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On Sun, 2021-07-25 at 01:12 +0200, Thomas Deutschmann wrote: |
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> Hi, |
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> |
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> I don't understand. Isn't it the same motion we put down just 2 months |
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> ago [1]? Or is this something new? |
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> |
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> If this isn't something new, what has changed since May [2]? |
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Apparently it has not been 'put down' because it came back via open |
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bugs. |
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> To remember: Currently we have two different hashes for every distfile. |
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> If we are going to throw this data away, we should really have good |
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> reasons to do that. Like said during that council meeting, BLAKE2B and |
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> SHA512 are competing hashes. What's wrong with having a backup plan even |
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> for a very unlikely scenario, that BLAKE2B will get broken? |
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Define 'broken'. |
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> It's not like SHA512 is requiring any additional deps which are |
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> unmaintained or something like that. SHA has even hardware acceleration |
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> support in modern systems. |
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...which is entirely irrelevant given that both hashes need to be |
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calculated. (SHA512 + BLAKE2B) can be as fast as the slower of two |
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in the best scenario. |
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> In addition it is even more likely that you will find SHA checksum files |
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> with upstream release tarballs than BLAKE2B files. |
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Again, I don't see how that's even remotely relevant. |
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> Remember that verify-sig.eclass I criticized last year? Of course some |
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> scenarios I outlined were very unlikely and I never expected that I can |
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> run around in near future saying "I told you". But in January 2021, |
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> CVE-2021-3345 happened in libgcrypt... |
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I don't see how this is relevant either. Are you admitting that you're |
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criticizing all my ideas because I just happen to propose them? |
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |
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