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Daniel Drake wrote: |
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> Alec Warner wrote: |
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>> This is to prevent people from sticking a random unchecksum'd ebuild |
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>> in your tree and then having portage source it for depend() metadata |
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>> and then getting bitten by some global scope nasties. |
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> |
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> Is this really the correct solution to this "problem"? |
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> |
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> I can't see the use case: do people really download (potentially |
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> malicious) ebuilds, stick them in their overlay, and then *not* use them? |
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> |
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> Somehow I don't think that's true - people will generally download |
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> ebuilds, and use them (even if they fail during compilation, they will |
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> have been used in some form). |
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> |
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> If you start requiring people to create Manifests for these ebuilds, |
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> they will do so, and this has not changed the security implications of |
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> these "untrusted" ebuilds. |
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> |
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> Am I missing something? |
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> |
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> Daniel |
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|
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The plan is to eventually include digital signature verification |
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together with the Manifest verification. The framework isn't |
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completely implemented yet, but we're beginning to put some of the |
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required mechanisms into place. |
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|
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Considering that repoman users generally have complete trust in |
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their cvs checkout, I suppose it would make sense to allow repoman |
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features to be configured separately. For example, we could allow |
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you to set REPOMAN_FEATURES="-strict" in make.conf so that you won't |
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be bothered by broken Manifests when running repoman. |
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|
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Zac |
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