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Lindsay Haisley <fmouse-gentoo@×××.com> posted |
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1192831388.10036.7.camel@××××××××××.com, excerpted below, on Fri, 19 Oct |
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2007 17:03:08 -0500: |
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|
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> I researched this, and solved the problem. The correct solution was |
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> posted at |
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> http://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/slackware-14/12.0-and-hal-read- |
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this-566862/ |
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> |
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> Basically, I had to do 2 things: |
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> |
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> 1. Add myself to the group plugdev in /etc/group 2. Reload the Dbus |
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> config with /etc/init.d/dbus reload |
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> |
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> It would be a Good Thing if new local accounts could be added to group |
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> plugdev when they're created. |
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|
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Adding users you wish to have this access to the plugdev group is indeed |
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the correct solution, and indeed, mentioned in the log messages for the |
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hal package when you merge it. Check your portage messages log, or see |
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the elog at the end of the hal ebuilds if necessary. So the instructions |
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were there for you to read if you wanted to. |
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|
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However, security-wise, you've hit a bit of a raw nerve here, so excuse |
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me while I rant a bit... |
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It would *NOT* be a "Good Thing" (r), and in fact, would be a very "Bad |
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Thing" (r) to do this automatically when new users are created, as that |
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kills important aspects of the Unix/Linux security model, the entire |
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reason the generic "users" group isn't used in the first place. There |
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are good reasons sysadmins may not WANT every user to have automount |
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rights, and it's already possible to expand your newuser scripts locally |
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to automatically add a user to various groups, if you as sysadmin decide |
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that's what you want to do. |
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Among other possible security issues is the fact that it's not always |
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possible to cleanly give a user the rights necessary to mount a volume, |
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without also giving them generically the rights to overwrite system |
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devices, and if you have potentially malicious users, or even simply |
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naive "innocent" users that don't understand security and don't see any |
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reason why they should /have/ to understand it, clicking on anything that |
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comes their way... With what you're advocating, why not do away with |
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logins and have everybody run as root, thereby avoiding the permissions |
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problem entirely? After all, MS did effectively that for years with the |
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their 9x series, and we all know how problem free /that/ was. |
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|
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So... please think before you make requests for automating procedures |
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that effectively automate the creation of security holes. If you want |
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platforms that do such things, they are available; no need to make Gentoo |
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into one of them by default. |
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|
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-- |
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Duncan - List replies preferred. No HTML msgs. |
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"Every nonfree program has a lord, a master -- |
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and if you use the program, he is your master." Richard Stallman |
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|
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-- |
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