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On Sat, 15 Aug 2015 09:53:37 +0200 Michał Górny wrote: |
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> Dnia 2015-08-15, o godz. 10:50:02 |
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> Andrew Savchenko <bircoph@g.o> napisał(a): |
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> |
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> > Hi, |
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> > |
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> > On Fri, 14 Aug 2015 10:54:57 -0400 Rich Freeman wrote: |
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> > > On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Kristian Fiskerstrand <k_f@g.o> wrote: |
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> > > > They will be OpenPGP signed by a releng key during thickening and |
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> > > > portage will auto-verify it using gkeys once things are in place. As |
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> > > > such checksum for ebuilds and other files certainly needs to be part |
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> > > > of the manifest, otherwise it can open up for malicious alterations of |
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> > > > these files. |
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> > > > |
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> > > |
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> > > As much as I'd love to see it all folded into git, the reality is also |
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> > > that git signatures are only bound to files by a series of sha1 |
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> > > hashes, and sha1 is not a strong hash function. Git really ought to |
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> > > move to sha256 at some point, preferably in a manner that makes it |
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> > > expandable in the future to other hash functions. But, this isn't a |
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> > > high-priority for upstream. |
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> > > |
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> > > The same limitation is true of any git gpg signature, including tag |
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> > > signatures. It is all held together by sha1. The manifest system is |
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> > > much stronger. |
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> > |
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> > OK, if manifests are that important, why not generate full manifest |
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> > during repoman commit? If we do not tamper with $Id$, the only file |
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> > outside of this manifest will be ChangeLog generated during rsync |
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> > propagation. Then we have following options: |
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> > - do not sing ChangeLog: even if it will be tampered, little harm |
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> > can be done, since it doesn't affect live system or build process; |
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> > - sign ChangeLog with releng key; |
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> > - sign developer-signed manifest + ChangeLog with releng key. Thus |
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> > we'll have double signature for most important files. |
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> |
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> How about we switch back to CVS if we're going to kill git anyway? It'd |
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> at least save our time wasted by these pointless discussions. |
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|
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I don't understand your point. Please explain. |
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|
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I see nobody here talking about killing git. I see people concerned |
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that git is not cryptographically secure enough, thus looking for |
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gpg-signed manifests or other solutions. |
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|
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Best regards, |
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Andrew Savchenko |
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