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Rich Freeman: |
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> On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 6:56 PM, hasufell <hasufell@g.o> wrote: |
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>> According to Robin, it's not about rebasing, it's about signing all |
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>> commits so that messing with the blob (even if it has the same sha-1) |
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>> will cause signature verification failure. |
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>> |
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> |
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> The only thing that gets signed is the commit message, and the only |
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> thing that ties the commit message to the code is the sha1 of the |
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> top-level tree. If you can attack sha1 either at any tree level or at |
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> the blob level you can defeat the signature. |
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> |
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So can we get this clear now. |
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Robin said |
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> The Git commit-signing design explicitly signs the entire commit, including blob contents, to avoid this security problem. |
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Is this correct or not? |
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