Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: Kent Fredric <kentfredric@×××××.com>
To: gentoo-dev <gentoo-dev@l.g.o>
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: rsync mirror security
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 03:20:25
Message-Id: CAATnKFAMxOtAJO2hZRwLWazu1e=Qwy4v1UE5nn9eAzt4YPvP9g@mail.gmail.com
In Reply to: [gentoo-dev] Re: rsync mirror security by Matthias Maier
1 On 11 August 2015 at 09:05, Matthias Maier <tamiko@g.o> wrote:
2 > We could also provide automatic signed tags every 30min/1h/2h/whatever
3 > (signed with a suitable infrastructure key). With that, the integrity of
4 > a tagged git checkout can be easily verified on client side.
5
6
7 I'm distinctly under the impression that a signed tag doesn't really
8 give you anything a signed commit wouldn't.
9
10 That is, I was under the impression signing a tag only signs the
11 references themselves, and then relies on SHA1 referential integrity
12 beyond that.
13
14
15 Hence, a signed tag basically is a statement proving X author
16 authorized Y-SHA1, and then it subsequently implies that X author
17 authorized whatever Y-SHA1 refers to.
18
19 So adding additional tags *just* for the purpose of having a periodic
20 signature would give no benefit over the "all tags are signed, all
21 commits are signed" mechanism for git users, and the signed tag could
22 _not_ be verified against an RSYNC clone.
23
24 --
25 Kent
26
27 KENTNL - https://metacpan.org/author/KENTNL

Replies

Subject Author
Re: [gentoo-dev] Re: rsync mirror security Matthias Maier <tamiko@g.o>