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On 03/14/2013 09:01 PM, Robin H. Johnson wrote: |
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> On Thu, Mar 14, 2013 at 05:14:15PM +0100, Michał Górny wrote: |
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>> If that means doing an additional signature every time something is |
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>> going to be committed, that sounds like an overkill. If we were to do |
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>> something radical, I'd rather be in favor of disabling keyword |
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>> expansion completely and finally being able to do sane commits. |
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> I foresee it as more of: |
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> IFF this commit will call GPG later, ensure the agent can access the |
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> secret key BEFORE trying to sign at the end. |
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> |
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> As to how to accomplish this, it's either a throwaway sig, or poking the |
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> agent protocol directly. |
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> |
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The only trouble with that is if the agent is configured to only unlock |
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keys for limited periods of time, then your initial check might catch |
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the agent when the key is still unlocked, but your subsequent call to |
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GPG comes after the timeout. I ran into this while trying to set up |
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automated signing of debian packages I was building. |
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All it really means, in a practical procedural sense, is that you need |
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to allow yourself a way to roll back anything you've been doing if that |
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later check fails. |
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