @@ static struct sock *__udp4_lib_lookup(st
+ 	return result;
+ }
+ 
++struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(struct net *net, __be32 saddr, __be16 sport,
++			   __be32 daddr, __be16 dport, int dif)
++{
++	return __udp4_lib_lookup(net, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, dif, udp_hash);
++}
++
++
+ static inline struct sock *udp_v4_mcast_next(struct sock *sk,
+ 					     __be16 loc_port, __be32 loc_addr,
+ 					     __be16 rmt_port, __be32 rmt_addr,
+@@ -600,9 +613,16 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, stru
+ 		dport = usin->sin_port;
+ 		if (dport == 0)
+ 			return -EINVAL;
++
++		if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin))
++			return -EPERM;
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+ 			return -EDESTADDRREQ;
++
++		if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL))
++			return -EPERM;
++
+ 		daddr = inet->daddr;
+ 		dport = inet->dport;
+ 		/* Open fast path for connected socket.
+@@ -864,6 +884,11 @@ try_again:
+ 	if (!skb)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
++	if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		goto out_free;
++	}
++
+ 	ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ 	copied = len;
+ 	if (copied > ulen)
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ static struct tlvtype_proc tlvprochopopt
+ 		.type	= IPV6_TLV_JUMBO,
+ 		.func	= ipv6_hop_jumbo,
+ 	},
+-	{ -1, }
++	{ -1, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+ int ipv6_parse_hopopts(struct sk_buff *skb)
+diff -urNp a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
+--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ out:
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+-static int rawv6_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, void *from, int length,
++static int rawv6_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, void *from, unsigned int length,
+ 			struct flowi *fl, struct rt6_info *rt,
+ 			unsigned int flags)
+ {
+diff -urNp a/net/irda/ircomm/ircomm_tty.c b/net/irda/ircomm/ircomm_tty.c
+--- a/net/irda/ircomm/ircomm_tty.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/irda/ircomm/ircomm_tty.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static int ircomm_tty_open(struct tty_st
+ 	IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s()\n", __FUNCTION__ );
+ 
+ 	line = tty->index;
+-	if ((line < 0) || (line >= IRCOMM_TTY_PORTS)) {
++	if (line >= IRCOMM_TTY_PORTS) {
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -urNp a/net/mac80211/regdomain.c b/net/mac80211/regdomain.c
+--- a/net/mac80211/regdomain.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/mac80211/regdomain.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -61,14 +61,14 @@ static const struct ieee80211_channel_ra
+ 	{ 5180, 5240, 17, 6 } /* IEEE 802.11a, channels 36..48 */,
+ 	{ 5260, 5320, 23, 6 } /* IEEE 802.11a, channels 52..64 */,
+ 	{ 5745, 5825, 30, 6 } /* IEEE 802.11a, channels 149..165, outdoor */,
+-	{ 0 }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ static const struct ieee80211_channel_range ieee80211_mkk_channels[] = {
+ 	{ 2412, 2472, 20, 6 } /* IEEE 802.11b/g, channels 1..13 */,
+ 	{ 5170, 5240, 20, 6 } /* IEEE 802.11a, channels 34..48 */,
+ 	{ 5260, 5320, 20, 6 } /* IEEE 802.11a, channels 52..64 */,
+-	{ 0 }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ 
+diff -urNp a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
+--- a/net/sctp/socket.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/sctp/socket.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_sendmsg(struct kioc
+ 	struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo;
+ 	struct sctp_initmsg *sinit;
+ 	sctp_assoc_t associd = 0;
+-	sctp_cmsgs_t cmsgs = { NULL };
++	sctp_cmsgs_t cmsgs = { NULL, NULL };
+ 	int err;
+ 	sctp_scope_t scope;
+ 	long timeo;
+diff -urNp a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
+--- a/net/socket.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/socket.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
+ #include <linux/wireless.h>
+ #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
+ 
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+@@ -94,6 +95,21 @@
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <linux/netfilter.h>
+ 
++extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type,
++			      const int protocol);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct socket *sck);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck);
++extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock,
++			     const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
++extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock,
++			   const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
++extern int gr_search_listen(const struct socket * sock);
++extern int gr_search_accept(const struct socket * sock);
++extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type,
++			    const int protocol);
++
+ static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare);
+ static ssize_t sock_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iov,
+ 			 unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos);
+@@ -297,7 +313,7 @@ static int sockfs_get_sb(struct file_sys
+ 			     mnt);
+ }
+ 
+-static struct vfsmount *sock_mnt __read_mostly;
++struct vfsmount *sock_mnt __read_mostly;
+ 
+ static struct file_system_type sock_fs_type = {
+ 	.name =		"sockfs",
+@@ -1218,6 +1234,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socket(int family, i
+ 	int retval;
+ 	struct socket *sock;
+ 
++	if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) {
++		retval = -EACCES;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock);
+ 	if (retval < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1348,6 +1374,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_bind(int fd, struct 
+ 	if (sock) {
+ 		err = move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr, addrlen, address);
+ 		if (err >= 0) {
++			if (!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)address) ||
++			    gr_handle_sock_server((struct sockaddr *)address)) {
++				err = -EACCES;
++				goto error;
++			}
++
+ 			err = security_socket_bind(sock,
+ 						   (struct sockaddr *)address,
+ 						   addrlen);
+@@ -1356,6 +1388,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_bind(int fd, struct 
+ 						      (struct sockaddr *)
+ 						      address, addrlen);
+ 		}
++error:
+ 		fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
+ 	}
+ 	return err;
+@@ -1379,10 +1412,17 @@ asmlinkage long sys_listen(int fd, int b
+ 		if ((unsigned)backlog > somaxconn)
+ 			backlog = somaxconn;
+ 
++		if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock) ||
++		    !gr_search_listen(sock)) {
++			err = -EPERM;
++			goto error;
++		}
++
+ 		err = security_socket_listen(sock, backlog);
+ 		if (!err)
+ 			err = sock->ops->listen(sock, backlog);
+ 
++error:
+ 		fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
+ 	}
+ 	return err;
+@@ -1419,6 +1459,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc
+ 	newsock->type = sock->type;
+ 	newsock->ops = sock->ops;
+ 
++	if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock) ||
++	    !gr_search_accept(sock)) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		sock_release(newsock);
++		goto out_put;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * We don't need try_module_get here, as the listening socket (sock)
+ 	 * has the protocol module (sock->ops->owner) held.
+@@ -1462,6 +1509,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc
+ 	err = newfd;
+ 
+ 	security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
++	gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk);
+ 
+ out_put:
+ 	fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
+@@ -1495,6 +1543,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru
+ {
+ 	struct socket *sock;
+ 	char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
++	struct sockaddr *sck;
+ 	int err, fput_needed;
+ 
+ 	sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
+@@ -1504,6 +1553,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru
+ 	if (err < 0)
+ 		goto out_put;
+ 
++	sck = (struct sockaddr *)address;
++	if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck) ||
++	    gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) {
++		err = -EACCES;
++		goto out_put;
++	}
++
+ 	err =
+ 	    security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
+ 	if (err)
+@@ -1770,6 +1826,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shutdown(int fd, int
+ 			err = sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how);
+ 		fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
+ 	}
++
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+diff -urNp a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
+--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ static struct hlist_head unix_socket_table[UNIX_HASH_SIZE + 1];
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_table_lock);
+@@ -720,6 +721,12 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru
+ 		err = -ECONNREFUSED;
+ 		if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ 			goto put_fail;
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt)) {
++			err = -EACCES;
++			goto put_fail;
++		}
++
+ 		u = unix_find_socket_byinode(net, nd.path.dentry->d_inode);
+ 		if (!u)
+ 			goto put_fail;
+@@ -740,6 +747,13 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru
+ 		if (u) {
+ 			struct dentry *dentry;
+ 			dentry = unix_sk(u)->dentry;
++
++			if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->sk_peercred.pid)) {
++				err = -EPERM;
++				sock_put(u);
++				goto fail;
++			}
++
+ 			if (dentry)
+ 				touch_atime(unix_sk(u)->mnt, dentry);
+ 		} else
+@@ -819,9 +833,18 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
+ 		 */
+ 		mode = S_IFSOCK |
+ 		       (SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask);
++
++		if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.path.dentry, nd.path.mnt, mode)) {
++			err = -EACCES;
++			goto out_mknod_dput;
++		}
++
+ 		err = vfs_mknod(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
+ 		if (err)
+ 			goto out_mknod_dput;
++
++		gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.path.mnt);
++
+ 		mutex_unlock(&nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
+ 		dput(nd.path.dentry);
+ 		nd.path.dentry = dentry;
+@@ -839,6 +862,10 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
+ 			goto out_unlock;
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++		sk->sk_peercred.pid = current->pid;
++#endif
++
+ 		list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash];
+ 	} else {
+ 		list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)];
+diff -urNp a/scripts/pnmtologo.c b/scripts/pnmtologo.c
+--- a/scripts/pnmtologo.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/scripts/pnmtologo.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -237,14 +237,14 @@ static void write_header(void)
+     fprintf(out, " *  Linux logo %s\n", logoname);
+     fputs(" */\n\n", out);
+     fputs("#include <linux/linux_logo.h>\n\n", out);
+-    fprintf(out, "static unsigned char %s_data[] __initdata = {\n",
++    fprintf(out, "static unsigned char %s_data[] = {\n",
+ 	    logoname);
+ }
+ 
+ static void write_footer(void)
+ {
+     fputs("\n};\n\n", out);
+-    fprintf(out, "struct linux_logo %s __initdata = {\n", logoname);
++    fprintf(out, "struct linux_logo %s = {\n", logoname);
+     fprintf(out, "    .type\t= %s,\n", logo_types[logo_type]);
+     fprintf(out, "    .width\t= %d,\n", logo_width);
+     fprintf(out, "    .height\t= %d,\n", logo_height);
+@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static void write_logo_clut224(void)
+     fputs("\n};\n\n", out);
+ 
+     /* write logo clut */
+-    fprintf(out, "static unsigned char %s_clut[] __initdata = {\n",
++    fprintf(out, "static unsigned char %s_clut[] = {\n",
+ 	    logoname);
+     write_hex_cnt = 0;
+     for (i = 0; i < logo_clutsize; i++) {
+diff -urNp a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
+--- a/security/Kconfig	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/security/Kconfig	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -4,6 +4,429 @@
+ 
+ menu "Security options"
+ 
++source grsecurity/Kconfig
++
++menu "PaX"
++
++config PAX
++	bool "Enable various PaX features"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
++	help
++	  This allows you to enable various PaX features.  PaX adds
++	  intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
++	  the risks posed by exploitable memory corruption bugs.
++
++menu "PaX Control"
++	depends on PAX
++
++config PAX_SOFTMODE
++	bool 'Support soft mode'
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will allow you to run PaX in soft mode, that
++	  is, PaX features will not be enforced by default, only on executables
++	  marked explicitly.  You must also enable PT_PAX_FLAGS support as it
++	  is the only way to mark executables for soft mode use.
++
++	  Soft mode can be activated by using the "pax_softmode=1" kernel command
++	  line option on boot.  Furthermore you can control various PaX features
++	  at runtime via the entries in /proc/sys/kernel/pax.
++
++config PAX_EI_PAX
++	bool 'Use legacy ELF header marking'
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
++	  a per executable basis via the 'chpax' utility available at
++	  http://pax.grsecurity.net/.  The control flags will be read from
++	  an otherwise reserved part of the ELF header.  This marking has
++	  numerous drawbacks (no support for soft-mode, toolchain does not
++	  know about the non-standard use of the ELF header) therefore it
++	  has been deprecated in favour of PT_PAX_FLAGS support.
++
++	  If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF
++	  program header then you MUST enable this option otherwise they
++	  will not get any protection.
++
++	  Note that if you enable PT_PAX_FLAGS marking support as well,
++	  the PT_PAX_FLAG marks will override the legacy EI_PAX marks.
++
++config PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	bool 'Use ELF program header marking'
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
++	  a per executable basis via the 'paxctl' utility available at
++	  http://pax.grsecurity.net/.  The control flags will be read from
++	  a PaX specific ELF program header (PT_PAX_FLAGS).  This marking
++	  has the benefits of supporting both soft mode and being fully
++	  integrated into the toolchain (the binutils patch is available
++	  from http://pax.grsecurity.net).
++
++	  If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF
++	  program header then you MUST enable the EI_PAX marking support
++	  otherwise they will not get any protection.
++
++	  Note that if you enable the legacy EI_PAX marking support as well,
++	  the EI_PAX marks will be overridden by the PT_PAX_FLAGS marks.
++
++choice
++	prompt 'MAC system integration'
++	default PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	help
++	  Mandatory Access Control systems have the option of controlling
++	  PaX flags on a per executable basis, choose the method supported
++	  by your particular system.
++
++	  - "none": if your MAC system does not interact with PaX,
++	  - "direct": if your MAC system defines pax_set_initial_flags() itself,
++	  - "hook": if your MAC system uses the pax_set_initial_flags_func callback.
++
++	  NOTE: this option is for developers/integrators only.
++
++	config PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS
++		bool 'none'
++
++	config PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++		bool 'direct'
++
++	config PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++		bool 'hook'
++endchoice
++
++endmenu
++
++menu "Non-executable pages"
++	depends on PAX
++
++config PAX_NOEXEC
++	bool "Enforce non-executable pages"
++	depends on (PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) && (ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
++	help
++	  By design some architectures do not allow for protecting memory
++	  pages against execution or even if they do, Linux does not make
++	  use of this feature.  In practice this means that if a page is
++	  readable (such as the stack or heap) it is also executable.
++
++	  There is a well known exploit technique that makes use of this
++	  fact and a common programming mistake where an attacker can
++	  introduce code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's
++	  memory (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it.
++
++	  If the attacked program was running with different (typically
++	  higher) privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate
++	  his own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for
++	  which he does not have write access to, etc).
++
++	  Enabling this option will let you choose from various features
++	  that prevent the injection and execution of 'foreign' code in
++	  a program.
++
++	  This will also break programs that rely on the old behaviour and
++	  expect that dynamically allocated memory via the malloc() family
++	  of functions is executable (which it is not).  Notable examples
++	  are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime and wine.
++
++config PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	bool "Paging based non-executable pages"
++	depends on !COMPAT_VDSO && PAX_NOEXEC && (!X86_32 || M586 || M586TSC || M586MMX || M686 || MPENTIUMII || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMM || MCORE2 || MPENTIUM4 || MPSC || MK7 || MK8 || MWINCHIPC6 || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIP3D || MVIAC3_2 || MVIAC7)
++	help
++	  This implementation is based on the paging feature of the CPU.
++	  On i386 without hardware non-executable bit support there is a
++	  variable but usually low performance impact, however on Intel's
++	  P4 core based CPUs it is very high so you should not enable this
++	  for kernels meant to be used on such CPUs.
++
++	  On alpha, avr32, ia64, parisc, sparc, sparc64, x86_64 and i386
++	  with hardware non-executable bit support there is no performance
++	  impact, on ppc the impact is negligible.
++
++	  Note that several architectures require various emulations due to
++	  badly designed userland ABIs, this will cause a performance impact
++	  but will disappear as soon as userland is fixed (e.g., ppc users
++	  can make use of the secure-plt feature found in binutils).
++
++config PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	bool "Segmentation based non-executable pages"
++	depends on !COMPAT_VDSO && PAX_NOEXEC && X86_32
++	help
++	  This implementation is based on the segmentation feature of the
++	  CPU and has a very small performance impact, however applications
++	  will be limited to a 1.5 GB address space instead of the normal
++	  3 GB.
++
++config PAX_EMUTRAMP
++	bool "Emulate trampolines" if (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (PARISC || PPC32 || X86)
++	default y if PARISC || PPC32
++	help
++	  There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or
++	  another attempt to execute special small code snippets from
++	  non-executable memory pages.  Most notable examples are the
++	  signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and
++	  the GCC trampolines.
++
++	  If you enabled CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC or CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC then
++	  such programs will no longer work under your kernel.
++
++	  As a remedy you can say Y here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
++	  utilities to enable trampoline emulation for the affected programs
++	  yet still have the protection provided by the non-executable pages.
++
++	  On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option and EMUSIGRT as
++	  well, otherwise your system will not even boot.
++
++	  Alternatively you can say N here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
++	  utilities to disable CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC and CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++	  for the affected files.
++
++	  NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the
++	  protection provided by non-executable pages that an attacker
++	  could abuse.  Therefore the best solution is to not have any
++	  files on your system that would require this option.  This can
++	  be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel
++	  signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs
++	  that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC.
++	  Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements
++	  nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX.
++
++config PAX_EMUSIGRT
++	bool "Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines"
++	depends on PAX_EMUTRAMP && (PARISC || PPC32)
++	default y
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
++	  and emulate signal return trampolines executing on the stack
++	  that would otherwise lead to task termination.
++
++	  This solution is intended as a temporary one for users with
++	  legacy versions of libc (libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc before 0.9.17,
++	  Modula-3 runtime, etc) or executables linked to such, basically
++	  everything that does not specify its own SA_RESTORER function in
++	  normal executable memory like glibc 2.1+ does.
++
++	  On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option, otherwise your
++	  system will not even boot.
++
++	  NOTE: this feature cannot be disabled on a per executable basis
++	  and since it *does* open up a loophole in the protection provided
++	  by non-executable pages, the best solution is to not have any
++	  files on your system that would require this option.
++
++config PAX_MPROTECT
++	bool "Restrict mprotect()"
++	depends on (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !PPC64
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will prevent programs from
++	   - changing the executable status of memory pages that were
++	     not originally created as executable,
++	   - making read-only executable pages writable again,
++	   - creating executable pages from anonymous memory.
++
++	  You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by
++	  the enforcement of non-executable pages.
++
++	  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
++	  this feature on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_NOELFRELOCS
++	bool "Disallow ELF text relocations"
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT && !PAX_ETEXECRELOCS && (IA64 || X86 || X86_64)
++	help
++	  Non-executable pages and mprotect() restrictions are effective
++	  in preventing the introduction of new executable code into an
++	  attacked task's address space.  There remain only two venues
++	  for this kind of attack: if the attacker can execute already
++	  existing code in the attacked task then he can either have it
++	  create and mmap() a file containing his code or have it mmap()
++	  an already existing ELF library that does not have position
++	  independent code in it and use mprotect() on it to make it
++	  writable and copy his code there.  While protecting against
++	  the former approach is beyond PaX, the latter can be prevented
++	  by having only PIC ELF libraries on one's system (which do not
++	  need to relocate their code).  If you are sure this is your case,
++	  then enable this option otherwise be careful as you may not even
++	  be able to boot or log on your system (for example, some PAM
++	  modules are erroneously compiled as non-PIC by default).
++
++	  NOTE: if you are using dynamic ELF executables (as suggested
++	  when using ASLR) then you must have made sure that you linked
++	  your files using the PIC version of crt1 (the et_dyn.tar.gz package
++	  referenced there has already been updated to support this).
++
++config PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
++	bool "Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations"
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
++	default y
++	help
++	  On some architectures there are incorrectly created applications
++	  that require text relocations and would not work without enabling
++	  this option.  If you are an alpha, ia64 or parisc user, you should
++	  enable this option and disable it once you have made sure that
++	  none of your applications need it.
++
++config PAX_EMUPLT
++	bool "Automatically emulate ELF PLT"
++	depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	default y
++	help
++	  Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
++	  and emulate the Procedure Linkage Table entries in ELF files.
++	  On some architectures such entries are in writable memory, and
++	  become non-executable leading to task termination.  Therefore
++	  it is mandatory that you enable this option on alpha, parisc,
++	  ppc (if secure-plt is not used throughout in userland), sparc
++	  and sparc64, otherwise your system would not even boot.
++
++	  NOTE: this feature *does* open up a loophole in the protection
++	  provided by the non-executable pages, therefore the proper
++	  solution is to modify the toolchain to produce a PLT that does
++	  not need to be writable.
++
++config PAX_DLRESOLVE
++	bool
++	depends on PAX_EMUPLT && (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	default y
++
++config PAX_SYSCALL
++	bool
++	depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PPC32
++	default y
++
++config PAX_KERNEXEC
++	bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages"
++	depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !EFI && !COMPAT_VDSO && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !PARAVIRT
++	help
++	  This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT,
++	  that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject
++	  and execute 'foreign' code in kernel memory itself.
++
++endmenu
++
++menu "Address Space Layout Randomization"
++	depends on PAX
++
++config PAX_ASLR
++	bool "Address Space Layout Randomization"
++	depends on PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
++	help
++	  Many if not most exploit techniques rely on the knowledge of
++	  certain addresses in the attacked program.  The following options
++	  will allow the kernel to apply a certain amount of randomization
++	  to specific parts of the program thereby forcing an attacker to
++	  guess them in most cases.  Any failed guess will most likely crash
++	  the attacked program which allows the kernel to detect such attempts
++	  and react on them.  PaX itself provides no reaction mechanisms,
++	  instead it is strongly encouraged that you make use of Nergal's
++	  segvguard (ftp://ftp.pl.openwall.com/misc/segvguard/) or grsecurity's
++	  (http://www.grsecurity.net/) built-in crash detection features or
++	  develop one yourself.
++
++	  By saying Y here you can choose to randomize the following areas:
++	   - top of the task's kernel stack
++	   - top of the task's userland stack
++	   - base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one
++	     (this includes all libraries)
++	   - base address of the main executable
++
++	  It is strongly recommended to say Y here as address space layout
++	  randomization has negligible impact on performance yet it provides
++	  a very effective protection.
++
++	  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
++	  this feature on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_RANDKSTACK
++	bool "Randomize kernel stack base"
++	depends on PAX_ASLR && X86_TSC && X86_32
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's kernel
++	  stack on every system call.  This will not only force an attacker
++	  to guess it but also prevent him from making use of possible
++	  leaked information about it.
++
++	  Since the kernel stack is a rather scarce resource, randomization
++	  may cause unexpected stack overflows, therefore you should very
++	  carefully test your system.  Note that once enabled in the kernel
++	  configuration, this feature cannot be disabled on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	bool "Randomize user stack base"
++	depends on PAX_ASLR
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's userland
++	  stack.  The randomization is done in two steps where the second
++	  one may apply a big amount of shift to the top of the stack and
++	  cause problems for programs that want to use lots of memory (more
++	  than 2.5 GB if SEGMEXEC is not active, or 1.25 GB when it is).
++	  For this reason the second step can be controlled by 'chpax' or
++	  'paxctl' on a per file basis.
++
++config PAX_RANDMMAP
++	bool "Randomize mmap() base"
++	depends on PAX_ASLR
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will use a randomized base address for
++	  mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves.  As a result
++	  all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random addresses
++	  and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where an attacker
++	  attempts to execute library code for his purposes (e.g. spawn a
++	  shell from an exploited program that is running at an elevated
++	  privilege level).
++
++	  Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its
++	  base address will be randomized as well, completing the full
++	  randomization of the address space layout.  Attacking such programs
++	  becomes a guess game.  You can find an example of doing this at
++	  http://pax.grsecurity.net/et_dyn.tar.gz and practical samples at
++	  http://www.grsecurity.net/grsec-gcc-specs.tar.gz .
++
++	  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this
++	  feature on a per file basis.
++
++endmenu
++
++menu "Miscellaneous hardening features"
++
++config PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
++	bool "Sanitize all freed memory"
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will erase memory pages as soon as they
++	  are freed.  This in turn reduces the lifetime of data stored in the
++	  pages, making it less likely that sensitive information such as
++	  passwords, cryptographic secrets, etc stay in memory for too long.
++
++	  This is especially useful for programs whose runtime is short, long
++	  lived processes and the kernel itself benefit from this as long as
++	  they operate on whole memory pages and ensure timely freeing of pages
++	  that may hold sensitive information.
++
++	  The tradeoff is performance impact, on a single CPU system kernel
++	  compilation sees a 3% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary
++	  and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload
++	  before deploying it.
++
++	  Note that this feature does not protect data stored in live pages,
++	  e.g., process memory swapped to disk may stay there for a long time.
++
++config PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
++	bool "Prevent invalid userland pointer dereference"
++	depends on X86_32 && !COMPAT_VDSO
++	help
++	  By saying Y here the kernel will be prevented from dereferencing
++	  userland pointers in contexts where the kernel expects only kernel
++	  pointers.  This is both a useful runtime debugging feature and a
++	  security measure that prevents exploiting a class of kernel bugs.
++
++	  The tradeoff is that some virtualization solutions may experience
++	  a huge slowdown and therefore you should not enable this feature
++	  for kernels meant to run in such environments.  Whether a given VM
++	  solution is affected or not is best determined by simply trying it
++	  out, the performance impact will be obvious right on boot as this
++	  mechanism engages from very early on.  A good rule of thumb is that
++	  VMs running on CPUs without hardware virtualization support (i.e.,
++	  the majority of IA-32 CPUs) will likely experience the slowdown.
++
++endmenu
++
++endmenu
++
+ config KEYS
+ 	bool "Enable access key retention support"
+ 	help
+diff -urNp a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
+--- a/security/commoncap.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/security/commoncap.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -24,15 +24,18 @@
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+ #include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ /* Global security state */
+ 
+ unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits);
+ 
++extern kernel_cap_t gr_cap_rtnetlink(struct sock *sk);
++
+ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+-	NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
++	NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = gr_cap_rtnetlink(sk);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -54,7 +57,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
+ int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+ {
+ 	/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
+-	if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
++	if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))
++		return 0;
++	return -EPERM;
++}
++
++int cap_capable_nolog (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
++{
++	/* tsk = current for all callers */
++	if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable_nolog(cap))
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return -EPERM;
+ }
+@@ -352,8 +363,11 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+-	current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
++	if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
++		current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
++
++	if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
++		current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+ 
+ 	/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
+ 	 * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
+@@ -366,6 +380,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
+ 			cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
+ 	}
+ 
++	gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
++
+ 	/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
+ 
+ 	current->keep_capabilities = 0;
+@@ -592,7 +608,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struc
+ {
+ 	int cap_sys_admin = 0;
+ 
+-	if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
++	if (cap_capable_nolog(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
+ 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
+ 	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+ }
+diff -urNp a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
+--- a/security/dummy.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/security/dummy.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ 
+ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+ {
+@@ -140,8 +141,11 @@ static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (stru
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+-	current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
++	if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
++		current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
++
++	if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
++		current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+ 
+ 	dummy_capget(current, &current->cap_effective, &current->cap_inheritable, &current->cap_permitted);
+ }
+diff -urNp a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2911,8 +2911,8 @@ static void snd_pcm_oss_proc_done(struct
+ 	}
+ }
+ #else /* !CONFIG_SND_VERBOSE_PROCFS */
+-#define snd_pcm_oss_proc_init(pcm)
+-#define snd_pcm_oss_proc_done(pcm)
++#define snd_pcm_oss_proc_init(pcm) do {} while (0)
++#define snd_pcm_oss_proc_done(pcm) do {} while (0)
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SND_VERBOSE_PROCFS */
+ 
+ /*
+diff -urNp a/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.h b/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.h
+--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.h	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.h	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ void snd_use_lock_sync_helper(snd_use_lo
+ #else /* SMP || CONFIG_SND_DEBUG */
+ 
+ typedef spinlock_t snd_use_lock_t;	/* dummy */
+-#define snd_use_lock_init(lockp) /**/
+-#define snd_use_lock_use(lockp) /**/
+-#define snd_use_lock_free(lockp) /**/
+-#define snd_use_lock_sync(lockp) /**/
++#define snd_use_lock_init(lockp) do {} while (0)
++#define snd_use_lock_use(lockp) do {} while (0)
++#define snd_use_lock_free(lockp) do {} while (0)
++#define snd_use_lock_sync(lockp) do {} while (0)
+ 
+ #endif /* SMP || CONFIG_SND_DEBUG */
+ 
+diff -urNp a/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_patch.c b/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_patch.c
+--- a/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_patch.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_patch.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ static const struct snd_ac97_res_table a
+ 	{ AC97_VIDEO, 0x9f1f },
+ 	{ AC97_AUX, 0x9f1f },
+ 	{ AC97_PCM, 0x9f1f },
+-	{ } /* terminator */
++	{ 0, 0 } /* terminator */
+ };
+ 
+ static int patch_ad1819(struct snd_ac97 * ac97)
+@@ -3564,7 +3564,7 @@ static struct snd_ac97_res_table lm4550_
+ 	{ AC97_AUX, 0x1f1f },
+ 	{ AC97_PCM, 0x1f1f },
+ 	{ AC97_REC_GAIN, 0x0f0f },
+-	{ } /* terminator */
++	{ 0, 0 } /* terminator */
+ };
+ 
+ static int patch_lm4550(struct snd_ac97 *ac97)
+diff -urNp a/sound/pci/ens1370.c b/sound/pci/ens1370.c
+--- a/sound/pci/ens1370.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/sound/pci/ens1370.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id snd_audiopci
+ 	{ 0x1274, 0x5880, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0, },	/* ES1373 - CT5880 */
+ 	{ 0x1102, 0x8938, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, 0, },	/* Ectiva EV1938 */
+ #endif
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, snd_audiopci_ids);
+diff -urNp a/sound/pci/intel8x0.c b/sound/pci/intel8x0.c
+--- a/sound/pci/intel8x0.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/sound/pci/intel8x0.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id snd_intel8x0
+ 	{ 0x1022, 0x746d, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, DEVICE_INTEL },	/* AMD8111 */
+ 	{ 0x1022, 0x7445, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, DEVICE_INTEL },	/* AMD768 */
+ 	{ 0x10b9, 0x5455, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, DEVICE_ALI },   /* Ali5455 */
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, snd_intel8x0_ids);
+@@ -2057,7 +2057,7 @@ static struct ac97_quirk ac97_quirks[] _
+ 		.type = AC97_TUNE_HP_ONLY
+ 	},
+ #endif
+-	{ } /* terminator */
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL, 0 } /* terminator */
+ };
+ 
+ static int __devinit snd_intel8x0_mixer(struct intel8x0 *chip, int ac97_clock,
+diff -urNp a/sound/pci/intel8x0m.c b/sound/pci/intel8x0m.c
+--- a/sound/pci/intel8x0m.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/sound/pci/intel8x0m.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static struct pci_device_id snd_intel8x0
+ 	{ 0x1022, 0x746d, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, DEVICE_INTEL },	/* AMD8111 */
+ 	{ 0x10b9, 0x5455, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, DEVICE_ALI },   /* Ali5455 */
+ #endif
+-	{ 0, }
++	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, snd_intel8x0m_ids);
+@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static struct shortname_table {
+ 	{ 0x5455, "ALi M5455" },
+ 	{ 0x746d, "AMD AMD8111" },
+ #endif
+-	{ 0 },
++	{ 0, NULL },
+ };
+ 
+ static int __devinit snd_intel8x0m_probe(struct pci_dev *pci,
+diff -urNp a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c	2008-08-20 11:16:13.000000000 -0700
++++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c	2008-08-20 18:36:57.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1077,6 +1077,9 @@ static struct miscdevice kvm_dev = {
+ 	KVM_MINOR,
+ 	"kvm",
+ 	&kvm_chardev_ops,
++	{NULL, NULL},
++	NULL,
++	NULL
+ };
+ 
+ static void hardware_enable(void *junk)

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4421_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4421_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4421_grsec-remove-localversion-grsec.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+
+Remove grsecurity's localversion-grsec file as it is inconsistent with
+Gentoo's kernel practices and naming scheme.
+
+--- a/localversion-grsec	2008-02-24 14:26:59.000000000 +0000
++++ b/localversion-grsec	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1 +0,0 @@
+--grsec

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4422_grsec-mute-warnings.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4422_grsec-mute-warnings.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4422_grsec-mute-warnings.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Updated patch for kernel series 2.6.24.
+
+The credits/description from the original version of this patch remain accurate
+and are included below.
+
+---
+From: Alexander Gabert <gaberta@××××××××.de>
+
+This patch removes the warnings introduced by grsec patch 2.1.9 and later.
+It removes the -W options added by the patch and restores the original
+warning flags of vanilla kernel versions.
+
+Acked-by: Christian Heim <phreak@g.o>
+---
+
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@
+ 
+ HOSTCC       = gcc
+ HOSTCXX      = g++
+-HOSTCFLAGS   = -Wall -W -Wno-unused -Wno-sign-compare -Wstrict-prototypes -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer
++HOSTCFLAGS   = -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer
+ HOSTCXXFLAGS = -O2
+ 
+ # Decide whether to build built-in, modular, or both.

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4425_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4425_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4425_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Allow PaX options to be selected without first selecting CONFIG_GRKERNSEC.
+
+This patch has been updated to keep current with newer kernel versions.
+The original version of this patch contained no credits/description.
+
+--- a/security/Kconfig
++++ b/security/Kconfig
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ menu "PaX"
+ 
+ config PAX
+ 	bool "Enable various PaX features"
+-	depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
++	depends on (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
+ 	help
+ 	  This allows you to enable various PaX features.  PaX adds
+ 	  intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+@@ -422,10 +422,12 @@ static void show_fault_oops(struct pt_re
+ #else
+ 	if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < init_mm.end_code)
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+ 		if (current->signal->curr_ip)
+ 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
+ 				 NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip), current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current->uid, current->euid);
+ 		else
++#endif
+ 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
+ 				 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current->uid, current->euid);
+ #endif
+--- a/fs/exec.c
++++ b/fs/exec.c
+@@ -1691,9 +1691,11 @@ void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *re
+ 		}
+ 		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ 	}
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+ 	if (tsk->signal->curr_ip)
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", NIPQUAD(tsk->signal->curr_ip), path_fault, start, end, offset);
+ 	else
++#endif
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
+ 	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
+ 			"PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4430_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4430_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4430_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+
+grsecurity contains a number of options which allow certain protections
+to be applied to or exempted from members of a given group. However, the
+default GIDs specified in the upstream patch are entirely arbitrary and
+there is no telling which (if any) groups the GIDs will correlate with
+on an end-user's system. Because some users don't pay a great deal of
+attention to the finer points of kernel configuration, it is probably
+wise to specify some reasonable defaults so as to stop careless users
+from shooting themselves in the foot.
+
+--- a/grsecurity/Kconfig
++++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig
+@@ -352,7 +564,7 @@
+ config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
+ 	int "GID for special group"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+-	default 1001
++	default 10
+ 
+ config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ 	bool "Additional restrictions"
+@@ -547,7 +759,7 @@
+ config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
+ 	int "GID for auditing"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
+-	default 1007
++	default 100
+ 
+ config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
+ 	bool "Exec logging"
+@@ -700,7 +912,7 @@
+ config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
+ 	int "GID for untrusted users"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && !GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
+-	default 1005
++	default 100
+ 	help
+ 	  If you have selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
+ 	  GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.
+@@ -712,7 +924,7 @@
+ config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
+ 	int "GID for trusted users"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
+-	default 1005
++	default 10
+ 	help
+ 	  If you have selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
+ 	  GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.
+@@ -754,7 +966,7 @@
+ config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
+ 	int "GID to deny all sockets for"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
+-	default 1004
++	default 65534
+ 	help
+ 	  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
+ 	  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
+@@ -775,7 +987,7 @@
+ config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
+ 	int "GID to deny client sockets for"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
+-	default 1003
++	default 65534
+ 	help
+ 	  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
+ 	  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
+@@ -793,7 +1005,7 @@
+ config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
+ 	int "GID to deny server sockets for"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
+-	default 1002
++	default 65534
+ 	help
+ 	  Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
+ 	  Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4435_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4435_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4435_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+
+Add Hardened Gentoo [server/workstation] predefined grsecurity
+levels. They're designed to provide a comparitively high level of
+security while remaining generally suitable for as great a majority
+of the userbase as possible (particularly new users).
+
+Make Hardened Gentoo [workstation] predefined grsecurity level the
+default. The Hardened Gentoo [server] level is more restrictive
+and conflicts with some software and thus would be less suitable.
+
+The original version of this patch was conceived and created by:
+Ned Ludd <solar@g.o>
+
+--- a/grsecurity/Kconfig
++++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ choice
+ 	prompt "Security Level"
+ 	depends on GRKERNSEC
+-	default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
++	default GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
+ 
+ config GRKERNSEC_LOW
+ 	bool "Low"
+@@ -181,6 +181,214 @@
+ 	  - Mount/unmount/remount logging
+ 	  - Kernel symbol hiding
+ 	  - Prevention of memory exhaustion-based exploits
++
++config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_SERVER
++	bool "Hardened Gentoo [server]"
++	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	select GRKERNSEC_IO if (X86)
++	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++#	select GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++#	select GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
++	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	select PAX
++	select PAX_ASLR
++	select PAX_DLRESOLVE if (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	select PAX_EI_PAX
++	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC || PPC32)
++	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC || PPC32)
++	select PAX_ETEXECRELOCS if (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
++	select PAX_KERNEXEC if (X86 && !EFI && !COMPAT_VDSO && !PARAVIRT && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK))
++	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
++	select PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF if (X86_32 && !COMPAT_VDSO)
++	select PAX_MPROTECT if (!PPC64)
++	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	select PAX_NOELFRELOCS if (X86)
++	select PAX_NOEXEC
++	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_32 && X86_TSC)
++	select PAX_RANDMMAP
++	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
++	select PAX_SYSCALL if (PPC32)
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, a configuration will be used that is endorsed by
++	  the Hardened Gentoo project.  Therefore, many of the protections
++	  made available by grsecurity and PaX will be enabled.
++
++	  Hardened Gentoo's pre-defined security levels are designed to provide
++	  a high level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with the
++	  majority of available software.  For further information, please
++	  view <http://www.grsecurity.net> and <http://pax.grsecurity.net> as
++	  well as the Hardened Gentoo Primer at
++	  <http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/hardened/primer.xml>.
++
++	  This Hardened Gentoo [server] level is identical to the
++	  Hardened Gentoo [workstation] level, but with the GRKERNSEC_IO,
++	  PAX_KERNEXEC and PAX_NOELFRELOCS security features enabled.
++	  Accordingly, this is the preferred security level if the system will
++	  not be utilizing software incompatible with the aforementioned
++	  grsecurity/PaX features.
++
++	  You may wish to emerge paxctl, a utility which allows you to toggle
++	  PaX features on problematic binaries on an individual basis. Note that
++	  this only works for ELF binaries that contain a PT_PAX_FLAGS header.
++	  Translated, this means that if you wish to toggle PaX features on
++	  binaries provided by applications that are distributed only in binary
++	  format (rather than being built locally from sources), you will need to
++	  run paxctl -C on the binaries beforehand so as to inject the missing
++	  headers.
++
++	  When this level is selected, some options cannot be changed. However,
++	  you may opt to fully customize the options that are selected by
++	  choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu. You may find it helpful
++	  to inherit the options selected by the "Hardened Gentoo [server]"
++	  security level as a starting point for further configuration. To
++	  accomplish this, select this security level then exit the menuconfig
++	  interface, saving changes when prompted. Then, run make menuconfig
++	  again and select the "Custom" level.
++
++	  Note that this security level probably should not be used if the
++	  target system is a 32bit x86 virtualized guest.  If you intend to run
++	  the kernel in a 32bit x86 virtualized guest you will likely need to
++	  disable the PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF option in order to avoid an unacceptable
++	  impact on performance.
++
++config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
++	bool "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]"
++	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++	select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
++	select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++#	select GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++#	select GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
++	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
++	select PAX
++	select PAX_ASLR
++	select PAX_DLRESOLVE if (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	select PAX_EI_PAX
++	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
++	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC || PPC32)
++	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC || PPC32)
++	select PAX_ETEXECRELOCS if (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
++	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
++	select PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF if (X86_32 && !COMPAT_VDSO)
++	select PAX_MPROTECT if (!PPC64)
++	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
++	select PAX_NOEXEC
++	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
++	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
++	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_32 && X86_TSC)
++	select PAX_RANDMMAP
++	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
++	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
++	select PAX_SYSCALL if (PPC32)
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, a configuration will be used that is endorsed by
++	  the Hardened Gentoo project.  Therefore, many of the protections
++	  made available by grsecurity and PaX will be enabled.
++
++	  Hardened Gentoo's pre-defined security levels are designed to provide
++	  a high level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with the
++	  majority of available software.  For further information, please
++	  view <http://www.grsecurity.net> and <http://pax.grsecurity.net> as
++	  well as the Hardened Gentoo Primer at
++	  <http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/hardened/primer.xml>.
++
++	  This Hardened Gentoo [workstation] level is designed for machines
++	  which are intended to run software not compatible with the
++	  GRKERNSEC_IO, PAX_KERNEXEC and PAX_NOELFRELOCS features of grsecurity.
++	  Accordingly, this security level is suitable for use with the X server
++	  "Xorg" and/or any system that will act as host OS to the virtualization
++	  softwares vmware-server or virtualbox.
++
++	  You may wish to emerge paxctl, a utility which allows you to toggle
++	  PaX features on problematic binaries on an individual basis. Note that
++	  this only works for ELF binaries that contain a PT_PAX_FLAGS header.
++	  Translated, this means that if you wish to toggle PaX features on
++	  binaries provided by applications that are distributed only in binary
++	  format (rather than being built locally from sources), you will need to
++	  run paxctl -C on the binaries beforehand so as to inject the missing
++	  headers.
++
++	  When this level is selected, some options cannot be changed. However,
++	  you may opt to fully customize the options that are selected by
++	  choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu. You may find it helpful
++	  to inherit the options selected by the "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]"
++	  security level as a starting point for further configuration. To
++	  accomplish this, select this security level then exit the menuconfig
++	  interface, saving changes when prompted. Then, run make menuconfig
++	  again and select the "Custom" level.
++
++	  Note that this security level probably should not be used if the
++	  target system is a 32bit x86 virtualized guest.  If you intend to run
++	  the kernel in a 32bit x86 virtualized guest you will likely need to
++	  disable the PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF option in order to avoid an unacceptable
++	  impact on performance.
++
+ config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
+ 	bool "Custom"
+ 	help

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4440_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4440_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4440_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+This is a reworked version of the original
+*_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch carried in earlier releases of
+hardened-sources.
+
+Dropping the patch, or simply fixing the #ifdef of the original patch
+could break automated logging setups so this route was necessary.
+
+Suggestions for improving the help text are welcome.
+
+The original patch's description is still accurate and included below.
+
+---
+Provides support for a new field ipaddr within the SELinux
+AVC audit log, relying in task_struct->curr_ip (ipv4 only)
+provided by grSecurity patch to be applied before.
+
+Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@×××.org>
+---
+
+--- a/grsecurity/Kconfig
++++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig
+@@ -1044,6 +1044,27 @@ endmenu
+ menu "Logging Options"
+ depends on GRKERNSEC
+ 
++config GRKERNSEC_SELINUX_AVC_LOG_IPADDR
++	def_bool n
++	prompt "Add source IP address to SELinux AVC log messages"
++	depends on GRKERNSEC && SECURITY_SELINUX
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, a new field "ipaddr=" will be added to many SELinux
++	  AVC log messages.  The value of this field in any given message
++	  represents the source IP address of the remote machine/user that created
++	  the offending process.
++
++	  This information is sourced from task_struct->curr_ip provided by
++	  grsecurity's GRKERNSEC top-level configuration option.  One limitation
++	  is that only IPv4 is supported.
++
++	  In many instances SELinux AVC log messages already log a superior level
++	  of information that also includes source port and destination ip/port.
++	  Additionally, SELinux's AVC log code supports IPv6.
++
++	  However, grsecurity's task_struct->curr_ip will sometimes (often?) 
++	  provide the offender's IP address where stock SELinux logging fails to.
++
+ config GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME
+ 	int "Seconds in between log messages (minimum)"
+ 	default 10
+--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
++++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
+@@ -202,6 +202,11 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_
+ 	char *scontext;
+ 	u32 scontext_len;
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SELINUX_AVC_LOG_IPADDR
++	if (current->signal->curr_ip)
++		audit_log_format(ab, "ipaddr=%u.%u.%u.%u ", NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
++#endif
++
+  	rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+ 	if (rc)
+ 		audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4445_disable-compat_vdso.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4445_disable-compat_vdso.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4445_disable-compat_vdso.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+
+COMPAT_VDSO is inappropriate for any modern Hardened Gentoo system. It
+conflicts with various parts of PaX, crashing the system if enabled
+while PaX's NOEXEC or UDEREF features are active. Moreover, it prevents
+a number of important PaX options from appearing in the configuration
+menu, including all PaX NOEXEC implementations. Unfortunately, the
+reason for the disappearance of these PaX configuration options is
+often far from obvious to inexperienced users.
+
+Therefore, we disable the COMPAT_VDSO menu entry entirely. However,
+COMPAT_VDSO operation can still be enabled via bootparam and sysctl
+interfaces. Consequently, we must also disable the ability to select
+COMPAT_VDSO operation at boot or runtime. Here we patch the kernel so
+that selecting COMPAT_VDSO operation at boot/runtime has no effect if
+conflicting PaX options are enabled, leaving VDSO_ENABLED operation
+intact.
+
+Closes bug: http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210138
+
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+@@ -1215,16 +1215,7 @@ config HOTPLUG_CPU
+ 
+ config COMPAT_VDSO
+ 	def_bool n
+-	prompt "Compat VDSO support"
+ 	depends on (X86_32 || IA32_EMULATION) && !PAX_NOEXEC
+-	help
+-	  Map the 32-bit VDSO to the predictable old-style address too.
+-	---help---
+-	  Say N here if you are running a sufficiently recent glibc
+-	  version (2.3.3 or later), to remove the high-mapped
+-	  VDSO mapping and to exclusively use the randomized VDSO.
+-
+-	  If unsure, say Y.
+ 
+ endmenu
+ 
+--- a/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
+@@ -333,17 +333,21 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct l
+ 
+ 	map_compat_vdso(compat);
+ 
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF)
+ 	if (compat)
+ 		addr = VDSO_HIGH_BASE;
+ 	else {
++#endif
+ 		addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE, 0, MAP_EXECUTABLE);
+ 		if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
+ 			ret = addr;
+ 			goto up_fail;
+ 		}
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (compat_uses_vma || !compat) {
++#endif
+ 		/*
+ 		 * MAYWRITE to allow gdb to COW and set breakpoints
+ 		 *
+@@ -361,7 +365,9 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct l
+ 
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			goto up_fail;
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF)
+ 	}
++#endif
+ 
+ 	current->mm->context.vdso = addr;
+ 	current_thread_info()->sysenter_return =

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4450_pax-remove-read_implies_exec-for-pax-binaries.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4450_pax-remove-read_implies_exec-for-pax-binaries.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4450_pax-remove-read_implies_exec-for-pax-binaries.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Remove READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality for PaX controlled binaries.
+
+This fixes problems that can occur when a binary has neither PT_PAX or
+GNU_STACK ELF program headers on a system without an EI_PAX enabled kernel.
+
+See also: http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2023
+
+Thanks to nixnut <nixnut@g.o> and Kerin Millar <kerframil@×××××.com>
+for bringing it to my attention.
+
+This patch is present in upstream grsecurity patches as of
+pax-linux-2.6.26.3-test19.patch.
+
+--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
++++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+@@ -993,9 +993,10 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
+ 	SET_PERSONALITY(loc->elf_ex, 0);
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
+-	if (current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
++	if (current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
+ 		executable_stack = EXSTACK_DISABLE_X;
+-	else
++		current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
++	} else
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack))

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4455_pax-fix-uvesafb-compile-and-misc.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4455_pax-fix-uvesafb-compile-and-misc.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4455_pax-fix-uvesafb-compile-and-misc.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Fix compilation and miscellaneous other problems in uvesafb.
+
+Fixes bug #245427.
+
+More info @ http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=2016
+
+This patch is present in upstream grsecurity patches as of
+pax-linux-2.6.26-test7.patch.
+
+--- a/drivers/video/uvesafb.c
++++ b/drivers/video/uvesafb.c
+@@ -561,25 +561,25 @@ static int __devinit uvesafb_vbe_getpmi(
+ {
+ 	int i, err;
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
+-	u8 *pmi_code;
+-	unsigned long cr0;
+-#endif
+-
+ 	uvesafb_reset(task);
+ 	task->t.regs.eax = 0x4f0a;
+ 	task->t.regs.ebx = 0x0;
+ 	err = uvesafb_exec(task);
+ 
+-	par->pmi_setpal = par->ypan = 0;
+-	if ((task->t.regs.eax & 0xffff) != 0x4f || task->t.regs.es < 0xc000)
+-		return 0;
++	if ((task->t.regs.eax & 0xffff) != 0x4f || task->t.regs.es < 0xc000) {
++		par->pmi_setpal = par->ypan = 0;
++	} else {
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
+-	pmi_code = module_alloc_exec((u16)task->t.regs.ecx);
+-	if (pmi_code) {
+-#elif !defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
+-	if (1) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
++		unsigned long cr0;
++
++		par->pmi_code = module_alloc_exec((u16)task->t.regs.ecx);
++#endif
++		if (!par->pmi_code) {
++			par->pmi_setpal = par->ypan = 0;
++			return 0;
++		}
+ #endif
+ 
+ 		par->pmi_base = (u16 *)phys_to_virt(((u32)task->t.regs.es << 4)
+@@ -587,18 +587,14 @@ static int __devinit uvesafb_vbe_getpmi(
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
+ 		pax_open_kernel(cr0);
+-		memcpy(pmi_code, par->pmi_base, (u16)task->t.regs.ecx);
++		memcpy(par->pmi_code, par->pmi_base, (u16)task->t.regs.ecx);
+ 		pax_close_kernel(cr0);
+-#else
+-		pmi_code = par->pmi_base;
+-#endif
+-
+-		par->pmi_start = pmi_code + par->pmi_base[1];
+-		par->pmi_pal = pmi_code + par->pmi_base[2];
+ 
+-#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
+-		par->pmi_start = ktva_ktla(par->pmi_start);
+-		par->pmi_pal = ktva_ktla(par->pmi_pal);
++		par->pmi_start = ktva_ktla(par->pmi_code + par->pmi_base[1]);
++		par->pmi_pal = ktva_ktla(par->pmi_code + par->pmi_base[2]);
++#else
++		par->pmi_start = (u8 *)par->pmi_base + par->pmi_base[1];
++		par->pmi_pal = (u8 *)par->pmi_base + par->pmi_base[2];
+ #endif
+ 
+ 		printk(KERN_INFO "uvesafb: protected mode interface info at "
+@@ -1855,6 +1851,11 @@ out:
+ 	if (par->vbe_modes)
+ 		kfree(par->vbe_modes);
+ 
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++	if (par->pmi_code)
++		module_free_exec(NULL, par->pmi_code);
++#endif
++
+ 	framebuffer_release(info);
+ 	return err;
+ }
+@@ -1881,6 +1882,12 @@ static int uvesafb_remove(struct platfor
+ 				kfree(par->vbe_state_orig);
+ 			if (par->vbe_state_saved)
+ 				kfree(par->vbe_state_saved);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
++			if (par->pmi_code)
++				module_free_exec(NULL, par->pmi_code);
++#endif
++
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		framebuffer_release(info);
+--- a/include/video/uvesafb.h
++++ b/include/video/uvesafb.h
+@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct uvesafb_par {
+ 	u8 ypan;			/* 0 - nothing, 1 - ypan, 2 - ywrap */
+ 	u8 pmi_setpal;			/* PMI for palette changes */
+ 	u16 *pmi_base;			/* protected mode interface location */
++	u8 *pmi_code;			/* protected mode code location */
+ 	void *pmi_start;
+ 	void *pmi_pal;
+ 	u8 *vbe_state_orig;		/*

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4460_pax-fix-mmap-BUG_ON-task-size-check.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4460_pax-fix-mmap-BUG_ON-task-size-check.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4460_pax-fix-mmap-BUG_ON-task-size-check.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Fix incorrect vma task size check under SEGMEXEC.
+
+Fixes bug #246607.
+
+Thanks to Hugo Mildenberger for reporting and PaX Team for the fix.
+
+This patch is present in upstream grsecurity patches as of
+pax-linux-2.6.27.7-test22.patch.
+
+--- a/mm/mmap.c
++++ b/mm/mmap.c
+@@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *pax_find_mirror_v
+ 		BUG_ON(vma->vm_mirror);
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+-	BUG_ON(vma->vm_end - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1 < vma->vm_start - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1);
++	BUG_ON(vma->vm_start < SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE && SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE < vma->vm_end);
+ 	vma_m = vma->vm_mirror;
+ 	BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_mirror != vma);
+ 	BUG_ON(vma->vm_file != vma_m->vm_file);

Added: hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4465_pax-fix-false-RLIMIT_STACK-warnings.patch
===================================================================
--- hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4465_pax-fix-false-RLIMIT_STACK-warnings.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ hardened/2.6/tags/2.6.25-13/4465_pax-fix-false-RLIMIT_STACK-warnings.patch	2009-01-20 21:27:53 UTC (rev 1478)
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From: Gordon Malm <gengor@g.o>
+
+Fix false-positive RLIMIT_STACK warnings.
+
+Thanks to PaX Team for the heads up.
+
+This patch is present in upstream grsecurity patches as of
+pax-linux-2.6.27.7-test22.patch.
+
+--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+@@ -840,16 +840,14 @@ not_pax_fault:
+ 		goto good_area;
+ 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
+ 		goto bad_area;
+-	if (error_code & PF_USER) {
+-		/*
+-		 * Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug.
+-		 * The large cushion allows instructions like enter
+-		 * and pusha to work.  ("enter $65535,$31" pushes
+-		 * 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.)
+-		 */
+-		if (address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)
+-			goto bad_area;
+-	}
++	/*
++	 * Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug.
++	 * The large cushion allows instructions like enter
++	 * and pusha to work.  ("enter $65535,$31" pushes
++	 * 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.)
++	 */
++	if (address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)
++		goto bad_area;
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
+ 	if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && vma->vm_end - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1 < address - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE - 1)
+--- a/kernel/exit.c
++++ b/kernel/exit.c
+@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
+ #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+ #include <linux/mutex.h>
+ #include <linux/futex.h>
+-#include <linux/compat.h>
+ #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h> /* for audit_free() */
+ #include <linux/resource.h>
+@@ -974,14 +973,6 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
+ 		exit_itimers(tsk->signal);
+ 	}
+ 	acct_collect(code, group_dead);
+-#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
+-	if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list))
+-		exit_robust_list(tsk);
+-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+-	if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list))
+-		compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
+-#endif
+-#endif
+ 	if (group_dead)
+ 		tty_audit_exit();
+ 	if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
+--- a/kernel/fork.c
++++ b/kernel/fork.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+ #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+ #include <linux/futex.h>
++#include <linux/compat.h>
+ #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
+ #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+@@ -491,6 +492,16 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ {
+ 	struct completion *vfork_done = tsk->vfork_done;
+ 
++	/* Get rid of any futexes when releasing the mm */
++#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
++	if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list))
++		exit_robust_list(tsk);
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++	if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list))
++		compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Get rid of any cached register state */
+ 	deactivate_mm(tsk, mm);
+ 
\ No newline at end of file