[gentoo-dev] Re: Improve the security of the default profile

[Ryan Hill]

On Sat, 07 Sep 2013 19:08:57 -0400
"Rick \"Zero_Chaos\" Farina" <zerochaos@g.o> wrote:

> Personally I think this would be a great stepping stone.  If we add
> - -fstack-protector to 4.8.1 it will improve security (only a little I
> know) and give us an idea of what issues we may have.  After a short
> enjoyment of fixing any issues which come up we could more to
> - -fstack-protector-strong in 4.9.

Okay it won't be available for 4.8.1.  It's going to require a couple minor
glibc changes and a lot of testing.  A bunch of packages stick workarounds
behind a hardened USE flag or do things like `filter-flags -fstack-protector`
which don't actually work (we have to patch the compiler, not just add it to
the default flags in the profiles or something).  I need to check the
interactions with hardened's spec files.  And I need to get 4.8.1 out the door
two weeks ago. Once we fix the fallout from the unmasking I'll get back to this.

I also want to make a comment on the implications of this change that people
may not have considered.  Bugs caused by -fstack-protector can no longer be
just dismissed as unsupported, invalid, or assigned to the hardened team and
forgotten about.  You will be expected to fix them, and `append-flags
-fno-stack-protector` is not an acceptable fix.  You can't champion for more
secure defaults and then just disable them when they get in your way.

So does anyone have any objections to making -fstack-protector the default?
Now is the time to speak up.



(and for the record I've changed my mind and would like to see this go forward,
so please stop emailing me)


-- 
Ryan Hill                        psn: dirtyepic_sk
   gcc-porting/toolchain/wxwidgets @ gentoo.org

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