Gentoo Archives: gentoo-dev

From: "William L. Thomson Jr." <wlt-ml@××××××.com>
To: gentoo-dev@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-dev] Prevent binary/non-compiled packages from binary package creation
Date: Wed, 09 Aug 2017 20:36:08
Message-Id: assp.0394db8eb2.20170809163556.337cb4a5@o-sinc.com
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-dev] Prevent binary/non-compiled packages from binary package creation by Francesco Riosa
1 On Wed, 9 Aug 2017 22:23:41 +0200
2 Francesco Riosa <vivo75@×××××.com> wrote:
3
4 > 2017-08-09 17:33 GMT+02:00 William L. Thomson Jr. <wlt-ml@××××××.com>:
5 >
6 > > On Wed, 9 Aug 2017 11:07:04 +1000
7 > > "Sam Jorna (wraeth)" <wraeth@g.o> wrote:
8 > >
9 > > > > What then is the benefit? If what is installed is the same from
10 > > > > package manager or binpkg. Also your redistributing another's
11 > > > > package in binary format which may not be legally allowed.
12 > > >
13 > > > The difference is that how the package manager/ebuild installs the
14 > > > package may be better suited to the environment than what upstream
15 > > > expects (such as upstreams that install through a .run file)
16 > >
17 > > I fail to see how basically skipping src_install and maybe some
18 > > prepare stuff that makes it better suited to an environment.
19 > > Can you explain that further?
20 > >
21 > > These packages are just exploded tarballs. I fail to see the benefit
22 > > to repacking those into another tarball to be exploded. At best
23 > > skipping src_install and/or prepare, seems to be the only
24 > > difference.
25 > >
26 > one such benefit is that the binhost is known and managed by someone
27 > you trust, SRC_URI point to the wider and dangerous internet.
28
29 Interesting argument, saying upstreams cannot be trusted. Nor Gentoo
30 with its manifests and hashes of the files referenced in SRC_URI. Given
31 that most will come from Gentoo mirrors not upstream servers. Ignoring
32 that the binhost has to use these SRC_URI's just the same. It makes
33 sense in very strange way.
34
35 FYI binpkgs have no hash. If someone did something malicious within the
36 binhost to the binpkgs. You have no way of knowing. Yes the same can
37 happen with ebuilds and manifest. But easy to sync portage and see if a
38 manifest has changed.
39
40 Therefore relying on binhost as means of security is possible but odd,
41 as it leaves things open to potentially larger issues.
42
43 > So please leave this as a configurable choice.
44
45 For some things configurable would make sense. For things like fetch
46 restricted, it would not. Since it is not legal to mirror that stuff to
47 begin with. It surely is not to re-package.
48
49 --
50 William L. Thomson Jr.

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